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Digital Archive International History Declassified

February 06, 1965

RECORD OF THE FIRST CONTACT BETWEEN PREMIER ZHOU AND VICE PREMIER CHEN YI AND KOSYGIN

This document was made possible with support from the Henry Luce Foundation

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    Premier Zhou and others meet to discuss the current situations in South Vietnam and Laos, U.S. and Soviet strategy, and Chinese-Soviet competition over civil aviation, among other pressing issues.
    "Record of the First Contact between Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kosygin," February 06, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-03957-04, 1-21. Translated by Stephen Mercado. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165488
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Top Secret Document 75  

Foreign Ministry Top Secret Files

Record of the First Contact and Conversation of Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi with Kosygin and Others (5 February 1965)

(Premier and Vice Premier Chen have not yet reviewed)

Time:  3 p.m., 5 February 1965

Location: On the way from the airport to the Diaoyutai State Guest House

Part One: Record of Premier Zhou’s Conversation with [Premier Alexei] Kosygin

Part Two: Summary of Vice Premier Chen Yi’s Conversation with [CPSU Secretary Yuri] Andropov

Part Three: Summary of Other Comrades’ Conversations and Related Circumstances

Content Summary of Conversations

1. Kosygin proposed calling on Chairman Mao [Zedong] and President Liu [Shaoqi].

2. Kosygin spoke of the problems of South Vietnam and Laos, saying that it was necessary to help the United States in Vietnam develop a way out.

3. Kosygin said that in regard to the 1 March [Consultative] Meeting, they had a new situation and a new attitude.

4. Andropov said that this latest visit to Vietnam was mainly for strengthening relations between the two parties and the two countries. They discussed the issue of providing Vietnam’s military with technical assistance. He also said that the Soviet Union and China should talk with one another to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle and prepare to exchange views with him on this issue.

 5. Andropov indicated that the Soviet side intended to use this occasion of passing through Beijing for an exchange of views with him on the issue of relations between the two parties and the two countries. He also said that the Soviet delegation after visiting was not going to visit other Southeast Asian countries and that, after a visit of four days to Vietnam, it remained for them to pass through Beijing on their return to the Soviet Union.

6. Andropov indicated that the Soviet delegation intended for an exchange of views with him regarding the 1 March Meeting. He also said that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has already had another thought about this, that now they should in a new environment seek a good attitude, and that the Chinese comrades also should change their own position.

7. [First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov said that [President Lyndon B.] Johnson and [Prime Minister Harold] Wilson both want to visit the Soviet Union and that Kosygin also will visit the United States and Britain, although the exact time remains undecided. 

8. [Air Marshal Yevgeny F.] Loginov indicated that in future talks between the two sides on civil aviation (reference to negotiations on revision of the civil aviation agreement and its protocol), Soviet civil aviation will take heed not to harm the interests of Chinese civil aviation.

Part One

Record of Premier Zhou’s Conversation with Kosygin

(Interpreter: Yan Mingfu)

Kosygin: This is my first time to come to Beijing. How is your life?

Comrade Zhou Enlai (hereafter Zhou): Fine, a little busy.

Kosygin: If there is much work, that is good. If there is little work, ... [ellipsis in original] 

Zhou: How are you?

Kosygin: Fine, thank you.

Zhou: The wind here is a bit stronger, and it is dry.

Kosygin: As I saw along the way, it certainly is dry.

Zhou: We have less snow here. How is it for you over there?

Kosygin: There is a great deal of snow in Irkutsk. I arrived last night in Irkutsk. The time difference was five hours. Not wanting to sleep, I took a walk in Irkutsk. There was a great deal of wind and snow, but the climate was very comfortable. 

Zhou: Snow is good for you.

Kosygin: We also have a great deal of snow in Moscow. It has snowed heavily throughout Siberia. It has also snowed heavily in Kazakhstan.

Zhou: With much snow, it will be good for your harvest this year.

Kosygin: Of course it is good, but it does not have a decisive effect. In the end there are many unknown variables.

Zhou: Well, that is the way it is with agriculture.

Kosygin: That is not the way it is in the factory. In the factory, it is all clear. In agriculture, when people say it will be good, the result may be bad; when people say it will be bad, the result may be good.

Zhou: There are times when, seen from the surface, there is much growth, but in harvesting you see that all the grains have not fully ripened.

Kosygin: This is my first time to come to Beijing. All of our comrades asked me to give you their regards. The day before yesterday we had a meeting of our Central Committee Presidium. Brezhnev, [Presidium Chairman Nikolay] Podgorny and the other comrades all send you their regards.

Zhou: Thank you. Is Comrade Brezhnev well?

Kosygin:  He is well. He is working.

Zhou: Is he not in worse health than you?  He told me that he has heart trouble.

Kosygin: It is hard to figure out whose health is good and whose health is bad (laughs). He is in good health. [Former Central Committee Secretary Frol] Kozlov recently died.

Zhou: Yes, we all know about that.

Kosygin: He had been ill for two years. He could not move about on his own and needed two people to hold him to stand up. On the day he died, others took him to the table to eat. As soon as he was in his chair, he collapsed and died without uttering a word.

Zhou: Yes, people with such paralysis dread shaking.

Kosygin: He did not shake. He simply sat there and died. How is my schedule today? What are your thoughts?

Zhou: From here we go to the hotel. It will take some time, so we can talk a bit. Later, you will have lunch and rest in the afternoon. In the evening we can dine together. Before dinner you can rest.

Kosygin: Do you think it possible for us to go call on some people?

