February 13, 1981
Memorandum from John McMahon to the Director of Central Intelligence, '[Redacted] Report'

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Summary:
Translation of an address made by Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski. He discusses how Poland's problems are a result of leadership not adhering to Socialist-Leninist ideology and the need for peaceful intervention in Poland.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Report

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John N. McMahon

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Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "The Summary Address by General of the Army Wojciech JARUZELSKI, PZPR Central Committee Politburo Member and Minister of National Defense, given at the Central Conference of the PPR Armed Forces Party-Political Aktiv." In the address JARUZELSKI makes a resume of a broad range of crisis views expressed at the conference, appears to be calling for a peaceful resolution of Polish problems, and is ascribing them to economic and social errors committed by fallible human beings, including party leaders, who failed to adhere to Socialist-Leninist and party statutes and teachings. The party itself is blameless. In a sense, he states, the crisis is welcome in that it has served to reveal weak points in the party, the military and other "basically healthy" state and party organisms. The party is now evolving a new configuration for action, and, while Soviet and other friendly forces guard Polish security in brotherly cooperation, the party itself will bring Poland out of the present crisis, because it will not be "an outside force" that will erase the errors of the past.

[Note: For related information, see FIRDB-312/00067-81 and FIRDB-312/00268-81.]
I talked today with Comrade KANIA who was interested in the progress of the conference thus far. I responded, maybe too tersely, that there is in it an exemplary candor, great zeal, and a high level of substance. That is how I evaluate the discussion which has turned out to be an unusually rich mine of our knowledge, and I would say, of our party feelings.
It was dominated by matters issuing from the ideological-political aspects of the present situation. But it also touched on current matters that stem from necessities of life, are tied in with varied types of problems and tender points that make themselves known in the armed forces. The representatives of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense have responded to a series of questions and demands to which we could have responded today literally on the spot. I would ask you to regard this as evidence of a very serious approach and of a simultaneous affirmation of further study of all issues which the conference has brought up. I think that it was a great party lesson for us all, that we shall carry away from it both a warm, earnest atmosphere of commitment, as well as a wealth of experience--hard facts for use in further work.

For understandable reasons, I will not be able to refer to everything; in many instances this, after all, would be premature. As General BARYLA already said, all proposals will be recorded carefully and fully, and also consistently recast into specific activity. Everything that will be possible will be done. This evening, after our adjournment, the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense will convene in order to officially consider decisively and concretely those matters which, already at this moment, can and ought to be done at this stage.

Simultaneously, I understand that with this agenda from the VI Plenum, expanded, related to our specific matters and adapted to conditions of every military element, we will go actively "downwards" to the party masses; that the representatives of the Ministry's leadership, central institutions, districts, and branches of the armed forces will take a significant part in this process; that this will be a successive--after a couple of other recent ones--direct contact of the so-called "top" with the so-called "bottom," in order to bring them still more closely together, in order to breathe in one party breath.
As far as I know, the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces anticipates--after discussions with representatives of districts, branches of the armed forces, chiefs of political directorates, secretaries of party committees--convoking expanded meetings of party district committees and branches of armed forces, at which these problems will be examined and appropriately adopted.

The current situation of the armed forces has, in a sense, a dual character. On the one hand, we, of course, are carrying its burden in all of its dimensions: ideological-political, moral, and ultimately, economic-material. On the other hand, in this situation, the role of the armed forces grows as the link of people's authority and of strength in our party, which should provide the greatest possible aid to party activity, carried out, as a result of the VI Plenum, on the scale of the whole society, within the entire party. Undoubtedly, in order to fulfill this role effectively, we ourselves must carry out once more--surely everyone of you has already done this many times--a self-examination: how far in the course of 10 years, after the tragic December 1970, did we manage to measure up to obligations which confronted the armed forces, the party members in the forces?

Before today's conference, I once more looked over materials from that period, from the conference conducted in January 1971, in which many comrades present here probably took part, and also from Party conferences in the Warsaw Military District, in central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, finally, from the Central Committee, VIII Plenum of that period. We have to correct, improve many matters, because the worst thing would be self-complacency, self-anesthetization--the discussion, after all, conveyed this sufficiently keenly--but, simultaneously, we surely have the right to make the observation, that, in the totality of matters, the armed forces stand before our party with their head raised high. Not only because we were a serious and material factor of political vision and political resolution in a dramatic conflict; probably, first and foremost, because the attitude of the armed forces during that period, even to this very day, constitutes and constitutes a warning to the enemy; this is also because the forces are an example for society, a fact confirmed by the many letters sent to us, pointing out the moral health of the
armed forces, their disciplined and organized posture, finally, because our attitude constituted a guarantee, and continues to be understood as such by our allies, by our friends from allied countries in the Warsaw Pact, and for the party of armed forces were an extraordinarily valuable source of support giving it a feeling of freedom in taking certain decisions, especially concerning cadre and personnel changes. Maybe this will ring too loftily, but I judge that history will demonstrate what a noble role our forces fulfilled during that time and are continuing to fulfill, all of us—from simple private to general.

Such an attitude of the armed forces and such a role of theirs was possible thanks to the ideological moral, military-organizational maturity acquired, thanks to internal relationships, thanks to the trust and solidarity of the military family and to social authority, and their high position in the allied system, confirmed once more during the July inspection by the Combined Armed Forces Command level, by our missile launchings, the Exercise BRATERSTWO BRONI [BROTHERHOOD IN ARMS], and by our entire great contribution, our inventiveness and frequently unique solutions. They enjoy the esteem of our friends, who acknowledge our qualities, our distinctiveness of tradition, of national customs and culture, and simultaneously value our class and international reliability, and our loyalty to Marxist-Leninists ideals.

The health of these organisms which, being guided by the compass of ideology, consistently proceed along the socialist road, constitutes the best evidence that in a people's state, under the leading role of the party, much can be accomplished without upheaval, that profound distortions and aberrations essentially are foreign to socialism. We must defend and protect the net gains of our forces, the party and social, external and internal appraisals resulting from it. After all, it is the concrete end-result of:
- our great effort, the effort, as of today, of many soldierly generations (after all, we are entering into the 38th year of the existence of the people's forces);
- sleepless nights;
- the labor expended in training areas, airfields, and harbors;
- the great social and intellectual-cultural advancement of our people's cadre;
- the great work of party organizations; and
- the hearts of our uniformed ranks.

The cheapening of these gains would be an injury done not only to the matter of defense capabilities and to the cause of the state, but also to every soldier.

We have had and do have a certain--let us call it by mutual agreement--system, which protected us to a substantial degree against the distortions of self-important-bureaucratic centralism; as a system, it apparently could not have been bad, since no important, basic decision, no course of action, no resolution of greater or lesser basic nature has been generally called into question.

What sort of mechanisms have we succeeded in activating thus, that they do function, though not without certain disruptions, and are bringing benefits to our cause?

I think that the first of them is the authentically party-like cadre policy in its essence. Comrades have talked about its elements, about reviewing it passed judgments, especially on its public nature. Omitting the formal side of this process, it is necessary to emphasize its openness, its evolution through an understandable system of formation, with the end result that, in general, the right person is in the right position.
The second—is the activity of collective and social bodies, their actual influence on various aspects of armed forces life. There is the burden of authority, the range of every possible type of consultation, of opinion testing, and sharing them from "top to bottom." There are inspectors' hearings of complaints and grievances, also other forms of contact between particular levels, providing opportunities to become familiar with possibilities of recognizing reality, to recognize state of mind.

Finally, at whatever level it is critically evaluated, there is the system of control, settling of accounts, and doctrinal-statutory documentation. One can, in this or other manner, perfect, improve, limit, or enrich it, but there is no doubt that it affords the possibility of synthetization of experiences and opinions, does not allow departures from principles, and therefore is a form of struggle with voluntarism, which has caused so much harm in our party and state life; furthermore, it gives a basis for accountability, which likewise constitutes a part of the organizational assets, a significant element in the correct functioning of the command and control system in the armed forces.

It appears, however, that the basic especially significant factor of guarantee is the party organization in the military, the party in the armed forces. Today's conference confirmed this in an emphatic way. The communists in the forces, with the party organization as their platform, irrespective of all weaknesses, irrespective of that which has to be improved and perfected, created conditions for mobilization of the population, for the utilization of their initiative, for a critical look at many phenomena. This does not mean that we still do not have in this sector a large backlog and great needs. We'll take up this theme a little later.
There are many comrades in this hall, who reach in memory into the quite distant past and speak with a certain melancholy about the constantly decreasing length of the future, from the biological paint of new, which we have before us. It is completely understandable that, in periods of overall accountability, various types of affirmations, reservations, or even of professions gain strength against this background. In recent months, officially and unofficially, huge numbers of questions and proposals have been reaching military authorities, in direct discussions as well. We are studying them with complete seriousness, with full responsiveness. This takes a good deal of time, sometimes it is unpleasant, painful. We are approaching this, however, with conscientious attention, accepting the fact that a certain apprehension, internal confusion results from an emotional approach to various elements of the situation, that one must be forebearing even where not everything is fair, one must reach to the core of the matter in order to find the issues which are deserving of extended consideration. Many of the demands have a subjective tint, but, to repeat it, everyone of us is, after all, only a human being, and everyone of us reacts subjectively, feels subjectively. One should somehow at least try to confront and adjust those reactions with a certain broader reality. That is why I emphasize once more that we are approaching these problems with complete seriousness.

At the same time, however, I would like to share a certain impression with the comrades and simultaneously ask for your observation on these matters. What, specifically, is the mechanism behind these demands, these frequently angrily sounding pretensions? What is it that prompts them, as a matter of course, to be addressed to the top and, and frequently to contradict each other? I shall give a series of examples, which will illustrate this state of affairs, and simultaneously will allow the comrades, to develop appropriate attitudes to their work and, within bounds of their competence, to make appropriate decisions.
As is well known, a problem being brought up is that of pay regulations in the armed forces. We are preoccupied with this question, and I judge that in the very near future an average, on which we shall be able to depend, will become known. In no case will it be lower than the average increase on the scale of the entire country, but we are trying, as far as possible, to make it higher. Why, then, am I speaking about this matter in context of contradictions in demands?

