May 29, 1963
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7237]

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Summary:
Cable from a Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, detailing talks with Vietnamese officials and the Soviet ambassador. They discuss the investigations of the ICC, and the importance of probes into the Vietnamese situation. The Soviet ambassador notes that Soviet-Vietnamese relations have shifted.

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- English Translation
Secret

Ciphergram No. 7237

From…Saigon……dispatched on 29.5.63 at 6:50 hours……..received 30.5.63 at 9:50 hours……

Came in to the Decoding Department…30.5.63 at 14:00 hours………………………………….

Spasowski

FYI: Trojanowski, Thee, Chodorek

I am passing on, in a summarized form, a report from the talks with Premier [Pham Van Dong], with the current [Xuan Thuy] and previous [Ung Van Khiem] Minister of Foreign Affairs, [and Soviet] Ambassador [Suren] Tovmassian. I will discuss separately the contacts with the Chinese ambassador. The Poles were welcomed with a special kindness.

1. The need for further compliance with the principles of not activating the [work of the International Supervisory and Control] Commission was acknowledged. However, due to tactical considerations, we should establish, from time to time, our points even if we were to do so without carrying them out until the end. For example, this is how we are to take care of the matter of the American intervention and the reactivation of the

Mixed Commission.

2. Everyone is very pleased with the way we are carrying out the matter of chemical weapons within the Commission. The reasons for this positive assessment:

The possibility exists of utilizing the letter of the Commission for propaganda- political matters.

The partners [Canadian and Indian delegates to the ICC] found themselves in a very uncomfortable situation; they are delaying the matter under the embarrassing pretext of waiting for a legal decision from New Delhi and Ottawa. We strengthened our position towards them since to their accusations of sabotage we have two [counterpoints]: the American intervention and chemical warfare.

It will be more difficult for the partners to look into the matters which are convenient to them since given such a fundamental [matter] they could not agree. We are to bring up this matter from time to time.

3. Everyone considers our task of conducting political probes regarding all Vietnamese matters as particularly important and perhaps most urgent [at this time]. We were reminded of the great usefulness of the probes conducted by Ambassador [Leonard?] Pohoryles, and especially given the new situation we should, all the more, show activity and quickly provide information. They are expecting that due to the crisis in American politics, more and more people from the diplomatic corps and from the South government will be seeking contacts with us. Premier [Pham Van Dong] and the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Xuan Thuy] presented to us what they wanted us to emphasize during the contacts. The Chinese ambassador was particularly in favor of expanding probes; Ambassador Tovmassian underlined the significance of our information due to changes in Soviet-Vietnamese relations. There are matters which were dispatched to Saigon and to the West without informing the Soviet comrades.

4. I emphasized that I would pass on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all new elements regarding the policy and the tasks in order to receive instructions.

5. I will discuss further issues in the next cable.

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Ung Van Khiem, labeled as a revisionist and pro-Soviet by the North Vietnamese leadership, was replaced by Xuan Thuy on April 30, 1963 as DRV’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.