Zhou: What do you have in mind?

Kosygin: How shall I put this? If I may say so, if it were appropriate and acceptable, I would like to call on Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Liu Shaoqi, that is, if it would not be troublesome for you.

Zhou: This afternoon our comrades on the Central Committee must have talks with Comrade [Che] Guevara’s Cuban delegation. I will not participate. These comrades here and I have come specifically to receive you. They [Guevara’s delegation] arrived the day before yesterday. We already had discussions with them once yesterday and are going to continue talks today.

Kosygin: Of course, what I have just said is my personal remark. Although we are neighbors, we do not have much contact, so today we have an opportunity to talk a bit.

Zhou: I shall pass you remarks to them.

Kosygin: If anything comes of it, let me know.

Zhou: We are very happy that you went this time to visit Vietnam. This is because Vietnam is at the forefront of the struggle against the United States. If we were to speak of a hot war, then that would be the region where the most intense fighting would take place. As for the United States, that area is also for them the greatest headache, which they have brought about themselves.

Kosygin: The Americans are very uneasy about our trip to Vietnam.

Zhou: They are paying great attention to it. They have sent [National Security Advisor McGeorge] Bundy to South Vietnam but declared multiple times that it had nothing to do with the Soviet Premier’s visit. The armed struggle of the people of South Vietnam is progressing very well.

Kosygin: Very well.

Zhou: This is a war of the entire people. Even in their dense waterway net regions, they have beaten the US military and the puppet army. One can say that at present they are fighting even better than when we resisted Japan. The newcomers come to the fore.

Kosygin: They have put to use your experience.

Zhou: They have put to use yours and our positive experience and negative experience.

Kosygin: You and we both fought long battles and we know what war is.

Zhou: They need support and need assistance. Therefore, you going this time and being able to support them is a good deed.

Kosygin: Yes, I think that it would be good if we can act together on this problem. One should even say that it would be better.

Zhou: For victory in the struggle against the United States, we should act together. At present the United States is feeling that it is in exceptional difficulty and is continuing to fight. The United States has no confidence and no way out. Did you not tell us the key point of [Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko’s conversation with the Americans? Did they also not talk about this issue? However, they certainly will not willingly withdraw.

Kosygin: We need to help them to find a way out of Vietnam. It is not a matter of finding a way out for them, but it is one of letting them in Vietnam open a way out.

Zhou: Right. Opening a way out is what is called their withdrawal. They still do not dare.

Kosygin: Withdrawal is their only way out.

Zhou: They themselves broke the 1954 Geneva Conference Accords. We both participated in the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Accords said that Vietnam had to implement a policy of non-alignment. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam adheres to the agreement. South Vietnam, however, from Ngo Dinh Diem to Nguyen Khanh, has broken this agreement. The United States has directly carried out armed interference in violation of the Geneva Accords. It is the United States that has incited armed interference. By no means have we incited it. Therefore, we are perfectly justified in helping the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and helping the people of South Vietnam. If they withdraw, the people of South Vietnam themselves will resolve their own problems themselves. North Vietnam will not interfere. The people of Vietnam themselves will choose their own system and government. Only in a second step would the people of the two Vietnams themselves choose their own system and government.

Kosygin:  Comrade Zhou Enlai, excuse me for interrupting you, but why are there so many people here wearing masks?

Zhou: There is sand blown by the wind, people want to block the wind, are afraid of catching a cold, and are preventing colds. This is particularly the case for people walking on the road for long distances. Some people have experience. Accustomed to walking long distances on the road, they do not wear a mask. See, there are also people not wearing masks.

Kosygin: Excuse me for interrupting your talk.

Zhou: It doesn’t matter. Therefore, as we see, in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords, that issue can be resolved. But the Americans say that this is a problem of face and say that they would lose face. However, this face is what they themselves are going to lose. Therefore, the problem is like this: They are in a very awkward situation, one into which they have fallen and cannot beat, but still they refuse to leave. They are clamoring that they have to stay there and fight for 10 years. Then let them fight there for 10 years. However, this is empty talk. No sooner does South Vietnam’s puppet regime have any problem than the White House immediately becomes nervous. They have also threatened that they are going to expand the war and fight a Korean-style war. Fine, let them go ahead.

Kosygin: When [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and I discussed this problem, I also spoke that way.

Zhou: Only in speaking about the issue this way with them will they begin to consider it.

Kosygin: This problem, as they see it, is a simple one.

Zhou: Yes. Of course, for them it is also an issue of domestic politics, an issue of allies, and an issue of influence in Asia.

Kosygin: They mainly consider it a problem of face.

Zhou: This problem is one that they have brought about themselves. Nobody asked them to go there.

Kosygin: I agree with your general assessment regarding the situation in Vietnam.

Zhou: Nor have we been the ones who have gone and incited. We are strictly protecting our own borders. Of course, there is gathered on our border a large number of soldiers.

Kosygin: We know.

Zhou: However, by no means do we make one move beyond. We do this in order to prevent any contingency and prevent US provocations. They sent many U-2 aircraft and unmanned aircraft to take photographs and conduct reconnaissance. We shot down several aircraft. They also know that we have gathered a large number of soldiers. We have declared to them that we are well prepared but that we do not want to expand the war. If you make a move there, then we will make a move there. The Korean War, also, has not extended to a global scope. We have always adhered to these principles. We do not make the first move. If they make the first move, then we follow and make a move. They have to consider this. Therefore, it is good that you went this time to see things.

Kosygin: Yes, we went and understood the situation.