Some of them are aimed in the direction of a need for a further flattening of armed forces pay scales, and in this connection it should be said that we are perhaps the sole state organization that has such far-ranging levellings in pay scales. For example, the salary of a district commander is three times greater than that of a platoon commander, while in the armed forces prior to the outbreak of World War II, the difference for similar positions was ninefold. I am a supporter of maintaining these levellings, and, as I believe, senior commanders likewise consider them as being fair. But simultaneously--and this is not at all a real phenomenon--there are advocates for an opposite point of view.

Many are of the opinion that the professional NCO's are discriminated against in regard to pay and subsistence. At the same time, however, there are opinions of officers that NCO's actually obtain excessive preferences that frequently provide them with even better compensation than this or that senior officer. There are voices to increase the special allowance which would make it possible to place emphasis more correctly on better or inferior work results. At the same time there are quite a few, possibly a majority, of voices for including the entire special allowance and even the award fund in the rate of pay. There are doubts whether the preference should be given to the head of a company or of supplies, to the regimental commander, or a chief of a service in a division. If increases were to be made everywhere and everything were to be equalized, there would be no preferences, however, there would be a grand levelling--the height of dreams for all loafers.
Should preference be given for full service, for length of service in the army--there are many such proposals--or for first line action? Should we fill military positions with civilian employees, or vice versa--as others propose--decrease the number of such positions in order to have greater freedom in professional cadre assignments than there is currently?

There are proposals that the efforts of the military service and efforts of the cadre demonstrate greater intensity and greater vigor. In any event, they are reasonable proposals which were also presented at the present conference. On the other hand, however--as I must admit, I read this with regret--there are many proposals that work should last only 8 hours, and everything beyond that must receive payment; that services, guards, watches, etc., must receive overtime pay. Consequently, how can we demonstrate the efforts of the services, the noble efforts, that is our--as we say--privilege, if at the same time we have to refute an argument on introducing the paid type of service. More democracy and fewer organized entities. Eliminate extended control, at the same time decrease the burden of the junior cadre, which remain too long in barracks. Show the armed forces more forcefully working on behalf of the national economy, and at the same time reduce the burden and decrease the participation of the armed forces in work on behalf of the national economy. Show the armed forces more actively in various surroundings, but at the same time refrain from showing the efficiency of the armed forces to various representatives of society, because this is very time consuming and costly.

This is barely an indication not only of individual opinions, but frequently even of quite sizable mass opinions. This proves how difficult it is to satisfy everyone. And, again, this is normal, this is human. I am speaking of this not to dramatize or condemn, but to present the thinking and anxiety which this body should be confronted with and aware of. This involves many elements, objective and subjective, which depend on the individual, on the concrete situation, and on the unit, region, and the environment. These are matters linked with specific norms, but at the same time with action which does not always satisfy the norm or the underlying principle. These are matters of a specific regulation and of specific exceptions to
this regulation, which in similar or other instances may appear differently. All of this is very difficult. The armed forces leadership does not avoid making decisions in these matters; however, it cannot comply with all demands, particularly if they are out of the question. Consequently the decisions we make cannot be interpreted by all as ideal, but we are striving that they be the best; that they take into consideration superior reasoning and the rationale of the whole. It is for this reason that we are appealing for confidence. At the same time we are appealing for discussions, for consultations, and for expressions of general opinion cross-verified by coming from differing sets of experience. We will make the necessary adjustments. This will be a real help, in fact coauthorship, joint responsibility. We are particularly counting on the party aktiv to do this.

It is important, however, that this type of discussion be carried on in an atmosphere of seriousness and calm. This is due to the dignity, ethics, and nature of the armed forces, which preclude haggling that is offensive to a decisive majority of the cadre. However, this is not the main issue. Of greatest importance here is superior reasoning. Our army is an important link--and I must further state--the upholder of the people's authority. Its stability is of crucial importance. Let us remember Czechoslovakia in 1968, the destabilization of the Czechoslovak People's Army as a critical turning point, and the critical element in all events. That is why our military feelings are not our own internal affair.

The adversary is observing us. He is looking whether the attitude of the army is unequivocal, whether it is monolithic, and whether it is dominated by calmness, stability, work discipline, and great vigilance. In accordance with the situation in the armed forces he estimates what he can do. Therefore, he must be continually and invariably aware--I speak of this with greatest seriousness--that the Polish Armed Forces, the People's army, will guard and defend socialist Poland and that for socialism and for the Party--as Comrade Commander TEKELI stated--it will become a fortress. Consequently the stakes are great. Our responsibility is great, and must be projected into the discussions, the mood, and work.
The problem of responsibility is difficult and complicated; it besieges us in all political, as well as moral matters. There exists here much pain, a bitterness of the party and of all members of the party. This was emphasized once again during the discussions by Comrades SZEWCZYK, LUKASIK, FAJKO, WITEK, and others. This is a very important matter. It is anticipation. It is tension. The faults, though of various dimensions, are enormous, because the negative effects, which are felt by our party and by our country, are enormous. These faults cause indignation and in certain instances even disgust. The responsibility which lies with our party, that is, historical and moral responsibility, requires however--independent of the gravity of the situation--great reflection, insight, objectivity, and justice. Not too long ago in our propaganda, and not only in propaganda, we merely indicated the objective reasons for our difficulties and problems which had accumulated. At present--after all, comrades, you did speak of this during the discussions--a tilt occurred in the other direction. We speak only of subjective illnesses, only of mistakes, only of bad things which happened in our country. Throughout there is a need for restraint and a judicious approach.

As you, comrades, are aware, an announcement has been made, and practical actions have already been undertaken for a concrete assessment of the responsibility of particular individuals--decision-makers and experts in the field of specific licenses or investments. As far as the complexity of it goes, the license for the BERLIET bus represents an obvious and most glaring example. These buses are stopping on all streets, they are breaking down, and everyone is criticizing them. As the specialists are initially saying, which actually does not mean that their opinions after full examination will prove to be justified and true, the license is not bad. The BERLIET operates well in France and in other countries. In Poland, on the other hand, the performance, the technology of certain elements and certain assemblies does not meet parameters; they fall short of expectations, and that is the reason for the increase in breakdowns. Consequently it is difficult to actually obtain an objective picture.
In turn, investments--this is also a matter that is not that simple. Though there is no doubt, it can be said on the basis of studies that they were excessive, because they exceeded specified amounts and norms which were permissible. The specific proportions were staggering. However, an assessment whether investment X or Y was correct also requires closer scrutiny. An objective scrutiny is also required of the extent to which they were the result of decisions from higher up, of investment megalomania, and the extent to which they were influenced by pressures from the rank and file, which, after all, are very strong. There was an inclination toward overinvestment by local, provincial, and industrial elements. Now and then it became an accomplished fact.

Comrades, as Comrade WLODARSKI stated, everyone to a certain extent could also have done something better and could find something on his conscience. Voluntarism, of various levels, also appeared everywhere. We are also guilty. For example, Comrade Colonel ROBOK has spoken of construction or repairs in GOLDAP or elsewhere. Admittedly, this isn't HUTA KATOWICE, but then the decision was made at another level and in specified proportions. I do not intend to suggest making allowances in this matter. I want you to know that I belong to those who present the matter as critically as possible. Resulting accountability is being required and will be required. However, at the same time I consider that if this is actually to be instructive and preventively influence our entire future history, it must be objective, thorough, and serious. Decisions must be based on higher interests of the country and the party. Therefore studies must be competent and must be definitively brought to a close.

There is also this consideration, which was reflected in the report of the Political Bureau, that, after the standstill of the sixties, there was a great social need for rapid development. In the years 1971, 1973, and 1975, after all, the great leap achieved was with the full approval of the entire society, its great support and outright pressure for speed, pressure for more, and pressure for persistence. In addition, even the VIII Congress, six months before the catastrophe, instilled some hope and made some serious changes in the structure of the government.
Frankly speaking, we were fascinated with the achievements of the first 5 years. We were captivated by the personality traits of the First Secretary. In this there is probably material for study by psychologists. Great confidence was also associated with this. If you delegate a great matter to someone, you simultaneously place trust in him. Real authority is always required by the party. We cared for this authority, we were building it up, possibly not always in a manner that was proper; possibly it was excessive, but without doubt very sincere throughout the years. This was a process; a process which created a particular position for an individual or a certain small group of individuals; a position increasingly well protected by those who within the shadow of this individual were able to create specific systems and inner circles of know-how, confidentiality, and decision-making.

On the other hand, it is difficult to say that there were no conditions, no opportunities for presenting comments and opinions. I am not saying this in order to whitewash anything in this matter. However, I myself have had repeated opportunities to voice various types of appraisals and objections, and these never encountered radical rejection or cut off; rather, they were accepted at face value that it is necessary to think about it, it is necessary to examine it, let the comrades reflect upon it. For the most part those were the responses. This may also have contributed toward the problem of criticism. Speaking of suppressing criticism, we most often have an image that the person being criticized, benefiting from his position, cuts off the critic's head, or at least his ears. This vulgar reaction occurs now rather infrequently, or else there has been very little of it. I think that the most effective massive and common stifling of criticism is to simply turn a deaf ear to it. And this is probably the most dangerous way, because it makes counteraction more difficult, it demobilizes, and it does not permit correcting the wrong.
I speak about these matters, and as you, comrades, are aware, I spoke about them at the VI Plenum, because, as Minister of National Defense, formally I am the superior officer, the chief, but morally and in Party matters I feel that I have the mandate of the military membership collective, of the party in the armed forces. I consider this as my duty and only in the sense that you, comrades, entrust me with this mandate, can I work to the best of my capabilities and strength. I have always been guided by the principle, and I think that we should faithfully keep this principle, that the people's socialist army should relate with greatest discipline and confidence to the decisions of our party, and that nothing in the behavior of the armed forces and their representatives should bear the stigma of a position of strength. This is not our style, in fact, it is the style of South America and Turkey. The strength of our army depends on party discipline. Equally, I cannot imagine it in any other way in the future.

