February 06, 1965
Record of the First Contact between Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kosygin

Citation:

Summary:
Premier Zhou and others meet to discuss the current situations in South Vietnam and Laos, U.S. and Soviet strategy, and Chinese-Soviet competition over civil aviation, among other pressing issues.

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Chinese

Contents:
- English Translation
- Chinese Transcription
- Scan of Original Document
Record of the First Contact and Conversation of Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi with Kosygin and Others (5 February 1965)

(Premier and Vice Premier Chen have not yet reviewed)

Time: 3 p.m., 5 February 1965

Location: On the way from the airport to the Diaoyutai State Guest House

Part One: Record of Premier Zhou’s Conversation with [Premier Alexei] Kosygin

Part Two: Summary of Vice Premier Chen Yi’s Conversation with [CPSU Secretary Yuri] Andropov

Part Three: Summary of Other Comrades’ Conversations and Related Circumstances

Content Summary of Conversations

1. Kosygin proposed calling on Chairman Mao [Zedong] and President Liu [Shaoqi].

2. Kosygin spoke of the problems of South Vietnam and Laos, saying that it was necessary to help the United States in Vietnam develop a way out.

3. Kosygin said that in regard to the 1 March [Consultative] Meeting, they had a new situation and a new attitude.

4. Andropov said that this latest visit to Vietnam was mainly for strengthening relations between the two parties and the two countries. They discussed the issue of providing Vietnam’s military with technical assistance. He also said that the Soviet Union and China should talk with one another to support the Vietnamese people in their struggle and prepare to exchange views with him on this issue.

5. Andropov indicated that the Soviet side intended to use this occasion of passing through Beijing for an exchange of views with him on the issue of relations between the two parties and the two countries. He also said that the Soviet delegation after visiting was not going to visit other Southeast Asian countries and that, after a visit of four days to Vietnam, it remained for them to pass through Beijing on their return to the Soviet Union.

6. Andropov indicated that the Soviet delegation intended for an exchange of views with him regarding the 1 March Meeting. He also said that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has already had another thought about this, that now they should in a new environment seek a good attitude, and that the Chinese comrades also should change their own position.

7. [First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V.] Kuznetsov said that [President Lyndon B.] Johnson and [Prime Minister Harold] Wilson both want to visit the Soviet Union and that Kosygin also will visit the United States and Britain, although the exact time remains undecided.

8. [Air Marshal Yevgeny F.] Loginov indicated that in future talks between the two sides on civil aviation (reference to negotiations on revision of the civil aviation agreement and its protocol), Soviet civil aviation will take heed not to harm the interests of Chinese civil aviation.

Part One

Record of Premier Zhou’s Conversation with Kosygin
Kosygin: This is my first time to come to Beijing. How is your life?

Comrade Zhou Enlai (hereafter Zhou): Fine, a little busy.

Kosygin: If there is much work, that is good. If there is little work, ... [ellipsis in original]

Zhou: How are you?

Kosygin: Fine, thank you.

Zhou: The wind here is a bit stronger, and it is dry.

Kosygin: As I saw along the way, it certainly is dry.

Zhou: We have less snow here. How is it for you over there?

Kosygin: There is a great deal of snow in Irkutsk. I arrived last night in Irkutsk. The time difference was five hours. Not wanting to sleep, I took a walk in Irkutsk. There was a great deal of wind and snow, but the climate was very comfortable.

Zhou: Snow is good for you.

Kosygin: We also have a great deal of snow in Moscow. It has snowed heavily throughout Siberia. It has also snowed heavily in Kazakhstan.

Zhou: With much snow, it will be good for your harvest this year.

Kosygin: Of course it is good, but it does not have a decisive effect. In the end there are many unknown variables.

Zhou: Well, that is the way it is with agriculture.

Kosygin: That is not the way it is in the factory. In the factory, it is all clear. In agriculture, when people say it will be good, the result may be bad; when people say it will be bad, the result may be good.

Zhou: There are times when, seen from the surface, there is much growth, but in harvesting you see that all the grains have not fully ripened.

Kosygin: This is my first time to come to Beijing. All of our comrades asked me to give you their regards. The day before yesterday we had a meeting of our Central Committee Presidium. Brezhnev, [Presidium Chairman Nikolay] Podgorny and the other comrades all send you their regards.

Zhou: Thank you. Is Comrade Brezhnev well?

Kosygin: He is well. He is working.

Zhou: Is he not in worse health than you? He told me that he has heart trouble.

Kosygin: It is hard to figure out whose health is good and whose health is bad (laughs). He is in good health. [Former Central Committee Secretary Frol] Kozlov recently died.

Zhou: Yes, we all know about that.
Kosygin: He had been ill for two years. He could not move about on his own and needed two people to hold him to stand up. On the day he died, others took him to the table to eat. As soon as he was in his chair, he collapsed and died without uttering a word.