Zhou: Support for the Vietnamese people is not only support for Vietnam but is also related to the Lao Patriotic Front and the Kingdom of Cambodia, as they share common interests.

Kosygin: The situation in Laos, too, is very complicated.

Zhou: This, too, is something that the United States has single-handedly brought about. Look, in 1961 and 1962, we made great efforts, and the Americans signed the 1962 Geneva Accords. [Prince] Phouma went to see you and spoke well. He came to see us here and spoke well. Then he was also prepared to go to France and from there to Britain. He indicated that he wanted to establish a good, unified government. However, as soon as we returned, the United States directed the rightists to carry out a coup d’etat, wrecking the coalition government and resulting in the present situation. Now they are continuously quarreling and fighting among themselves.

Kosygin: Do you mean to say that they started military operations?

Zhou: Yes. All along they have been fighting, and there have been deaths.

Kosygin: Who has been killed?

Zhou: Between them some soldiers on both sides have died. Let them fight among themselves and continuously carry out coups d’etat.

Kosygin:  Saigon, too, is continuously experiencing coups d’etat.

Zhou: Since the killing of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother by the Americans, there have already been eight coups d’etat.

Kosygin: They will carry out 28 coups d’etat there.

Zhou: Yes.

Kosygin: They continuously carry out coups d’etat there.

Zhou:  Therefore, we need not worry.

Kosygin: We won’t, we won’t. We are not at all uneasy. When I last saw Phouma, it was on his way back from France.

Zhou: He originally was thinking of implementing a policy of neutrality. Because of his having such an inclination, rightist elements carried out a coup d’etat and completely made him their captive. He now entirely listens to the United States and the rightists. Of course, his so-called move to neutrality is nothing more than drawing a bit closer to France. The United States does not permit even this. At present De Gaulle, too, has expressed disappointment in him.

Kosygin: When I had a conversation with him, I asked him, why do you need to accept the Americans’ weapons? He said, then you give me weapons. You give the Lao Patriotic Front weapons, and the Lao Patriotic Front fights us. If they fight, we fight. What on earth am I, this poor peasant, to do? Everywhere I am beaten up. If you gave me weapons, I then would not need US weapons.

Zhou: However, in fact there has never been any major fighting there.

Kosygin: Yes, yes.

Zhou: If we need to talk about really major fighting, there is the US bombing. But now the people there have learned how to shoot down aircraft.

Kosygin: They do not shoot down many of them.

Zhou: The Americans are forcing them to do this, too.

Kosygin: In any event, the situation in Laos is not simple. Laos has many groups with different points of view and different inclinations.

Zhou: It is best to let them fight among themselves.

Kosygin: It is best not to fight.

Zhou: Without fighting, everyone will talk of uniting but will not unite. Did not the three parties go to Paris for a conference? The Lao Patriotic Front also sent people and did not speak of any result.

Kosygin: Yes, all the representatives of the parties passed through Moscow on their return from Paris and met with us.

Zhou: So long as Phouma colludes with the rightists, there will be no results.

Kosygin:  Phouma has accused [Prince] Souphanouvong of not wanting to talk with him.

Zhou: That’s the way it is there. Let the rightists stir up trouble among themselves. Let the rightists fight among themselves. So let the rightists and neutralists fight among themselves.

Kosygin: If this were the case, then fine. In fact, however, this is not the case. Mainly, it is that there are external forces there at work.

Zhou: The external forces are the United States. Let the United States become bogged down there.

Kosygin: Sorry, what is that place there? Why is it built with a wall around it?

Zhou: Those there are worker residences.

Kosygin: Why do they all have a wall around them?

Zhou: This is a custom. They also can block the sand blown by the wind.

Kosygin: This building, what place is it?

Zhou: This is a factory.

Kosygin: Which factory?

Zhou: This is the Beijing Automobile Parts Factory. Let the United States get bogged down there up to its mud-covered legs. Its say in the world will weaken and the whole world’s struggle against the United States will develop further.

Kosygin: Yes. Of course, while bogged down the United States goes ahead in this region without even knowing how to disengage.

Zhou: Yes. This is beneficial for the people of the world in their struggle against imperialism and their struggle against the United States.

Kosygin: Yes.

Zhou:  Therefore, since you have come here, we should cooperate in supporting the struggle of Vietnam, Laos, and the people of Indochina against imperialism.

Kosygin: Yes. I think that, if we can find common ground, we can discuss some major measures.

Zhou: If so, then why do you still have to open the meeting [Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow] on 1 March?

Kosygin: 1 May, oh, 1 March. If you are willing to listen to me, then I can have a good talk with you and will talk with you about many interesting situations. This is one topic of conversation.  If you are willing to listen to what I have to say on this issue, if there is such a desire, then I can talk about many new situations.

Zhou: Yes! I recall, Comrade Kosygin, that when seeing me off you said that you wanted to bear the heavy burden of the past. Well, then, this meeting on 1 March, too, is a heavy burden.

Kosygin: I think that, on this issue, we have a new situation and we have a new attitude.

Zhou: But you continue with this burden! You know our attitude. I talked about it the last time as well. Did I not advise you to start again from scratch? Start from bilateral and multilateral talks! Create the conditions!

Kosygin: Do you know what? I want to tell you that you are completely mistaken. On this issue, you happened to bear burdens it just so happened that you bore burdens that were beneficial for [former Premier Nikita] Khrushchev. This is what I want to say to you. Why do I say this? It is because this way of doing things was advantageous in regard to Khrushchev, but it is not in order to be with us.

