November 08, 1957
CDS Report No. 62 from Choi Duk Shin to the President
(Syngman Rhee)

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Summary:
Choi Duk Shin announces the denial of South Korea's admittance into the Colombo Plan, offers his
opinions on the threat of Red China's interference in Asia, and reports on major events in South
Vietnam.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CBS REPORT NO. 062

Excellency,

I have the honour to submit the Weekly Report No. 062 which is covering the following subjects:

1. Receipt of Instructions
2. My Views on Present Situation
3. Forthcoming Visit of Two Hungarian Freedom Fighters to our Country

1. Receipt of Instructions

In this week's pouch, I have received Your Excellency's instructions No. 95 and No. 96 both dated October 30, together with several informational data.

As I reported in my previous report, I have sent a letter to the President of Vietnam through the Foreign Minister last week to express our profound sympathy on the stampede at the Cultural Exhibition Fair. I also have already expressed deep shock and concerns over the bombing incidents recently happened in this capital of Vietnam to the American Ambassador and General Williams, Chief of MAAG at a reception.

As for Vietnam's hope to be seated in the FAO council, I have reported to our Foreign Minister and I believe that the copy of the said report has reached Your Excellency's Office.

I am deeply honoured to have Your Excellency's particular concerns over several problems.
For joining the Colombo Plan organization, it is to my great regret that our effort had been failed this year and I myself feel a part of responsibility in this regard. I am confident that we should exert our continuing efforts to bring about successful conclusions.

As for the Cultural Exhibition, I feel rather relieved at this moment that we did not participate in the present Cultural Exhibition Fair. Only the United States and Indonesia have joined Vietnam in the Fair this year. It is apparent that other countries had not enough time to prepare for participation in the events. In my frank observation, the materials in display are somehow inferior in quantity and quality in comparison with other international fairs.

I attach herewith a few photos on the Cultural Exhibition Fair in Saigon for Your Excellency's reference.

My suggestion for introduction of Korean cultural treasures to this part of the world is that we will be able to bring here the materials now under display in the United States on the way back to home. If all necessary arrangements will be done properly, this means will be one of the best, since no other preparation except for displaying itself is required. And further there are bright hope that our cultural greatness will be shown not only in Vietnam but other neighboring countries in this area.

I am quite sure this attempt will tremendously contribute to bring about better understanding about our country among peoples in this part of the world.

As for the Ceylonese attitude at the United Nations debate, I am deeply shocked and at the same time
ashamed at such unfriendly manners in attacking our country.

I have carefully read the copy of Minister Han's report which Your Excellency sent to me in this week's pouch and I must feel some of responsibility on this matter, but please be assured that my recent trip to Ceylon has never brought at least any worsening relations with our country. As I reported in my Special Report No. 8 "Trip to Ceylon," the hospitality which was shown by Ceylonese officials during my visit was very good, and I am so confident that there must be no room of untruth in my report at all.

In fact, I have to report to Your Excellency on the recent situation of that country. When I visited Ceylon last April, there were vanguards of diplomatic mission of Soviet Russia in Colombo, the capital of Ceylon, and at the present time Soviet Russia sent her Ambassador and probably so was Red China.

It is apparent that Ceylon has been confronting tremendous diplomatic offensive from the Communists and at the same time remarkable pressure from neighboring neutralist India. As "Time" magazine pointed out, Britain is withdrawing her influence and the United States is not so popular in that country, quite contrary to the advance of the Communists.

As American press is warning and moreover the Agriculture Minister of that country is declaring, "Ceylon will be all left within the next five years." This situation is most deplorable.

During my stay in Colombo, I have met about ten persons, as was arranged by the protocol officer of Ceylonese Government. And I think the protocol officer arranged for
me only to meet with those who are not really belonging to
the camp of the Reds.

I wish to take immediate actions to write letters
to those whom I have been maintaining acquaintances with and
to express our deep shock on their most unfriendly attitude
toward us at the U.N. debate on Korean question.

2. My Views on Present Situation

As it was known to me, two greatest tasks which
we are facing now are the national unification and struggle
against Japan's expansion toward Southeast Asia. And I am
really confident that the unification of our nation will not
be able to accomplish without complete destruction of Red
China, our closest enemy and biggest threats on our national
security. At the same time we cannot stop the growing
expansion of Japan's aggressive designs in this part of the
world without close cooperation of Asian countries.

