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January 20, 1951


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    Yudin recounts his meetings with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. In three meetings, Yudin learned more about China's relations with other communist parties in Asia, economic conditions in China, and developments in the Korean War.
    "Report from P. F. Yudin to I. V. Stalin on Meetings with the Leaders of the Communist Party of China, including Mao Zedong on 31 December 1950," January 20, 1951, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ARAN, f. 1636, op. 1, d. 199, ll. 1-6, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 345, ll. 0010-0014. Published in Istoricheskii Arkhiv Nº 4 (2006): 15-19. Translated by Sergey Radchenko
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to Cde. I. V. Stalin

Moscow 20 January 1951

I report to you about my recent meetings with the leaders of the Communist Party of China.

1. On 31 December 1950 during a dinner at Mao Zedong's (present at the New Year meeting were: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi1, Zhou Enlai2, and Zhu De3), Mao Zedong spoke about the war in Korea, and pointed to the fact that unfortunately the Americans do not want to wage big battles. We, he said, hoped that the Americans would fight for the 38th Parallel, but they abandoned it almost without resistance and now are also hastily evacuating Seoul. Our main task in Korea is to kill as much American troops as possible. Mao Zedong said, we are not against the war in Korea dragging on since every day the American troops are in Korea America burns with fever, sows discord among the ruling circles of the American imperialists, and influences public opinion against the ruling circles.

[Footnote at the bottom of the page: P. F. Yudin had held a conversation with Mao Zedong before, on 29 October 1957 (see "Operatsiya proydet menee boleznenno" (The Operation Will Go Less Painfully"//Istochnik. 1996. Nº 4. S. 109-114)].

Mao Zedong expressed satisfaction that they had organized the supply of their troops in Korea with everything necessary. In the beginning they organized the supply of their troops badly, although the troops were also located close to the Chinese border. He said that they were learning much from the experience of the war in Korea, how a modern army needs to be organized and how to wage a war against modern imperialist armies.

After dinner Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi stepped aside and invited me over to them. A small conversation was held during which Mao Zedong complained a lot about the poor state of his health. He said that he had sharply decreased blood pressure, that he was overworked to an extreme degree, and had reached a condition that he could not work. Mao Zedong said that in the near future he plans to go somewhere to rest for a month or two.

Then Mao Zedong said that right now all the Communist Parties of the Asian countries are turning to him for advice, with requests for help, and that right now in Peking there are permanent representatives from all the Communist Parties of Asia except the Communist Party of India. The situation in the different Communist Parties of Asia needs to be studied, to give them advice, and to give them various aid. It is difficult for us to handled this matter alone.

In addition, said Mao Zedong, many new issues are arising here in China which need to be studied and solved. We would like for the VKP(b) CC to study our issues and our work.

In connection with this Mao Zedong stated the following: we are seriously raising the question of the need to have a permanent representative from the VKP(b) CC in the CC of our Party. The VKP(b) CC representative should have several of his own assistants who would study the problems of Asia together with our officials, and raise these questions to the VKP(b) CC and the CPC CC for a joint solution. Mao Zedong told Liu Shaoqi to meet with me and talk about what they knew about the situation in the Communist Parties of Asia.

In conclusion Mao Zedong said he regrets that I was not able to familiarize myself with all the regions of China and that he would like for me to come to China again after his works come out in Russian. He asked me what I thought of this. I thanked him for such a suggestion and said that the VKP(b) CC ought to study this issue. Mao Zedong said that he had addressed a request to Cde. Stalin about this question.

2. On 3 January 1951 Liu Shaoqi invited me to his office in the CPC CC. In the conversation he repeated to me what Mao Zedong had said, that there are permanent representatives in the CPC CC from all the Parties of the Asian countries. From several countries, for example, from Burma and Indonesia, there are representatives from groups of these Parties who are fighting each other. He said that they are coming themselves, without prior agreement, since their border is poorly closed. Liu Shaoqi said, we are trying to check them in advance before entering into discussions with them. From the Communist Party of Indonesia they asked permission to come for representatives of the two groups from the CC leadership fighting each another there. He said, we haven't given them a reply yet since we don't know any of them.

