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Research Memorandum RFE-44 from Roger Hilsman to Acting Secretary, 'Japan’s Reaction to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation'

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Summary:
This “Limited Distribution” report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in US-Japan security relations or in Tokyo’s general approach to nuclear weapons.

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TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: INR - Roger Hillsman
SUBJECT: Japan's Reaction to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation

The following study has been prepared at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Policy Planning Council, and examines the implications of Japanese reactions to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. It focuses on prospective developments during the 1963-5 period, the likely time for Peiping to explode a crude nuclear device but several years before Peiping possesses a meaningful nuclear weapons capability. Key assumptions underlying the analysis include (1) continuation of the existing balance of political forces within Japan, (2) no international agreement banning the testing or employment of nuclear weapons in Asia, and (3) exclusion of Communist China from the UN and an absence of diplomatic relations between Communist China and both Japan and the US.

ABSTRACT

The primary impact of a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation, so far as Japan is concerned, will be political rather than military. In a further effort to disrupt US-Japan security relations and to neutralize Japan, Peiping may claim that Japan's only protection against involvement in nuclear war is through elimination of US military bases on its territory. This claim may be accomplished by renewed proposals for an "atom free zone" in the Pacific and requests for "normalization of Sino-Japanese relations."

Depending upon steps taken by the US to anticipate and follow up Peiping's initial nuclear detonation, Japanese reaction could complicate US-Japan relations. The ruling conservative party would probably move cautiously and pursue a "wait and see" policy to assess the full import of developments elsewhere in Asia, as well as in Japan itself. In the short-run domestic public opinion may revive discussion of the 1945 nuclear holocausts, demonstrations against US bases, and demands for a global prohibition of atomic weapons. Peiping's themes might be amplified in Japan by pacifistic and socialistic intellectuals, communist front organizations, and mass media sensationalism.
In the longer-run the policy choices of the Japanese Government could be affected by secondarily related issues such as the stability and growth of Japan's economy, the relative cohesion of radical and conservative factions, and the prospects for Sino-Japanese trade. It is possible that pre-detonation and post-detonation moves by both US and Japanese leaders could awaken Japanese public opinion to the need for continued reliance on Free World strength and a greater contribution to the security of Asia. This could be of longer-run importance as Peiping acquires a strategic nuclear capability. It is unlikely, however, that any sudden or basic changes in Japan's foreign policy will result from the detonation alone, either in undermining US-Japanese security arrangements, or in immediately increasing Japan's participation in Free World defense arrangements, especially where nuclear weapons are concerned.
## Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Impact of External Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Estimated Range of Japanese Reaction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Left</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Right</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Short Range Outlook</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Long Range Outlook</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Short Range Implications for US Policy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Nuclear Armament and National Policies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Postwar Policy Outlook</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Majority View of National Security</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Minority View of National Security</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Major Components of Japanese Reactions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Japanese Public</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Opinion Media Trends</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Present Status of Nuclear Conditioning</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Military and Finance Leaders</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii

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A. Impact of External Environment

External events are likely to have a considerable bearing on the intensity and directions of Japanese reactions to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation, with Peiping's political use of the detonation perhaps playing a key role. Other variables in the external environment that could affect Japanese reactions include the state of cold war tensions, relationship between Peiping and Moscow, new Chinese Communist moves in Southeast Asia or the Taiwan Straits, and a measure of international agreement on disarmament.

Peiping's posture toward Japan during the detonation and early post-detonation period will be conditioned by its primary aim of eliminating US power in Asia. Japan's security treaty with the US is a cornerstone of the American military presence in the Western Pacific and therefore a major obstacle to this goal. So long as the American position in Japan is strong, Peiping's primary objective will be to weaken that position. Its efforts in this phase of strategy will be directed toward undercutting the domestic strength of Japan's conservative government as a prerequisite to moving the nation toward neutralism. It will probably not, in this phase, adopt a posture of overt military threat. Peiping's lack of a nuclear delivery capability will not be the sole factor conditioning this choice. Policy constructions which will avoid prompting a Japanese nuclear capability will be equally important.

