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August 15, 1986

Report Memo from S. Mukha to Comrade A.P. Liashko, 'On the Reliability of Measures taken for Dosimetric Inspection of Contaminated Environment and Food Products'

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

[Handwritten: “276”]

15th of August, '86

 

#6320

Secret

Copy #2

 

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

to Comrade A.P. Liashko

 

REPORT MEMO

 

On the reliability of measures taken for dosimetric inspection of contaminated environment and food products

 

In the process of the multipronged work being conducted by Ministries and agencies of the Republic to eliminate the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station, considerable failures are occurring, the varied reasons for which are related to matters of lax adherence to established standards, [which are] intended to achieve the maximum possible reduction of radioactive contamination of the environment and food products.

 

The work of complex loading and decontamination points (CLDPs) is not organized in the way it should be within the 30 kilometer zone. In July, in particular, at the Dibrov CLDP, practically no work was done to unload the transport. At the Starye Sokoly CLDP, a total of 3 trucks were loaded. At the Ditiatki CLDP, from the 27th-31st of July, loading was accomplished 73 times, which is significantly less than the daily workflow of [a standard] CLDP (2,500 units of transport enter the zone on a daily basis).

 

There are defects in the ways that lading platforms which are being operated upon and used without any repairs (at the Starye Sokoly CLDP, there is no runoff trough for contaminated water, there are no separate zones for the passage of “clean” trucks and trucks working in the zone, and the treatment plant has cracks in its foundation). The work shifts of specialists sent here by different agencies do not align with one another.

 

One of the causes for such a situation is the lack of official association between organizations providing work at the CLDPs (12 ministries and agencies are actively participating).

 

According to the opinion of specialists, in order to ensure greater precision in the work at the CLDPs, it would be expedient to create one dispatcher service and to resolve the question of advance information about timelines and volumes of loads that will arrive, to consider the transport demand of all three platforms and divide it according to a schedule of arriving loads, and to establish unified shifts for individuals working here. It would also be expedient to tighten control over entry and exit from the 30 kilometer zone through the offices of Internal Affairs.

 

There are also defects in the work of Special Processing Transport Points (SPTPs). For instance, at the “Gorenichi” SPTP, a sedimentation tank for contaminated silt and sand was not cleaned for a period of two months. For this reason, after 7-10 days it overflowed and was unsuitable for further use.  At the “Dibrova” SPTP, run by Citizens’ Defense members of the military (troop number 42216), processed water is being poured into defective storage containers that are not hermetically sealed, as they should be. SPTP ATP-31043, located at the crossroads between Ovruch, Vil’cha, Polesskoe, and Chernobyl, is calculated to have processed only one unit of transport at a time, causing transport delays of up to 5 hours. Processed water is being poured into an ordinary ditch not originally intended for this purpose.

 

As is known, Party and Soviet offices of the Republic are devoting great attention to providing the population of the city of Kiev and Kiev Oblast with high-quality food and to the problem of the water supply. However, in this area, as well, there are questions that arise which require constant control and a timely resolution.

 

For instance, in the period after the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station, in 231 households from 45 districts in Kiev, Chernigov, Cherkassi, Zhitomir, Vinnitsiya, and Khmel’nitsi regions, radioactive contamination exceeding allowable norms in meat and dairy products was noted. Even the reliability of internal government dosimetric inspection is decreasing because of inadequacies of measuring equipment.

 

For this same reason, no guarantee can be provided for the radiological inspections in a number of enterprises within the Republic’s Ministry of Bread Production. Failures of an organizational nature are also occurring. For example, no dosimetric inspection is being conducted on food products being provided to the third shift of Bread Factory #12 in Kiev (the inspection point only works in two shifts), and the laboratory at Bread Factory #1 is not fully equipped.

 

In the system of theMain Food Processing Industry Administration of the Ukr. SSR, “Gosagroprom”, for many enterprises there are unresolved questions remaining about the burial of ventilation filters, the radiation inspection of packaging, the transfer and storage of completed food products, and raw food lacking a reliable enclosure with specialized protective materials.

 

Furthermore, the Ukr. SSR Ministry of Health has still not established the maximum allowable standards of radioactive contamination for processed food products such as sugar, pastries, beer, and others.

 

In order to increase the effectiveness of the measures taken to prevent radioactive contamination in goods being sold by the State, proposals are being introduced by specialists to fully exclude the delivery of products to “supply stores,” bypassing central district and city warehouses, and to introduce unified document forms about the results of dosimetric inspection in central organizations, as well as forms or stamps to show the provenance and routing of goods. In order to prevent negative conversations among the population, it is expedient to also consider the question of informing consumers in stores about the food delivered.

 

In consideration of the aspects of commerce at collective farm markets and its significance for providing the population with food products, the current defects in their work deserve a special reaction from the appropriate agencies and organizations.