Zhou: Not necessarily.

Kosygin: I can explain it to you.

Zhou: The meeting originated with Khrushchev. The meeting that you are going to open on 1 March is related to the meeting of 15 December and the meeting of 30 July.

Kosygin: Everything you have said is correct.

Zhou: Your new leaders at the start could have made another proposal and started from scratch.

Kosygin:  Comrade Zhou Enlai, we put forward new suggestions. You did not want to hear them! But this issue cannot be discussed in the car. We can discuss this issue. You must have known that I was passing through Beijing and that we could still discuss it! Can it be that we only can use this chance opportunity to discuss this issue?

Zhou: Well, of course, we have to discuss it!

Kosygin: I think that this is very important issue, one related to the entire International Communist Movement. I say to you in all seriousness that it is you who provided grist to the mill for Khrushchev, not us. We are willing to talk with you, but you are not willing to talk with us.

Zhou: This is a bit strange.

Kosygin: This is the dialectic method. Is this the main street of Beijing?

Zhou: This is the Beijing Hotel. This is the avenue that runs from the east of the palace through to the west of the palace.

Kosygin: This is a very beautiful street.

Zhou: Those are the red walls built in the feudal era. These two buildings were built in 1959: one is the History Museum and the other is the Great Hall of the People.

Kosygin: What monument is this?

Zhou:  It is a monument to the people’s revolutionary martyrs, those who sacrificed themselves from the Opium War to the founding of the nation. This is our Gate of Heavenly Peace [Tiananmen].

Kosygin: Is this a place for review of the troops? It is a great place.

Zhou:  The building area of the Great Hall of the People is 150,000 square meters.

Kosygin: This is your legislative building.

Zhou:  It is the place of the General Office of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. There is also the Great Auditorium and the Banquet Hall.

Kosygin: I like it very much. The building is very beautiful. Bud I wonder: how is the lighting inside?

Zhou: There is not enough sunlight, of course, but the lighting is good.

Kosygin: Where are we now?

Zhou: This is Zhongnanhai, which in the past was the winter residence of the emperors. One could think of it as the Winter Palace. Here now is the area of the CPC Central Committee and the General Affairs Office of the State Council.

Kosygin: This is the Council of Ministers?

Zhou: Yes.

Kosygin:  Comrade Zhou Enlai, you have occupied the area of the imperial residence. (laughter)

Zhou: Your Kremlin, too, belonged to the emperor in the past!

Kosygin: At that time the czar was living in Petersburg. The Kremlin was not the imperial palace. But Comrade Zhou Enlai, you grabbed the place where the emperor lived. (laughter)

Zhou: The last one was Chiang Kai-shek, who was living at that time in Nanjing!

Kosygin: I myself am a Leningrader. I saw the czar review the troops. I threw stones at the former police. I grew up in the workers’ district – Vyborgsky District.

Zhou: In front of us here is the Cultural Palace of Nationalities.

Kosygin: When was it built? Is it newly built, or is it an old building?

Zhou: It is a new one, also built in 1959.

Kosygin: Is it built according to the old style?

Zhou: It is according to the national style. There is the National Hotel.

Kosygin: Does it have 11 stories? We decided to build buildings of 10 and 11 stories in Moscow. Khrushchev at that time made a mess of it. He ordered that only buildings of five stories could be built. We told him that it was wrong to do it that way. He said: You don't understand anything. We can only build five stories. I said to him: You say that we don't understand anything, but in fact it is you who doesn't understand anything. We have now cancelled that order.

Zhou: That there is the television building.

Kosygin:  How many cities in China have television stations?

Zhou: Nearly 10 cities, including Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Guangzhou.

Kosygin: Are there many television sets?

Zhou: Not many.

Kosygin: Roughly how many?

Zhou: I cannot answer you right away.

Kosygin: Television is a very interesting problem. Such countries as the United States, Italy, and France are all trapped in black &white television! Everybody has bought a black & white television set. Changing to color will take at least 10 years. We can pass over black & white and directly do it in color. This way, in several years we could run ahead of them. They are talking big now but will fall behind in the future.

Zhou: This would be another example of those who start late passing those who started early.

Kosygin: We want to do something interesting about this problem of popularizing television. I discussed this problem with specialists from France and West Germany. The United States has started to do color televisions, roughly one million of them, while there are 50 million black & white television sets. It is not a simple matter to change. Our black & white sets are nearly 20 million. If we changed at a stroke to color, we could surpass them. The most important thing is not to let US color television invade Western Europe. They are one system, and we are another system. If we promote our own television system in Europe, they cannot enter. The French are now studying this problem. We are cooperating with the French. This way, the Americans will not enter.

Zhou: Cooperating with the French and rejecting the United States is a good decision.

Kosygin: We have had talks on this problem with De Gaulle. On this problem, you also can do the same in Asia.

Zhou: We still do not have such great power.

Kosygin: Let’s do it together! You are always opposing us, saying that we are Khrushchev elements. We have not stuck a label on you. We drove out Khrushchev, and you call us Khrushchev elements. To hell with Khrushchev elements!

Zhou: You drove out Khrushchev, and we are not opposed to it!

Kosygin: But you still call us Khrushchev elements! Comrade Zhou Enlai, this is a weak point of yours. You will see. History will prove you wrong.

Summary of Conversation after Arriving at the Hotel

(notes written from memory after the event)

Kosygin: Do you approve of this trip of ours to Vietnam?

Zhou: I did not say it at the start, but we are very happy that you visited Vietnam and gave support and aid to the Vietnamese people.

