

March 16, 1981
Memorandum from John McMahon to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency, '[Redacted] Report'

Citation:

"Memorandum from John McMahon to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency, '[Redacted] Report'," March 16, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA declassification, 2008
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165281>

Summary:

Translation discusses public unrest after implementing martial law, including a rise in robberies and participation in resistance groups such as Solidarnosc. It also lists the military members involved in the decision making exercise.

Credits:

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Original Language:

English

Contents:

- Scan of Original Document

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, National Security Agency

FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [] Report

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[]
[] John N. McMahon

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Distribution:

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

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Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland

FIRDB-312/00763-81

DATE OF
INFO. February 1981

DATE 16 March 1981

SUBJECT

Poland's Present Tense Internal Situation, and Scenario of
Events Before and After Possible Introduction of Martial Law

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) document entitled "Appraisal of the Current Internal Situation in Poland, and a Hypothetical Sequence of Critical Events Before and After Introduction of Martial Law," classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. It describes:

- current unrest in Poland;
- dissatisfaction before and after imposition of martial law;
- gradual stabilization of the internal situation as a result of MIA activities and the positive attitude of the clergy.

Also included is a list of names and positions of 19 MIA officers of major general, brigadier general, and colonel rank who participated in a 16 February 1981 decisionmaking exercise.

End of Summary

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SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

Attachment No. 1

APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION
IN POLAND, AND A HYPOTHETICAL SEQUENCE
OF CRITICAL EVENTS BEFORE AND AFTER
INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW*

1. Basic elements of the current situation in Poland

The political-operational situation in Poland is characterized by persistence of social tensions and conflicts which are of varying levels of intensity, causing further disturbances in the economy and making it impossible to lead the country out of the crisis.

* [Translator's Note: The expression "martial law" is an arbitrary translation of the Polish stan wojenny, literally "military or wartime state." This is a state of law covering situations of threat from abroad and from domestic anti-government forces. The normal Polish term for martial law (stan wyjątkowy) has been declared as inapplicable under socialism-communism and only used in reference to capitalist countries which were reportedly prone habitually to suspend rights of citizens indefinitely. Stan wojenny is defined by the Encyklopedia Powszechna (General Encyclopedia), published in 1973 as a state of law, the introduction of which suspends temporarily certain civil rights and increases government authority and obligations of citizens. The propaganda-based concept-straddling stan wojenny introduced linguistic confusion and the Leksykon Wiedzy Wojskowej (Military Lexicon), published in 1979, already noted that it was sometimes used (particularly in Poland) synonymously with the purged stan wyjątkowy. The term seems to have been rehabilitated for use in the present crisis situation in Poland.]

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The upsetting of the economy, decline of social discipline, scarcity of raw materials and power, drop in production, inflation, and market shortages bring about disorganization in economic life.

Against this background in the initiatives and activities of the SOLIDARNOSC leadership, there is noted an escalation of demands tending in the direction of a permanent functional impairment of the state and its organs. Actions are undertaken for the purpose of systematic control of mass communications media and printing.

Escalation of socially burdensome demands and constant concessions by the authorities have convinced SOLIDARNOSC that the authorities are not in a position to solve any problems.

An increasing lack of involvement in carrying out the policies of party and state authorities is noted.

Counterrevolutionary forces including KOR active members and other hostile elements, which took over command of the leading elements of SOLIDARNOSC while setting up new organizational structures, are turning the union movement into a political force whose goal is the takeover of power and changes in the system of government.


The persistence of such a state threatens the survival interests of the nation, promotes anarchy and impotence of the defense capability of Peoples Poland and the Warsaw Pact.