 

First and foremost, because of a lack of dosimetric equipment, the necessary radiation inspections are not being provided on food products being sold. At 19 markets in Kiev, where up to six thousand salespeople work every day, there are only 51 dosimetric machines. Their low capacity and frequent breakdowns lead to attempts by some sellers to avoid dosimetric inspection or sell their food in areas adjacent to the markets. The markets are not equipped with special areas for the collection of unsuitable food to dispose of it in special storage.

 

According to the opinion of specialists, to ensure reliable radiation inspection and to prevent the sale of contaminated food products to the population, it is necessary for the relevant agencies to consider their capabilities, provide inspection groups with sufficient equipment, legislate the possible removal of unsuitable products from shelves (with appropriate compensation for its cost), take measures to organize preliminary inspections in places from which food is being brought into Kiev, and provide markets with special areas for contaminated food and its subsequent removal to special storage or places where it can be used.

 

In order to suppress trade in food products that have not been properly inspected, it would be justified to strengthen preventive work in some places, including with the involvement of the community and Internal Affairs authorities, and to make a decision about administrative responsibility for such violations.

 

It is suggested for the appropriate agencies to also consider the question of workers from sanitary epidemiological stations conducting passport control at food processing industrial enterprises, Citizens’ Defense, and scientific institutions for the purpose of developing concrete recommendations on preventive measures to reveal the actual number and quality of dosimetric devices needed in consideration of current production technology. At the same time, a determination will be made on measures to conduct passport controls over transport involved in delivery of food products.

 

The population of Kiev is being provided with water by the Desna and Dnieper water treatment stations with an overall capacity of 1,400,000 m3 per 24 hours, as well as from 298 artesian wells with a capacity of 320,000 m3 per 24 hours. Dosimetric inspection of Kiev is basically reliable, and the quality of drinking water meets established standards. In the opinion of specialists, in order to achieve more effective inspection of water quality, it is necessary for the production administration of the Kiev water supply authority to repair the SEG-SO 6 spectrometer that is installed at the Dnieper water treatment station.

 

In the population centers of Kiev region, drinking water quality also meets the current standard, with the exception of individual cases of increased water activity in the Polesskoe District. According to an agreement with Soviet authorities, work is also being done by the Citizens Defense to hermetically seal off wells in select local areas and to periodically pump the water from them. However, this work is not yet completed in the Borispol, Vasil’kov, Vyshgorod, or Ivankov Districts (overall there are 17,654 wells in Districts within the Oblast that have not yet been hermetically sealed). Specialized equipment is lacking to pump the water from the sealed wells for sanitary purposes in Ivankov, Borodianka, Irpen’, Skvyra, and Belaya Tserkov’.

 

Specialists recommend that, because of the coming Autumn and Winter seasons, it is necessary to strengthen quality control over water from Polesskoe, Borodianka, and Ivankov Districts, and at the same time to consider the question of providing the subdivisions conducting measurements with more precise equipment (DP-100) and distribute an additional number of dosimeters because of the current insufficient supply. They also recommend that Citizens Defense headquarters conduct repeated training for personnel by qualified specialists who are physicists or radiologists.

 

In reporting on the above information, we consider it necessary, first and foremost, to increase  the responsibility of the leaders of related ministries and agencies over unconditional and immediate provision of established technologies to reduce the level of radioactive contamination in all activities to eliminate the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station, as well as to provide reliable inspections of radioactivity in resolving the problems of the living conditions of the population.

 

In our opinion, it is necessary to direct the appropriate agencies to consider proposals from specialists that have been mentioned in this report memo — the organization must swiftly complete those items that it considers necessary.

 

We also suggest that it is necessary for the Ukr. SSR’s Ministries of Housing and Communal Services, Land Improvement, and the Water Authority to focus their efforts on addressing long-term problems such as:

 

-The development of means and methods to create systems to provide quality treatment of water that will remove radionuclides;

 

-The determination, in conjunction with the Ukr. SSR Academy of Sciences, of places and ways of burying contaminated sewage waste (more than 200,000 tons have accumulated), as well as leaves from parks in Kiev that will fall in Autumn, in a way that will prevent negative effects from this waste on the environment;

 

-Searching for ways of eliminating shortages in the system of water lines of active atomic energy station located in Ukraine, which is connected with the collection of untreated used water in closed reservoirs, which may bring about irreversible ecological consequences.

 

 

The Committee of State Security [KGB] of the Ukrainian SSR, in the process of counter-intelligence operations conducted to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station, is using its operative capabilities to take measures to swiftly uncover and eliminate shortages.

 

The operative conditions are under control.

 

We are reporting for your information.

 

CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY [KGB] OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

 

S. Mukha

 

[Handwritten: verified (signature) 14. August 86]

 

 

The document refers to the multifaceted work of ministries and departments of the USSR in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident and recommends numerous new to reduce environmental, food, and water contamination.


Document Information

Source

HDA SBU, f. 31, spr. 1. Originally published by the Center for Research into the Liberation Movement (TsDVR) together with the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv at http://avr.org.ua/index.php/viewDoc/24477/.

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