Liu Shaoqi spoke first of all about the situation in the Communist Party of Japan. He said that Tokuda4 and Nosaka5 are in Peking right now. We are studying the situation in the Communist Party of Japan right now. Liu Shaoqi said that he has had two meetings with Tokuda and Nosaka. There will be several more meetings, and right now some Japanese documents are being translated. After some time they will form a more complete picture about the situation in the Communist Party of Japan. He said, right now the following is clear for them, that there is a split in the Communist Party of Japan. Two Politburo members and five CC members put together a new CC and are fighting the CC headed by Tokuda and Nosaka. The CC of the Communist Party of Japan is mainly waging an organized struggle against the opposition. Entire organizations are being expelled from the Party for supporting the opposition. The opposition accuses the CC of not fully admitting the mistakes pointed out in the Informbyuro newspaper at one time.

Liu Shaoqi said that back in September they had printed an editorial about the tasks of the Communist Party of Japan in the publication of the Communist Party of China, about the need to preserve Party unity, and that the main task of the Communist Party of Japan were the struggle to expel the American imperialists from Japan and the struggle for the national independence of Japan.

He said that this had some influence, but not completely. Liu Shaoqi said that they want to invite representatives of the opposition of the Communist Party of Japan to Peking and to identify the substance of the differences together with Tokuda, Nosaka, and representatives of the opposition and work out the common line of the activity of the Communist Party of Japan.

Liu Shaoqi dwelt especially on the situation in the Communist Party of India. He said splits had arisen in the Party for a long time, and the leadership often changes. Each group which comes into the leadership expels the supporters of the group of the leadership that was overthrown from the Party. After the war there were 200,000 Party members in the Communist Party of India, but right now there are no more than 40,000.

Liu Shaoqi said that very great importance needs to be given to strengthening the Communist Party of India in connection with that role which India should play in the final destruction of international imperialism.

Liu Shaoqi asked me especially to pose to the VKP(b) CC the question of the situation of the Communist Party of India in order to work out measures to strengthen this Party. He said that their point of view on this issue comes down to the following: representatives of the Communist Party of India need to be invited to Peking or Moscow, the situation in this Party needs to be studied in detail, and to work out the political line of the Communist Party of India and direct it onto the right path. The Communist Party of India cannot cope with this task through its own efforts. Such a condition of the Communist Party of India which it is experiencing right now only benefits the British and American imperialists.

Liu Shaoqi said that a congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam would be held in the near future. It is evident that Ho Chi Minh6 will enter the CC in this congress and take a leading position as chairman or general secretary of the CC. Up to now Ho Chi Minh has not been in the CC and has not occupied any organizational post, but has been in the position of a person standing above the CC as a supreme or highest leader of the people. The CC of the Communist Party of Vietnam consults with Ho Chi Minh on practically all issues and he essentially supervises the activity of the CC.

Liu Shaoqi said that there is factional warfare in the Communist Parties of Burma and Indonesia. He spoke favorably of the Communist Party of Malaysia.

At the end of the conversation Liu Shaoqi raised the same question about which Mao Zedong had spoken, the need for permanent representation of the VKP(b) CC in the CPC. He said that in his opinion there should be about five officials with the authorized representative of the VKP(b) CC who would, if they were not specialists, be specialized in Asian issues. For its part the CPC CC would also allot an appropriate group of officials for joint work with the VKP(b) CC officials. He added further that right now they are creating courses for about 400 people for them to train officials of the various Communist Parties of Asian countries. And, he said, we have a great need for the help of the VKP(b) CC in this, which the VKP(b) CC officials permanently working in China could give. Liu Shaoqi said that they attach great importance to the issue of a representation of the VKP(b) CC in the CPC CC.

3. On 4 January 1951 Zhou Enlai came to my apartment. His statements mainly touched on the situation in Korea, and about questions of the economic situation of China and the anti-American campaign being pursued in China. He said nothing new about the situation in Korea in comparison with what Mao Zedong had said. Speaking of the economic situation inside the country he pointed to the fact that this year they had created a good situation with grain. They have grain reserves which provide not only domestic needs, also including the supply of the troops in Korea and aid to Korea with grain, but they can also export grain to other countries. Zhou Enlai spoke of the difficulties which they are already experiencing right now in expert specialists for the economy. He said that it would be hard to cope with this task without the aid of the USSR. He said, we will have address a request the government of the USSR and to the governments of the people's democracies for them to give agreement to send a large group of students to their countries to study in their universities and institutes. But we have will have new difficulties - right now we do not have enough money and we will ask them to give a deferment for payment for teaching of the students.