2. Variants of anticipated development of the situation before introduction of martial law

a) A general strike combined with elements of sitdown strikes. The following do not function: transportation, communications, power, health services, printing, mass media, educational institutions, and supply. The counterrevolutionary forces, controlling individual spheres of life, come out with demands for changes in the PPR Constitution, resignation of the government, new elections, and PPR withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

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The personnel of some plants go out into the street. Law and order is disrupted. Extremist elements attack party and government buildings.

b) Regional strikes combined with sitdown strikes in some places of work. Strike readiness persists in order to compel party and government authorities to satisfy demands. Disruptions appear in supply, transportation, and educational institutions. Demands for further changes in party and government organization persist. Supply shortages cause widespread dissatisfaction. Criminal offenses increase. Antisocialist elements intensify anti-Soviet propaganda.

c) The counterrevolutionary elements, while not relinquishing the final aim of taking over power, temporarily tactically lessen the state of tension. The main effort is directed at winning over all society in order to seize power by means of reform.


3. Variants of anticipated development of the situation after introduction of martial law

The situation in Poland will be dependent on the circumstances which cause the introduction of martial law.


The following variants of sequences of events are anticipated:

a) Noncompliance with directives of state and administrative authorities, combined with a refusal to work. Organization of "self-defense" groups, seizure of weapons, attacks on party and government buildings, and also public institutions, committing acts of sabotage at work places, and likewise murders of active party members, functionaries of the Citizens Militia and security service, and soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces. Intensification of subversive propaganda activity by hostile groups inside the country and from foreign centers.

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The rise of panic combined with procuring food by committing robberies.

A part of society assumes a hostile attitude and declares for the counterrevolutionary side aggravated by the possible invasion of Warsaw Pact forces.

b) Noncompliance with directives in some regions of the country, refusal to work by personnel of part of the important industrial plants, occurrence of local strikes or other phenomena disorganizing life in the country. Part of society resorts to passive resistance. Few acts of sabotage and diversion occur. Demands for the release of arrested persons are made.

c) A gradual stabilization of life in the country follows as a result of action we have taken, and of the positive attitude of the clergy. As a result of arresting the leaders of antisocialist groups, local centers cease hostile activity. Propaganda activity of anticommunist centers abroad increases.


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Warsaw 1981


List
of Participants in Decisionmaking Game on 16 February 1981

No.	Rank	Name	Position
1.	Major General	Boguslaw STACHURA	Vice Minister of Internal Affairs (MIA), Chief of MIA Staff
2.	Brigadier General	Jozef BEIM	Deputy Commander, Main HQ of Citizens Militia (CM)
3.	Brigadier General	Jan SLOWIKOWSKI	Director, Dept I, MIA
4.	Brigadier General	Wladyslaw CIASTON	Director, Dept III "A", MIA
5.	Brigadier General	Jan GORECKI	Director, Bureau of Govt Protection
6.	Brigadier General	Stefan STOCHAJ	Director, Military Equipment Dept, MIA
7.	Brigadier General	Bonifacy JEDYNAK	Director, Cadre Dept, MIA
8.	Brigadier General	Jerzy CWIEK	Capital Commandant, CM
9.	Colonel	Zdzislaw SAREWICZ	Director, Dept II, MIA
10.	Colonel	Henryk WALCZYNSKI	Director, Dept III, MIA
11.	Colonel	Czeslaw WIEJAK	Deputy Director, Dept IV, MIA

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|-------------|-----------------------|--|
| 12. Colonel | Ryszard WOJCICKI | Director, Bureau "W",
MIA |
| 13. Colonel | Benedykt JANUSZEWSKI | Deputy Director,
Communications
Directorate, MIA |
| 14. Colonel | Franciszek JOZWIAK | Director, Dept of
Material and Technical
Administration |
| 15. Colonel | Tadeusz KWIATKOWSKI | Director, Investigations
Bureau, MIA |
| 16. Colonel | Bronislaw PAWLIKOWSKI | Director, Directorate I,
MIA |
| 17. Colonel | Jan WIELOCH | Director, Operations
Bureau, KGMO [expansion
unknown, possibly Main
HQ of Citizens Militia] |
| | <u>Secretariat</u> | |
| 18. Colonel | Jan WASILUK | Deputy Director,
Directorate I, MIA |
| 19. Colonel | Jan CZYZEWSKI | Deputy Chief, Div I,
Directorate I, MIA |

