Citation:


Summary:

Wu Zhili's claims that bacteriological warfare allegedly conducted by the United States in Korea in 1952 was a "false alarm."

Original Language:

Chinese

Contents:

- English Translation
- Chinese Transcription
[Editor’s Comment: This essay is the posthumous work of Comrade Wu Zhili, former director of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Health Division. With the exception of a few sentences and obvious typographical errors, this journal did not permit alterations in order to not influence the understanding of its contents.]

It has already been 44 years (in 1997) since the armistice of the Korean War, but as for the worldwide sensation of 1952: how indisputable is the bacteriological war of the American imperialists?

The case is one of false alarm.

That year the Party Central Committee confirmed (at least at the beginning) that it believed that the U.S. Army was conducting bacteriological warfare. We mobilized the whole military and the whole nation, spending large amounts of manpower and materiel to carry out an anti-bacteriological warfare movement. At the same time, American imperialism was also notoriously reaching a low point. When the former commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, [Matthew Bunker] Ridgeway, was transferred to Allied Headquarters Europe at the end of 1952, crowds jeered him at his arrival to the airport, calling him “the god of pestilence” and causing him embarrassment. Not until he swore by the name of God that the U.S. military did not undertake bacteriological warfare was he allowed to go.

The affair originated with the appearance of large numbers of flies and fleas on the snowy winter ground. It was later learned that these were snow fleas (in Korean called ‘oguli’), not human fleas, and that they are a natural phenomenon on the snow in the winter. Snow fleas are of the order Springtail (Collembola), genus Dark springtail (Isotoma palustris). I also had reports of snow fleas in Northeast China. At that time we thought flies and fleas could not be found on the snow, and given that foreign newspapers were reporting that Japanese bacteriological war criminal Ishii [Shiro] had come to the front lines in Korea to investigate suspicious deaths on the U.S. military side, the Central Committee determined that the U.S. military was conducting bacteriological warfare.

The principal course of the affair was as follows: On January 29, 1952, the [Chinese People’s] Volunteer Army Health Division and Volunteer Army Headquarters received a telegram from the 42nd Army claiming that U.S. planes flew over Pyonggang county (where that army was encamped) on January 28, 1952, and on the snow-covered ground in the trenches many types of insects were discovered. Among them were fleas, flies, and spider-like insects. The 42nd Army sent specimens of 23 fleas (snow fleas), 33 flies, and spider-like insects. Our chemical testing lab conducted cultures and did not discover pathogenic bacteria. The head of the 42nd Army Health Division was Gao Liang, a very attentive and qualified health cadre who had been the head of education at the medical school when I was in the 3rd Division. He must have been somewhat on alert about bacteriological warfare in order to send this telegram. The 42nd Army’s telegram was also sent to PVA Command, where it drew the a high degree of attention from Commander Peng Dehuai, was forwarded to the Party Central Committee, and was sent to every unit to alert them and require timely reports of any similar situations. At that time we thought flies and fleas could not be found on the snow, and given that foreign newspapers were reporting that Japanese bacteriological war criminal Ishii [Shiro] had come to the front lines in Korea to investigate suspicious deaths on the U.S. military side, the Central Committee determined that the U.S. military was conducting bacteriological warfare.

Coincidentally, at that time suspicious deaths were discovered on the U.S. military front lines, and the U.S. military sent Japanese bacteriological war criminal and former head of Unit 731 Ishii to North Korea to investigate this matter and publish this information. Based on the above
information, the Party Central Committee determined that the U.S. military was conducting bacteriological warfare. After just a few days, on February 22, 1952, the front page of the People's Daily ran an eye-grabbing top headline, which, in the name of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the North Korean government, denounced the U.S. imperialists for carrying out large-scale bacteriological war in Korea and Northeast China. Photographs of the dropped objects and bacterial smears were attached. This drew jarring and successive condemnation from the whole world. Prior to this, we did not know People's Daily would publish so quickly. After publication, I said to Health Division Deputy Director Zhu Zhiguang (since passed): “From here on, we should be passive.” Zhu said, “After today, we can only write an article.”

