



## **February 15, 1963**

### **Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow)**

#### **Citation:**

“Secret Telegram from Rapacki (Warsaw) to Jaszczuk (Moscow),” February 15, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-603, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45.  
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118913>

#### **Summary:**

Cable from Adam Rapacki to Boleslaw Jaszczuk in Moscow describing to him a conversation between Polish and the North Vietnamese officials in Warsaw.

#### **Credits:**

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#### **Original Language:**

Polish

#### **Contents:**

- English Translation

Ciphergram

Secret

Warsaw, 15 February, 1963

1689 15.II.63 at 12:10 hours

**MOSCOW-JASZCZUK**

Your conversations with Gromyko and Andropov:

We [Poles] hope that it is clear to them [Soviets] that:

1) We did not insinuate anything to the [North] Vietnamese, except only to make them aware that the matter [was] important, even though we rejected the first American proposition;<sup>[1]</sup>

2) We were careful all the more since [the North Vietnamese] Ambassador [in Warsaw Tran Chi Hien] immediately accentuated, with his entire honesty, the differences of the views within the Party;<sup>[2]</sup>

We limited ourselves to taking notes, asking his position and listening to his long arguments, which we considered "symptomatic, but not conclusive."

[Deciphered on] 15.II.63 at 13:00 hours

/-/ Rapacki

[1] It is not clear what American proposition Rapacki refers to here.

[2] It is not clear what Rapacki refers to here, but, most likely, the allusion is to differences over the Sino- Soviet split and the advisability of pursuing an armed struggle even at the risk of an escalated conflict with

the Americans.