At the same time, I would like to emphasize--after all I did speak on this subject with the chiefs of political directorates and representatives of the leading political cadre of the armed forces—that the armed forces have had and do have great autonomy and freedom of action emanating not so much from the obvious special nature of our military organism, as from its well-being, its capability, its correct line, and its confidence in the cadre. That is why I think that those comrades who blame all misfortunes on activists higher up—and this even pertains to, as you know, certain members of the party leadership and also to certain local activists—could not find enough courage to state that within their own milieu they could have resolved many matters in a correct and proper manner, and that not always did the top interfere or order false and amoral actions. Comrade Colonel Najda accurately spoke about this. I think his speech had a great influence on everyone because of his party zeal. If I am unnecessarily prolonging this argument somewhat, it is in order that it may provide us with the worldly wisdom that in many instances it is not right to depend on others, on those on "top" and those on the "bottom," and that it is necessary, in view of the fact that the party statute is at one's disposal and is available for one's support, to do everything that is possible to fulfill the tasks within one's own sphere assigned by the party.
Returning again to our military autonomy, I would like you comrades to know that it was possible for the autonomy to have a quality to let us act in a manner free of many sins of the past period, thanks to the direct help and the understanding on the part of Comrade Stanislaw KANIA. I am speaking of this not because today he is the First Secretary of our party, for many comrades after all are familiar with the position on military matters he has long held in the past, but because his position was and is still extremely valuable to us.

And, once again, on the subject of responsibility. In discussions during the break the comrades emphasized that perhaps the main concern is not as much the responsibility for decisions made and for political mistakes, but more the responsibility for violations of ethical norms. Comrade NAJDA also mentioned how difficult it is to evaluate this and how complicated and delicate this matter is. Nevertheless it is necessary to start from the top—from the First Secretary and the Premier; delicately, to put it very delicately, there was in fact excessive concern for personal matters and family matters. To account for this is not a simple and explicit matter, particularly when it concerns privilege and permissible authorization, when it exceeds certain bounds and ultimately because of consequences that may become associated with it. It is also necessary to remember the huge, unquestionable contributions—50 years in the workers movement, in world and international politics, or in the second case, a person whose way of life is so close to us soldiers and who made the great contributions in the most difficult period of the battle for independence of our state, and during its birth. These are unusually difficult matters, which place a great burden of responsibility on the present leadership of the party, which must act in compliance with superior reasoning, as well as in accordance with their conscience and with common human sensitivity. That is very difficult. I am not expressing an official opinion on this matter; moreover, we have not completed an assessment of this area of discussion; however, I share these views with you because I know that they torment and distress us. I would like you to be aware how complicated the settlement of this matter is and what dimension must be used in order to satisfy everyone, and in order to comply with justice, and at the same time to take into account every consideration.
The situation after the VI Plenum is very complex and there are highly varied regional and environmental differences. This was most sharply stated in the statements of Comrades DUTKOWSKI and TEKIELI. We understand that here, after all, is the bastion most unfriendly and unpleasant to us. In other areas the situation is more favorable, moreover, it is variable; changes are being made which are of benefit to some and of no benefit to others. Striving to generalize this and to include it within some framework, it can be stated that prior to VI Plenum we kept withdrawing on practically the entire front. We lost specific positions. This was in reality a one-way, regressive and unfavorable process for the party. After the VI Plenum the party is slowly beginning to reassert itself. This disturbs the adversary. He wants to prevent this. And as a result, at present we have to some extent two parallel processes proceeding along two parallel paths -- a continuation of withdrawal, but, at the same time, a movement forward. I emphasize: parallel processes. Certainly they provide occasion for conflict; however, there has been no frontal clash, and at this time there are no conditions under which such a clash would have to take place.

What is the basis for withdrawal? On what do the losses, which we frequently bear, depend? The admittedly decreasing strikes, by now scattered, but still taking place here and there, low productivity, weakening discipline, and antisocialist forces, which are attempting to penetrate and implant hostile slogans within certain elements of the union movement. Well known is the recent meeting in ŻYDGOSZZŻ with its various adventurous formulations. Continually, there's a lot of demagoguery; many instances of attacks on the leadership cadre. In many party organizations there is passivity and rehashing of the past, a continual atmosphere of squaring accounts, of gossip, and particularly of a psychosis of massive accusations of party and government activists with corruption and embezzlement. This is the basis for the process of withdrawal, of losses.
Next, the movement forward. We are clear in our assessments and trends for further action. Many party elements are shaking off the past. A very important and patriotic part of society is interested in peace and dreams of peace. It is against strikes. Neither is there full unanimity within the new trade unions. There are even certain regional conflicts. Many positive actions have been undertaken in regard to cadre, economy, and organization-systems. This was reflected in part at the meeting of the Parliament [Sejm].

What is most important in the present situation? To stop, to slow down, to limit the movement backwards in order to finally halt and at the same time accelerate, expand on a wider, and then on the entire front, the movement forward. Speaking in the words of LENIN, the main element in this undertaking is the party, its hardening, the retrieval of positions and recovery of confidence. Next, the main front in the battle for confidence is the economy. However, in this sphere, very many conditions appear which are not and will not be easy to overcome. These include huge debts and, taking them as emergency matters, market and supply difficulties. At the same time, as the comrades have rightfully emphasized, the truth must increasingly reach society--that, in fact, is occurring--that the condition for improving the situation is uninterrupted work and higher productivity, and that a civic approach, seriousness, and understanding are required for the situation in agriculture, which has the earmarks of a natural calamity and creates very important problems. Recently Comrade BAYSARKOV, the Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Soviet Union, visited Poland. The agreements particularly are very valuable and important for the future and permit us to see the light at the end of the tunnel in which we are at the present. Once again I emphasize that allied solidarity and understanding of our affairs gives us a chance to get out of the situation, specifically with the condition that we get a grip on ourselves and that we do what we have to do. This is a large matter.
There was talk about strikes. General SZEWCZYK spoke quite strongly about this. I wouldn't want to get involved in theoretical arguments on the subject of what a strike means in socialism. We have sufficient evidence of that. As I have already said, society feels this: after all, life itself, intellect, instinct for self-preservation, speak to us about it. We saw yesterday on the monitor that even this "leader" says he is opposed to strikes, because strikes are injurious and so on, not by coincidence. After all, he must consider the perception by the public, and the public has had enough. A strike is an extreme. You know under what kind of conditions we took a stand in this matter and expressed agreement with definite formulas. Anyway, it happened at a time when this strike was really a form of protest and an expression of dissatisfaction, which was justified. Thus, the 31 August strike was of a different character, and we treated it differently from those which have gone on since 1 September and are still festering up to today. The process of striking on a daily basis is disastrous, it strikes out at all of society, especially the workers themselves, because when one working man goes on strike, the truth is that another must provide for him. Fighting for hasty interests can ruin the historic class interests of the working class, its basic achievements. We must really talk and write more about this, even though this is being done to a certain extent.

Our comrades have correctly spoken about using examples from capitalist countries to illustrate the so-called rights to strike, the sharp limitations coming into play there. What is the appearance of this totalitarianism of which the enemy is accusing us? I suppose the headline of one issue of *L'Humanite* says it best: in GDANSK discussions are proceeding, and in LE HAVRE they are beating up each other. This refers to the well-known strike of French fishermen. So the totalitarians are holding discussions and the democrats are trading blows. What is more, strikes over there are legalized, but at the same time there is great unemployment and no one is concerned about it. With us, actually, counteracting unemployment and its threat remains one of the objective causes of difficulty. For that precise reason we have large investments in order to employ millions of people coming into productive age. Our workers are working and protesting in factories created for them by
socialism. Consider bourgeois Poland, which was the backwoods of
Europe, hungry, with a backward countryside, exporting people
overseas--this was all a burden on our national psyche. It is
because of this that the party, the government of the people, all
communists, are obsessed with full employment, obsessed with the
threat of unemployment. It is perhaps this that gives rise to
our hunger for capital, this pressure from below, all this haste
which is not always economically justifiable or rational. This
again is not a justification, but still one of the basic elements
of our national psyche and our history.

Our working class in its fundamental whole is, after all,
wise, and has a sense of responsibility. Socialism is its
system. It put this class in charge as a sovereign and dominant
force. Therefore, if we diverge from certain basic socialist
values, the working class itself will make the correction. It
has a right to do this. Its leading role is manifested in this
right. But it also becomes evident that the party is the party
of the working class, because it is capable, as Comrade KANIA
says, of responding with humility to the will of this class, even
if this appears to be fraught with danger.

We count on the fact that the working class, when it
ultimately convinces itself that the party is on the right path,
when it better realizes the increasing dangers, will be capable
of opposing laxity, rejecting the refuse of anarchy, because
anarchy is certainly the greatest enemy of democracy. Anarchy
gives voice to radical, demoralized elements which sooner or
later will be thrown overboard by this same working class.

At the same time we expect that, after emotions cool,
grievances will be addressed to the "top," but not solely with
bias, even though the party leadership has assumed self-
critically the full burden of responsibility. This is correct,
as it should be. We carry this responsibility.
The government and party have been incorrectly managed. But at the same time the situation can only be fully corrected when in every sector and work position people will see the wrong about themselves, and in themselves, with objectivity and justice. They will understand the problem of joint responsibility. How many shirkers, loafers, drunkards, who have no moral credentials for this, have often shouted at the top of their voices and, against a background of general dissatisfaction, could find a responsive audience here and there? How will it be necessary to fight in order to improve attitudes to work? At least to reduce absenteeism? Every day 10 percent of workers in the collectivized economy, that is 1,200,000 persons, do not show up for work. Sick leaves altogether amount to more than absences because of vacations. Everything must be corrected in this area as well.