The Central Health Division was under the charge of Deputy Director He Cheng. He had worked in Northeast China, and knew that Japan’s Unit 731 had engaged in bacteriological warfare. He knew Ishii’s person and deeds, and that they were his mistaken decision- and the Party Central Committee agreed. He sent entomologist Professor He Qi and bacteriologist Professor Wei Xi (both of them since passed) to Korea to investigate. Before they came, we had already dispatched men (including myself) to the reporting units many times to ascertain the situation, an investigation which concluded that there were insects and other objects dropped on the snow, but which did not discover people who had died suddenly or suspiciously fallen ill. Units that had previously reported deaths said that the reports had been hearsay. As for flies, almost every house has them in front of and behind the stove—they could fly out the door onto the snow at any time.

My personal analysis was: (1) Imperialism is capable of carrying out all manner of evils, and bacteriological war is not an exception. (2) Severe winter, however, is not a good season for conducting bacteriological war. When the weather is cold the mobility of insects is weakened, and is not conducive to bacteria reproduction. (3) Dropping [objects] on the front line trenches, where there are few people and sickness does not spread easily, and where the U.S. military’s trenches are not more than ten meters away, allows for the possibility of ricocheting. (4) Korea already had an epidemic of lice-borne contagious diseases. All the houses in the cities and towns had been burned down, and the common people all lived in air-raid shelters. Their lives are already difficult, but the Korean people are extremely tenacious and bacteriological warfare cannot be the greater disaster that forces them to surrender. (5) Our preliminary investigation still could not prove that the U.S. military carried out bacteriological warfare.

I reported my viewpoint to Deputy Commander Hong, and he agreed that I should send a report of my opinion to Commander Peng and the Central Committee. I suggested that it would be wise to not publicize this as a major matter, in order to avoid being passive and wasting manpower and resources (this was before Professors He and Wei had arrived). Just then, a telegram arrived from the Central Committee, criticizing my lack of vigilance and saying that the enemy had not carried out bacteriological warfare, but that we could still take advantage of this to reinforce health work. Afterward Professors He and Wei carried on with their investigations and observed insect specimens and bacterial smears. He discovered that the so-called fleas were snow fleas, while Wei discovered that although the stained snow flea smears seemed to have bubonic plague bacteria, they showed to be gram-positive (bubonic plague is gram-negative). They could not culture plague. I asked their opinion. He Qi said (verbatim), “I think it’s a false alarm.”

After Commander Peng saw my telegram, he requested that I give an in-person report. Deputy Commander Hong asked me to give Commander Peng a realistic account of my viewpoint. Coincidentally, Chief Kim of the Korean People’s Army Disease Prevention Bureau was ordered to come get to the bottom of things and discuss with me how to manage the situation, because they also could not come up with evidence. I took him with me to see Commander Peng, hoping that Kim could be a witness to the fact that evidence of bacteriological warfare could not be found. That evening, we arrived at the PVA Headquarters in Hoechang County (We were posted at Seongcheon County, about a two-hour drive from the Command). Commander Peng, Deputy Commanders Deng Hua and Song Shilun, and ten or more others were sitting. We reported the results of our investigation and our opinions as stated above. Commander Peng said sternly (this is
the general idea): “Our Health Director is an America imperialist operative and speaks on behalf of the enemy. Can the health of the Volunteer Army be guaranteed?” Then he said, “There are others who report that you are neglecting the sick and wounded. If a thousand or ten thousand die on the battlefield that’s fine, but if one dies afterwards I will come to you for a reckoning.” I said, “I will no longer act as Health Director. I have no other request, except please let me stay in Korea and fight.” Commander Peng declared the meeting temporarily in recess for the standing committee to deliberate. When the meeting resumed, Commander Peng said, “The standing committee still wants you as the Health Director. Do a proper job. Set up a general disease prevention office and be the deputy director. Deng Hua will be the director.”

On the road later with Director Kim, he said that he was scared and trembling because he thought I’d be beheaded. He also said, “Your Commander Peng is great, he loves the troops! He both educates you and regards you highly. You have a good Party, and a good Commander. After returning to post, I reported everything to Deputy Commander Hong, including what Commander Peng said to me personally. Hong did not utter a word, except to say “Do a proper job!” After only a few days, the Director of the Northeast Military Region Health Division, Dai Zhenghua (since passed), was tasked by the Central Military Commission to investigate anti-bacteriological warfare work. I gave him a report of Commander Peng’s instructions. Dai said, “Don’t be afraid, just go do what Commander Peng said.” That night at midnight, I received a phone call from the Soviet Chief of Staff at Headquarters who, through a translator, said, “Stalin has asked whether bacteriological warfare is really occurring.” I answered, “Go ask Commander Peng,” and hung up the phone. I thought to myself, this is really hard to figure out! If I don’t do this right I’ll be beheaded. I should prepare myself to be beheaded.