Kosygin: Yes. This time we mainly listened to the views of the Vietnamese comrades and spoke of our views. It was mainly internal talks. We went to work. There were fewer mass spectacles.

Zhou: The support of the public support is still necessary, and one can express it in the banquet speech.

Kosygin: They arranged a mass meeting. In my speech I certainly wanted to express my public support in my speech. What made an impression on the Americans was that we had internal talks. I am very busy with work, so I was only able to stay four days in Vietnam.

Zhou: So, you are returning on the 10th.

Kosygin: Yes.

Zhou: This is your first to visit overseas since taking office.

Kosygin: Yes. Quite a few countries invited me to visit after taking office. For example, there was West Germany. I have already rejected it. Wilson, too, has many times invited me. After he came to power, we still thought that they would be better, but things are worse and worse. Therefore, we have agreed to visit Britain, but we have to discuss separately the specific dates. We will have Gromyko visit there first, and the time for my visit will be delayed. I find that you seem to have a good attitude towards the Wilson government on certain issues, right?

Zhou: What is your basis for talking that way?

Kosygin: For example, you think that Britain’s proposal for a joint nuclear force is better than that of the United States!

Zhou: This is completely the West’s provocation and rumor. Show me the evidence!

Kosygin: I will bring it.

Zhou: When their trade minister arrived, I criticized to his face their policies on the issues of two Chinas, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s joint nuclear force, and Malaysia. Labor Party elements, like the Conservatives, are all imperialist elements, but at times they are even worse than the Conservatives. They talk of one thing, and then they do the opposite.

Kosygin: This is a chronic problem. I have had many conversations with that trade minister. I agree with your assessment of him.

CHINESE (TRANSCRIPTION) HTML

绝密 文 75  

外交部绝密文件

周总理、陈毅副总理同柯西金等第一次接触谈话记录(一九六五年二月五日)

(未经总理, 陈总审阅)

时间:一九六五年二月五日十五时

地点:从机场到钓鱼台宾馆的途中

第一部分 周总理同柯西金的谈话记录

第二部分 陈毅副总理同安德罗波夫的谈话记要

第三部分 其他同志谈话记要及有关情况

谈话内容提要

一、 柯西金提出拜访毛主席和刘主席

二、 柯西金谈到南越,老挝问题,说要帮助美国在越南开一个出路

三、 柯西金说,他们对三月一日会议有新的情况,新的态度

四、 安德罗波夫说,这次去越主要是为了加强两党两国关系,商讨给越军事技术援助的问题.并说苏,中两国应该谈一起支持越南人民斗争,准备就此问题同我交换意见

五、安德罗波夫表示: 苏方打算利用这次路过的机会同我就两党两国关系问题交换意见.并说苏代表团访越后不再访问其他东南亚国家,访越四天后仍经北京回国

六、安德罗波夫表示: 苏代表团打算同我就三月一日会议交换意见,说苏共对此已有另一个考虑,现在应该在新的环境中寻求一个好的途径,中国同志也应该改变一下自己的立场

七、库兹涅佐夫说,约翰逊,威尔逊都希望访苏,柯西金也将访美,英,但具体时间都未定

八、洛吉诺夫表示,在今后双方民航的谈判(按:指修改民航协定及其议定书的谈判)中,苏联民航将注意不损害中国民航的利益

第一部分

周总理同柯西金的谈话记录

(译员:闫明复)

柯西金(以下简称柯):我第一次到北京.你生活怎么样?

周恩来同志(以下简称周): 好,忙一点

柯:工作多就很好,工作少,…

周:你身体怎么样?

柯:不错,谢谢。

周:我们这里风大一点,干旱。

柯:我沿路上看到确实是干旱

周:我们这里雪少,你们那边怎么样?

柯:伊尔库茨克雪很大。我是昨晚上到伊尔库茨克的,时差五个小时,我不想睡觉,夜晚就在伊尔库茨克散步,风雪很大,但气候很舒适。

周:雪对你们很好。

柯:我们莫斯科雪也很大。整个西伯利亚都下了大雪。哈萨克斯坦也下了大雪。

周:雪多对你们今年的庄稼好。

柯:当然是很好,但是这不起决定性作用。总有很多未知数。

周:这是农业嘛。

柯:这不是在工厂,在工厂里面一切都很清楚,在农业方面,当人们说很好,结果可能不好;当人们说不好,结果可能不错。

周:有时表面上看它长得很多,但是收下来粒子都不饱满。

柯:我这是第一次到北京来,我们的所有同志都要我向你们问候。前天我们中央主席团开了会,勃列日涅夫,波德戈尔内和其他同志都向你们问候。

周:谢谢。勃列日涅夫同志身体好吗?

柯:不错嘛。他在工作。

周:他的身体不是比你差吗?他对我说,他有心脏病。

柯:谁的身体好,谁的身体坏,这个问题很难弄清楚。(笑)他身体不错。科兹洛夫不久前去世了。

周:是呀,我们都知道了。

柯:他病了两年了。自己不能行动,要两个人扶着才能够站起来。他去世的那一天,就是别人把他扶到桌子旁边去吃饭,刚做在椅子上,就跌倒死去了,一言未发。

周:是呀,有这种麻痹症的人就是怕震动。

柯:他也没有震动,就是坐在那里就死了。我今天的日程怎么样?你有什么想法?

周:我们从这里到宾馆去。时间比较长,可以谈一谈,然后你们吃中饭,下午休息,晚上我们可以在一起吃吃饭,晚饭以前可以休息。

柯:你认为有没有可能去拜访一些人?