It was fashionable in the course of these events for various kinds of pretentious actions and gestures to take place. I think, however, that there will be increasingly more complete awareness that not everyone who attends holy mass is an angel, and not everyone who sings the Polish national anthem is a true patriot in act and deed. Before bursting into song it would be well to answer the questions in one's conscience as to how one works, how one feels, how one fulfills his daily duty. And here, if you please, comrades, lies the great educational role of the military. I admit that to some extent I felt a certain void in this discussion. How do we evaluate the attitude of our reservists whom we had in our ranks for 2 or 3 years, whom we trained and educated. What is the durability of our educational contribution, as we say, of the military as a great school of patriotic, civic education. How durable is the example of discipline, organization and good work which we should inculcate? In the light of events is this question unwarranted? Should we not also make a deeper analysis from this point of view?
Certainly I do not simplify the matter. Obviously, in this short period of time we cannot completely change a man who, after all, finds himself under a variety of influences. But our ambition and duty should be an increasingly better and more durable formation of characteristics, always engendering in this man, even in moments of greatest agitation, a feeling of deep civic responsibility infused in him in his military service. In this context I also want to mention the role of youth organizations in the military, about which Comrades GORECKI and JASKOWIAK have spoken. Specifically, it is attitude training, preference for ideological work, not manipulating the young, not instilling a paternalistic relationship. I think it is very important—and this we accept with satisfaction, that in the difficult situation which we have and are living through, the youth organization in the armed forces has fulfilled its duties well.

Comrades PORADKO, MUSZYNSKI, KUBICKI and others have spoken about the enemy. We must be constantly aware that our internal problems and disputes are taking place in the real world, which is divided, perceived in the context of a historical confrontation of socialism with capitalism, with imperialism. The fact that precisely this inimical world is intruding into our affairs, and the activities of its various propaganda and other organs, is the best possible testimony that the struggle taking place here is a segment of a large, global front of the intersystem struggle. As soldiers we must always remember this.

In the internal sector, taking up the matter as a whole, we must mention that segment of it—let us call it liberal-anarchist—which is represented by KURON, MICHNIK and others, with a very confused program, allegedly socialist, but in fact opposed to socialism. It is also represented by various kinds of deceptive phraseology and cynical posturing, STASZEWSKI—and ZAMBROSKI—like in attending church and prostrating themselves, etc. It is well known that among them there never was anything in common with the church, but rather, in its own time, with the synagogue. And the second segment—reactionary-nationalistic—MOCZULSKI and company. They beat around the bush less, speaking simply about the overthrow of the system and total return to private ownership. As MOCZULSKI stated so generously, NOWA HUTA and the Grand Theater will not be returned to private ownership—this he guarantees.
This is then, if you will, comrades, the real enemy, independently of political coloration, or of faction that comes into play. To express it in a parliamentary manner--it is the socialist opposition. They are the organized groups which I have spoken of, and there are sympathizers in circles which keep a certain distance from socialism. Depending on the situation, this distance expresses itself more strongly or more weakly in practical terms. This pertains to certain centers of creative intelligentsia or scientific circles. And finally--fitful support to the opposition is given by a certain portion of the masses, whenever certain opposition slogans reflect messages and convey feelings, problems and irritations within these masses. But this is support for slogan, not for action. And we are also aware of this. This is precisely the present situation. On this depend all paradoxes and all the dramatization within the situation, about which I have spoken on numerous occasions, i.e., that the opposition exploits errors of the authorities, and social difficulties and emotions; the opposition strikes a pose of a fighter with admonitions about rights embodied in the constitution, as a defender of the populace. But that is, after all, a tactical maneuver. We must expose the fact that tactics enter into play, whereas at the same time the long range goal is different, actually antiworker and counterrevolutionary, that socialism, according to one view, cannot be reformed, and must be overthrown, according to the view of others.

Most important are arguments and facts which should bespeak this and which should reach the people. Not epithets, as Comrade MUSZYNSKI has emphasized, but exclusively efforts to reach into the background of this or that dissident or adversary, although it may be worthwhile to recall this, also, but concrete facts, realities of today which unmask true intentions. What, specifically, should be emphasized?
First of all, despite known agreements between the government and strike committee leaders, the enemy wants the country to flounder into deeper crisis. He continues to cause heavy turbulence, new demands for pay. The enemy is spreading total negativism, gossip, striving not to permit the return of calm, the restoration of discipline. In a word, he is impeding the administration of the country. He is harassing the authorities, forcing them to deal repetitiously with the same matters, instead of with economic order and development. Thus, in fact, they want to press demands to the point of absurdity, to a situation threatening economic ruin, and from there going on to anarchy, licentiousness and great dangers. And it is here that the enemy shows true antisocialist and true antinational face.

Secondly— he intends to create rifts between People's Poland and the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, to weaken our allied trust, which would be a de facto rupture of the balance of forces and stability in Europe resulting from 35 years of alignment of forces. He wants to turn Poland into a Trojan horse and objectively into a pawn on the global chessboard. Actually the game about which the enemy thinks and dreams can only happen at the expense of Poland. The greatest loss would be felt, clearly, by Poland. STRAUSS admittedly lost the election, but half his countrymen are for revision of the border, and almost all for the unification of Germany. And we know that weakening the position of the GDR, Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union would again be a blow in first order against Poland. We have the most to lose. We are a country with the most widely disputed status quo. Only 35 years ago Polish was not spoken in GDANSK, SZCZECIN and WROCLAW. Calling forth the ghosts of those times is a dangerous play against vital national truths. And here again the antisocialist, antinationalist nature of this policy reveals itself.
In this context it must be stressed that only the party, although in the process of development it has committed serious errors, strategically and objectively represents the interests of the working class. Only the party and socialism give Poland the prospect of peace, national security, social security and the certainty of advancement for working people. The antisocialist forces, as the occasion permitted, tactically supported the aspirations of the working class, because it was convenient for them, like a springboard to the second, or even, as they say, the third stage. But strategically their goal is different. In alliance with them, in the long run, the working class would lose. They want another system, another Poland, not considering whether in such a situation Poland would be a possibility at all. Therefore, if many slogans, many theses, many critical voices heard from the enemy, from us, as well as the working class sound alike, we must always remember the well-known saying: when two say the same thing, they may not mean the same thing.

Our criticism is sharp. It was precisely this way in the VI Plenum—lashing out at close quarters, but constructive in viewpoint. Their criticism is destructive and ruinous. With every opportunity this must be brought out with increasing clarity and shown up as a mechanism of class warfare. And here lies a great role for propaganda, as you have correctly emphasized, propaganda which requires careful revaluation in the sense of enriching its content, as well as in updating methods, and of closer tie-ins with science, about which Comrade WANKA spoke here: theory and practice, analysis of practices and weapons used; on the one hand there are Leninist principles, on the other—historical considerations which, in our real conditions, we must take into account. We must reckon on less strict censorship, and actually this is justifiable. In many cases the censor has stopped information which was publicly available, because it was planted by the enemy. Censorship is essential and its framework must be appropriately observed, but it must be reasonable. At the same time, dilution of censorship stresses the weight of the daily struggle of the party for public support, which cannot be simply decreed from a rostrum. It is necessary to acquire it through practice, life, sincerity and truth. It is necessary to clash more frequently and resolutely with the enemy, not by epithets or banalities, but by argument,
concrete facts, truth--also by hard, aggressive, but sincere talks with the masses. I cited once, in a meeting of the Military Council, the example that our comrades in the GDR for years have had--a situation that is even worse than ours, because at all times every GDR citizen, merely by turning the television dial, hears in his mother tongue the entire argumentation of the antisocialist enemy. They had to adapt to that. They fight, and fight quite effectively. Why should we not do the same?

Our society today is shocked by the large number of various errors and neglect. They have struck society in a concentrated form, as it were. Whatever happens today, the slightest detail which irritates people, which perturbs them, is classed as a general condition blamed on the system; if the caretaker has swept the sidewalk badly, it is socialism that is always at fault, it is the Politburo that is at fault. It's a type of psychosis.

I suppose we tend to speak too little about the fact that in our system it is possible to achieve significantly better results than we manage to do. Here I draw a comparison with countries with our form of government: GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary in particular. It is, thus, a question of people and the errors they make--not of socialism.

Our troubles have obscured what is happening in the capitalist world. Unemployment, terrorism, drug addiction--everything that in comparison makes our situation and our peace a paradise on earth. These points are not new, but they must constantly be treated as a current element in the struggle.

We should not allow the opposition to have a monopoly on discussing ticklish matters. We must drag out from under the ground difficult problems, undertake a candid dialog with the public, talk about complaints, but, above all, about roads to their solution. Therein lies the element of our superiority, that we point to a program, we talk about solutions. They talk about negative things.
With this background, a few words on the strength of the state. There is a theory, and it happened that I heard it under very dramatic circumstances, from the lips of both Comrade GOMULKA and Comrade GIEREK, that this nation cannot be governed, that it does not measure up to its leaders. They said this in moments of emotion, and I would ask you not to expand upon it. After all, the concern is about something else. This theory actually does have a certain justification in that the Poles do not have a national instinct because that is the way things worked out in our traditions, in our history. This is only a part of the truth, that is to say, in the sense that we have certain gaps in our social discipline. History, however, has at the same time shown something completely opposite. Our people have longed for an independent state particularly fervently; in the name of this state they have fought for independence as have few other people. They even formed insurgent or underground elements of nationhood.

Our people want a good strong state. A cavalier attitude toward certain features is not an attitude toward the state as such, but toward certain elements of authority, toward government. Society is very demanding in its attitude toward authority, critical, difficult to manage, but it is capable of respecting and obeying authority which fulfils its duties well. Our people's fatherland, historically speaking, is young. Thousands of the best people, including soldiers, have perished in order to defend and preserve this state as an organized form of people's authority. And we must defend it today. We must constantly strengthen this state. The military is after all a very important state element, a kind of synthesis and pattern of statehood. And at present that is very important.

Our armed forces are, as we know, universally respected and liked. Not only thanks to tradition, although that helps very much; the present-day stance is decisive. There are, however, sad examples about which you have spoken, about which I spoke in your name from the rostrum of the VI Plenum. The cadre proposes, in the light of these facts, to fight for its authority. We are doing this, and will do it. You know that the report of the Politburo at the Plenum contained a favorable turn. I tried to express it in my presentation; Vice Premier KOPEC devoted to the
military a fragment of his speech in the Sejm; Comrade PRZYMANOWSKI spoke beautifully, inspired by the Main Political Directorate, by General BARYLA. An extensive press and television presentation of the armed forces at its most attractive during our festive days followed. In the near future there will be a television program on the economy-mindedness of the People's Polish Armed Forces. I spoke on this subject with the new chairman of the Committee on Radio and Television Matters, Comrade BALICKI.