After only a few days, He Cheng and Gong Rengquan organized a disease prevention inspection unit with a 30-person strong line-up that included He Qi and Wei Xi and had it come to Korea to aid in countering bacteriological warfare. Among them were:

- Entomologist He Qi
- Flea expert Liao Zhiying
- Parasite experts Wu Guang and Bao Dingcheng
- Bacteriologists Wei Xi, Chen Wengui (a plague expert who proved that Japan used the plague during the War of Resistance), Fang Liang (Korean), Xie Zhimu, Guo Shiqin, and Cheng Zhiyi
- Virologist Guo Chengzhou
- Epidemiology experts He Guanqing and Yu Huanwen
- Expert in Rickettsia corpuscles Liu Weitong (who is also an epidemiology expert)
- Approximately 10 young scientists (Ren Minfeng, Wu Zilin, Hu Jietang, Li Yimin, Li Zhenqiong, Gao Yundiao, Liu Yujing, etc.)
- 10 or more photographers and technicians

I divided them into 4 teams, the largest of which I placed near the Health Division. I placed the other 3 teams in the health departments of the Eastern, Central, and Western fronts respectively. These 3 teams were to take charge of the preliminary examination of specimens sent up from the field, and were responsible for directing disease prevention work on the ground. Specimens that had problems in the preliminary examination would be sent to the group headquarters at Seongcheon for a secondary examination. The number of specimens received was large (several hundred), and some had bacteria cultured from them. All of these were Salmonella-type, and neither plague nor cholera appeared. A few times anthrax was found
on tree leaf specimens. There were all kinds of so-called “dropped objects,” but it was difficult to link them to bacteriological warfare.

I quickly formulated anti-bacteriological warfare measures (strengthening individual health measures, giving more types of vaccinations, requiring everyone to pin their trouser leg and sleeve openings tight and wear scarves around the neck, setting sentries to watch the sky, developing methods for collecting and submitting specimens for examination, on-the-spot swatting of insects dropped from the air, sprinkling sanitizer, discovering suspiciously ill personnel first isolate them and then report, etc.) and promulgated them throughout the whole army. I also got Commander Peng's approval (which the PAV Headquarters and allied governments circulated to the whole army) to perform autopsies on the dead, giving a green light to researching the cause of their injury and death.

For the entire year, no sick patient or deceased person was found to have anything to do with bacteriological warfare. Because of our particular focus on health, the number of sick personnel was greatly reduced. Later, in 1987, a few army leader cadres ran into me and said, “The American imperialists engaged in such massive germ warfare but our side didn’t even have one death!” By then, I thought this was unimaginable.

That year [1952] we were busy with receiving investigatory delegations: Li Dequan [Otto Braun, Comintern advisor to the Chinese Communist Party] and Liao Chengzhi led the Chinese team, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, and the International Scientific Commission. The head of the latter delegation was Royal Society fellow Joseph Needham, who wrote \textit{Science and Civilisation in China}.\footnote{17} The deputy head of the delegation was U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences fellow Zhukov-Verezhnikov, who was experienced in this area and was a medical expert at the trial of Japanese bacteriological war criminals in Khabarovsk. He brought a young English translator named Mr. Kowalski.\footnote{18} Members of the delegation included Brazilian biologist and bat expert Dr. [Samuel B.] Pessoa, French veterinary expert Professor [Jean] Malterre, Swedish clinical laboratory scientist Dr. Andrea Andreen (female), and Italian biologist Dr. [Oliviero] Olivo. Our own Dr. Qian Sanqiang was the point-of-contact, Doctor Chen Shu was the Russian translator, tropical disease expert Dr. Zhong Huilan and (gynecology) professor Yan Renying (female) were English translators. Of the former two investigation teams, one was entirely Chinese and of course fully cooperated.

