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Digital Archive International History Declassified

September, 1972


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    Treaties Bureau Chief Takashima explained the Japanese delegation's proposal which includes the issue of the end to the state of war and Taiwan to China.
    "Explanation for China regarding the Japanese Delegation’s Proposal for the Japan-China Joint Declaration," September, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2001-42, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Obtained by Yutaka Kanda and translated by Ryo C. Kato.
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Meeting Foreign Minister Ohira [Masayoshi] – Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei (Records)

(1972 September 26th ~ 27th)

- Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization Negotiations Record -

Asia Bureau, China Section


(Note: The following record was typed in May 1978 from the original normalization negotiation records)


Enclosure 1

Explanation for China regarding the Japanese Delegation’s Proposal for the Japan-China Joint Declaration

(Notice) The following is the text read aloud by Treaties Bureau Chief Takashima during the first foreign ministerial meeting held on September 26th. Refer to Enclosure 1 for the Japanese proposal and Enclosure 2 for the Chinese outline.

The Japan-China Joint Declaration on the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China was prepared by Japan based on the document, “Outline Proposal for the Japan-China Joint Declaration,” that was confidentially provided to us on a previous occasion. This draft emphasizes the viewpoints of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and also reflects the standpoint of the Government of Japan on important issues. Through contrast and comparison with the “Outline” provided by the China, the following will explain Japan’s draft joint declaration and Japan’s positions regarding each of the clauses.

First – Similarly to China’s “Outline,” Clause 1 will raise the issue regarding the end to the state of war between Japan and China. There are two differences with the “Outline” are that both the Governments of Japan and China affirm the end to the state of war, and that the timing of the end to the state of war is not made explicit. Because these two differences are of particular importance, we would like to take this opportunity to explain the Government of Japan’s fundamental standpoint regarding this issue and gain China’s understanding.

The issue regarding the end of the state of war between Japan and China, needless to say, stems from the differing fundamental standpoints of our two countries regarding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty [signed in 1952 between Japan and the Republic of China].

We would like to reiterate the explanation given yesterday by Prime Minster Ohira. Japan fully understands that China is not in any way bound by the treaty concluded between Japan and Taiwan. The Government of Japan does not request in any way for the Government of the People’s Republic of China to change its standpoint in this regard. At the same time, the Government of Japan, as a responsible government, cannot take the standpoint that the treaty that we had willfully concluded was invalid. This will also be difficult for the citizens of Japan to support. Therefore we cannot agree to the interpretation that the forthcoming joint statement establishes for the first time an agreed end to the state of war, and that the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan was invalid from the start and that until now a legal state of war had existed between Japan and China.

The expressions used in Clause 1 were written based on these considerations. It is neither necessary nor possible to settle our respective differing legal understandings of Japan-China relations until now. We believe that both Japan and China’s respective standpoints can be compatible if, to emphasize the existence of a generally peaceful relationship between Japan and China, the factual end of the state of war is confirmed, but the timing is left unspecified. Regarding how to express this, we will await until we receive China’s proposal and further consider it.

Second – Clause 2 is the Government of Japan’s recognition of the Government of the People’s Republic of China. This matches the first part of Clause 2 of the “Outline.” The Chinese “Outline” is structured so that it first comprehensively and abstractly describes Japan’s attitude towards China’s Three Principle-like standpoints, including the issue of recognition. Then the section states the specifics of the issue of recognition. We believe that this section should only address the issue of recognition and more clearly indicate the Government of Japan’s attitude. The other two issues (that is, the Taiwan issue and the issue regarding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty) should each be addressed separately. Judging from other joint statements made by China and third states, it is our thought that China should not have particular objections to separating the issues of recognition and the Taiwan issue. However, in relation to Premier Zhou’s comments from yesterday, we hope to hear China’s perspective regarding this issue.

Third – This section corresponds to the latter half of Clause 2 in China’s “Outline.” Clause 3 is with regard to the agreement between Japan and China to exchange ambassadors and establishment of diplomatic offices. The content of this section is more detailed than the one found in the “Outline.” However, it is based on previous joint statements made between China and third states, so we feel that it does not need supplemental explanations.

Furthermore, it is our thought that diplomatic relations between Japan and China should start from the date of the joint declaration. We understand that this matches China’s thoughts.

The content of this section is with regard to matters that requires a formal agreement between the Governments of Japan and China. In the case of our nation this requires a domestic procedure that necessitates a document of agreement that is separate to the joint statement. If there are no particular objections on the side of China, we are thinking that in the joint statement we will confirm the agreement, but will produce a simple document separately.

Fourth – This section is with regard to the Taiwan issue and it corresponds to the first entry in the appendix, “Tacit Agreements,” found in the “Outline.”

As China already knows, Japan does not intend to produce any documents for secret agreements for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. With regard to the Taiwan issue, and any other issues, we wish to include in the joint statement those expressions that can be mutually agreed upon by both Japan and China.

An explanation of China’s stance towards the Taiwan issue is as follows:

It is not the stance of Japan, as a country that renounced all rights in regard to Taiwan through the San Francisco Treaty, to make any pronouncements regarding the current legal position of Taiwan. We are fully cognizant that China’s position regarding the San Francisco Treaty differs from that of Japan. However, Japan, as a party to this Treaty, cannot tear down its position. However, it is also the unchanging position of the Government of Japan that the intention of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration was to revert Taiwan to China. Furthermore, our nation fully respects the standpoint of China that “China is one.” Naturally, we absolutely do not have either the intention of trying to once again make Taiwan a territory of Japan oor the intention of supporting the independence of Taiwan. Consequently, in the future, we have no expectation for Taiwan to be the territory of any country except for the People’s Republic of China.