As you know, we already have successive guidelines for cooperation with civilian party authorities, with commands, with the political apparatus, with military party authorities. The implementation varies with various regions, of which you have spoken. But, of course, it is a very significant document. We have something to refer to. At the VII Congress, as you are aware, beautiful words were spoken. The military is the pride and joy of our party, of the entire Polish nation. We will be mindful of maintaining this mood, but this is not a substitute for our military action. In this connection we must also be aware that the party today is too sore, rather in pain, somewhat crippled to be able to fight for the authority of the military. Let us not be surprised that there may not be enough strength and time for this. It is we who must work for the authority of the party, because it is the foundation of all other socialist authorities. Thus the key to the matter is our effort. We must continue to work on the position of the military at all times and everywhere.

Let us consider the origin of these negative matters which cause us so much injury and grief. But, first of all, let us look at the dimension of the phenomenon. Despite everything, it is merely marginal, incidental, transitory—just as was the winter and spring of 1971. It looms before our eyes—only incidental. Comrades, we must take note of this.
This comes, in the first place, from the activity and instigation of our enemy. An accompaniment to this were various "Free Europe" radio programs, the case of LEWANDOWSKI, matters of the military budget as being a special burden on our society. The enemy wants to weaken the military as an important and reliable element of the people's state. It is one of the elements of the class struggle. Anybody can see this clearly.

Secondly--this arises from general feelings, against the background of the difficult living conditions of our people, the economic situation of our existence. These feelings, steered by the medium of particularly backward elements of people, are being directed to as sophisticated a social group as the armed forces, which, on the whole, are better provided for than an average citizen. This is true not only in terms of pay and family allotments, which always continue to produce dissatisfaction, or else because of free living quarters of which we have spoken, but also in matters of subsistence and our efforts somehow to shield the cadre from all kinds of aggravations of daily life, in questions of health care and recreation which are resolved better in the military than in other areas of government. In a situation where these matters do not come to the surface sharply among our people as a concern and a burden, they are not felt very acutely; now they are stressed.

Also, comrades, we should not exclude the possibility that the people do not always and in every case have the best daily image of the army. There's a variety of situations that tend to embarrass the army. There are reservists, those who served in the army and who retain some bitterness, grudges, prejudices--these, too, should be taken into consideration. The only thing we can do is not to create situations which may harm the army. We should display the genuinely populist character of our army. We should demonstrate that it is thrifty, efficient and contributes to the nation's economy. (I again return to the example of military parades; there probably is no other army which at its own initiative, at the suggestion of its own leadership, gave up traditional parades, despite the fact that they had been held for years and often in very trying situations.) And, before all else--we must strive for the very highest standards for our army in every respect and fight everything which is harmful to the
army, which tarnishes it, compromises it, or makes it ludicrous; from fatal accidents down to excesses in dealing with the public, from waste and excessive and particularly ostentatious exploitation of position or rank, to a bureaucratic style of work, horseplay and conceit, from use of improper language to unconcern for outer appearance, etc. We are concerned here with properly conceived defense of our way of life, our military family, understood literally—which was the subject of talk by Comrade CIECKOWSKA—and understood broadly as a certain type of a community.

We need more dedication to the elimination from our own ranks of whatever is wrong. It is too bad that the various morally indefensible phenomena are tried—usually at the initiative of commanding officers, or the political apparatus, or in rare cases of their immediate milieu—before honor courts which should—but do not—cut away all that which besmirches and harms the organism.

Thus, we must all honor the good name of our armed forces—particularly in front of outsiders. We should not cause injury, and we should not join in unrestrained criticism.

There was a beautiful saying among Poles in Germany before the war, one of the commandments of a Polish patriot: "Poland is our mother and we may not speak ill of her." We may paraphrase this: the army is our family, our home; we must not evaluate it rashly and one-sidedly; we should be always concerned with its good name.

Dear comrades! The problem of criticism and critical attitude has been strongly intertwined throughout our discussion, as a matter of great importance and great strength, which the party has at its disposal and which it should utilize. This matter was discussed in the speech of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate. This is the Leninist method. Criticism, self-criticism and self-correction should be and is an organic attribute of the party, particularly in the performance of its leadership role. After all, the party has a wealth of intelligent, educated and thinking persons. It is an immense asset. For this reason we must oppose the opportunism and conformism which lurks in, and is
in a sense an organic part of, human frailty; we should not allow criticism and results produced by it to die their natural death. But we should approach very carefully the problem of criticism in particular periods of time (when it has mass character is general), in order to determine selectively and precisely when this criticism is positive criticism, when it is simple discontent, and when it represents hostility, or whether we have to do with purposeful action, with thoughtlessness spurred by emotion or with faintheartedness, or ignorance. This is a difficult matter, particularly when many individual occurrences combine into a certain common current which is sometimes murky; in such cases selectivity will not always be very precise.

Speaking about this I don't have in mind specifically our military environment, because I am aware that here we have to do with constructive criticism and only sometimes with casualness, emotion and discontent, but surely never with enmity. We should also be always conscious in our awareness of criticism that it may in one or another instance be utilized for negative purposes. I don't want you comrades to interpret this as distaste to engage in criticism, or critical examination. Just the opposite; I consider criticism to be a great force which we should utilize, particularly in the period when criticism appear to be all around us.

We must preserve the spirit of openness which has characterized this consultation. There is nothing more dangerous for the party, for communists, than discussions or criticism which circulate only behind the scenes. Lately such phenomena have been common. We should never again take to corridors with our stand as party members, with the position of the party. The corridors are our undoing. If we encounter a voice that is objectively bad, and worse harmful, but possibly expressed without evil design, we must always appraise it from the standpoint of intent, we should note to what extent such a voice mobilizes and to what extent it demobilizes, and should patiently expose its error of reasoning. Do not, therefore, silence the voices which clash with our tenets, principles and ideology, but, at the same time, they must be opposed as a matter of principle. Criticism should touch on shortcomings in our activities, our errors, but in the name of the principles of socialism, in the name of the party. Such is its basic criterion.
In this difficult period we may once again take a good look at all our comrades who had proven themselves with exceptional distinction and correctness, who showed themselves to be with the party—for better or for worse, who displayed their grit and countered negative phenomena as communists and soldiers. We may always rely on them, and will rely on them. We must remember them. They are the guardsmen of our party.

It is encouraging that, as I heard on several occasions, in certain elements of the armed forces we have evidence of instances of joining party ranks. This is a very heartening development. It is still too early to say how widespread this is, its scale; but its very existence proves that we are on the right path. I think that this should be presented more forcefully in the press, that it should be given proper recognition.

But, on the other hand, we have instances of party membership cards being returned (in the army the number of such cases is very small, does not go beyond the usual norm). This is done by persons whom we may divide into three groups. In group one are people who may even be good and honest but act on impulse; they have little resistance and easily break down. If there is in such a case also a conviction that here is a man who is worth saving for the party, we should give him our helping hand, since, when the present state of emotionalism passes, he himself will be ashamed of his present action. There may be also the fainthearted, the weak and fearful. It is better that these remain outside the party family—without fuss, discrimination, without reproach, but with an explanation that we too are not interested in including them among our vanguard. And, finally, there is a third group; here are weaklings, individuals without discipline, poor workers, disappointed in various ways in their own personal lives. Some of them regard this as a way to get out of the army. Let them go; this is a way to get rid of unnecessary ballast. I relate this with what was said by Comrade KOZIEL: to the work of Party Control Commission, to adherence to principle in this matter. We should not change our course. Quality of party ranks in the armed forces is a special matter.
I like the idea presented by Comrade NAJDA on the presentation of party membership cards. Perhaps this could be done by veterans of the movement of struggle and service.

It is particularly important that we completely succeed in convincing people that all bad things that occurred in our country and in our party are violations of the principles of socialism and Marxism-Leninism. It is precisely here that the special role of our cadre should become apparent. We have said: "Each officer is an educated Marxist." This imposes an obligation. An educated Marxist should be able to explain that these things which occurred--with such great harm to the nation and the party--are contrary to the great and glorious idea which we espouse and that a decisive return to this idea is the best way for escaping from the crisis. Marxism is not an incantation or a mark of loyalty. Sometimes certain comrades seem to think that usage of the words "in accordance with Marxism-Leninism" is like a stamp which attests to a correct process of thinking, while at the same time they show nothing of consequence in their subsequent reflections and especially in this Marxism of theirs in action.

We should treat Marxism as a constantly viable guidepost, show where it is violated and fight against its violation. In these circumstances political training and ideological indoctrination are particularly important. In our armed forces we have always paid great attention to this field of activity. And this certainly produces good results. But at this time the Marxist approach and its successful application among the people is a question of supreme ideological importance. It is in this direction that we should turn with our political training. We should round out or modify certain subjects and certain studies so that they respond to the needs of today, so that the theory will relate directly to our concrete situation. This is a very important matter. I think that this is particularly important in the training of our young cadre--the future of the army--therefore in institutions of higher learning, in officers schools. After all, this is our vanguard. It is in this direction that we should aim our efforts. We should, as was stated by Comrade WOJDAK, broaden, in a word, our whole indoctrination activity as widely as possible. I would call it

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our extended line of political action. We should involve a greater number of people for direct participation in indoctrination work. We need a new style in propaganda, a new style of political work, as was said by Comrade OLIWA. We should find answers to our own questions and interpret skillfully what, in the new party line outlined at the VI Plenum, is a return to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, or even--in our conditions--its contemporary enrichment, or an experiment, and what is a temporary but necessary retreat and compromise. In these matters we must produce more self-evident explanations. I would think that the Military Political Academy could do this reasonably soon.