Zhou: Yes, people with such paralysis dread shaking.

Kosygin: He did not shake. He simply sat there and died. How is my schedule today? What are your thoughts?

Zhou: From here we go to the hotel. It will take some time, so we can talk a bit. Later, you will have lunch and rest in the afternoon. In the evening we can dine together. Before dinner you can rest.

Kosygin: Do you think it possible for us to go call on some people?

Zhou: What do you have in mind?

Kosygin: How shall I put this? If I may say so, if it were appropriate and acceptable, I would like to call on Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Liu Shaoqi, that is, if it would not be troublesome for you.

Zhou: This afternoon our comrades on the Central Committee must have talks with Comrade [Che] Guevara’s Cuban delegation. I will not participate. These comrades here and I have come specifically to receive you. They [Guevara’s delegation] arrived the day before yesterday. We already had discussions with them once yesterday and are going to continue talks today.

Kosygin: Of course, what I have just said is my personal remark. Although we are neighbors, we do not have much contact, so today we have an opportunity to talk a bit.

Zhou: I shall pass you remarks to them.

Kosygin: If anything comes of it, let me know.

Zhou: We are very happy that you went this time to visit Vietnam. This is because Vietnam is at the forefront of the struggle against the United States. If we were to speak of a hot war, then that would be the region where the most intense fighting would take place. As for the United States, that area is also for them the greatest headache, which they have brought about themselves.

Kosygin: The Americans are very uneasy about our trip to Vietnam.

Zhou: They are paying great attention to it. They have sent [National Security Advisor McGeorge] Bundy to South Vietnam but declared multiple times that it had nothing to do with the Soviet Premier’s visit. The armed struggle of the people of South Vietnam is progressing very well.

Kosygin: Very well.

Zhou: This is a war of the entire people. Even in their dense waterway net regions, they have beaten the US military and the puppet army. One can say that at present they are fighting even better than when we resisted Japan. The newcomers come to the fore.

Kosygin: They have put to use your experience.

Zhou: They have put to use yours and our positive experience and negative experience.

Kosygin: You and we both fought long battles and we know what war is.
Zhou: They need support and need assistance. Therefore, you going this time and being able to support them is a good deed.

Kosygin: Yes, I think that it would be good if we can act together on this problem. One should even say that it would be better.

Zhou: For victory in the struggle against the United States, we should act together. At present the United States is feeling that it is in exceptional difficulty and is continuing to fight. The United States has no confidence and no way out. Did you not tell us the key point of [Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko’s conversation with the Americans? Did they also not talk about this issue? However, they certainly will not willingly withdraw.

Kosygin: We need to help them to find a way out of Vietnam. It is not a matter of finding a way out for them, but it is one of letting them in Vietnam open a way out.

Zhou: Right. Opening a way out is what is called their withdrawal. They still do not dare.

Kosygin: Withdrawal is their only way out.

Zhou: They themselves broke the 1954 Geneva Conference Accords. We both participated in the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Accords said that Vietnam had to implement a policy of non-alignment. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam adheres to the agreement. South Vietnam, however, from Ngo Dinh Diem to Nguyen Khanh, has broken this agreement. The United States has directly carried out armed interference in violation of the Geneva Accords. It is the United States that has incited armed interference. By no means have we incited it. Therefore, we are perfectly justified in helping the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and helping the people of South Vietnam. If they withdraw, the people of South Vietnam themselves will resolve their own problems themselves. North Vietnam will not interfere. The people of Vietnam themselves will choose their own system and government. Only in a second step would the people of the two Vietnams themselves choose their own system and government.

Kosygin: Comrade Zhou Enlai, excuse me for interrupting you, but why are there so many people here wearing masks?

Zhou: There is sand blown by the wind, people want to block the wind, are afraid of catching a cold, and are preventing colds. This is particularly the case for people walking on the road for long distances. Some people have experience. Accustomed to walking long distances on the road, they do not wear a mask. See, there are also people not wearing masks.

Kosygin: Excuse me for interrupting your talk.

Zhou: It doesn’t matter. Therefore, as we see, in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Accords, that issue can be resolved. But the Americans say that this is a problem of face and say that they would lose face. However, this face is what they themselves are going to lose. Therefore, the problem is like this: They are in a very awkward situation, one into which they have fallen and cannot beat, but still they refuse to leave. They are clamoring that they have to stay there and fight for 10 years. Then let them fight there for 10 years. However, this is empty talk. No sooner does South Vietnam’s puppet regime have any problem than the White House immediately becomes nervous. They have also threatened that they are going to expand the war and fight a Korean-style war. Fine, let them go ahead.

Kosygin: When [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and I discussed this problem, I also spoke that way.