From this viewpoint, the Government of Japan believes that any further issues arising from the fact that Taiwan is under the control of an administration separate from the Government of the People’s Republic of China is an issue to be solved by the Chinese people, that is it should be solved as a Chinese domestic issue. Our nation does not deny the policies of other countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government in existence in Taiwan. As long as it is the will of the people of Japan that a military confrontation between the United States and China must be avoided, it is the fundamental viewpoint of the Government of Japan that the Taiwan issue must be solved peacefully.

The following is a concise combination of the Japanese and Chinese standpoints.

Fifth – We do not object to the basic principles employed for the relationship between Japan and China that appears in Clause 4 of the “Outline.” We would like to place this is Clause 5. The latter part of this section calls on Japan and China to resolve disputes in peaceful and non-military means, and for both countries to mutually respect that Japan and China have the right to pursue their own domestic policies. The above is included because in order to accomplish the emphasized goal as it is presented in the earlier section, “to establish a peaceful and friendly relationship on a permanent basis,” it is necessary for both Japan and China to take the basic stance of mutually recognizing and tolerating the fact that both countries are based on different political, economic, and social systems.

Sixth – The content of this section is the same as Clause 5 in the “Outline,” so there is nothing to clarify.

Seventh – The nature of the issue of reparations is such that it is not something that our side should be making proposals about, so we kept the section in parentheses. The content is not changed from Clause 7 of the “Outline,” but we made some modifications to the wording. We commend the Government of the People’s Republic of China for not seeking reparations from our country, but we cannot include in the joint statement any expressions that effectively mean that the peace treaty concluded between Japan and Taiwan was invalid from the start. We believe that if the expression is non-legal, as in the Japanese proposal, the respective basic positions of Japan and China would not be damaged.

Eight – Clause 8 combines Clauses 6 and 8 of the “Outline.” It is with regard to the expected negotiations to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship following the normalization of relations. It also raises several examples. Regarding the issues that were left out, we did not do so out of any compelling reasons to exclude them, but because we are not convinced of the necessity to conclude agreements for those topics at this time.

For this section, there are two points regarding which we would like to confirm that there are no misunderstandings with China.

First, although the Government of Japan does not know the specifics for the content of the treaty that China is imagining, it is not opposed to entering negotiations after receiving specific proposals from China in order conclude a treaty that set the compass and establish a foundation for the relationship between Japan and China. It is hoped that problems relating to the liquidation of abnormal relations between Japan and China in the past, including war, should all be solved by this conversation and its result, the Joint Statement, thereby leaving no backward job in the future

Next, regarding the various administrative arrangements, we do not intend to deny the functions of the preexisting civilian-level arrangements. However, there will be cases where the content of these civilian-level arrangements cannot be incorporated into arrangements between governments. Therefore, we would like to avoid wordings in the joint declaration that may be interpreted as meaning that the government is restricted by these arrangements.

Ninth – Our basic standpoint regarding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty is as it was mentioned in Clause 1 regarding the issue of the end to the state of war. If the diplomatic normalization of Japan and China is accomplished, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty will completely lose its substantial and enduring meaning. Therefore, the Government of Japan is prepared to publically acknowledge the termination of this treaty as a way of emphasizing the start of a new relationship between Japan and China.

Tenth – The “Tacit Agreement” section attached to the Chinese “Outline” raises two points regarding the Taiwan issue and China’s considerations regarding the mutual withdrawal of Japan and Taiwan’s embassies and consulates, and the future of Japans’ post-war investments in China. With regard to point one, we fully understand that it is a necessary consequence. Naturally, we will implement it within a reasonable period; therefore it is unnecessary to put it into public or non-public writing, and we hope for China to place their trust in the Government of Japan. Second, based on our basic policy of not creating secret documents, it is our thinking to just keep this as an oral agreement.









(於 迎賓館)

(注: 本「会談要録」は、国交正常化当時の記録を改めて昭和53年5月タイプ印刷に付したものである






















賠償の問題に関する第7項は、本来わが方から提案すべき性質の事項ではないので、括弧内に含めてある。その内容は、中国側の「大綱」第7項とその趣旨において変わりがないが、若干の表現上の修正が行なわれている。すなわち、日本政府は、わが国に対して賠償を求めないとの中華人民共和国政府のを率直に評価するものであるが、他方、第1項の戦争状態終結の問題と全く同様に、日本が台湾との間に結んだ平和条約が当初から無効であつたことを明白に意味する結果となるような表現が共同声明の中で用いられることは同意できない。日本側提案のような法律的ではない表現であれば、日中双方の基本的立場を害することなく、問題を処理しうると考えるので、この点について中国側の配慮を期待したい。 {文中のは空白}






10 なお、中国側の「大綱」別添の「黙約事項」においては、台湾問題のほかに、わが国と台湾との間の大使館、領事館の相互撤去及び戦後の台湾に対する日本の投資に対する将来の中国側の配慮の2点が言及されているが、このうちの第1点に関しては、これが日中国交正常化の必然的帰結と認識しており、妥当な期間内に当然実現されるものであるので、このようなことのために、公表・不公表を問わず、あえて文書を作成する必要はなく、中国側において日本政府を信用してもらいたい。また、第2点に関しても、秘密文書を作成しないとの基本方針に基づき、これを口頭での了解にとどめておくべきものと考える



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