I wish to elaborate my views on the present
situation together with few of my humble suggestions as
follows:

a. Our Unification and Red China

In my views there must be three main formulae
to achieve our national unification and to bring complete
destruction of Red China, and these are:

(i) Using military might
(ii) Using moral pressure of the United Nations
(iii) To wait until Red China's self-destruction

(i). Using Military Might

It would appear that this means will be still
the most effective to get Chinese Communists out of our soil.
However, this time it should not be limited to Korean soil, but we should insist on opening a second front in the mainland of China. Each time that there is a discussion of Nationalist China's forces, the Nationalist Chinese leaders are happy to say "send troops to Korea". Several times I have told them frankly that the effective way to utilize the Nationalist Chinese troops is to open a second front on the mainland of China. The reinforcement of Chinese forces in Korea only creates some more complicated situation and could not help the situation in the least. We should let the leaders of Nationalist China feel that to fight the Chinese Communists is their obligation and duty; we have the right to ask them to take care of China's Reds by opening the front in the mainland.

As I see the situation in China:

(a) There is no doubt as to the will and determination of Nationalist Chinese to recover their mainland of China, the only question is that "when" will be the most "golden opportunity".

In a recent statement, President Chiang Kai-Shek of China declared that next two or three years will be the chance to take positive actions to recovery of Chinese mainland.

(b) Current Red China's "rectification campaign" showed the world that the Red regime is having troubles from the intellectual class. There are definite growing signs of the distrust between the Communist leaders and the kidnapped or surrendered leaders of non-Communism.

(c) The living standard of the Chinese mass is excessively low, and this might become the great source of discontent of Chinese people.
The chance to win back the mainland at the present moment is greater than ever before.

In view of the above analysis of the situation on China I feel the time is ripe to have closer contact and coordination with Nationalist China's political and military authorities. It is advisable that our Government will
(a) assure the Chinese that we will assist and cooperate with them in any way possible in the task of recovering their mainland;
(b) set up a system of constant coordination between Korea and China in the fight against Red China.

Since it is difficult to persuade our American friends to reopen the right war at the right place, we should try our best to persuade the Chinese to do their part as soon as possible.

I recall Your Excellency proposed this strategy to Nationalist China in 1953 and made it to the U.S. Congress in 1954. Now is the time to materialize it.

(44) Using moral pressure of the United Nations
Needless to say that the U.N. is bound to fulfill its obligation for "Unification of Korea". As we repeatedly pointed out, the only obstacle in the way of achievement of Korean unification is the existence of Chinese Communists in our territory.

While we are seeking every opportunity to achieve our great goal of recovering our lost territory of our northern part, it is still worthwhile to demand the U.N. to fulfill its sacred obligation on this vital problem.

Beside the efforts for our admission to U.N.,
there must be strong move once again to condemn Red China as an aggressor as the U.N. had demonstrated its firm determination in condemning Soviet Russia for her barbarious actions in Hungary. This task should begin its strenuous campaign from the current U.N. General Assembly meeting, and there must be some sort of concrete resolution which should greatly strike Red China on the moral aspect for her inhuman aggression.

(iii) To wait until Communists' self-destruction

Your Excellency pointed out that President Eisenhower's peace-at-any-cost policy will eventually destroy America. And I feel there are quite few statesmen of the Free World who are wishfully thinking of the self-destruction of the Communists which I myself think is next to impossible.

Mr. Dulles was said to decide to oppose to any action which might help to raise Red China's prestige in Asia in one hand and to advise Free China not to invade and recover Chinese mainland on the other hand. And he also oppose to reopen the fighting in our country. Thus Mr. Dulles has meant to oppose to people to fight for justice.

It is most unfortunate that the U.S. Government maintains this pitiful position. I am so certain that we have to work harder in Washington to get American leaders realize that we ought to take positive, preventive measures before it becomes too late. To convince American leaders on the danger of world communism is the most urgent and important task of our diplomacy in Washington.

b. To Prevent Japan's Expansion to Southeast Asia.

Japan's expansionism is increasingly posing
great threats to all the peoples in this part of the world. Although we have generally many allies to counter Communists' aggressive designs with collective efforts, we have only a very few real friends to fight against Japan's ambition. The big powers are encouraging Japan nowadays and are advising the newly-born countries in this area to cooperate with the Japanese.

I fully understand the grave responsibility and vitally-important mission which Your Excellency charge to me, but frankly I have to admit that my ability and capacity are so limited to accomplish all of them.

It is crystal-clear that the Japanese well know our strong counter-measure against their ambitious plans of expansionism, and that, therefore, they are trying to make every possible effort to isolate us from international focus. In order to counter positively the Japanese move, the following ways of actions are urgently suggested:

1) Expansion of diplomatic activities in this area without bringing any affect to the present personnel and budgetary situation.