Zhou: Only in speaking about the issue this way with them will they begin to consider it.
Kosygin: This problem, as they see it, is a simple one.

Zhou: Yes. Of course, for them it is also an issue of domestic politics, an issue of allies, and an issue of influence in Asia.

Kosygin: They mainly consider it a problem of face.

Zhou: This problem is one that they have brought about themselves. Nobody asked them to go there.

Kosygin: I agree with your general assessment regarding the situation in Vietnam.

Zhou: Nor have we been the ones who have gone and incited. We are strictly protecting our own borders. Of course, there is gathered on our border a large number of soldiers.

Kosygin: We know.

Zhou: However, by no means do we make one move beyond. We do this in order to prevent any contingency and prevent US provocations. They sent many U-2 aircraft and unmanned aircraft to take photographs and conduct reconnaissance. We shot down several aircraft. They also know that we have gathered a large number of soldiers. We have declared to them that we are well prepared but that we do not want to expand the war. If you make a move there, then we will make a move there. The Korean War, also, has not extended to a global scope. We have always adhered to these principles. We do not make the first move. If they make the first move, then we follow and make a move. They have to consider this. Therefore, it is good that you went this time to see things.

Kosygin: Yes, we went and understood the situation.

Zhou: Support for the Vietnamese people is not only support for Vietnam but is also related to the Lao Patriotic Front and the Kingdom of Cambodia, as they share common interests.

Kosygin: The situation in Laos, too, is very complicated.

Zhou: This, too, is something that the United States has single-handedly brought about. Look, in 1961 and 1962, we made great efforts, and the Americans signed the 1962 Geneva Accords. [Prince] Phouma went to see you and spoke well. He came to see us here and spoke well. Then he was also prepared to go to France and from there to Britain. He indicated that he wanted to establish a good, unified government. However, as soon as we returned, the United States directed the rightists to carry out a coup d'etat, wrecking the coalition government and resulting in the present situation. Now they are continuously quarreling and fighting among themselves.

Kosygin: Do you mean to say that they started military operations?

Zhou: Yes. All along they have been fighting, and there have been deaths.

Kosygin: Who has been killed?

Zhou: Between them some soldiers on both sides have died. Let them fight among themselves and continuously carry out coups d'etat.

Kosygin: Saigon, too, is continuously experiencing coups d'etat.

Zhou: Since the killing of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother by the Americans, there have already been eight coups d'etat.
Kosygin: They will carry out 28 coups d’etat there.

Zhou: Yes.

Kosygin: They continuously carry out coups d’etat there.

Zhou: Therefore, we need not worry.

Kosygin: We won’t, we won’t. We are not at all uneasy. When I last saw Phouma, it was on his way back from France.

Zhou: He originally was thinking of implementing a policy of neutrality. Because of his having such an inclination, rightist elements carried out a coup d’etat and completely made him their captive. He now entirely listens to the United States and the rightists. Of course, his so-called move to neutrality is nothing more than drawing a bit closer to France. The United States does not permit even this. At present De Gaulle, too, has expressed disappointment in him.

Kosygin: When I had a conversation with him, I asked him, why do you need to accept the Americans’ weapons? He said, then you give me weapons. You give the Lao Patriotic Front weapons, and the Lao Patriotic Front fights us. If they fight, we fight. What on earth am I, this poor peasant, to do? Everywhere I am beaten up. If you gave me weapons, I then would not need US weapons.

Zhou: However, in fact there has never been any major fighting there.

Kosygin: Yes, yes.

Zhou: If we need to talk about really major fighting, there is the US bombing. But now the people there have learned how to shoot down aircraft.

Kosygin: They do not shoot down many of them.

Zhou: The Americans are forcing them to do this, too.

Kosygin: In any event, the situation in Laos is not simple. Laos has many groups with different points of view and different inclinations.

Zhou: It is best to let them fight among themselves.

Kosygin: It is best not to fight.

Zhou: Without fighting, everyone will talk of uniting but will not unite. Did not the three parties go to Paris for a conference? The Lao Patriotic Front also sent people and did not speak of any result.

Kosygin: Yes, all the representatives of the parties passed through Moscow on their return from Paris and met with us.

Zhou: So long as Phouma colludes with the rightists, there will be no results.

Kosygin: Phouma has accused [Prince] Souphanouvong of not wanting to talk with him.

Zhou: That’s the way it is there. Let the rightists stir up trouble among themselves. Let the rightists fight among themselves. So let the rightists and neutralists fight among themselves.

Kosygin: If this were the case, then fine. In fact, however, this is not the case. Mainly, it is that there are external forces there at work.
Zhou: The external forces are the United States. Let the United States become bogged down there.

Kosygin: Sorry, what is that place there? Why is it built with a wall around it?