周:你有什么想法?

柯:这怎么说呢?要我说的话,如果适宜,可以接受的话,拜访毛泽东同志,刘少奇同志,如果这对你们不困难的话。

周:今天下午我们中央同志要跟古巴代表团格瓦拉同志谈判。我没有参加,我和这几个同志专门来接待你们。他们是前天到的,昨天已经谈了一次,今天要继续谈。

柯:当然,我刚才讲的是我个人的意见。我们虽然是邻居,但是来往不多,所以今天有这样一个机会可以谈一谈。

周:我转告吧。

柯:有什么结果,你告诉我吧。

周:我们很高兴,你们这一次去访问越南。因为越南是处在反美斗争的最前线。如果讲热战的话,那么那里是进行最激烈的的战斗的地区。对美国来讲,这也是他们最头痛的地方,这是他们自己造成的。

柯:美国人对我们这次到越南去很感不安。

周:很注意。他们派了邦迪到南越去,但是又多次声明,同部长会议主席的访问无关。南越人民的武装斗争进行得很好。

柯:是很好。

周:这是个全民的战争。他们甚至于在水网地区也击败了美军和伪军。可以说,他们现在比我们抗日时期打得还好。后来居上嘛。

柯:他们运用了你们的经验。

周:运用了你们和我们的正面的经验和反面的经验。

柯:我们和你们都打了很长时间的仗,我们知道什么叫作战争。

周:他们是需要支持,需要援助的。所以,你们这次去能够支援他们是好事。

柯:是呀,我认为,如果在这些问题上我们能够配合行动的话,那是会好的,甚至于应该说是会更好的。

周:为了反美斗争的胜利,我们应该配合行动。现在美国感到非常困难,继续打下去,他没有信心,也没有出路。你们不是把葛罗米柯跟美国人谈话的要点告诉了我们了吗?他们不是也谈这个问题吗?但是他们决不甘心退出。

柯:需要帮助他们从越南找到一个出路。不是给他们找出路,而是在越南给他们开一个出路。

周:是呀,开一个出路就是叫他们撤退,他们又不干嘛。

柯:撤退是他们唯一的出路。

周:他们自己破坏了一九五四年日内瓦会议的协议嘛。我们都参加了日内瓦会议。日内瓦协议说了,越南要执行不结盟的政策。越南民主共和国是遵守这一条协议的。而南越,从吴庭艳到阮庆,都破坏了这个协议。美国进行了直接的武装干涉,违背了日内瓦协议。武装干涉是他挑起了,我们并没有去挑。所以,我们援助越南民主共和国,援助南越人民,是天经地义的事情。如果他们撤退的话,南越人民自己会解决自己的问题。北越不会去干涉。越南人民自己会选择自己的制度和政府。第二步,才是两个越南的人民自己会选择自己的制度和政府。

柯:周恩来同志,对不起,我打断你一下,为什么这里好多人都带口罩?

周:有风沙,要挡风,怕感冒,预防感冒。尤其是在长途的路上走来走去。有些人有经验,习惯走长路,就不戴。你看,也有的人不戴口罩。

柯:对不起,我打断了你的讲话。

周:没有关系。所以,看起来,要按照一九五四年的日内瓦协议,那问题是可以解决的。而美国人讲,这是个面子问题,说是要丢面子。但是,这个面子是他们自己要丢的嘛。所以,这个问题就是这样:他们陷入了既打不下去,但是又不肯走的这样一个很尴尬的局面。他们喧嚷,还要在那里打十年。就让他们在那里打十年吧。但是,这是句空话。南越伪政权一发生一个什么问题,白宫马上就紧张。他们还威胁说,要扩大战争,要打朝鲜式的战争。好,请吧。

柯:我跟腊斯克谈这个问题的时候,也是这样说的。

周:只有这样跟他们谈问题,他们才会开始考虑。

柯:这个问题对他们来说不是一个简单的问题。

周:是呀,当然,这对他们来讲,又是个内政问题,又是个同盟国的问题,还是他们在亚洲的影响的问题。

柯:他们主要考虑的是个面子问题。

周:这个问题是他们自己造成的嘛,没有人请他们去嘛。

柯:我对你对越南局势的总的评价是同意的。

周:又不是我们去挑,我们是严守我们自己的边界线。当然,我们边界线上是集了重兵。

柯:我们知道。

周:但是我们决不超出一步。我们这样做为了预防万一,预防他挑衅。他们派了许多U-2飞机和无人驾驶的飞机来照相,来侦察,我们打下了几架。他们也知道我们是集了重兵。我们对他们声明说,我们是准备好的,但是我们不要扩大战争,你们走到那里,我们走到那里。朝鲜战争也没有扩大到世界范围嘛。我们是一直遵守这些原则的,我们是不走第一步的。他们走第一步,我们就跟着走。他们是要考虑的。所以,你们这次去看看是很好的。

柯:是呀,去了解了解情况。

周:对越南人民的支持不仅仅是对越南,这也是关系到老挝爱国战线党和柬埔寨王国,因为他们是利害与共的。

柯:老挝的局势也是很复杂的。

周:这也是美国一手造成的嘛。你看,一九六一年,一九六二年,我们费了很大的努力,美国人在一九六二年的日内瓦会议的协议上签了字嘛。富马到你们那里去说得很好,到我们这里来也说得很好。然后他又准备到法国去,从那里到英国,他表示,要成立一个好的团结政府。但是,从我们这里一回去,美国就指使右派搞了政变,破坏了联合政府,结果就造成了这样的局势。现在他们内部不断地吵架,自己打自己嘛。

柯:他们难道开始了武装行动吗?