It seems likely that Peiping will exploit the detonation on two levels. Because the event itself will not alter the balance of power in the Far East and to avoid causing an undesired over-reaction, Chinese Communist moves vis-a-vis the Japanese Government may well continue initially in a low key. To the Japanese public, however, Peiping's propaganda approaches are apt to be more vigorous, compressing the timing of the detonation, weapons development, and delivery capability so as to achieve the maximum psycho-political impact. Peiping would hope thereby to create a ground swell of public opinion which could then be turned against the government itself.

The main themes of Peiping's communications to various Japanese audiences are likely to be:

1) The heightened dangers of alliance with the US; an attempt to equate US base rights with a quasi-belligerent status for Japan.

2) Peiping's peaceful intentions, including the non-military uses of atomic energy, revived consideration of an atom-free Pacific zone,
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1) The heightened dangers of alliance with the US; an attempt to equate US base rights with a quasi-belligerent status for Japan.

2) Peiping's peaceful intentions, including the non-military uses of atomic energy, revived consideration of an atom-free Pacific zone,
full membership in the UN (with GRC expulsion as a precondition),
diplomatic recognition as a prelude to greatly enhanced trade with
Japan.

3) The image of Communist China as a new world power, as
Asia's first nuclear power, as a full partner in the irresistibly
strong Communist bloc toward which Asia's balance of power was
shifting, inevitably and irrevocably.

4) US inability to protect Japan in nuclear war; the
danger that US pressures on Japan to prepare for nuclear war
will lead to a revival of Japanese militarism.

Among these main themes, Peiping will have an infinite
number of variations but always with the basic thrust: the risk
level of Japan's US alliance in a nuclear armed Asia is unacceptable.

B. Estimated Range of Japanese Reaction

Communist China's initial detonation of a nuclear device will
not come as a surprise in Japan. Public discussion of this possibility
has been underway for more than a year. A government white paper,
published in mid-1961 predicted that Communist China would begin
nuclear weapons tests within the next three years. Nevertheless, the
actual detonation will impress the Japanese as signalling the entry of
an Asian nation into the nuclear club and be a clear demonstration
of Communist China's world power status.

The initial shock period is apt to be fairly short. In its own
political interest, the Japanese Government would be obliged to pour
oil on the waters of public opinion. In this effort it may receive
support from public media leaders who have shifted noticeably away
from irresponsible emotionalism in the past two years. The press
is more likely to continue this trend than to revert to hysteria.
The Japanese public, too, is apt to react more calmly than it would
have a year or so ago, before Soviet and, subsequently, US nuclear
testing resumed and the public became relatively, if unhappily,
accustomed to it.

The Chinese Communist detonation will have a special impact
however it is played. Whereas many Japanese have sought re-
assurance from the belief that the USSR's preoccupations were
primarily in Europe, they are likely to feel that Communist China will
focus particular attention on technically advanced, economically
prosperous Japan. The nature, if not the limits, of the potential
threat will be very clear. Ten years ago the demonstrations of a Soviet nuclear capability found Japan with no alternatives to passivity. While a similar response to a Chinese Communist capability is also possible, the Japanese now have a wider range of choices.

The detonation will inevitably bring the problem of Japan’s defense posture to the forefront of public consciousness. It will serve to force reconsideration of problems that the Japanese have generally preferred to ignore -- most prominently, what to do about Japan’s vulnerability to nuclear attack. A crystallization of existing attitudes and a consolidation of opposing policy positions appears more likely than panic or a sharp shift in orientation. Leftists, who argue that a Communist state will not wage aggressive war and who have tended to discount Communist China’s aggressive intentions toward Japan, are not likely to alter their appraisal since it is based upon an idealistic view of China’s inherent pacifism and not on estimates of Chinese capabilities. To most Japanese, however, Peiping’s possession of a nuclear potential is likely to bring home more strongly than ever the hopelessly inadequate state of their country’s defenses. Barring the reoccurrence of the 1960 type of concatenation of internal and external tensions, the rethinking of Japan’s defense posture is apt to be serious and solemn despite the best efforts of the articulate left-wing minority to whip up hysteria.