Zhou: Those there are worker residences.

Kosygin: Why do they all have a wall around them?

Zhou: This is a custom. They also can block the sand blown by the wind.

Kosygin: This building, what place is it?

Zhou: This is a factory.

Kosygin: Which factory?

Zhou: This is the Beijing Automobile Parts Factory. Let the United States get bogged down there up to its mud-covered legs. Its say in the world will weaken and the whole world’s struggle against the United States will develop further.

Kosygin: Yes. Of course, while bogged down the United States goes ahead in this region without even knowing how to disengage.

Zhou: Yes. This is beneficial for the people of the world in their struggle against imperialism and their struggle against the United States.

Kosygin: Yes.

Zhou: Therefore, since you have come here, we should cooperate in supporting the struggle of Vietnam, Laos, and the people of Indochina against imperialism.

Kosygin: Yes. I think that, if we can find common ground, we can discuss some major measures.

Zhou: If so, then why do you still have to open the meeting [Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow] on 1 March?

Kosygin: 1 May, oh, 1 March. If you are willing to listen to me, then I can have a good talk with you and will talk with you about many interesting situations. This is one topic of conversation. If you are willing to listen to what I have to say on this issue, if there is such a desire, then I can talk about many new situations.

Zhou: Yes! I recall, Comrade Kosygin, that when seeing me off you said that you wanted to bear the heavy burden of the past. Well, then, this meeting on 1 March, too, is a heavy burden.

Kosygin: I think that, on this issue, we have a new situation and we have a new attitude.

Zhou: But you continue with this burden! You know our attitude. I talked about it the last time as well. Did I not advise you to start again from scratch? Start from bilateral and multilateral talks! Create the conditions!

Kosygin: Do you know what? I want to tell you that you are completely mistaken. On this issue, you happened to bear burdens it just so happened that you bore burdens that were beneficial for [former Premier Nikita] Khrushchev. This is what I want to say to you. Why do I say this? It is because this way of doing things was advantageous in regard to Khrushchev, but it is not in order to be with us.
**Zhou:** Not necessarily.

**Kosygin:** I can explain it to you.

**Zhou:** The meeting originated with Khrushchev. The meeting that you are going to open on 1 March is related to the meeting of 15 December and the meeting of 30 July.

**Kosygin:** Everything you have said is correct.

**Zhou:** Your new leaders at the start could have made another proposal and started from scratch.

**Kosygin:** Comrade Zhou Enlai, we put forward new suggestions. You did not want to hear them! But this issue cannot be discussed in the car. We can discuss this issue. You must have known that I was passing through Beijing and that we could still discuss it! Can it be that we only can use this chance opportunity to discuss this issue?

**Zhou:** Well, of course, we have to discuss it!

**Kosygin:** I think that this is very important issue, one related to the entire International Communist Movement. I say to you in all seriousness that it is you who provided grist to the mill for Khrushchev, not us. We are willing to talk with you, but you are not willing to talk with us.

**Zhou:** This is a bit strange.

**Kosygin:** This is the dialectic method. Is this the main street of Beijing?

**Zhou:** This is the Beijing Hotel. This is the avenue that runs from the east of the palace through to the west of the palace.

**Kosygin:** This is a very beautiful street.

**Zhou:** Those are the red walls built in the feudal era. These two buildings were built in 1959: one is the History Museum and the other is the Great Hall of the People.

**Kosygin:** What monument is this?

**Zhou:** It is a monument to the people's revolutionary martyrs, those who sacrificed themselves from the Opium War to the founding of the nation. This is our Gate of Heavenly Peace [Tiananmen].

**Kosygin:** Is this a place for review of the troops? It is a great place.

**Zhou:** The building area of the Great Hall of the People is 150,000 square meters.

**Kosygin:** This is your legislative building.

**Zhou:** It is the place of the General Office of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. There is also the Great Auditorium and the Banquet Hall.

**Kosygin:** I like it very much. The building is very beautiful. But I wonder: how is the lighting inside?

**Zhou:** There is not enough sunlight, of course, but the lighting is good.

**Kosygin:** Where are we now?
Zhou: This is Zhongnanhai, which in the past was the winter residence of the emperors. One could think of it as the Winter Palace. Here now is the area of the CPC Central Committee and the General Affairs Office of the State Council.

Kosygin: This is the Council of Ministers?

Zhou: Yes.

Kosygin: Comrade Zhou Enlai, you have occupied the area of the imperial residence. (laughter)

Zhou: Your Kremlin, too, belonged to the emperor in the past!

Kosygin: At that time the czar was living in Petersburg. The Kremlin was not the imperial palace. But Comrade Zhou Enlai, you grabbed the place where the emperor lived. (laughter)

Zhou: The last one was Chiang Kai-shek, who was living at that time in Nanjing!