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers, not being natural scientists, diligently noted down everything we said, all the while cursing American imperialism. It was not the same with the International Scientific Commission: although they believed that the American imperialists conducted bacteriological warfare, we could not produce proof of the issue. Soviet Academician Zhukov was entrusted [with the task] by Stalin. He was an all-right fellow. When they came to Korea, which was right after the U.S. military conducted a huge bombing raid on Pyongyang, Pyongyang was a field of rubble. The investigation teams first inspected the bacterial evidence dropped by American planes in the Northeast [of China] (July 12 to July 25). Before entering Korea, Zhukov had said to them, “Korea is a battlefield and very dangerous, we might as well make a conclusion about the results of the Northeast investigation and sign it in order to avoid working hard and accomplishing nothing [if we get killed].” The other delegates thought this made sense, and wrote the initial conclusion that the U.S. military had conducted bacteriological warfare in Northeast China. In Korea (July 28 to August 1), they were set up in a hotel deep underground, but were still harassed by American planes at night.

On the day the hearing began, the Korean side reported two cases. One was of cholera deaths: American planes dropped straw baskets on Daedong in Pyongyang, which contained mussels carrying cholera. Patients ate the mussels, got cholera, and died. Korea had not had cholera in many years. The other case was of plague deaths: one day a family discovered fleas on the surface of their water jar, which was very strange. After a few days, members of the family fell ill and died. The autopsy revealed plague. Korea had never before had plague. (This case was prepared under the guidance of Professor Chen Wengui at the request of the Korean side, it was
similar to what he observed in water jars in the 1940s when Japan dropped disease-carrying fleas at Changde).

The Volunteer Army brought forward the case of two first lieutenants at the 20th Group encampment who discovered a dense group of fleas while chopping wood. They collected quite a few and sent them in. Plague was cultured from the fleas. Because we required everyone to tighten their trouser leg and sleeve openings and immediately sanitize areas upon which objects had been dropped from the sky while we were countering anti-bacteriological warfare, the army did not have any sick or dead. The scientists easily accepted this, and they adopted the testimony. The truth of this matter is that the fleas were discovered in small thatched cottages in the forest. These cottages have firewood and other assorted items in them that are suitable for flea colonies. It is difficult to say that the American imperialists dropped these in. When they were giving the above report, they did not mention the thatched cottages. This time when they were asked to go out and testify at the scene, one of them said that Chairman Mao taught him not to lie. He was unable to move. What to do? Only to persuade him to submit to the current needs of the struggle against the enemy and say that the place where fleas were discovered was out in the open. All the flea specimens were human fleas (*Pulexirritans*). As for the plague, that was easy, we could cause it to appear.

About the middle of May, Chen Wengui phoned me from our inspection team’s bacteria lab to tell me that Fang Liang had lost the plague cultures dropped by the enemy (the bacteria lab was originally Fang Liang’s responsibility, in reality the lab had never had plague cultures). Chen Wengui had studied plague with an Indian professor and discovered it at once. I realized that this was a big problem and immediately notified Director He Cheng in Beijing and Director Wang Bin in Northeast China to promptly send Comrade Men Xin to get the plague cultures or else this would all be [too] difficult to manage. Men Xin (who later served as the director of Military Hospital 203 in Liaoyang, since retired) went to Shenyang, and came back in 5 days with two tubes of plague cultures (packed in sealed iron pipes). I gave one tube to Chen Wengui, and gave the other to the North Korean deputy prime minister of health protection Ro Jin-han in the presence of the deputy captain of our disease prevention unit Li Zhefan. He had asked for the bacteria cultures before, and at this moment he knew exactly why I gave him the cultures. After this, I told Li Zhefan, “In case it will be difficult when the time comes to prove bacteriological warfare, inject me with plague and let me die. This way, the director of the Health Division will have caught the plague dropped by the U.S. military even if it is not iron-clad evidence.” He said, “That won’t do. We can always think of another way.” It was apparent how large the pressure was at this time. Li was of Korean ethnicity. Before Liberation he had done plague prevention work with Soviet experts in Northeast China and was already a remarkable expert. A few years ago I asked him if he remembered this affair, and he said he did not remember it too clearly.

Within this one year I went to Beijing three times to report on issues related to anti-bacteriological warfare. I saw Premier Zhou [Enlai] every time. Even though Premier Zhou had many matters to attend to, he asked a lot of very detailed questions about this issue. One time, the Korean Deputy Prime Minister for Health Protection went with me to Beijing and gave the Premier a report of the preparatory work of the International Scientific Investigation Team. The Premier asked the Korean side what difficulties there were, and I interjected, after which the Premier immediately asked Deputy Prime Minister Ro what he thought of my opinion. It moved me that the Premier had the noble character to respect the opinions of others, and at the same time made me feel like I should not so wantonly interrupt. One evening, at a little past 8 o’clock, the Premier was eating while discussing issues with me. He only had a small bowl of rice, two small plates of vegetables and a small bowl of soup. Quite a thrifty life.