1. The Left. The Socialists and the Communists will predictably step up the present campaign to abrogate US-Japan security arrangements and to move Japan toward a policy of neutralism. They will exploit whatever enhanced respect Communist China gains from the events as a nation capable of joining the nuclear club. They will use the initial detonation as proof of the capability and efficiency of a "socialist" society. The organized left can be expected to bring renewed vigor to its advocacy of international agreements, in which Peiping would participate, to ban nuclear tests and weapons, to bring about general disarmament, and to secure a demilitarized Pacific zone.

Unless careful moves were made to downgrade the detonation’s impact before it occurred, the Japanese left might also find it possible to use the event to exacerbate existing US-Japan frictions. Particularly if Peiping timed the detonation to coincide with heightened tensions in the Far East, old issues such as storing nuclear weapons in Japan, Japan’s involuntary involvement in crises outside its own borders, and the Okinawa reversion problem could be exploited. The question of escalation even in small conflicts might be revived by the organized left, with sympathetic support from Japan’s intellectuals, students, urban laborers and at least a part of the press. Non-military frictions, such as US trade policies and inhibitions on trade with Communist China, would receive renewed attention from the left.
There may be some defections from left-wing ranks over the shock of discovering that Communist China is, indeed, militant enough to develop nuclear armaments. For the most part, however, the leftists will be moved to rationalize Peking's acquisition of nuclear capacity as a necessary defense measure which does not constitute a threat against Japan.

2. The Right. Supporters of a more rapid defense buildup for Japan may get a more positive response from among those who had tended to discount Japan's vulnerability on the thesis that the USSR was preoccupied in Europe and Communist China lacked the means for a major military offensive effort. National pride and confidence that Japan is capable of outstripping China technically would also support this view. There are powerful elements in the Liberal Democratic Party who might initially press for arming Japan's defense forces with dual capability weapons and who might be prepared to allow the US to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

However, such advocates of greater defense effort probably would not find ready support among the conservatives in control of the government. The latter would be deliberate in reconsidering a defense policy which they could argue has provided maximum security at minimum cost. Japan has enjoyed the safety of a nuclear deterrent without the economic or political sacrifice inherent in the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. Crises elsewhere in Asia may relate ultimately to Japan's security, but they have been met so far without involvement of Japan's military force. Japan's military budget takes a smaller share of GNP than for any Asian country, communist or non-communist. In short, in this view, a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation would provide no obvious and immediate reason for altering the US alliance, for stepping up the pace of Japan's defense effort, or for plunging into an independent nuclear program. In any case the dynamics of conservative party factionalism and the past record of conservative disunity on major controversial issues argue against agreement within the government itself on a policy of nuclear armament.

3. The Short Range Outlook. Short of a direct threat to the security of the home islands or an unforeseen rise to power of a dynamic new political force in Japan, a marked change in the country's defense policies appears unlikely. Neither the initial detonation nor the subsequent achievement of a limited delivery capability by themselves will have that effect. Heightened domestic and external tensions in concert could force the pace of policy reconsideration. To the extent that the resulting debate freed itself from sensationalism and political irresponsibility, it might serve to educate Japanese opinion on the present and prospective shape of Free Asia's security.
Such public discussion might also clarify the reasons for Japan's dependence on a continued US presence, and its need to make greater contributions to its own military protection. Over a period of time, basic modifications might occur in Japanese attitudes toward nuclear weapons, perhaps permitting participation in advanced weapons systems' deployment in purely defensive fashion on the islands or in adjacent waters.