周:是呀,一直在打嘛,还有死亡嘛。

柯:哪些人被打死了?

周:他们之间的一些士兵,双方都有死亡。让他们自己打嘛,不断地政变嘛。

柯:西贡也是不断地政变。

周:吴庭艳兄弟被美国人杀死以后,到现在已经是第八次政变了。

柯:他们那儿会搞第二十八次政变的。

周:是呀。

柯:他们那里会不断地政变。

周:所以,我们不要着急。

柯:不会,不会。我们并不感到不安,我最后一次看到富马的时候,是他从法国回来路过。

周:他本来想执行中立政策。因为他有这样一个倾向,所以右派分子就搞了政变,把他完全俘虏过去了。现在他就是完全听美国和右派的话。当然,他所谓走中立,也不过就是靠拢法国一些。就连这个,美国都不许可。现在戴高乐对他也表示失望了。

柯:我跟他谈话的时候,我就问他,你为什么要接受美国人的武器?他说,那你们给我武器嘛。你们给爱国战线党武器,爱国战线党打我们,那边也打,这边也打。我这个可怜的农民到底怎么办呢?到处都挨打。你要给我武器,我就不要美国武器了。

周:但是实际上那里并没有打什么大仗。

柯:是呀,是呀。

周:要讲真正大仗,还是美国的轰炸。但是现在那里的人民也学会了打飞机。

柯:打下的也不多。

周:这也是美国人迫使他们这样做的。

柯:不管怎么说吧,老挝的局势不简单。老挝有许多不同观点、不同倾向的集团。

周:最好让他们自己打。

柯:最好是不打架。

周:不打架,大家就讲团结嘛,但是他们团结不起来嘛。三方面不是到巴黎去开会吗?爱国战线党也派人去了,也没有谈出什么结果嘛。

柯:是呀,他们这几方面的代表从巴黎回来的时候都路过我们那里,跟我们见过。

周:只要富马跟右派勾结在一起,就不会有什么结果。

柯:富马指责苏法努冯说,苏法努冯不愿意跟他谈话。

周:那有这样的事啊。让他们右派内部闹嘛,让他们右派内部打嘛,让这些右派和中派自己打嘛。

柯:如果是这样的话,那就好了。但是实际上不是这样。主要是有外部力量在那里起作用。

周:外部力量就是美国。让美国陷在那里。

柯:对不起,那是什么地方?为什么用墙把它修起来?

周:那是工人住宅。

柯:为什么都有墙?

周:这是个习惯。另外也可以挡风沙。

柯:这幢房子是什么地方?

周:这是一个工厂。

柯:什么工厂?

周:这是北京汽车配件工厂。让美国把他的泥腿陷在这里,他在世界上的发言权也就削弱了,全世界的反美斗争也会进一步开展。

柯:是呀。当然,他在这个地区是陷进去了,也不知道怎么能够脱身。

周:是呀,这对世界人民的反帝斗争、反美斗争有利。

柯:是呀。

周:所以,你们这回来,我们应该配合支援越南、老挝、印度支那人民的反帝斗争。

柯:是呀。我想,如果我们能够找到共同点的话,我们可以商量若干重大措施。

周:如果这样的话,为什么你们还要开三月一号的会议呀?

柯:五月一号,噢,三月一号。如果你们愿意听我谈的话我可以好好跟你们谈一谈,可以跟你们谈很多有意思的情况,这是一个谈话的课题之一。如果你们愿意在这个问题上听我谈些什么的话,如果有这种愿望的话,那么我可以谈许多新的情况。

周:是呀!我记得,柯西金同志在送我走的时候说过,你们愿意把过去的重担子背下来。那么这个三月一号的会议也是重担子之一。

柯:我想,在这个问题上,我们有新的情况,我们有新的态度。

周:但你们把这个担子继承下来了嘛!我们的态度你们都知道。我上一次都谈了。我不是劝你们另起炉灶吗?从双边的和多边的会谈着手嘛!创造条件嘛!

柯:你知道吗?我想这样给你说,你们完全看错了。在这个问题上,你们正好背上了对赫鲁晓夫的作为有利的担子。这就是我要对你们说的。我为什么这样讲呢?因为这种做法是对赫鲁晓夫有利的,而不是为了同我们在一起。

周:这倒不见得。

柯:我可以向你们解释。

周: 会议是来源于赫鲁晓夫.你们要在三月一日开的这个会, 是同十二月十五日的会议有联系的, 是同七月三十日的信有联系的。

柯:你说的这一切都对。

周:你们新的领导本来可以另外提出新的建议,另起炉灶。

柯:周恩来同志,我们提出了新的建议,你们不愿意听嘛!但这个问题不是能够在汽车上谈的。这个问题可以谈一谈。要知道,我是路过北京的,我们还可以谈一谈嘛!莫非我们只能利用在汽车上这个偶然的机会来谈这个问题吗?

周:那当然,我们要谈一谈嘛!

柯:我认为这是个很重大的问题,是个有关整个国际共产主义运动的问题。我很认真地对你们说:是你们向赫鲁晓夫的磨盘里注水,而不是我们。我们愿意跟你们谈,而你们不愿意跟我们谈。

周:这倒是些奇异的话。

柯:这是辩证法。这是北京主要街道吗?