Zhou Enlai spoke in detail about the campaign to fight the American imperialists which is being pursued in China right now, pointing out that they have achieved significant political results in this campaign. Even a majority of the urban bourgeoisie is taking an active part in this movement. He said, there has never been anything like this in China. If we have to fight America we are seriously preparing our people for this.

Zhou Enlai also touched on the situation in the various countries of Asia, especially in Japan and India. He basically repeated what Liu Shaoqi had said yesterday, and also dwelt in detail on the importance of India, [the importance] which it should play for the final destruction of world imperialism, and on the need for the creation of a strong Communist Party of India.

P. Yudin

Attachment: I am attaching my note which I sent Mao Zedong about my trip throughout China. When I returned from the trip Mao Zedong was ill. Chen Boda7 told me that Mao Zedong would be pleased if I wrote him a note about my trip throughout China.

P. Yu[din]

ARAN. F. 1636 (P. F. Yudin). Op. 1. D. 194. L. 9-13. Typed copy.

Nº 2

P. F. Yudin to N. S. Khrushchev

Record of a 9 November 1957 conversation between Mao Zedong and P. F. Yudina

a the title of the document

10 November 1957

Tonight Mao Zedong invited me to a conversation.

He asked to pass N. S. Khrushchev several wishes in connection with the preparation of the Conference.

1. In his opinion, the final coordination of the draft Declaration between the Chinese and Soviet representatives ought to be concluded no later than 10 November and on this same day distribute the coordinated text to all the delegations of the fraternal Parties, including those who are not participants of the Conference.

2. In my opinion, it is advisable to distribute the draft Declaration in the name of the two Parties, the CPSU and the CPC, inasmuch as "obviously it is not at all proper for the CPSU to speak in its own name on two questions of principle, the leading rule of the Soviet Union and the initiative of convening subsequent Conferences of fraternal Parties".

3. It is desirable to begin the Conference on 13 November. By this he has in mind that on 10 November all the delegations will receive the draft Declaration and they will report their comments to the CPSU CC (Cdes. B. N. Ponomarev10 and Yu. V. Andropov11) no later than 11 November. On 12 December, the day before the start of the Conference, the draft Declaration can be studied again, taking into consideration the comments and suggestions which were made. Mao Zedong expressed the wish that the work of the Conference last no less than two days, and if required, then three days, that is, 13-15 November.

4. Mao Zedong expressed agreement with the suggestion of the Poles which N. S. Khrushchev had reported to him, regarding the adoption of a second, more general, document "restrained in the spirit of the Appeal of the World Peace Council"12. In his opinion, this document should be brief. It can be signed either by the representatives of only the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries or by the representatives of all the fraternal and the other Parties in Moscow. Most likely, he noted, many will want to sign this document. Mao Zedong asked the CPSU CC to take on itself the preparation of the draft of this brief document with the expectation that he could familiarize himself with it on 10 November.

Then Mao Zedong spoke with satisfaction about the rapid convergence of the Soviet and Chinese points of view on the issues touched upon in the Declaration. He stressed that no fundamental changes were made to it by the Soviet and Chinese representatives during the discussion of the draft. Basically only some phrasings were clarified and improved, individual emphases were strengthened, etc. Some changes were made only on individual issues like, for example, the forms of the transition to socialism. Mao Zedong said, a characteristic and positive aspect of the Declaration is that general [questions] and questions of principle are examined in it and the complex domestic problems of individual countries (the USSR, China, Poland, and others) are not touched upon.

He further noted the need to preserve in the Declaration a brief addendum on the issue of Marxist dialectics (the addendum was written by Mao Zedong himself). He noted in this connection that during Stalin's lifetime metaphysics was strongly developed in the world socialist movement and the positions of the dialectical method were weakened. A subjectivist, metaphysical approach, which was the source of the production of dogmatic and revisionist mistakes, began to frequently dominate in the assessment and analysis of phenomena. At times the philosophy withdrew into itself instead of putting itself entirely at the service of the working class. Mao Zedong noted, in practical life they also began to speak of and use dialectics little. I suggest, he declared, speaking of this everywhere, at every opportunity, and on a large scale. Mao Zedong later spoke enthusiastically about an important guidance on this issue in N. S. Khrushchev's report.