Kosygin: I myself am a Leningrader. I saw the czar review the troops. I threw stones at the former police. I grew up in the workers' district – Vyborgsky District.

Zhou: In front of us here is the Cultural Palace of Nationalities.

Kosygin: When was it built? Is it newly built, or is it an old building?

Zhou: It is a new one, also built in 1959.

Kosygin: Is it built according to the old style?

Zhou: It is according to the national style. There is the National Hotel.

Kosygin: Does it have 11 stories? We decided to build buildings of 10 and 11 stories in Moscow. Khrushchev at that time made a mess of it. He ordered that only buildings of five stories could be built. We told him that it was wrong to do it that way. He said: You don't understand anything. We can only build five stories. I said to him: You say that we don't understand anything, but in fact it is you who doesn't understand anything. We have now cancelled that order.

Zhou: That there is the television building.

Kosygin: How many cities in China have television stations?

Zhou: Nearly 10 cities, including Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and Guangzhou.

Kosygin: Are there many television sets?

Zhou: Not many.

Kosygin: Roughly how many?

Zhou: I cannot answer you right away.

Kosygin: Television is a very interesting problem. Such countries as the United States, Italy, and France are all trapped in black & white television! Everybody has bought a black & white television set. Changing to color will take at least 10 years. We can pass over black & white and directly do it in color. This way, in several years we could run ahead of them. They are talking big now but will fall behind in the future.
Zhou: This would be another example of those who start late passing those who started early.

Kosygin: We want to do something interesting about this problem of popularizing television. I discussed this problem with specialists from France and West Germany. The United States has started to do color televisions, roughly one million of them, while there are 50 million black & white television sets. It is not a simple matter to change. Our black & white sets are nearly 20 million. If we changed at a stroke to color, we could surpass them. The most important thing is not to let US color television invade Western Europe. They are one system, and we are another system. If we promote our own television system in Europe, they cannot enter. The French are now studying this problem. We are cooperating with the French. This way, the Americans will not enter.

Zhou: Cooperating with the French and rejecting the United States is a good decision.

Kosygin: We have had talks on this problem with De Gaulle. On this problem, you also can do the same in Asia.

Zhou: We still do not have such great power.

Kosygin: Let's do it together! You are always opposing us, saying that we are Khrushchev elements. We have not stuck a label on you. We drove out Khrushchev, and you call us Khrushchev elements. To hell with Khrushchev elements!

Zhou: You drove out Khrushchev, and we are not opposed to it!

Kosygin: But you still call us Khrushchev elements! Comrade Zhou Enlai, this is a weak point of yours. You will see. History will prove you wrong.

Summary of Conversation after Arriving at the Hotel

(not notes written from memory after the event)

Kosygin: Do you approve of this trip of ours to Vietnam?

Zhou: I did not say it at the start, but we are very happy that you visited Vietnam and gave support and aid to the Vietnamese people.

Kosygin: Yes. This time we mainly listened to the views of the Vietnamese comrades and spoke of our views. It was mainly internal talks. We went to work. There were fewer mass spectacles.

Zhou: The support of the public support is still necessary, and one can express it in the banquet speech.

Kosygin: They arranged a mass meeting. In my speech I certainly wanted to express my public support in my speech. What made an impression on the Americans was that we had internal talks. I am very busy with work, so I was only able to stay four days in Vietnam.

Zhou: So, you are returning on the 10th.

Kosygin: Yes.

Zhou: This is your first to visit overseas since taking office.

Kosygin: Yes. Quite a few countries invited me to visit after taking office. For example, there was West Germany. I have already rejected it. Wilson, too, has many times invited me. After he came to power, we still thought that they would be better, but things are worse and worse.
Therefore, we have agreed to visit Britain, but we have to discuss separately the specific dates. We will have Gromyko visit there first, and the time for my visit will be delayed. I find that you seem to have a good attitude towards the Wilson government on certain issues, right?

**Zhou:** What is your basis for talking that way?

**Kosygin:** For example, you think that Britain’s proposal for a joint nuclear force is better than that of the United States!

**Zhou:** This is completely the West’s provocation and rumor. Show me the evidence!

**Kosygin:** I will bring it.

**Zhou:** When their trade minister arrived, I criticized to his face their policies on the issues of two Chinas, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s joint nuclear force, and Malaysia. Labor Party elements, like the Conservatives, are all imperialist elements, but at times they are even worse than the Conservatives. They talk of one thing, and then they do the opposite.