Before the investigation teams returned to Northeast China, they went to Pyoktong prisoner of war camp on the northern border of Korea and met with several U.S. airmen. They had earlier published in *People’s Daily* that they had dropped bacteriological bombs. With the investigation teams, they freely discussed the classes they took on bacteriological weapons and their experience with “bombs that don’t explode.” After the ceasefire, they were exchanged back to
their country. I heard that they were all disciplined for this. I really admire the persuasion work of our personnel in the prisoner-of-war camps.

When the investigation teams returned to Beijing, they signed and published a 500-page-thick black book, Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China. They were received by Chairman Mao.

After the international scientists gave their report to Chairman Mao, he said, “I see that the American imperialists are experimentally engaged in bacteriological warfare.” They unanimously approved what he said.

After Academician Zhukov returned to the Soviet Union and reported to Stalin, a telegram came from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party saying that bacteriological warfare was a false alarm. Premier Zhou immediately sought out Chief of Staff Huang Kecheng and Deputy Commander Hong Xuezhi and asked, “Have you been up to tricks?” Hong answered, “Yes, otherwise we wouldn’t have had anything to report.” At that time, China had sent people to Europe to do anti-bacteriological warfare propaganda. Premier Zhou promptly ordered a retraction. Afterwards China did not raise the matter again, but following [generations] did not know. A few people who write books are always inserting that the American imperialists engaged in bacteriological warfare. I always recommend conveying that we were “threatened” by bacteriological warfare, thus taking a more defensible position. When he was sick, Huang Kecheng asked me to pass his opinion to the comrades at the Academy of Military Sciences who were editing an encyclopedia: “The American imperialists did not engage in bacteriological warfare in Korea. Right now the two countries’ relationship is not bad, and it would be inappropriate to keep talking about this issue.” When they heard this, they sent someone to ask if there had been bacteriological warfare after all. I only said that we do not have enough evidence.

This has been my silent regret for decades. There has been no other. I only feel sorry for the international scientists who signed their names. Perhaps I am too naïve, because it is possible they knew the truth but obeyed the requirements of the political struggle. If it was like this then fine, but if not then they were deceived by me. I had unceasingly expressed my apology for them to Huang Kecheng. Huang said, “You don’t need to feel this way, this was political struggle! Furthermore you had expressed your views on bacteriological warfare from the beginning. It was not an easy situation, and you were given responsibility too late.”

I think that there will be a day in history to speak clearly about this incident. Now that I am an 83-year-old man who knows the facts and is no longer on duty, it is fitting to speak out: the bacteriological war of 1952 was a false alarm.

September 1997

(Retrospective from February 2, 2005: Last year, in 2004, Professor Li Yimin at the Military Hospital Academy of Science forwarded an essay written by a professor at a Belgian medical college, discussing this affair in particular, which said: “Russia has published documents from the former Soviet Union. In the fall of 1952, the Soviet Central Party Committee sent telegrams to Chairman Mao Zedong and Chairman Kim Il Sung respectively, claiming that the U.S. military had certainly not conducted bacteriological warfare and that it was a false alarm. The Academy membership of Soviet expert Zhukov has been revoked because he took the lead on producing the black book.”)

(The author [Wu Zhili] is the former Director of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Health Division)

([Yanhuang chunqiu] Editor: Huang Zhong)

The Chinese word used, wenshen [瘟神], is a deity traditionally believed in Korea and China to cause disease and
pestilence. The fact that European crowds were using the name of a Chinese deity in this case may be embellishment by the author.


[3] The Chinese term is generally used to refer to the *Pulex irritans*. The original article uses the common names for organisms, except in a few cases where the scientific name is given parenthetically after the common name in the text. In all other cases, the translator has provided the scientific nomenclature in the footnotes.

[4] Possibly intended to refer to *Isotomurus palustris*.

[5] Although the author used the term for “housefly” above, this instance uses only the more general categorical sense of “fly.”

[6] Here the author uses the term “housefly” again.

[7] *Carassius carassius*.

[8] Zhu uses the word for an academic article [wenzhang, 文章] rather than the word for an official report [baogao, 報].