Returning to the question of the draft Declaration, Mao Zedong expressed a desire that the senior comrades from the CPSU CC read it again. Mao Zedong said that he himself would also read this draft again. Possibly, he noted, new thoughts and aspects would appear which were not reflected in the Declaration. For example, it is worth thinking about whether it would be advisable to add a phrase in the text of the Declaration about the condition of the peasantry, etc.

Then Mao Zedong again spoke about the importance and need for the representatives of all the fraternal Parties to have advance familiarization with the draft Declaration. In this event, he said, on the one hand, democracy will be observed, and on the other fresh, interesting thoughts will probably appear. It is only necessary that the delegations report their comments and wishes no later than the evening of 11 November. It is true, Mao Zedong noted, that the time devoted to them to study the draft is not much, but "it ought to be taken into consideration that the Conference will last two or three days, and each delegation will be able to submit additional comments during this period".

Concerning the issue of the composition of the Chinese delegation to the Conference Mao Zedong pointed to several options: 1) the participation in the Conference of only CPC CC Party officials (without Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai13 and Minister of Finance Li Xiannian14), 2) the participation of all delegation members who are Party members [kommunisty] (11 people), 3) the participation of the entire Chinese delegation which has arrived in Moscow, including non-Party members (as guests). He noted, it ought to be borne in mind that the non-Party members of our delegation are in favor of socialism. In the latter case non-Party members of the delegations of other countries (Poland, etc.) can also be invited to the Conference. Mao Zedong said, this question can be discussed separately.

Later during the conversation Mao Zedong briefly told about his meetings in Moscow with the representatives of some fraternal Parties.

Mao Zedong said that the longest conversation he had was with Gomulka15. Mao Zedong noted, judging from the discussion with him, the following two points of the Declaration present the greatest difficulty for the Poles: 1) the criticism of American imperialism and 2) the designation about the leading role of the USSR in the camp of socialism. Gomulka, Mao Zedong said, "speaking with me in the name of the Polish people, stressed that not he personally, but the people of Poland will not accept these clauses". In reply to my recommendation to conduct the necessary explanatory work among the people, declared Mao Zedong, Gomulka replied, "We don't have time to do this". In the conversation with Mao Zedong Gomulka stressed that in Poland they will not accept wording containing sharp criticism of the US. At the same time he admitted that such wording finds broad support among the people in the USSR and the PRC. During the conversation Gomulka expressed the assumption that the Conference Declaration "will promote the further growth of international tension". Mao Zedong noted, I explained to him that the imperialists create international tension, and therefore the Communist movement has been forced to take measures in response "restraining the imperialists from reckless actions". He said, Gomulka stuck to his own opinion about these questions.

A considerable portion of time in the conversation with Gomulka was devoted to the question of the leading role of the USSR. Mao Zedong said, during the conversation I stressed that "in each group there is its group leader, in each platoon there is its platoon commander. In our platoon of the socialist countries there also should be its own commander and that is our strength". He continued, he showed Gomulka that "the role of a commander is a difficult task, and very bothersome".

Mao Zedong noted, it is unquestionably difficult to expect any change from one conversation, but I tried strenuously to show Gomulka the mistakenness of his positions. Of course, it would be desirable for the Poles to sign the Declaration. But if they refuse to do this, declared Mao Zedong, then the Declaration needs to be adopted without them "so that they don't say that they were forced to sign it. In the event of their refusal we can wait and in about three years they will sign anyway. During the conversation Gomulka did not veto the Declaration, but made many reservations". Mao Zedong said that after the delivery of the draft Declaration to the Poles he proposes going again to Gomulka and again talking with him in detail.

Mao Zedong noted, things are more difficult with the Yugoslavs than with the Poles inasmuch as "they stand with [their] legs not on one, but on two boats".