**Kosygin:** This is a chronic problem. I have had many conversations with that trade minister. I agree with your assessment of him.
外交部密文件

周理、毅副理同柯西金等第一次接触（一九六五年二月五日）

（未理，）

:一九六五年二月五日十五

地点：机到台的途中

第一部分周理同柯西金的

第二部分毅副理同安德波夫的要

第三部分其他同志要及有情

容提要

一、柯西金提出拜毛主席和主席

二、柯西金到南越，要助美在越南一出路

三、柯西金，他三月一日有新的情，新的度

四、安德波夫，次去越主要是了加强党和商越事技援助的。并中一起支持越南人民斗，准就此同我交意

五、安德波夫表示：方打算利用次路的机同我就党系交意。并代表越南不再其他南家，越四天后仍北京回

六、安德波夫表示：代表打算同我就三月一日交意，共此已有另一考，在在新的境中求一好的途，中同志也改一下自己的立

七、涅佐夫，翰，威尔都希望，柯西金也美英，但具体都未定

八、洛吉夫表示，在今后双方民航的判（按：指修改民航定及其定的判）中，民航注意不害中民航的利益

第一部分

周理同柯西金的

（明复）

柯西金（以下柯）：我第一次到北京，你生活怎么？

周恩同志（以下周）：好，忙一点

柯：工作多就很好，工作少，

周：你身体怎么？

柯：不，。

周：我里大一点，干早。
柯：我沿路上看到确 是干旱

周：我 里雪少，你 那 怎么？

柯：伊尔 茨克雪很大。我是昨晚上到伊尔 茨克的，差五 小，我不想睡，夜晚就在伊尔 茨克散步，雪很大，但气候很舒适。

周：雪 你 很好。

柯：莫斯科雪也很大。整 西伯利 都下了大雪。哈 克斯坦也下了大雪。

周：风 你 今年的庄稼好。

柯：然 是很好，但是 不起 定性作 用。有很多未知。

周：是 嘛。

柯：不是在工厂，在工厂里面一切都很清楚，在 方面，人 很好，果可能不好；人 不好，果可能不。

周：有 表面上看 得很多，但是收下 粒子都不。

柯：我 是第一次到北京，我 的所有同志都要我向你 候。前天我 中央主席 了，勃列日涅夫，波德戈尔 和其他同志都向你 候。

周：。勃列日涅夫同志身体好 ？

柯：不 嘛。他在工作。

周：他的身体不是比你差？他 我，他有心 病。

柯：的身体好，的身体坏，很 清楚。他他身体不。科 洛夫不久前去世了。

周：是呀，我 都知道了。

柯：他病了 年了。自己不能行，要 人扶着才能 站起。他去世的那一天，就是 人把他扶到桌子旁去吃，做在椅子上，就跌倒死去了，一言未。

周：是呀，有 种麻痹症的人就是怕震。

柯：他也 有震，就是坐在那里就死了。我今天的日程怎么？你有什么想法？

周： 里到 去。 比，可以 一，然后你 吃中，下午休息，晚上 我 可以在一起吃吃， 晚 以前 可以休息。

柯：你 有 有可能去拜 一些人？

周：你有什么想法？

柯：怎么 呢？要我 的，如果适，可以接受的， 拜 毛 同志，少奇同志，如果 你不 该 的。

周：今天下午我 中央同志要跟古巴代表 格瓦拉同志 判。我有 加，我和 几 同志 接待你。他 是前天到的，昨天已 了一次，今天要。

柯：然，我 才的是我 人的意。我 然是 居，但是 往不多，所以今天有 一 机 可以 一。

周：我 告吧。
柯：有什么果，你告我吧。

周：我很高，你一次去越南，因越南是在反美斗的前，如果的，那么那里是行最激烈的斗的地。美，也是他最痛的地方，是他自己造成的。

柯：美国人我次到越南去感不安。

周：很注意。他派了邦迪到南越去，但是又多次明，同部主席的无。南越人民的武斗行得很好。

柯：是很好。

周：是全民的。他甚至于在工地也了美和。可以，他在比我抗日期打得好。后居上嘛。

柯：他用了你的。

周：用了你和我的正面的和反面的。

柯：我和你好打了很的仗，我知道什么叫作。

周：他是需要支持，需要援助的。所以，你次去能支援他，是好事。

柯：是呀，我，如果在些上我能配合行的，那是好的，甚至于是更好的。

周：了反美斗的胜利，我配合行。在美感到非常困，打下去，他有信心，也有出路。你不是把葛米柯跟美人的人要点告了我了？他不是也？但是他不甘心退出。

柯：需要助他越南找到一出路。不是他找出路，而是在越南他一出路。

周：是呀，一出路就是叫他撤退，他又不干嘛。

柯：撤退是他唯一的出路。

周：他自己破坏了一九五四年的日瓦的嘛。我都加了日瓦。日瓦了，越南要行不盟的政策。越南民主共和是遵守一的，而南越，庭到阮，都破坏了。美行了直接的武干涉，背了日瓦。武干涉是他挑起了，我并未去挑。所以，我援助越南民主共和，援助南越人民，是天地的事情。如果他撤退，南越人民自己解自己的。北越不去干涉。越南人民自己自己的制度和政府。第二步，才是越南的人民自己自己的制度和政府。