[9] It is unclear whether this refers to the PLA Central Health Division or a national government central health division, but in either case it is superior to the PVA Health Division.

[10] The word in Chinese translated here as ‘engaged in’ often has a negative connotation, and can imply that the speaker/writer feels that the action carried out was nefarious.


[12] In the original manuscript, the author has He Qi saying the term “false alarm” in English.

[13] The Chinese word used here is second person plural.

[14] *Yersinia pestis*.


[16] *Bacillus anthracis*.


[18] This rendering in English is an approximation of the original Russian name filtered through Chinese pronunciation.


[20] The name of the Indian professor is given in Chinese as suoke [索克], but the English spelling could not be determined.

[21] In simplified Chinese pronounced *Lu Zhenhan* [振], which in Korean hanja is rendered 류진한 or in Hangul 로진한.

[22] That is, ethnic Korean Chinese.

[23] Or, “They unanimously approved this way of putting it.”
朝停距今（1997年）已44年，至于1952年全世界，美帝主有口的菌的真相如何？

答案是—— 惊。

党中央是确正（至少始的候）美的行了菌，我了全和全，

花了大力和物力行反菌，美帝主也是一臭名的地，原朝美司令李奇微，1952年末任洲盟司令，到了机，群他是裨神，一下不了台。他上帝之名الطاعية 有行菌，才他走。

事件的起是冬季的雪地上出大量和跳蚤。后知道是雪蚤，不是人蚤，朝ogului，是冬季雪地自然象。雪蚤是尾目（Colembola）黑跳虫（Isotomapalustris）。我北也有雪蚤的告。那我以雪地上不可能有和跳蚤，加上日日本菌犯石井朝前查美不明死亡，于是中央判定美行了菌。

事件的主要如下：1952年1月29日，志愿生和志愿司令部收到42：美机于1952年1月28日、平康郡地，壕雪地上多种昆虫，有蚤，和似跳蚤的昆虫。42送跳蚤（雪蚤），33和似跳蚤的昆虫本、我化室行培，有致病菌。42生部是高良，是我在三校的教育，一很心和有水平的生干部，他一定菌有所警惕，才42的同志司，引起彭德怀司令的高度重。党中央，又告各部警惕和及告似情，一几乎所有部都有似（月中有近次告）。告投的西是五花八，有死鼠，有，有大蚊子，有昆虫容器（似是美撤宣用品的四格和降落地的筒），有和蛇，有一位告有朝居民突然死亡，告河中漂大量死，并送10余小死（一）本，菌培出是沙氏杆菌。《人民日》又美机多次投北投撒菌，死鼠和其他西，恰巧此，美前不明死亡，美派日本菌犯，原731部的石井朝查此事，并公布此消息。党中央根据以上情报判美行了菌。不几天，1952年2月22日，《人民日》版醒目消息，表中人民志愿和政府的名，美帝在朝和我北行大模菌并附有投撒物和菌涂片的照片，在全世界引起震和，事先我并不知《人民日》么快公布。公布后，我生部朱直光副部（已故世），下我要被了。朱今后只有做文章。

中央生部是副家，他在北工作，知道日本的731部是搞菌的部，知道石井其人其事，是他的判，党中央同意了。他派昆虫家何奇教授和菌家魏曦教授（二人均古世）朝查。他前，我有次派（包括我本人）到告位去核情，果是雪地上有昆虫和其他投撒物，但未突然死人和可疑病人，前死人的位是道听途的事件，至于，几乎家家灶前煮饭后，它可到口雪地上。我分析：（1）帝主是什么坏事都能干得出的，菌也不例外。（2）但冬不是行菌的好季，天冷昆虫活跃无力，也不利于菌繁殖。（3）在前壕招一投，人烟少，有病也染，而且离美壕不千米，有反的可能。（4）朝本有昆虫染病流行，城房舍多被炸毁，百姓都在防空洞中，生活困，朝民族极强，再菌也不更大力使他投降。（5）我的初步查尚未能美行菌。我向洪副司令我的看法，他同意我意告彭和中央。我欲找前多事事，以免被和浪人力。来是（何魏二教授尚未前到的事）中央即批我警惕性不高，就是未行菌，也可乘此。