Mao Zedong said, in conversations with Thorez16, Togliatti17, and Pollitt18 I asked about the situation in their countries since the CPC CC knows little about the situation in the European countries. An exchange of opinions was also conducted with representatives of these countries on the question of a peaceful transition to socialism in the course of which many interesting thoughts were expressed. A serious evolution has occurred on this question among the British Communists. Last year, while in China the leaders of the British Communist Party stood for "not one bullet being fired". "Right now they are already planning to shoot if the enemies open fire". Mao Zedong said, during the conversation I recommended that the British comrades rely more on their own forces. Pollitt, he noted, expressed a stubborn desire to sign the Declaration during the conversation. evidently pursuing the goal of "increasing the authority of the British Communist Party". "I spoke against these intentions of the British Communists".

During the conversation with the French comrades, continued Mao Zedong, they expressed some dissatisfaction with the Italian Communists. "However, right now a certain convergence of the positions of the French and Italian Communists with the position of the British Communist Party is being sensed".

Mao Zedong also told about his meeting with Kim Il Sung19. Mao Zedong said that the conversation touched on two issues: the withdrawal of units of the Chinese people's volunteers from Korea and the position of the Korean political emigrants in China. Mao Zedong said that he convinced Kim Il sung of the need to withdrawal six armies of Chinese people's volunteers and proposed performing this withdrawal in three stages - two armies in each stage. In showing the advisability of this measure, Mao Zedong pointed to the enormous burden in the DPRK budget for the maintenance of these armies. He also pointed out that the withdrawal of the Chinese units would create the possibility of the withdrawal of two American divisions from Korea and would facilitate a reduction of the Syngman Rhee20 army. Mao Zedong stressed that the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers was completely possible right now, for "the DPRK has well-fortified borders and a 300,000-man army". In the event of a provocation by the US and the South Koreans "the volunteers will remain volunteers, and they can always come to the aid of the Korean people". Mao Zedong noted, Kim Il Sung was previously always against the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers; during this conversation he promised to think seriously about this question. Touching on the question of the Korean political emigrants in China, Mao Zedong suggested that Kim Il Sung gather all of them in Peking while crossing China to the DRV and "declare an amnesty to them". Mao Zedong assured Kim Il Sung that these Korean would never be used by China against the DPRK. Kim Il Sung replied that "these people are not needed in Korea".

Then Mao Zedong talked with Kim Il Sung about Zhou Enlai's upcoming official visit to the DPRK. Mao Zedong noted, I told Kim Il Sung in this connection that "evidently you will not welcome my (Mao Zedong's) arrival in Korea inasmuch as I cause all kinds of trouble". Kim Il Sung did not agree with this opinion and declared that a great and warm welcome would be organized in the event of Mao Zedong's arrival in Korea.

P. Yudin

ARAN. F. 1636. Op. 1. D. 199. L.1-6. Typed copy


[Translator's note: footnotes 9 and 10 have been omitted because they refer to a document not requested to be translated]

1 Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) - CPC CC Secretary (1943-1956), Deputy Chairman of the PRC Central People's Government Council (1949-1954).

2 Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) - Premier of the PRC State Administrative Council (1949-1954).

3 Zhu De (1886-1976) - CPC CC Secretary (1945-1956), Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army of China (1945-1954).

4 Tokuda Kyuichi (1894-1953) - General Secretary of the CPJ [Communist Party of Japan] beginning in 1945.

5 Nosaka Sanzo (1892-1993) - member of the Politburo (beginning in 1955, the Presidium) of the CPJ (1958-1982).

6 Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) - Chairman of the CC of the Worker's Party of Vietnam (beginning in 1951), President (beginning in 1946), and Prime Minister (1946-1955) of the DRV.

7 Chen Boda (1904-1989) - Vice-President of the PRC Academy of Sciences (beginning in 1949).

10 Ponomarev, Boris Nikolayevich (1905-1995) - Soviet Party and state figure, chief of a CPSU CC department (1955-1961), CPSU CC Secretary (beginning in 1961). Historian and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (beginning in 1962).

11 Andropov, Yuriy Vladimirovich (1914-1984) - Soviet Party and state figure, chief of a CPSU CC department (beginning in 1957), Chairman of the USSR KGB (1967-1982), and General Secretary of the CPSU CC (beginning in 1982).

12 This means the Peace Manifesto, the final document of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties, published on 23 November 1957.

13 Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) - Deputy Premier of the State Council and PRC Minister of Defense (1954-1959).