柯：周思同志，不起，我打你一下，什么里好人都口罩？

周：有沙，要，怕感冒，防感冒。尤其是在途的路上走走去。有些人有，走路，就不戴。你看，也有的人不戴口罩。

柯：不起，我打了你的。

周：有系。所以，看起，要按照一九五四年的日瓦，那是可以解的。而美人，是面子，是要面子。但是，面子是他自己要的嘛。所以，就是：他陷入了既打不下去，但是又不肯走的很尬的局面。他喧嚷，要在那里打十年。就他在那里打十年吧。但是，是句空。南越政一生成什么，白上就。他威，要大，要打朝式的。好，吧。

柯：我跟即斯克的候，也是的。

周：只有跟他，他才始考。

柯：他不是一的。
周：是呀，他，又是政，又是同盟的，他是站在洲的影的。

柯：他主要想的是面子。

周：是他自己造成的嘛，有人他走嘛。

柯：你越南局的的价是同意的。

周：又不是我去挑，我是守我自己的界。然，我界上是集了重兵。

柯：我知道。

周：但是我不出一步。我做了防万一，防他挑。他派了多U-2机和无人的机照相，察，我打下几架。他也知道我是集了重兵。我，他明白我，我是集好的，但是他不要大，你走到那里，我到那里。朝也大到世界范嘛。我是一直遵守些原的，我是不走第一步的。他走第一步，我就跟着走。他是要考的。所以，你次去看看是很好的。

柯：是呀，去了解了解行。

周：越南人民的支持不 是越南，也是司到老党和柬埔寨王，因他是利害与共的。

柯：老的局也是很复的。

周：也是美一手造成的嘛。你看，一九六一年，一九六二年，我了很大的努力，美人在一九六二年的日瓦的上了字嘛，到你那里去得很好，到我里也得很好。然后他又准到去，那里到英，他表示要成立一个好的政府。但是，我一回回去，美就指使右派搞了政，破坏了合政府，果就造成了的局。在他部不地吵架，自己打自己嘛。

柯：他道始了武行？

周：是呀，一直在打嘛，有死亡嘛。

柯：哪些人被打死了？

周：他的一些士兵，双方都有死亡。他去打嘛，不地政嘛。

柯：是也，是不地政。

周：庭兄弟被美国人死以后，到在已是在八次政了。

柯：他那儿搞第二十八次政的。

周：是呀。

柯：他那里不地政。

周：所以，我不要着急。

柯：不，不。我并不感到不安，我最后一次看到富的候，是他法回路。

周：他本想行中立政策。因他有向，所以右派分子就搞了政，把他完全俘去了。在他就是完全听美和右派的。然，他所走中立，也不就是法一些。就，美都不可。在戴高利他也表示失望了。

柯：我跟他那个候，我就他，你什么要接受美人的武器？他，那你我武器嘛，你党武器，党打我，那也打，也打。我可怜的民到底怎么呢？到都挨打。你要我武器，我就不要美武器了。
周：但是上那里并有打什么仗。
柯：是呀，是呀。
周：要真正大仗，是美国的。但是在那里的人也打机。
柯：打下的也不多。
周：也是美国迫他做的。
柯：不管怎么说，老的局面不老有多不同点、不同向的集。
周：最好他自己的。
柯：最好是不打架。
周：不打架，大家就好，但是他不起。三方面不是到巴黎去？党也派人去了，也有出什么果。
柯：是呀，他的几方面的代表巴黎回的路都到那里，跟我。
周：只要法跟他右派勾在一起，就不有什么果。
柯：富指法努，法努不愿意跟他。
周：那有这回事吗？他右派部，他右派部打碰，一些右派和中派自己打碰。
柯：如果是的，那就好了。但是上不是。主要是有外部力量在那里起作用。
周：外部力量就是美国。美陷在那里。
柯：不起，那是什么地方？什么用把它修起？
周：那是工人住宅。
柯：什么都有？
周：是。另外也可以沙。
柯：幢房子是什么地方？
周：是一工厂。
柯：什么工厂？
周：是北京汽配件工厂。美国把他的泥腿陷在这里，他在世界的言也就削弱了，全世界的反美斗争也一步展。
柯：是呀。然，他在地是陷去了，也不知道怎么能身。
周：是呀，世界人民的反帝，反美有有利。
柯：是呀。
周：所以，你回，我配合支援越南、老、印度支那人民的反帝。
柯：是呀。我想，如果我能在找到共同点的，我可以商量若干重大措施。
周：如果你的，什么时候要三月一日的呀？