加强生工作。后何魏二教授下去作了查，查了昆虫本和菌涂片。何所跳蚤是雪蚤，魏雪蚤染色涂片是有形如鼠疫杆菌的菌，但呈革氏性（鼠疫杆菌是性），也培不出鼠疫菌。我他的看法，何奇（原），“我看是false alarm（惊）”彭看到我的后，要我查，洪副司令要我如将问的我的看法。恰巧朝人民防务局的金局奉命查我摸底和商量如何，因他也拿不出据。他他一同去，希望金能作找不到菌据的。等到了。

郡志司所在地。（我住成川郡，郡志司大小的汽路程。）彭、宋副司令等十余人在座。我了我查的果和看大彭。彭地（大意）：我生部是美帝主的特，替人，志愿的健康能有保障？他接着，有关你病不心，上死一干一死一万可以，下后死一，我都找你算。我，我可以不生部，我无所求，但我在朝打仗。彭宣布休，常委，夏后，彭，常委要你生部，好好干，成立防务公室，你副主任的（主任）。和金山同志后的路上，他他得报，以真要了。又你彭好，他兵，你又教育鱼囊，你有好觉，好司令。回到志后，问洪副司令，包括彭和我人的容。洪不吱，你好干吗！几天后，北生部正部（已故世）受委生部之职，查反菌工，我向他彭的指示，戴，你不要怕，就按彭的去做。日半夜，我接到志司的一翻的，斯大林菌是否真有其事。我答，你去彭，挂了。我心想，真！搞不好真要，有神经的精准。
几天后，和乃真朝何何和魏曦在有30余人容强大的防疫 朝助反菌，他之中有：

昆虫家何何

跳蚤家柳枝英

寄生虫家光包，包，包

菌家魏曦，文（鼠疫菌家，抗

明日投撒鼠疫），方亮（朝族），知母，

郭程知

病毒家郭成周

流行病家何清俞文

立克小体家通（也是流行病家）

青年科家10人左右（任民峰，滋霖，胡

介堂，李民，李振琼，高，育京等）

影和技10余人

我把自己成4，最大的放在部附近，另3放到中、西三的兵生。分任基地的本

的初，并到指防疫工作。初有本的本，送到成川大本部作二。本是收到不少，有好几份文，也培育

出病菌，但都是沙氏菌之，未出鼠疫杆菌和霍弧菌。有1-2次在本中，查到炭疽杆菌。所大投撒物，形

形色色都有，但很，和菌挂上。

我很快定了反菌的措施（加强人生活措施，注射多种疫苗，每人要扎腿和袖口，毛巾，空

哨，采本送方法，就地扑打空投昆虫，撒消毒，可疑患者先隔离后告等），全，井取得彭的同意，可以

死者尸解（由志司和志政通知全），后研究死原因，了灯。

整一年中，有一名和菌有的患者或死者。由于究生，病少不少。一些部，干部，1987年遇我的候，美帝搞么大的菌，我方竟有一名死者，那就得不可思议。

一年我忙于接待查：李定全和李德全的名人的查，民主法律查和科家查。后者是英科院院士李瑟（Joseph Needham，著《中科技史》）。副，是科院院士茹科夫·列斯尼科夫院士，他很有方面，曾任伯力判日本菌的家。他一名青年英文翻可斯基先生。有巴西生物蝙蝠家索教授，法家戴尔教授，瑞典法庭家安德琳博士，（女），意大利生物家利佛教授，我三强博士任，述，任俄文翻，病家惠博士和（科）仁英教授（女）任英文翻。前查，一全是中人，然全力合作。