14 Li Xiannian (1909-1992) - Deputy Premier of the State Council and PRC Minister of Finance, Chairman of the PRC (1983-1988), and [Chairman] of the All-China Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (beginning in 1988).

15 Gomulka, Wladyslaw (1905-1982) - First Secretary of the CC of the Polish United Worker's Party (1956-1970).

16 Thorez, Maurice (1900-1964) - Figure of the French and international Communist movement, General Secretary of the French Communist Party (beginning in 1930).

17 Togliatti, Palmiro (1893-1964) - Figure of the Italian and international Communist movement, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (beginning in 1926).

18 Harry Pollitt (1890-1960). Figure of the British and international Communist movement, General Secretary (1929-1956), and Chairman of the Executive Committee (beginning in 1956) of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

19 Kim Il Sung (1912-1994) - Figure of the Korean and international Communist movement, Chairman (1949-1966), General Secretary (beginning in 1966) of the CC of the Korean Worker's Party, Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers from 1948 to 1972, and President of the DPRK beginning in 1972.

20 Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) - President of South Korea (1948-1960).


Товарищу И. В. Сталину

Москва 20 января 1951 г.

Докладываю Вам о моих последних встречах с руководителями компартии Китая.

1. 3 1 декабря 1950 г. во время ужина у Мао Цзэдуна (на встрече Нового года, присутствовали: Мао Цзэдун, Лю Шаоци[1], Чжоу Эньлай[2],Чжу Дэ[3]), Мао Цзэдун говорил о войне в Корее, указывал на то, что американцы, к сожалению, не хотят вести больших сражений. Мы, говорил он, надеялись, что американцы будут сражаться за 38-ю параллель, но они оставили ее почти без сопротивлений, а теперь также поспешно эвакуируют Сеул. Главная наша задача в Корее - как можно больше уничтожить живой силы американцев. Мы, говорил Мао Цзэдун, не против того, чтобы война в Корее затянулась, так как каждый день пребывания американских войск в Корее лихорадит Америку, сеет раздоры внутри правящих кругов американских империалистов и настраивает против правящих кругов общественное мнение.

Мао Цзэдун выразил удовлетворение тем, что они наладили снабжение своих войск в Корее всем необходимым. В первое время ониплохо организовали снабжение своих войск, хотя войска и находились близко к китайской границе. Он сказал, что на опыте войны в Корее они многому учатся, как надо организовать современную армию и как надо вести войну против современных империалистических армий.

После ужина Мао Цзэдун и Лю Шаоци отошли в сторону и пригласили к себе меня. Состоялась небольшая беседа, во время которой МаоЦзэдун очень жаловался на плохое состояние своего здоровья. Он говорил, что у него резко пониженное кровяное давление, что он до крайней степени переутомился и дошел до такого состояния, что не может работать. Мао Цзэдун сказал, что он собирается в ближайшее время куда-нибудь уехать месяца на два на отдых.

Затем Мао Цзэдун говорил, что сейчас все компартии азиатских стран обращаются к ним за советами, с просьбами о помощи, что сейчас в Пекине находятся постоянные представители от всех компартий Азии, кроме компартии Индии. Надо изучать положение в различных партиях Азии, давать им советы, оказывать различную помощь. Одним нам с этим делом справляться трудно.

Кроме того, говорил Мао Цзэдун, у нас, в Китае, возникает много новых вопросов, которые надо изучать и решать. Мы бы хотели, чтобы ЦК ВКП(б) изучал наши вопросы и нашу работу.

В связи с этим Мао Цзэдун заявил следующее: мы всерьез ставим вопрос о необходимости иметь постоянного представителя от ЦК ВКП(б) при ЦК нашей партии. Представитель ЦК ВКП(б) должен иметь несколько своих помощников, которые бы вместе с нашими работниками изучали вопросы Азии, ставили бы эти вопросы перед ЦК ВКП(б) и перед ЦК КПК для совместного решения. Мао Цзэдун сказал Лю Шаоци, чтобы он встретился со мной и рассказал бы о том, что им известно о положении в компартиях Азии.