4. The Long Range Outlook. Japan may be expected to share with some of the stronger NATO countries a resurgence of nationalist feeling and sharpened desires for international prestige. These views will not necessarily lead, as they have in France and Britain, to the development of a national nuclear capability. More reasonable would be the expectation that Japan would share certain negative attitudes prevalent among the NATO allies -- a desire to allow the US to carry the main military burden for the Free World and persistent doubts about US willingness to use its nuclear deterrent, thereby risking attack on itself, in the defense of Japan. Japan does not enjoy the cushion of a multilateral alliance. Until the day when technology encompasses a more effective defense against missile attacks or when Japanese strategic thinking returns to the premises that underlay its axis with Germany, the country's exposed strategic position will continue to buttress existing preferences for modest, low keyed defense policies.

As the Chinese Communists increase their nuclear delivery capabilities, the range of conceivable consequences in Japan could include: 1) a more dynamic and nationalistic government actively promoting a military buildup in the context of a Western alignment; 2) a conservative government leading a new disengagement policy and seeking forms of accommodation with the Chinese Communists on terms which it would hope would leave the conservatives in power domestically; 3) fragmentation of both conservatives and socialists leading to a series of unstable and short-lived coalitions; 4) a socialist government actively seeking to ingratiate itself with Communist China and dedicated to a neutralist foreign policy.

C. Short Range Implications for US Policy

The degree of shock generated in Japan by the initial Chinese Communist nuclear detonation can be substantially lowered. Within the larger framework of our policies toward Japan, the specific objectives of US initiatives in this contingency might include:

1. Countering an image of Chinese Communist power which might induce awe or fear.

2. Demonstrating the manageable proportions of the threat so as to spur local defense efforts and make them appear worthwhile.
3. Convincing the Japanese that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not affect our willingness to explore all ways of safeguarding peace in the area.

4. Avoiding positions which might reduce the subsequent flexibility of our nuclear weapons policy.

US initiatives could encompass educative diplomacy directed at key Japanese leaders as well as several types of mass media educational programs. Such efforts will require some time to effect, and adroit handling to preclude arousing unnecessary apprehension. Although there are risks involved in laying the pre-detonation groundwork, they would appear to be less than responding after the fact to expected Chinese Communist exploitation of their accomplishment. Among the most apparent risks inherent in a program of pre-detonation education would be pressures for creation of an "atom free zone" in the Pacific. Such pressures seem bound to occur sooner or later in any case. Similar preparations against an expected increase in pressure to admit Communist China to the UN and other international organizations -- including disarmament negotiations -- will also be in order.

The methods by which US pre-detonation initiatives are to be implemented also raise serious policy problems. If initial approaches are confined to selected groups of Japanese leaders, the possibility of leaks could arouse exaggerated concern and carry counterproductive implications of US anxiety. On the other hand, a wider initial approach via mass media of information, is also capable of arousing undesirable public speculation, particularly if the Japanese Government itself were not adequately prepared to handle a domestic rebuttal. A combined public-private approach similar to that used to cushion the impact of US nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1962 would probably be feasible.

The content of US presentations should probably differ somewhat according to the target audience. Japanese civilian and military leaders would have a greater appreciation of analyses of Chinese Communist deficiencies in electronics, reliance on outside sources of technological information and material and similar argumentation designed to downgrade the Chinese effort than would the general public. US propaganda efforts to downgrade publicly specific Soviet technological accomplishments, for example, have been less effective than positive demonstrations that the US can match or outdo its rivals.

The Japanese public would probably be more receptive to emphasis on Communist China's vulnerability to counterblows, its inability to affect US retaliatory capabilities, and the probable unwillingness of the Soviet Union to risk general war for unilateral Chinese Communist aggression. The Japanese would welcome reiteration of the defensive nature of US
military strength, its constant willingness to negotiate for disarmament and its demonstrable championship of world peace. At the same time, reassurance of US willingness to defend its friends against attack and objective analyses designed to demonstrate that the balance of power has not been altered in the Far East also would be in order. Rather than attempting to downgrade the Chinese Communist technological accomplishment directly in public, argumentation that Peiping must constantly rely upon bluff and blackmail rather than superior power is available in the Quemoy crises of 1954 and 1958. Peiping's leaders should be pictured as calculating and shrewd rather than fanatic, irrational, or explosive in potential behavior. Their aims may be shown as jeopardizing the fate of all non-communist Asia, but their means must seem amenable to defeat through firmness.