An equally important problem is to see national unity as a matter of unquestioned great significance, but not in terms of absence of class, classlessness, non-socialism. There never is unity without conflicts and costs for not seeing or ignoring these conflicts. We are not concerned here with formal unity or unity at any price, but a unity forged in struggle, in overcoming the class enemy and anarchic tendencies. "In all our propaganda and agitation"--said Lenin--"we should put matters forward openly. Those in our midst who see in politics petty maneuverings, often bordering on fraud, should be categorically condemned." How great and beautiful are these words! That is how the context and form of our ideological and propaganda work, skillful conduct of dialog, discussion, of simple talks with people, should be! We must remember to strive for highest quality in our ideological and propaganda work. In these matters quality means quantity, i.e., only that counts which is good, which is on a high level, which is effective. Quantity without quality in ideological work and in propaganda is a source of destructiveness.
Comrades! Particularly important is unity and cohesion of our military ranks. All our relationships, between the cadre and the conscript soldier (a particularly important place belongs here to reserve officer and NCO reserve schools), as well as between the cadre and both soldiers and civilian employees--these are all relationships with our comrade-collaborators in work and service. We listened with attention to Comrade NIWICKI's speech and we are rather glad that so many comrades--OBIEDZINSKI, OLIWA and several others--spoke out on this particular point. Our approach to military employees must be characterized by still greater care and understanding for the importance of their work, their service. Self-critically we may state that we did not always attach enough importance to this matter. Due to the nature of military organization and structure, civilian workers found themselves at lower hierarchical levels and this resulted in the fact that we did not always manage to create necessary footings for contact and understanding. We must change this, we must improve, we must operate in this sphere honestly and unequivocally. It is possible that the creation of a Military Employee Labor Union will produce the necessary platform. Let us provide all conditions for its autonomous, really independent activity serving to protect their rights, but simultaneously serving our common cause--the cause of defense. This is, after all, our common concern.

We must not permit any kind of division among soldiers or divisive relationships toward soldiers who will now enter the service. It does not concern us to which union such a soldier belongs, or whether he participated in a strike. Each of them should be clear that with us he is composing his curriculum vitae anew. This does not, of course, mean that, should some odd types of activities, antisocialist in nature, come to light, we will do nothing. Our reaction must be firm. The military is not an area for antisocialist experimentation and must be protected from all that undermines its basic values.
The attitude to the new trade unions on our part is not an evasion or tactic. The Plenum took up this problem. We understand that these unions are to be a permanent phenomenon in our lives. Of course, we expect that they will base themselves on socialist principles and that their dynamism--so strong at present--and support for them from the masses, will be a mobilizing factor. Examples of this may be observed here and there. If they will feel a co-responsibility for the country, for work, for socialism, then we will have a basis for understanding which we accept, and will do our utmost to create the best possible working conditions for them. Such an approach on the part of the new unions will be a true measure of their actual concern for worker interests as they are understood in long-range and strategic terms. On the other hand, we will expose and fight all attempts to utilize the unions for shabby antisocialist purposes.

We want each good soldier and each civilian employee to feel at home with us. Sincerity, goodwill, courtesy must predominate. This was taken up by Comrade RUZKO and many other comrades. Socialism is judged by the immediate reality it produces. Sometimes it is not enough to be politically correct. It is of essence that the correct policy find the proper soil, that it be confirmed by the realities of the people's, workers' and peasants' army. The soldier must trust us; he must feel that we defend a righteous cause, that we fight not for socialism generally, as a general concept, socialism in some abstract sense, but that we fight for his own future, his peace and tranquility, his family, his home, that in the people's army there is truth and justice, that it manifests concern for the human being.

We must constantly enrich man's relationship to man. We have done much along this line. We would be hard put to find examples outside the army of such broad, active, and diverse efforts which improve that which unites man with man, which ennobles the life of man. Yet here we have not attained the ideal. Our shortcomings and weaknesses are still not inconsiderable. Our present sensitivity to these matters should be even greater than it is. We must do everything in order to use our military regulations—that the soldier is a comrade in
arms to another soldier--our ethical principles, our cultural program as our great weapon in the fight for the socialist concept of interhuman relations in the armed forces. We should begin with ourselves because, as superiors, we always carry the greatest responsibility. But in this the role of party organizations is also great. It must be in evidence in the defense of human dignity and man's living conditions.

We soldiers do not have trade unions. This is understandable. The party should in a certain sense fulfil even this role. I think that with this attitude we are in a sense in the forefront in our concern for the development of social bodies, all sorts of social control, and social distribution in matters of social and living conditions. Even the comrades note herein certain inequalities, some scattered excuses, cases of greater or lesser justification. I still think that we have reason for satisfaction that we, the army--an organism with particular qualities appropriate to armed forces--were able to create a system which in its essence is deeply democratic and which constitutes a platform on which active social factors and forces come to the fore and interact.

What is greatly needed--and I think we may rely on the support of the party administration and organizations--is a certain type of inventory of all shortcomings fermenting in various organisms of our armed forces. We should quickly take care of all these which we can, and give honest answers on those we cannot solve. To respond quickly and to the point to demands is very important. We should systematically and efficiently examine grievances and even anonymous complaints which, unfortunately, are a form of an educational reproof, a form of lack of confidence in us. I believe that achieving a reduction in anonymous actions should be an ambitious goal of our efforts, because this will show that honest persons who act anonymously would no longer be afraid, as they seem to be at present. At the same time, anonymous activities which evidence bad will, however difficult it is to find their authors, must be brought to light among us. This approach will strengthen our environment, will mobilize and equip us to combat those things which persist among us as foreign and diseased presences. Such anonymous elements should be uncovered and made public. This is a form of pillory.
which must not be addressed personally, but used as an instrument of education. We should not allow any indications of human anxieties, suffering, dishonesty—to surprise and startle us. We should always have some sensors which would reveal these matters to us. We must recognize, even if not formally, but morally and in party terms, that the unexpected appearance of certain phenomena disqualifies the supervisor and the party organization which failed to note them in time.

A matter of importance is direct contact, conversation. As you will know, we adopted at a session of the Military Council certain principles governing insets of representatives of central institutions at the operational level down to individual soldiers. We must not walk on stilts. We must be all together. There is need, as soon as possible, for members of the leadership, ministries, districts, branches of the armed forces, to take part in unit and basic military party organization meetings.

Despite our successes which we referred to, there are many things which can be improved and corrected. Many persons expressed themselves on this question during the discussion. I would like to return to a statement made by Comrade GOLEJEWSKI, that the shock which we have experienced has, despite its odd implication, this one plus that it revealed weak points everywhere, even in basically healthy organisms. In our everyday turmoil of duties we do not take note of certain matters, but it is worthwhile to retain the sensitivity which we have regained. It should not be allowed to be only a transitory event.

We have accomplished much in matters having to do with social and daily living conditions, concern for health of the cadre and soldiers generally; but we should continue to improve it. Winter approaches; we should protect the cadre and the civilian employees against hardship. Matters pertaining to maintenance were taken up today. We must particularly see to it, even at the cost of other tasks and work, that the soldiers and the cadre do not find themselves in wintertime in a state of misery.
We should be sensitive to all questions connected with unnecessary excesses, luxuries. We cannot tolerate this, particularly now, when the entire society carries such a great burden. This is not only a service matter but also a matter of party and morale. We should observe particularly rigorously honest procedures that earn social approval, in the assignment of living quarters, premiums and other benefits. We should increase the importance of the commission dealing with matters of social and living conditions of the social control teams, which we have discussed recently. Also, I see here an approach from three points of view. First, we obviously must satisfy more carefully and fully all needs which it is our duty to do. Secondly, we must assure honest distribution of what we have. And, finally, we must have a climate of goodwill which should prevail even when satisfaction of a given need is impossible. Our sensitivity to the way we do things must be particularly high.

Comrades, we must take a good look at what was bad in our behavior, or, in any case, misunderstood or not comprehensible. Where we find evidence of excessive and unjustified favors, privileges and discounts, we must of our own free will and force of party conscience straighten out, set the situation aright, clear the atmosphere. I am stressing one item which the comrades criticized with such zeal: opposition to senseless expenses connected with preparations for visits. Comrades, this is an affront to the visitor. After all, we have talked on many occasions about various excessive ornamental undertakings, various arrangements which have no meaningful operational justification. Yet, unfortunately, they still occur, and they still exist. Perhaps we were insufficiently consistent in enforcement when creating preventive measures. Whoever is making such decisions should not get away with it; he must pay dearly for it.
This is connected with the subject matter of corruption problems, which are now so widely discussed in the country, and so thoroughly exploited by the enemy. At this point it is necessary to know how to spot certain items correctly, and correctly evaluate them. We cannot be caught in a trap of psychosis set by the enemy, thereby casting a burden of suspicion on a rather large part of our leadership cadre. In this instance the slogan of the day "SZCZEPANSKI" has become a symbol, which in its implications enables one to see such "SZCZEPANSKI's" at every turn. Speaking parenthetically--I do not wish to be involved in providing any justifications in this affair, yet, as a matter of fact rumored versions are circulating that all those worldly possessions that are described as his personal property have been actually stolen, embezzled, and so on. I have spoken to Comrade CZUBINSKI about this situation. An investigation is already in an advanced stage, and it is known that the entire matter actually represents a huge, disgraceful abuse of authority (unjustifiable expenses, losses sustained by the government), yet no obvious thievery can be substantiated, or rather, can be proved. It is true that in building his villa he did employ TV workers, who, by the way, were paid by him (it is the same as if someone from the military employed soldiers in building his private house--which is also conduct that we condemn). Legal proceedings are now under way, and I am not convinced that some additional charges will not be made, although in any event certainly not to the prior extent and not of similar severity. I emphasize that this does not diminish the liability of the person who caused the party and the people's government such great harm, and who must be severely punished for all this.
In this context it is necessary to be aware that a system of various kinds of legal allowances is widely applied within the country, as well as in the armed forces, or, let us say, privileges, in homebuilding, sales of one-family houses, apartments, coupons for automobile purchase, that at times are rewards, at times are exchangeable—things that require additional payment, that in some sense are preferential. Conceivably such a system should be concretely reassessed; nevertheless, it is a practice massively used on a national scale. At a session of the Military Council I submitted specific data on the subject and certain features were exposed in a report of the Political Bureau. The issue is that the practice should be formalized, legalized and cleaned up. However, we must not permit ourselves to be put in a position of being actually accused by the enemy of complete thievery, embezzlement throughout the entire party or large segments within it. Thus it will be necessary to demonstrate more vigorously, in part this is beginning to take place, how many millionaires there are who in fact are preying on the state-controlled economy, and how much there is of private initiative operating on the edge of legality; what great harm and demoralization there is in all of this, since, obviously, these people turn over large sums of money in corrupt ways. In entire sectors of our social life there is bribery, venality and dissipation of national income; and, in this connection, how unfortunately frequent is the phenomenon that the people whom People's Poland educated, the working class, engineers, electronic technicians, experts in other fields open shops, boutiques and other businesses, in order to make money! Is this moral? Is parasitism moral? All this must be seen, corrected as part of a great revival, naturally starting with us, with the party.