周:这是北京饭店。这是一条从城东通到城西的大道。

柯:这是一条很漂亮的街。

周:那是封建时代修的红墙。这两个建筑是一九五九年修建的:一个是历史博物馆,一个是人民大会堂。

柯:这是什么碑?

周:是人民革命烈士纪念碑,是纪念从鸦片战争到建国以前牺牲的烈士的。这是我们的天安门。

柯:这是检阅的地方吗?是个很好的地方。

周:人民大会堂的建筑面积是十五万平方公尺。

柯:这是你们的议会大厦。

周:是人大常委办公的地方,还有大会堂,宴会厅。

柯:我很喜欢,建筑得很美。但不知道里边的照明怎么样?

周:阳光当然不够,但照明不错。

柯:这是什么地方?

周:这是中南海,是过去皇帝冬天住的地方,算是冬宫吧。现在是我们中央,国务院办公的地方。

柯:这是部长会议吗?

周:是的。

柯:周恩来同志,你们把皇帝住的地方给占了。(笑声)

周:你们的克里姆林宫过去也是皇帝的嘛!

柯:那时沙皇住在彼得堡,克林姆林宫不是皇宫。但周恩来同志却把皇帝住的地方给占了。(笑声)

周:最后的一个是蒋介石,那时他还在南京呢!

柯:我自己是列宁格勒人,我看见过沙皇阅兵,我用石头扔过旧警察。我生长在工人区---雄堡区。

周:前边是民族宫。

柯:是什么时候建筑的?是新建的,还是旧有的。

周:是新的,也是一九五九年建筑的。

柯:是按照旧的风格建筑的吧?

周:是按照民族风格。那是民族饭店。

柯:是十一层吧?我们决定在莫斯科建筑十层,十一层的楼房。赫鲁晓夫那时乱搞一通。他下命令只能盖五层的。我们对他说,这样做不对。他说:你们什么也不懂,只能盖五层的。我对他说,你说我们什么也不懂,实际是你什么也不懂。现在我们把这个命令取消了。

周:那是电视大楼。

柯:中国哪些城市有电视台?

周:上海,天津,沈阳,广州等近十个城市。

柯:电视机多不多?

周:不多。

柯:大概有多少?

周:一下子我不能回答你。

柯:电视是很有意思的一个问题。像美国,意大利,法国这些国家,都陷到黑白电视里边去啦!大家都买了黑白电视机。要想改成五彩的,至少需要十年。我们可以越过黑白的,直接搞五彩的。这样,几年后就可以跑到他们前面去。他们现在吹牛,将来就落后了。

周:这也是后来居上。

柯:我们想在电视机普及这个问题上办一件有意思的事情。我同法国,西德的专家讨论过这个问题。美国已开始搞五彩的了,大约有一百万台,而黑白的电视机则为五千万台。要改起来不是一个简单的问题。我们的黑白的将近两千万台。如果我们一下子改用五彩的,就可以超过他们。最主要的是不让美国的五彩电视入侵西欧。他们是一个体系,我们是另一个体系。如果我们把自己的体系的电视机推广到欧洲,他们就进不去。法国人现在正研究这个问题。我们正在同法国人合作。这样美国人进不去。

周:同法国人合作,抵制美国,这是个好的决定。

柯:我们在这个问题上同戴高乐谈判过。在这个问题上,你们也可以在亚洲这样做。

周:我们还没有这么大的力量。

柯:我们一起搞嘛!你们老是反对我们,说我们是赫鲁晓夫分子。我们没有给你们戴过帽子。我们赶走了赫鲁晓夫,你们倒把我们叫做赫鲁晓夫分子。让赫鲁晓夫分子见鬼去吧!

周:你们把赫鲁晓夫赶走,我们并不反对呀!

柯:可是你们还是把我们称为赫鲁晓夫分子呀!周恩来同志,你们这是个弱点。你们会看到,历史将证明,你们是不对的。

到宾馆后谈话记要

(事后追记)

柯:我们这次去越南,你们是否赞同?

周:我不是一开始就说了,你去越南访问,对越南人民给以支持和援助,我们很高兴。

柯:是的。我们这次主要是听听越南同志的意见,谈谈我们的意见,主要是内部谈话,去做工作,少搞群众场面。

周:公开的支持还是必要的,可在宴会讲话中表示。

柯:他们安排了群众大会,我在讲话中一定要表示公开支持。对美国人印象深的是我们内部谈些什么。我因工作很忙,所以在越南只停留四天。

周:那就是十号回国。

柯:是的。

周:这是你就任后第一次出国访问。

柯:是呀。有不少国家在我就任后邀请我去访问。如西德,我已经拒绝了;威尔逊也多次邀请,他上台后,我们还认为他们会好些,但越来越糟,所以我们同意去英国访问,但具体日期要另谈,先让葛罗米柯去访问,我访问的时间向后拖。我发现你们似乎在某些问题上对威尔逊政府的态度不错呀?

周:你们这样讲有什么根据呢?

柯:比如说,你们认为英国提出的联合核力量的建议比美国的好!

周:这完全是西方的挑衅和造谣。你拿出证据来吧!

柯:我拿的出来。

周:当他们的贸易大臣来的时候,我当面批评了他们在两个中国问题,联合国问题,北大西洋集团联合核力量问题,马来西亚问题上执行的政策。工党份子,同保守党一样,都是帝国主义份子,但是有的时候他们比保守党还坏。讲的一套,而作的则相反。

柯:这是他们的老毛病。我同这位贸易部长曾多次交谈。我同意你对他们的估价。

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