In considering the present situation, both personnel and budgetary, I believe that all the members in foreign service should devote their redoubled efforts for nation's prosperity and security. I am fully aware of our budgetary situation, particularly foreign exchange problem.

In consideration of the above-mentioned difficulties, the following methods are thinkable:

(a) Envoy will be accredited to several posts. For instance, the Minister to the Philippines will be able to be accredited to Australia and New Zealand; the Minister
to Vietnam to be accredited to Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, if necessary.

(b) Semi-official accreditation.

To those countries which we have not officially recognized, our Government can accredit semi-officially an Envoy now stationing in the same area. For instance, the Minister to Vietnam will be accredited to Laos, Cambodia and, or to Burma. Also the Minister to the Philippines can be accredited to Indonesia.

(c) In order to maintain at least the same prestige with envoys from Japan and other neutrals, the rank of the Envoy must be raised. All the Japanese envoys in this area are in the Ambassadorial rank. The ranks of individual envoys not only comfort the individual envoys involved in many occasions but affect the nation's prestige very greatly.

May Your Excellency be assured that there is no personal ambition and personal favor or disfavor to anybody in making the above suggestion. From my conscience and best judgment, I have mentioned in detail my views for Your Excellency's high consideration.

Through the above-mentioned few changes, we surely can obtain the following benefits:

One, As often as the situation requires, the envoy can make trip in accredited status to those countries where we do not have permanent representative.

Two, The way of accrediting one envoy to several friendly nations does not require any increase of personnel or budgetary expenditure. The envoy need only airfare and travelling expenses. Even in case that the envoy cannot make the trip, he still can communicate with the Governments to
which he was accredited through mail in the official status.

Beside the expansion of our diplomatic activities in this area, I wish to refer to our diplomacy as follows:

(b) To contact with home Government rather than to delegates to international conference.

If we want to get approval of our proposals or ideas from certain nations, it is better to contact with the home government rather than to the delegates at conference site.

We often feel that the delegates at conference are hardly expected to change their position and attitude without approval of their respective government at home. Naturally it takes time and is quite difficult to convince their government in order to change the decision already made.

It is really true that the delegates often are not enthusiastic in conveying our proposals or ideas to their home Government. Even if they will do so, they are reluctant.

The fastest and surest way is to contact with the Government concerned directly. This can be done by assigning the envoy to nearby country or by dispatching a special envoy. It will be further easily done if we have wide-spread diplomatic networks.

3. Forthcoming Visit of Two Hungarian Freedom Fighters to our Country.

I am happy to report to Your Excellency on the forthcoming trip to Korea of two Hungarian freedom-fighters who are now staying in this capital of Vietnam.

I have been in touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the same time with the Asian Peoples'
Anti-Communist League for arrangement of their trip. They wished to have our help and assistance in obtaining the round trip expenses of certain airlines between Seoul and Hongkong, and sojourn fees during their stay in Seoul.

The two Hungarians had participated in the Hungarian Revolution as members of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council. They escaped to the Free World in December 1956.

The Foreign Ministry sent me the cable on November 2 stating that the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League will invite them for a two-week stay in Seoul. So, they are expected to leave here for Seoul next week.

4. Major Events in Vietnam

a. The President Attended Requiem Mass

The President of Vietnam attended on November 2 a one-hour requiem mass for the combatants falling on the battlefields. The religious service was held at the Saigon Cathedral early in the morning.

Also present were many Government officials including the Vice-President and the diplomatic corps. I joined this solemn event with my colleagues.

b. The President's Visit to India

At the invitation of the Indian Government, President Ngo Dinh Diem left Saigon on November 4 for New-Delhi aboard an Air Vietnam plane for a five-day state visit to India.

This is the fifth state visit he has made this year, next to those paid to the United States, Thailand, Australia and the Republic of Korea.

The diplomatic corps was widely represented with its dean, Thailand's Ambassador. I was also at the
airport to say "bon voyage" to the President.

The President was reportedly greeted on arrival by Indian President Prasad and Prime Minister Nehru.

I attach all the data on President Ngo's visit to India to this report for Your Excellency's reference.

With sentiments of deepest loyalty and highest esteem,

Respectfully,

Choi Duk Shin
Minister to Vietnam

His Excellency
The President
Republic of Korea

Attachments: 1. Photos on Cultural Exhibition Fair in Saigon
2. Data on President Ngo Dinh Diem's state visit to India.

Copy: Minister of Foreign Affairs