The issues of organizing living and working conditions, of overburdening the cadre have been voiced loudly in the course of these consultations. Indeed, it is one of the most pressing problems that has been surfacing for a long time. Comrade SZAFRANSKI put this into sharp focus. General HUPALOWSKI presented a definitive philosophy of our activity in this area and, later on, Comrades SIWICKI and BARANSKI also spoke out, associating themselves with the discussion. We must seriously take this to heart although, obviously it isn't a new disclosure.
We have taken many steps which were supposed to decrease the cadre's overload. Having in mind the easing of burdens we introduced an extended control system which was criticized by certain people and praised by others. Its main purpose was to ease the conscript cadre's workload. Comrades, in discussing this matter calmly, it is necessary to bear in mind that in overburdening the professionals beyond average, we in turn have been trying to resolve some matters which in other circles do not appear in the best possible light, i.e., the provision of certain goods in short supply, medical care, wherever people in uniform are able to save time for their personal and family needs. The point is that we must not be one-sided and see the matter in a defensive way, as if suddenly we are discovering something which we have not seen and understood previously, and that only the strikes in the coastal region have opened our eyes to the overburdening of the cadre. The point in all these matters, which were under discussion and explained by comrades, among them the Chief of the General Staff (on red tape, inspection, etc), is also that in improving this entire process, party aid should be sought, primarily in the form of initiative and advice on how to accomplish it better. Comrade BARANSKI and the Chief of the General Staff have promised major changes on company and regimental losses, and it is clear that changes will provide results responding to needs, if they are based on broad consultations, opinions and assistance which we are requesting.

There still is the problem of extended stays outside of the place of our residence due to the nature of our service. That small booklet, which Comrade SZAFRANSKI was showing to us, still in prepublication pamphlet form only, I sent on 16 May to the Military Council in order to familiarize the Council with it and draw appropriate conclusions from it. Why? Because apart from inevitable and inescapable trips, such as to exercise areas, to various types of training inherent in our service, there are many instances when trips originate from faulty organization, from a deadline to be "ready by yesterday," from too long delays, lasting a week or several days, in obtaining or turning in equipment to a depot; calls to cadre discussions for which, again, one must also wait. In these matters one can fall back on an attitude of skepticism, but, once again it is a matter best resolved in concrete terms.
It seems to me that it is necessary to take preventive measures against red tape within all levels without exception. Despite prevailing views and formulations, bureaucracy must not be treated as solely an administrative office—procedural matter; a bureaucracy, if it is maintained within judicious, essential limits and is operated efficiently, is necessary and, as any occupation, deserves respect. Bureaucracy must be comprehended as a system which separates one man from another, paralyzing his activity; a system which oppresses people with a flood of irrational activities. In such a view of bureaucracy, it is possible to have, side by side, haughtiness and insolence, distrust and formalism, distaste for live contacts and nonstereotyped opinions, a propagation of official channels and immobilizing attitudes. Naturally, such a system also is a locale of an avalanche of guidelines and reporting—the subject of very frequent and justified complaints.

Comrades! It certainly would be unwise not to stress within today's consultations the importance of combat readiness, the significance of high fitness of the armed forces as a specialized defense system. Irrespective of how painful the situation is we are going through, whatever bitterness chokes our throats, no one will relieve us from this obligation. We are proud that combat readiness, the combat capabilities of our armed forces have not weakened even for a moment and that, indeed, here in Poland there were no soft spots within our defense systems even though, as it has been correctly stated, a defense system is a broader concept and consists of a totality of national and governmental effort. It is self-evident that it is necessary to do everything possible on behalf of classical forms of combat readiness, such as combat alert duty, guards, services, protection of arms, security-mindedness in a sense of taking care of secret documents and realizing that one is responsible for his words. Taking into consideration certain frustrations, instability of various sectors, I believe that jointly with the security organs we should check on the protection of security in all elements which are connected with the defense system, but are outside the armed forces.
Combat readiness also is our shield. Comrades DUDKOWSKI and PIETRUCHA spoke of concerns and difficulties, and Comrade NOWAK explained the issue, thus I do not wish to pursue the subject further. We have complete understanding from our party and governmental leadership for armed forces' needs, although we must be moderate and must realize that, under present circumstances, we will be unable to acquire all of those items of armament that are justified beyond any doubt from the combat point of view. However, in the light of the situation, there is a new dimension to service and party concern over the actual technical state and maintenance of arms and equipment. We must do our very best in this matter. And again, in the light of this situation, one can once again see the great importance of the fact that we remain in our socialist defense coalition, that our frontier on the Elbe is secure, that we are capable of solving our difficult internal problems with the feeling that our friends and allies are guarding our security. From them that is great assistance. Against this background I would like to emphasize the importance of constant, direct and close brotherly cooperation with soldiers of all friendly armed forces; of maintaining, or even expanding wherever it is possible, the rhythm of present contacts; in particular this should apply to the Northern Group of Soviet Forces--the comrades who jointly with us, shoulder to shoulder, defend the socialist community.

The problems of cooperation with local and provincial committee organs were rather strongly emphasized. Comrades ROZKO and PAJKO spoke about this. It is a mixed picture. There are good as well as bad examples. But, after all, this does not result solely in relationship to the armed forces, as the comrades largely portrayed the developments they referred to. As it happens, wherever the relationship with the military had not been the best, the leadership in general and contact with the public were also not the best. WROCLAW as well as BYDGOSZCZ could both serve as examples. Life demonstrated and exposed this to view. Therefore, I beg of you, comrades, to see to it that, in old as well as new situations, we exert an influence on mutual relationships with our posture, our adherence to principle, and with our help--since, after all they are not strong--and make sure that our party work in a particular area is competent and effective. It also is our business. A strong party in every facet of its activity is a pillar and base of all successes.
The comrades referred to the necessity of a broader and more thorough focus of attention on military matters. Indeed, perhaps more should be done showing the armed forces in difficult situations, at hard work, in demanding service activity. However, it is necessary that all of us take an active part in this. We do have a forum for portraying this kind of military effort. It is the Trybuna Ludu [People's Tribune], which allocates rather generous space for this purpose; there are a special TV program such as the Poligon, and radio programs. The need is to show our people how to give content to those avenues to audiences in the best possible way.

A problem of great importance, touched on in the discussions is that of reservists, reserve officers and work intensification in this area; finally also, the matter of good, sustained and tighter relationships with the People's Militia and the Security Service. We are in a common endeavor, and it is necessary to emphasize this in practice and constantly improve it.

Comrade LUKASIK, as well as other comrades, spoke a great deal—in general positively—on the subject of information. We feel that the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces has accomplished much in this area, particularly lately. However, it is necessary to keep improving the content of information and its dissemination. It is necessary to see that there are no obstructed channels in the intermediate links for relaying information, in order to have information reach its destination, without delays, without gaps and distortions due to the transmission process. Such things do occur very frequently. Let us, for instance, take transmissions on this meeting: they must be very well thought out, evaluated and adapted to the audiences. It cannot be, pardon me for the expression, pulled out of a sleeve, based on whatever one likes. The consideration and appropriate preparation of this information is an extremely important matter.
The comrades have paused on the relationship between organization-party, authority-party, and apparatus-commander. Comrade URBANIK brought up an interesting thought when he spoke on the influence, as he said, of the "bottom" upon the "top," that is, of a subordinate upon his superior. The essence of the matter is that there is a requirement for good leadership and that that requirement reveals itself from the rank and file in a particular way, simultaneously creating conditions for good leadership. All in all, I believe that these relationships, which I have pointed out, are essentially a model formulation for activity, that therein is harmony, and there are no really serious conflicts of interest. Perhaps it is also possible to evaluate the course of the debate on this question. Comrade GOLEJEWSKI referred to the need for improvement, primarily the consolidation of the role and organizational position of party and authorities, their initiatives and voice. It is difficult for me to tell at present whether this is a practical matter, or whether there are some institutional obstacles that have to be removed. However, it seems to me that the first assertion is closer to the truth, and that it is necessary, in fact, to do everything possible to have this new situation give us the encouragement to review, to reassess once more the position of the party authority and organization.

In party work--I share this view--the ideological content must predominate more widely and strongly in party work, particularly from the point of view of evaluating the situation, its influence on specific living conditions and military activity. There is a need for theoretical intensification in all those areas to which Comrades BANKA and BIENIEK have referred. Every professional soldier and party member must now be not only a Marxist by training, an expert in the political-military situation in general, but he must also be conversant with the present situation in Poland and the specific party policy on how to resolve this situation, including also the party defense policy.
I believe that at this point it is also necessary to emphasize that every party member must perform his obligations in party-like fashion. Perhaps this sounds superficial, but I want to put stress on the party statute. We speak too little about the statute, we refer to it too infrequently, and, unfortunately this applies up to the highest level of party leadership. The statute is the working document cast in steel for the party secretary and each party level of authority. Every communist, especially the party workers and activist members are obligated to study it and abide by it rigorously.