В заключение Мао Цзэдун сказал, что сожалеет, что я не успел познакомиться со всеми районами Китая и что он хотел бы, чтобы после выхода на русском языке его сочинений, чтобы я еще раз приехал в Китай. Он спросил меня, как я к этому отношусь. Я поблагодарил его за такое предложение и сказал, что этот вопрос должен решать ЦК ВКП(б). Мао Цзэдун сказал, что он по этому вопросу обратится с просьбой к товарищу Сталину.

2. 3 января 195 1 г. Лю Шаоци пригласил меня к себе в ЦК КПК. В беседе он повторил то, что говорил Мао Цзэдун, что от всех партий стран Азии имеются постоянные представители при ЦК КПК. От некоторых партий, например, от Бирмы, Индонезии имеются представители враждующих между собою групп этих партий. Он говорил, что приезжают они сами, без предварительного согласия, т. к. граница у них плохо закрыта. Мы, говорил Лю Шаоци, стараемся предварительно проверить их, прежде чем вступать с ними в переговоры. Из компартии Индии заг.росили разрешения приехать представителям спорящих там междусобою двух групп из руководства ЦК. Мы, говорил он, пока не дали им ответа, так как никого из них не знаем.

Лю Шаоци прежде всего рассказал о положении в компартии Я понии. Он сказал, что сейчас в Пекине находятся Токуда[4] и Носака[5]. Мы сейчас изучаем положение в компартии Японии. Лю Шаоци говорил, что у него с Токуда и Носака были две встречи. Предстоит еще несколько встреч, сейчас переводятся некоторые японские документы. Через некоторое время они составят более полное представление о положении в компартии Японии. Сейчас для них, говорил он, ясно следующее, что в компартии Японии существует раскол. Два члена Политбюро и пять членов ЦК составили новое ЦК и ведут борьбу против ЦК, возглавляемого Токуда и Носака. ЦК компартии Японии ведет главным образом организационную борьбу против оппозиции. Исключают из партии целые организации за поддержку оппозиции. Оппозиция обвиняет ЦК в том, что ЦК не до конца признал ошибки, указанные в свое время в газете Информбюро.

Лю Шаоци говорил, что они еще в сентябре в органе компартии Китая напечатали редакционную статью о задачах компартии Японии, о необходимости сохранения единства партии и что главной задачей компартии Японии являются борьба за изгнание американских империалистов из Японии, борьба за национальную независимость Японии.

Это, говорил он, возымело некоторое воздействие, но не до конца. Лю Шаоци говорил, что они хотят пригласить в Пекин представителей оппозиции компартии Японии и совместно с Токуда, Носака и представителями оппозиции подробней выяснить суть разногласий и выработать единую линию деятельности компартии Японии.

Лю Шаоци особо остановился на положении в компартии Индии. Он говорил, что в этой партии перманентно возникают расколы, часто меняется руководство. Каждая группа, которая приходит к руководству, исключает из партии сторонников группы свергнутого руководства. После войны в компартии Индии было 200 тысяч членов партии, а сейчас состалось не более 40 тысяч.

Лю Шаоци говорил, что укреплению компартии Индии надо придать очень большое значение в связи с той ролью, которую Индия должна сыграть в окончательном уничтожении международного империализма.

Лю Шаоци специально просил меня поставить перед ЦК ВКП(б) вопрос о положении в компартии Индии, чтобы выработать меры по укреплению этой партии. Он говорил, что их точка зрения по этому вопросу сводится к следующему: необходимо пригласить в Пекин или в Москву представителей компартии Индии, детально изучить положение в этой партии и выработать политическую линию компартии Индии, направить ее на истинный путь. Своими силами компартия Индии с этой задачей не справится. Такое состояние компартии Индии, которое она переживает сейчас, - только на пользу английским и американским империалистам.

Лю Шаоци говорил, что в ближайшее время состоится съезд компартии Вьетнама. Видимо, на этом съезде Хо Ши Мин[6] войдет в состав ЦК и займет руководящее положение как председатель или генеральный секретарь ЦК. До сих пор Хо Ши Мин не входил в состав ЦК, не занимает никакого организационного поста, а находится на положении человека, стоящего выше ЦК, как верховный или высший руководитель народа. ЦК компартии Вьетнама практически советуется: по всем вопросам с Хо Ши Мином, и он, по существу, руководит деятельностью ЦК.