The Japanese Government and public should be braced for an expected Chinese Communist propaganda campaign exploiting the detonation. US initiatives should be designed to reduce the impact of the Chinese campaign by placing the detonation in its strategic perspective. Regardless of the skill with which the US pre-detonation program is conducted, however, it is bound to raise longer range fundamental issues concerning the defense of Japan.

The US program could generate a series of new problems in the US-Japan alliance involving not only the specifics of Japan's own defense posture, but larger policy issues concerning nuclear proliferation. Heightened tensions deriving from Communist China's nuclear detonation may force the pace of Japanese policy decisions. While a strong Japanese response to the initial detonation is unlikely, the impact of US influence can be turned in several directions. Indefinite preservation of the status quo ante is probably impossible. It will be easier to determine what we do not want to occur (i.e., Japan's neutralization) than to cast in precise terms how far we would like Japan's defense development to proceed and at what pace.

In the continued absence of an international agreement on armament limitations, Japan may well proceed to strengthen its military establishment to give it enhanced independence of political choice and a greater voice in determining military policies in the Far East. Obsolescence alone will demand modernization of its weapons arsenal. The development of modern conventionally armed defensive weapons is already underway. A transition to dual capability defensive weapons, initially acquired from the US but eventually manufactured in Japan, is possible should the Japanese conclude that an international disarmament agreement is hopeless. This view would be reinforced if the proliferation of nuclear weapons caused them eventually to be regarded as a normal and necessary part of the military equipment of key major powers. Further development of security policies beyond a purely defensive phase to include the acquisition of a Japanese deterrent capacity, in the form of an off-shore based system such as Polaris, is a remote possibility at best.
Japan's responsible leaders have not yet formulated a firm long range policy on the development and use of nuclear weapons. In constructing their national security policies, however, they have been careful to draw a fine line between what is politically possible at present and what may be necessary in the future. Their "wait and see" approach will place a premium on the appearance of strength tempered by responsibility which must characterize US policy throughout Asia.
A. Nuclear Armament and National Policies

Japanese popular attitudes toward nuclear armaments have been consistently negative. With rare exceptions, official views have reflected rather than led public opinion on this subject. The result has been what amounts to a national neurosis, often ascribed to Japan's unique role as the only victim of nuclear attack. The actual causes go much deeper. They relate to Japan's exposed strategic position, to the political and social revolution in the home islands over the past fifteen years, to the lingering psychological aftermaths of World War II -- in sum, to the totality of Japan's readjustment to a revised role in Asian and world affairs.

1. Postwar Policy Outlook. Under conservative leadership for all but two of the 17 postwar years, Japan has consciously and deliberately turned away from its prewar position as an independent military power. It has sought economic prosperity and stability at home, and acceptability and equality abroad. It has, with some reluctance, recognized alignment with the United States as a basic requirement of its national welfare and its national security.

As Asia's most economically advanced nation, and one of the world's great industrial complexes, Japan shares generally in the outlook common to other developed nations of the northern hemisphere. At the same time it seeks to retain its Asian identity through close association with the Afro-Asian nations and sees itself as a bridge between these different worlds. It has learned to live with the reality of a nearby communist-dominated mainland, but has continued to seek a more satisfactory relationship with both Moscow and Peking. Success in this effort would hopefully, without sacrifice of national interests served in its Western alignment, soften the harsh outlines of the aggressive threat posed by communism and perhaps even improve its security and economic well-being. Peace for Japan is a cornerstone of national policy. The question of how to preserve it is the main foreign policy issue in Japanese politics.