Comrade LAGODZKI has relayed a series of practical observations on the subject of party meetings. We have to make an effort that the collective organizational wisdom is constantly defended at these meetings. We must see to it that they become more lively, vibrating with concern and conducted in the spirit of creative debate, in which every individual, whoever may be preoccupied with concern or doubts, should be heard out with patience. I think that meetings, depending on needs and possibilities, should be conducted more frequently. The party members, depending on needs, should also be effectively informed on the work of executive organs, the basic organization, and the party committee. The implementation of proposals and resolutions adopted at previous meetings should be presented systematically and thoroughly discussed. In my opinion, this is very important, and perhaps has not as yet become one of our stronger points. The people ought to know that their opinions are recognized and respected, and are not merely recorded in minutes. More individual discussions are also needed for the purpose of obtaining expressions of opinion on how the people see their role and the role of their organization in carrying out specific tasks. It can be said that these are matters that are common and generally known. However, comrades, I feel that the present gives them new and more urgent meaning.
Now, the authority of the party and of the party organization in the armed forces as a result of events: the voices in the discussion on the subject, in a certain sense, diverged, although the impression predominated—that is what I read into it—that that authority has increased. What counts before all else is experience, and that experience is the mainstay of the armed forces, the posture of the party in the armed forces. This is the standard that should be used for measuring the authority of the party organization, the authority of party members. It seems to me that this applies also to practical officers, the political apparatus, and all party activists, irrespective of the functions they perform. To the end they defended the truths which, at a given stage, the party represented, even if at the time they were aware that these are truths that are difficult to defend. When a struggle is going on, the orders of the command or leadership existing at the moment are carried out. But, at the same time, the weakness of command, errors of command do not signify army weaknesses. The command changes, the forces regroup themselves, and the army continues to perform its mission. Our party is that kind of an army. It would appear that those events, apart from causing great losses, at the same time have tempered, allowed all the best forces in our party to rectify themselves. Struggle and suffering give fortitude. As a result of this upheaval, if you will, comrades, in a certain sense we all have become different. I believe that this conclusion is the precise stand to be taken by communists, true communists who do not push events away from themselves, who experience them with depth, identify themselves with that army in whose ranks they attain victory, or on occasion who experience reverses. For a variety of considerations a number of factors will work in our behalf with greater difficulty, but we must do everything to transmute the phenomenon of "greater difficulty" into strength for ourselves; these factors are a stronger feeling of joint responsibility, of greater activity, of increased adherence to principle in combating evil, of greater closeness and solidarity in our ranks, an accelerated rhythm of work, and greater quality in it; (I speak of this as I now look at the perspective of the years 1981-1985, which for us must be years of exit from the crisis, years of further growth, that would also include the strengthening of our defensive power.)
The road to the building of a socialist Poland is a very broad one. This road is accommodating and will accommodate the efforts of everyone, including those who do not want to, do not know how, or cannot proceed down this same path, but, despite this, one moving in the same direction--to the welfare of a socialist Poland. Memorable are the words of Comrade KADAR expressed in the very painful--and how much more difficult times than ours--who spoke the great words: "Whoever is not against us, is with us." I believe that we, too, should look at the matter in those terms at this stage of our development and our situation: "Whoever is not against us, not against the party, is objectively with us"; and it is necessary to fight for these people, it is necessary to seek them out--people who have integrity, who are patriots, who recognize the righteousness of a socialist Poland.

In this context it can be said that not every dialogue has within itself constructive qualities, not every one serves progress, not every one is a demonstration of political sophistication and socialist democracy. Therefore, what kind of a dialogue do we mostly need? A dialogue which would be a discussion, an understanding between individuals conscious of their responsibility for the fate of Poland. I believe that words referring to the fate of Poland resound most credibly on the lips of those who have labored, and labored the most, historically, on behalf of Poland's liberation, and now struggle on behalf of its security--that is to say, the soldiers. And as for the enemy, his ideology, his activities--we will be against him uncompromisingly, we will increasingly take to the offensive.

I appeal to you, comrades! As I conclude my remarks, I would like to refer to the question, the plea pulsating very strongly--throughout these discussions: how much longer will this state of affairs, so very difficult for us, continue, for the moment not resolving itself rapidly enough in a positive direction? Why is this taking place? Many comrades have asked this question. Obviously, I could respond with the stereotyped assertion that, historically, time works in our favor, that there is no other way, that socialism will win. That is not the issue. We must be watchful of each day of the socialist cause, and those days--if they do not move us ahead--actually work against us.
share this anxiety and this concern. It is--I would say--a
proper concern for our profession. We are men of action--of
deeds and of combat. That stems from the nature of an army. To
the extent that I am successful, I want to speak out to you,
comrades. I am strong, in this flow of events, to put forth
efforts in order to speed up matters, to quicken processes so
necessary for the party. However, on the other hand, being in an
institution of leadership, I am aware of the complexity of this
transition to a frontal and rapidly evolving offensive action.

Comrades! As a result of, and within the confines of the
significant upheaval that has taken place, we find ourselves,
when all is said and done, on differing levels of a quite
substantively altered controlling structure. Many people have
changed. To an important degree the collective has changed, the
Central Committee Secretariat in particular. It is becoming
crystallized, is moving forward. It is a process. Try to
visualize, comrades, that a given directing authority is changing
itself to a very critical degree. How much time will be required
to restructure ourselves into a new configuration for action?
And, remember that this is not the ordinary, usual controlling
structure, and not the usual situation, and not the ordinary set
of circumstances. That is why perhaps, on occasion, an
observable inadequacy in the cohesion of some moves comes to the
surface, and that is why there are such deficiencies of our own
in the sphere of propaganda.

It is necessary to be aware that in addition to all
controlling mechanisms, there is, as we shall recognize, a huge
journalistic army, which is likewise experiencing its frustrations
and as a result of its usual pursuit of propaganda of success--
frequently, in contradiction to its own perception of reality, at
present has a tendency to tilt in the opposite direction. This
must be regulated, these people are also to be educated, it is
necessary to understand their spiritual condition. This is a
difficult process, not a simple one. Yesterday's meeting of
Comrade KANIA with the journalistic milieu was very constructive,
profitable. That is how Comrade KANIA evaluated the meeting today
in a conversation with me. We estimate that in this area gradual
improvement will be taking place, but we do not exclude the
possibility that we may encounter a gremlin or 2, or 10, or perhaps
even a 100.
Very many new people, a significant portion of provincial committees, have not yet come into their own. They were not prepared for struggle. During the VI Plenum I openly appealed to those comrades who do not feel confident of their strength to get their second wind. But it would appear that this is not easy to do. Thus, there will be further changes, but we must not allow it to become an avalanche, a confrontation. That is what the enemy is waiting for. It must be a judicious, peaceful procedure, it should be accomplished in the shortest possible time. It must be remembered, comrades, that we are being constantly thwarted by various emergency problems, by strikes, market difficulties, a mass of various encounters, which must be faced and which must be shouldered by the leadership.

Comrade KANIA is heavily burdened. He conducts countless meetings. Information on many of them as a rule is not being publicized. But, as we know, even personnel decisions require a variety of consultations, both with the individual who is coming in, and the individual who is departing. There is an endless variety of general meetings also taking place. That is an effort of immense scope, going on actually day and night. That is how we, comrades, are working. I refer to this not in order to make a show of it for our side. It is the truth that, under the best of circumstances, for months now sleep is snatched in two or so hours daily. In addition, there are the tremendous pressures, Sundays and Saturdays are taken up, there are no respites. I want to hope that you in some measure will develop an understanding for our inadequacies and those various cracks through which one weakness or another make their appearance. All these are efforts which are conducted, as can be seen, in a thoughtful manner, responsive to theses which were expressed during the VI Plenum, and are being implemented honestly. With his modesty and his calm Comrade KANIA is creating a mood which is preparing a good foundation for activities of the collective, even though for the moment it is not resulting in any kind of spectacular effects. That is of very great importance.
This year is also the time for the VII Plenum to take place. We note that this may occur during the turn between November and December, perhaps during the second half of November. Thereafter—the congress, the election of delegates will follow, and elections may take place in primary organizations. It is necessary to be hard in control of the situation, in order that the elections take place in a proper fashion, that factors do not come into play that would be likely to bring harm.

To sum up, comrades, it is not easy. Nevertheless, recalling the famous words from the most difficult moments of our history, we can conceivably say that there will yet be a holiday on our street. The party has experienced an upheaval, it has sustained heavy losses, but, as comrade NAJDA has said, the party as a total entity is not compromised. No one can rob the party of historical truths. "Socialism is not an automatic factory either of bread, of freedom, or of peace," the famous publicist Comrade OSMANCZYK has written. It is not an automatic factory. It is created by living people, with all their imperfections. No one other than the party was able to build a real, modern Poland. The party has the constitutional right to carry out a leadership role in the state. That right has evolved historically, it represents the present day legacy of the struggle and efforts of entire generations of Polish revolutionaries, communists, leftist socialists and leftist populists; in fact, all progressive forces of our nation. Under the leadership of our party, thanks to its policies, thanks to the nation's sacrifice in work, and the vigilant service of the Polish Armed Forces, there arose and now exists the current mold of a socialist Poland. If there are in our homeland balance sheets of errors, barriers of difficulties, currents of dissatisfaction—to paraphrase words of our great poet, "it will not be an outside power that will erase them."
We must, therefore, defend both the historical justifications and the strategies of our party, which has been and is generally valid as a policy, as a purpose, as a road. We must also defend those people who have served the party well, and continue to serve. The leadership role of the party is the sole guarantee for the future, and the improvement of party work is the precondition of bringing health to our entire social existence. The most immediate objective of party activity is now the rebuilding of confidence in the working masses, in the laboring class. From confidence will evolve and gain strength, we believe as never before, the bonds organically uniting our party with the nation. It is equally in this area that we can see our army's mission on behalf of the party. The great shock that we have lived through has created—which is something I have already discussed—specific positive opportunities. We must alter our thinking, but the results may be more profound, more enduring.

I am still impressed by our consultations. Despite everything, I see in them a source of optimism. That is what impressed me. The consultations have confirmed the great earnestness of our party ranks, their courage, their initiative. At the same time they reconfirmed their true democracy, their sense of responsibility. I am convinced that this is a condition that will endure. By virtue of the responsibility entrusted to the leadership of the armed forces, we will do everything in order to act in behalf of sustaining this condition, in order not to disappoint your trust. The immediate task, the first one for our party, for our nation, is to come out of the crisis. That is a basic issue and let everyone consider in his own conscience what he is duty bound to do in this instance. The party will provide further guidelines in its IX Congress, and I am convinced that, as heretofore, we will bring those guidelines to life honestly, firmly, and with honor.