Лю Шаоци говорил, что в компартиях Бирмы, Индонезии существует фракционная борьба. О компартии Малайи он отозвался положительно.

В заключение беседы Лю Шаоци поставил тот же вопрос, о котором говорил Мао Цзэдун, - о необходимости постоянного представительства ЦК ВКП(б) при КПК. Он говорил, что по его мнению, при уполномоченном ЦК ВКП(б) должно быть человек пять работников, которые бы, если они не специалисты, то специализировались бы по вопросам Азии. ЦК КПК со своей стороны также вьщелит соответствующую группу работников для совместной работы с работниками ЦК ВКП(б). Он добавил еще, что они сейчас создают курсы человек на 400 для обучения на них работников различных компартий стран Азии. И в этом, говорил он, нам необходима помощь ЦК ВКП(б), которую могли бы оказать постоянно работающие в Китае работники ЦК ВКП(б). Лю Шаоци говорил, что они придают большое значение вопросу о представительстве ЦК ВКП(б) при ЦК КПК.

3. 4 января 195 1 г. ко мне на квартиру приезжал Чжоу Эньлай. Его высказывания главным образом касались положения в Корее, по вопросам экономического положения Китая и антиамериканской кампании, проводимой в Китае. О положении в Корее он ничего нового не сказал, по сравнению с тем, что говорил Мао Цзэдун. Говоря об экономическом положении внутри страны, он указал на то, что в этом году у них создалось хорошее положение с хлебом. Они имеют резервы хлеба, которые обеспечивают не только внутренние потребности, включая и обеспечение войск в Корее, помощь хлебом Корее, но могут и вывозить хлеб в другие страны. Чжоу Эньлай говорил о трудностях, которые уже сейчас они испытывают в кадрах специалистов для народного хозяйства. Он говорил, что без помощи СССР им трудно будет справиться с этой задачей. Нам придется, говорил он, обратиться с просьбой к правительству СССР и к правительствам стран народной демократии, чтобы они дали согласие на посьшку в их страны большой группы студентов для обучения в их университетах и институтах. Но тут у нас будут новые трудности - сейчас у нас на это не хватит денег, и мы будем просить, чтобы дали рассрочку в расплате за обучение студентов.

Чжоу Эньлай подробно говорил о кампании борьбы с американскими империалистами, которая сейчас проводится в Китае, указав, что они добились серьезных политических результатов в этой кампании. Даже большинство городской буржуазии принимает активное участие в этом движении. Ничего подобного, говорил он, никогда в Китае не было. Если нам придется воевать с Америкой, то мы серьезно к этому готовим наш народ.

Чжоу Эньлай также коснулся положения в различных странах Азии, особенно в Японии и Индии. Он в основном повторил то, о чем накануне говорил Лю Шаоци, также подробно остановился на значении Индии, которое она должна сыграть для окончательного уничтожения мирового империализма, и на необходимости создания сильной компартии Индии.


Приложение: Прилагаю мою записку, которую я послал Мао Цзэдуну о своей поездке по Китаю. Когда я вернулся из поездки, Мао Цзэдун был болен. Чэнь Бода[7] сказал мне, что Мао Uзэдун бьm бы доволен, если бы я написал ему записку о своей поездке по Китаю.


[1] Лю Шаоци ( 1898- 1969) - секретарь ЦК КПК ( 1943-1956) , заместитель

председателя Центрального народного правительственного совета КНР ( 1949-


[2] Чжоу Эньлай ( 1898-1976) - премьер Государственного административного

совета КНР ( 1949-1954) .

[3] Чжу Дэ (1886-1976) - секретарь ЦК КПК ( 1945-1956) , главнокомандующий

Народно-освободительной армии Китая ( 1945- 1954).

[4] Токуда Кюити (1894-1953) - генеральный секретарь КПЯ (с 1945 г.)

[5] Носака Сандзо (1892-1993) - член Политбюро (с 1955 г. - Президиума) ЦК

кпя ( 1958-1982).

[6] Хо Ши Мин ( 1890- 1969) - председатель ЦК Партии трудящихся Вьетнама

(с 1951 г.), президент (с 1946 г.), премьер-министр (1946-1955) ДРВ.

[7] Чэнь Бода (1904- 1989) - вице-президент АН КНР (с 1949 г.).


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