2. The Majority View of National Security. Japan's conservatives, who have won a substantial majority in every postwar election, recognize that their country's industrial capacity and strategic position make it a primary target for communist expansion. They reject neutralism as dangerous and unfeasible for Japan, and accept mutual security arrangements with the US as the only practicable protection. The chief risk is that Japan might unwillingly become involved in hostilities. However, fears of general war have abated considerably and confidence that the US will not abuse its military rights in Japan has grown. For the majority, Japan's security position is at least tolerable.
3. The Minority View of National Security. The position of the left-wing opposition, ranging all the way from moderate Socialists to the communists, is less coherent, but in general embraces the severance of the security treaty with the US; formal peace treaties with Communist China and the USSR; a collective security arrangement with the US, USSR, and Communist China; and a reduction of Japan's own defense establishment. The largest element in the left-wing opposition, the Japan Socialist Party, advocates neutralism on the basis that Japan's only safe course lies in non-alignment with either power bloc; alliance threatens involvement in war which could only end in disaster for Japan.

B. Major Components of Japanese Reactions

1. The Japanese Public. There has been a discernible movement in the trend of Japanese public opinion toward national defense issues over the past decade. Despite the absence of an external crisis of sufficient dimensions to impinge directly upon Japan's national security, the public has moved along slowly in the wake of the government's emerging defense posture. A substantial majority of the voters repeatedly has returned to office conservative governments which upheld the security alliance with the US and modest levels of domestic appropriations reserved for the self-defense forces. This same majority, and some of the minority as well, have endorsed Japan's pursuit of peaceful uses of atomic energy. There was virtually no political opposition to Japan's participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency, or to the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the US and the UK for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. Despite some public confusion over the differences between military and non-military end uses of nuclear studies (a confusion exploited by communists and other leftists), the country has established a program of research that compares favorably with all but the most advanced western nations. The Japanese public, in sum, has moved a long way in the past decade from an attitude of almost universal militant pacifism.

The vocal minority, which clings to pacifism and works for Japan's neutralisation in the cold war, has failed over the past ten years to increase its popular support for these objectives. This suggests that it is constantly losing from its ranks young people who develop a more mature outlook toward Japan's position in the world. The left depends for the maintenance of its present size upon new infusions of youth; to a lesser extent the shift of the rural population toward the cities also bolsters left-wing strength. Neither of these factors seems capable in the short run of altering the fundamental bases which now characterize the main divisions of the Japanese electorate. If the traditions of parliamentary democracy were more deeply ingrained, the ability of the leftist minority to obstruct and confuse Japan's defense policies would be important but not critical. Given leftist license and a permissive government view toward extra-parliamentary agitation, the power of the minority opposition to influence key government policies has been seriously out of line with public opinion as measured at the polls.
2. Opinion Media Trends. Particularly in the past few years, external events have kept the nuclear armament issue before the public on a fairly constant basis. The clearest indicators of shifting Japanese views have come from reactions to the 1961 Soviet and 1962 US nuclear test series. The Soviet breach of the testing moratorium was poorly received in Japan; even the biased Japanese press joined in the general condemnation, leaving only a handful of extreme leftists and communists trying to find a rationale for the Soviet action. The timing of the US tests and the preliminary groundwork to undercut predictable Japanese criticism resulted in an unexpectedly moderate Japanese reaction. Never had understanding of US motivations seemed so widespread, or criticism milder. Japanese Government officials apologetically explained in private that their official protests against the US tests were required by the domestic political environment.

Parallel trends were discernible in Japanese views toward negotiating positions during the Geneva disarmament negotiations. Increasingly the press has termed the Soviet terms inflexible and each new Western proposal was greeted with hope that it would at least receive consideration by the Communists. These views were not confined solely to Japan's major cities: the tone of provincial newspaper coverage has been generally reasonable, giving fair to good treatment to US draft proposals at Geneva. The testing issues and the Geneva talks were accompanied by a larger number of relatively sober, scientific feature stories.