民主法律查，不是自然科家。什么他都真下，都美帝主。科家查就不一不。然他相信美帝行了菌，但我不能在据上出一点。茹科夫院士是受托于斯大林。他真行。他朝候，正是美平壤行大炸之后，平壤一片瓦。查先在北查美机在那里投撒菌的据（7月12日至7月25日）。入朝之前，茹科夫院士他，朝是，很危，我不妨北查果作，字，免得万一有意外，我而无功。其余的有道理，于是了美在中北行菌的初步。在朝（7月28日至8月1日），他被安置在深深的地下旅，夜晚受到美机的扰，听那朝方先作案件告，一，是霍病死亡例，是美机在平壤大同投下草包，有霍菌的蛙（文蛤），患者吃了蛙，得霍死亡。朝多年有霍了。另一，是鼠疫死亡，是家人某天在水缸表面了跳蚤，很奇怪，几天，家中有人病故，尸解是鼠疫。朝有鼠疫。（是朝方教文教授等的案情，和他40年代日本在常德投撒菌的跳蚤，水缸中很相似。）志愿国出来的20兵地名中尉在砍柴、密密的跳蚤群，他收集了不少，送培出鼠疫菌的案例。由于我在反菌，要求每人都要束腿和袖口，及投撒消毒，故无患者和死亡，此事件很利地被科家接受，通了。案件的真我是，跳蚤是在森林里的小茅屋里的，小茅屋有柴草和物，适合跳蚤的繁殖。就很美帝投的。他上候，有提到小茅屋。次要他出作，他中一人，毛主席教他不要，僵停了。怎么？只有服他服前的斗，把跳蚤的地点成是露天。蚤本是人蚤（Pulexirritans）。至于鼠疫杆菌，那就，我使它出了。
大在5月，文在我 的菌室打 告我，方亮把 投的鼠疫杆菌菌种 了（原是方亮 菌室，是 有 鼠疫杆菌菌种）。文在印度索克教授那里，鼠疫，一下子就 了。我意到 是大，上 北京的部和北的王斌，即派 新同志 取鼠疫菌种。一定要，不然一切都不好。新（后在203院院，已离体）去沈，回，取回 管鼠疫菌种（在密封的管里）。我把一管交文，一管我防 防副 李哲范的面交朝 保健副相 沈。他向我要 菌种。他心中有 何 我他菌种。事后我 李哲范，万一 明菌，我我注射鼠疫 菌我死，就 生部 染上美 投撒的鼠疫，不不怕是 ，他，那不行，有 法可找。可 力之大，李是朝 族， 解放前和 家在北一起搞 防鼠疫工作，已是出色的 家了。早几年我 他 不得此事，他 不太清了。

一年里，我跑了三次北京，有 反菌。每次都到周 理。周 理日理

万机，此事 非常之。一次，朝方保健副相和我同去北京，向 理 科 查 的准 工作，理 朝方有何因，我插了嘴，理 上 副相 我的意 是何看法，我 我非常感 理尊重 人的高 品格，同 我使感到我不 便插嘴。一次，晚上8点多，理一面 吃一面 和我。他就吃一小碗，小碟菜，— —素，一小碗。多 朴的生活。

查 回北前，去朝北 碧潼 俘 美空 几名 行，他 早在〈人民日〉上 表了他 投菌的。次他 又自由地向 查 他 听 投菌武器的 和 投 “不爆炸 的炸”。停 后，他 被交 回，美 他 何 莫 的 菌 之事。他回答， 中方答 很快放他 回。听 他 都 舍受 了分。我真佩服 俘 我方 人 的 服工作。

查 回到北京，了字，表了500厚的黑皮〈查在朝 和中的菌事 科委 告及附件〉。毛主席接了他。

科家向毛主席。后，毛主席，我看美帝 是 性的菌。他 异口同 同的法。

茹科夫院士回 向斯大林。后， 共中央，菌 是一 惊。周 理 上找 我 和洪 智副司令，你 做了手脚 有。洪答，做了，不然那 法交差，我 正派人于 洲作反 菌 宣， 理即下令撤回。之后我 再不提此事，但下面并不知道。一些 的人老要把美帝戴 菌 去。我 是建 用我 受到 菌的“戒”的口气，把文章做 在“防”的方面，克 病中要我向 事科院 百科全 的同志 他的意，美帝 在朝 搞 菌，在 系也不坏，不宜再 。他 听到之后，派人 我究竟有 有菌。我只 我 有足 的据。

事是我几十年的心病，有 的，只 得不中外科 家，他 都 名。也 我是太天真，因 他 可能知道 真相，但服 政治斗 需要。如是 倒 了，如不是 ，他 是受我 了。我曾不止一次向 克 不起他。你 不用 么想，搞政治斗 嘛，而且一 始你就表示了你 菌 的看法，是很不容易的事，你已 到 任了。

我想 件事在 史上 有一天要 马，在由我 在的知情的83 的老人 出 比 合适：1952 年的菌 是一 惊。

1997年9月

(2005年2月2日追。去年，2004年，事 院科 院李 民教授 一份比利时 科大 一位教授 的文章，此事，俄 公布了前 的案。共中中央1952年秋，同一天 毛 主席和金日成主席 了，美 并未 行菌，你 是一 惊，已 家茹科夫 撤 院士的 分，因他 搞了黑皮 告)

(作者[之理] 原中 人民志愿 生部)