



September 09, 1981
**Memorandum from Clair George to the Secretaries of State
and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency,
'New Draft Decree on Martial Law; Current Situation in
Poland'**

Citation:

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Summary:

Memorandum explains of a newly drafted decree of martial law, and increasing tensions between military leadership and Solidarnosc.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 September 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Director, National Security Agency

FROM : Clair George
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : 1. New Draft Decree on Martial Law
2. Current Situation in Poland
(DOI: Up to Early September 1981)

1. [redacted] Comment: The following information is from an extremely sensitive source and, therefore, recipients should hold this report very closely.]

2. A reliable source who has excellent access in the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that the National Council [sic, National Defense Committee?] has drafted a new decree on the introduction of Martial Law in Poland. This decree supercedes all previously prepared drafts of the National Defense Committee regarding this matter. This document is in the final phase of coordination. Source indicated that this document takes a more selective approach toward the introduction of Martial Law, both regarding the severity of the provisions of the decree as well as the extent of geographic implementation.

3. There has been an additional hardening in Jaruzelski's position toward Solidarnosc. At the most recent meeting of the Military Council Jaruzelski expressed the idea that "Fascist tendencies" are gaining ascendancy over citizens' rights in Solidarnosc. In Source's opinion, everything points to the fact that in the event of a more serious conflict, Jaruzelski will no longer be concerned regarding the declaration of Martial Law.

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
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4. Recently, Marshal Kulikov has put increasing pressure on Jaruzelski to introduce Soviet military advisors in the Polish Armed Forces down to the military district level in order to provide himself with greater influence on the Polish Armed Forces during the current crisis situation. Unlike other Warsaw Pact armed forces, since 1957 there have been no Soviet advisors in the Polish Armed Forces. Instead there has been a representation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces situated in Warsaw on Winnicka Street. Comment: This is presumably a reference to the Soviet representation of the Warsaw Pact in Poland headed by Soviet General of the Army Shcheglov.] During talks between Jaruzelski and Kulikov on the introduction of military advisors, the verbal exchange became so heated that allegedly Marshal Kulikov got up from the table without saying good-bye and left Jaruzelski's office slamming the door. After a long delay on this subject [date not provided], Jaruzelski, in coordination with Kania, agreed only to reinforce the Soviet representation on Winnicka Street by three representatives--for Front, political, and aviation matters. In addition, on the basis of reciprocity, there would be an exchange of representatives between the Polish Navy and the Soviet Baltic Fleet.


5. Source indicated that the following topics were approved by Jaruzelski for inclusion on the agenda for his and Kania's talks with Brezhnev in the Crimea on 14-15 August 1981:

- a. A comprehensive explanation of the state of readiness of Poland to declare Martial Law.
- b. The morale and political state of the Polish Armed Forces.
- c. Production of armaments and military equipment.
- d. Personnel replacements [in the armed forces?].

6. Moscow continues to disagree with the political policies of Jaruzelski and Kania, and the Soviets consider that the reelection of Kania to the position of First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party was a great disaster. Allegedly the Soviets suggested the transfer of Jaruzelski to the position of Chairman of the Council of State in order to open the way for the appointment of a hard-line government. The Soviets reportedly wanted Molczyk to head the Ministry of Defense and General Sawczuk to take over the Ministry of Internal Affairs.


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7. Olszowski's position in the Politburo has been visibly weakened. As an example of this Source cited the meager results of Olszowski's attempts to introduce troops into the radio and TV installations on the eve of the planned strike of technical personnel at these installations.  Comment: This is presumably a reference to the strikes that were to take place coincident with the beginning of the Solidarnosc congress on 5 September or those that would culminate in a nation-wide strike at the end of September.] At this meeting of the "Crisis Staff" of the Central Committee of the Party Olszowski announced his intention to initiate such troop action and requested that the Ministry of Defense make appropriate preparations, which General Siwicki routinely approved. Appropriate plans were prepared, reconnaissance activities took place, and even written orders were issued to subunit military commanders. However, the top leadership did not approve of this idea, agreeing only to a public demonstration of the presence of troops, such as patrols by armored personnel carriers.

8. There have been almost daily meetings of the "Crisis Staff" of the Central Committee, chaired by Olszowski. This staff determines the tactics of actions to be taken against Solidarnosc and it is prepared to issue and distribute newspapers during any days on which there is an interruption of publication. The staff is also responsible for other activities which are intended to make it impossible for Solidarnosc to prevent the broadcast of radio and TV programs.

9. Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, invited Jaruzelski to attend the Soviet military maneuvers which are currently taking place, and he plans on attending. Source stated that the Polish General Staff had only meager information on these maneuvers but does not view them as possibly being associated with Soviet intervention.




Clair George



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