Diet interpellations have demonstrated a less obvious trend, but one which Embassy Tokyo in May 1962 described as leaving the "GOJ and to some extent the US better off than before on the nuclear testing issue and the question of nuclear arms in Japan." Although Prime Minister Ikeda publicly placed himself in opposition to former Prime Minister Yoshiida's view (July 1962) that Japan should be ready, if need be, to accept nuclear weapons on behalf of its own interests and those of the free world, the Yoshiida statement failed to arouse the explosion which would have been expected even a year ago.

Other opinion trend indicators could be cited to support the thesis that a certain amount of objectivity has crept into the Japanese public's consideration of nuclear armaments. Perhaps more definitive is the government's own assessment of the domestic climate implied in its June 1962 rejection of the Japan Socialist Party proposal for a bipartisan declaration making Japan a permanent nuclear-free area. While the Liberal Democratic Party's clear-cut answer does not presage any radical shift in government policy, it does suggest that the government has taken a considered position on this highly controversial issue. In Japanese terms the significance of this step is an important measure of the leadership's own assessment of its local leeway.
3. Present Status of Nuclear Conditioning. Despite the active Japanese civilian nuclear studies program, there are widespread information gaps within leadership groups influential in national security affairs. Even among the military forces, only the senior army leaders are receiving instructive background information, largely provided by the US. Nuclear warfare training is given under the guise of "scientific technology," "disaster control" or similar cover. Navy education is presently nil but is expected to increase. Among air force officers, there is some education and training, but the leadership is still hypersensitive and shares with the other services a morbid fear that the public will learn of even the minimal program now in progress.

There is no systematic instruction on nuclear war among the civilian components of the government. Some officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Japan Defense Agency and intelligence groups concerned with disarmament studies and Chinese Communist nuclear progress have been exposed to a more realistic appreciation of the nuclear weapons problem. Their numbers are few, however, and there is no indication that the government intends to expand official, let alone public, education in the near future.

A parallel situation exists among the political elite. Certain elements of the Liberal Democratic Party who favor a stronger rearmament program recognize the need for conditioning the public, but they have consistently avoided broaching the subject directly. The Socialists are working in the opposite direction, playing upon public fears and exaggerating them. A few Japan Socialist Party members have sought out senior military officers for discussions of defense problems, but they are the exception. Among Japan's intellectual leaders -- journalists, commentators, film producers -- the tendency is to treat nuclear questions in a manner which highlights the hazards rather than the necessities of national defense.

Deep knowledge and sophisticated appreciation of nuclear matters are concentrated within Japan's scientific community. Basic research and development efforts are focused on peaceful uses of atomic energy, but even so, negative national attitudes have retarded these programs. Some of Japan's nuclear scientists undoubtedly feel frustrated and impatient in this environment. Others share widespread public prejudices and anxieties and are able to lend the weight of their knowledge and prestige to the opposition. Among this group are some nuclear scientists hostile to the US.

4. Military and Finance Leaders. The political influence of Japan's military leaders has been and will probably continue to be at a low ebb. The provision for civilian control over the Defense Agency is a more or less permanent feature of Japanese constitutional law. Illustrative of the acceptance of this postwar feature of the nation's defense outlook is the fact that the civilian heads of the Defense Agency have been third or fourth echelon politicians with little professional experience to bring to the job. The chief spokesman for increased rearmament will probably continue to be the few ex-military men serving in the Diet or as commentators in
newspapers or other public media. Evidence of political ambition among senior career military officers is lacking.

Another traditional source of support for the conservatives and -- in the past for strong national defense policies as well -- has been the nation's major financial interests. The extraordinary research and development costs of nuclear equipment, however, are not attractive to Japan's fully occupied industrialists. In the country's present state of full employment and boom-growth, financial leaders have demonstrated active interest in some nuclear programs promising financial returns, such as atomic powered ships and power generation. Moreover, this group as much as any other in Japan, feels the necessity for keeping up with modern technological developments abroad so that it will not be outstripped by foreign competitors. Based upon experience in other developed countries, however, it seems likely that new initiatives will have to come primarily from the government rather than from private industry.
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