柯：五月一日，噢，三月一日。如果你愿意听我的我可以好好跟你一，可以跟你很多有意思的情，是你的之一。如果你愿意在上听我些什么的，如果有种愿望的话，那么我可以多新闻。

周：是呀！我得，柯西金同志在送我走的时候，你愿意把去的重要子背下。那么三月一日的也是重要子之一。

柯：我想，在上，我有新的情，我有新的度。

周：是源于赫夫。你要在三月一日的，是同十二月十五日的有系的，是同七月三十日的信有系的。

柯：你的一切都。

周：是源于赫夫。你要在三月一日的，是同十二月十五日的有系的，是同七月三十日的信有系的。

柯：你的一切都。

周：你新的本可以另外提出新的建，另起灶。

柯：周恩来同志，我提出了新的建，你不愿意听嘛！但是你告诉政治，可以一。要知道，我是路北京的，我可以一嘛！莫非我只能利用在北京上偶然的机？

周：当然，我要一嘛！

柯：我愿意听我的，我是很大 \to 三，是很有情的。我真地你，是你向赫夫的磨里注水，而不是。我愿意跟你，而你不愿意跟我。

周：倒是些奇的。

柯：是法。是北京主要街道？

周：是北京，是城通到城西的大道。

柯：是很好的街。

周：那是封建代修的。建筑是一九五九年修建的：一是史博物，一是人民大堂。

柯：是什么碑？

周：是人民革命烈士念碑，是念片到建以前牲的烈士的。是我天安。

柯：是的地方？是很好的地方。

周：人民大堂的建筑面是十五万平方公尺。

柯：是你的大厦。

周：是人大常委公的地方，有大堂，宴。
柯：我很喜，建筑得很美。但不知道里面的照明怎么？

周：光然不，但照明不。

柯：是什么地方？

周：是中南海，是去皇帝冬天住的地方，算是冬吧。在是我中央，院公的地方。

柯：是部？

周：是的。

柯：周恩来同志，你把皇帝住的地方占了。（笑）

周：你的克里姆林去也是皇帝的嘛！

柯：那沙皇住在彼得堡，克林姆林不是皇。但周恩来同志却把皇帝住的地方占了。（笑）

周：最后的一是介石，那他在南京呢！

柯：我自己是列宁格勒人，我看沙皇兵，我用石扔警察。我生在工人---雄堡。

周：前是民族。

柯：是什么时候建筑的？是新建的，是有的。

周：是新的，也是一九五九年建筑的。

柯：是按照格建筑的吧？

周：是按照民族格。那是民族店。

柯：是十一吧？我定在莫斯科建筑十一的房。赫夫那搞一通，他下命令只能盖五的。我他，做不。他：你什么也不懂，只能盖五的。我他，你我什么也不懂，是你什么也不懂。在我把命令取消了。

周：那是大。

柯：中哪些城市有台？

周：上海，天津，沈，州等近十城市。

柯：机多不多？

周：不多。

柯：大概有多少？

周：一下子我不能回答你。

柯：是很有意思的。像美，意大利，法些家，都陷到黑白里去啦！大家都了黑白机。要想改成五彩的，至少需要十年。我可以越黑白的，直接搞五彩的。几年后就可以跑到他前面去。他在吹牛，就落后了。

周：也是后居上。

柯：我想在机普及上一件有意思的事情。我同法，西德的家美已始搞五彩的了，大
有一百万台，而黑白的机五千万台。要改起不是一的。我的黑白的近千万台。如果我一下子改用五彩的，就可以超他。最主要的是不美的五彩入侵西。他是一系的，我是另一系的。如果我把自己体系的机推到洲，他就不去。法人正在研究。我正在同法人合作。美人数不去。

周：同法人合作，抵制美，是好的定。

柯：我在上同戴高判。在上，你也可以在洲做。

周：有么大的力量。

柯：我一起搞嘛！你老是反我，我是赫夫分子。我有你戴帽子。我赶走了赫夫，你倒把我叫做赫夫分子。赫夫分子鬼去吧！

周：你把赫夫赶走，我并不反呀！

柯：可是你真是把我赫夫分子呀？周恩同志，你是弱点。你看，史明，你是不的。

到后要

（事后追）

柯：我次去越南，你是否同？

周：我不是一始就了，你去越南，越南人民以支持和援助，我很高。

柯：是的。我次主要是听听越南同志的意，我的意，主要是部，去做工作，少搞群面。

周：公的支持是必要的，可在宴中表示。

柯：他安排了群大，我在中一定要表示公支持。美人数深的是我部什么。我因工作很忙，所以在越南只停留四天。

周：那就是回。

柯：是的。

周：是你就任后第一次出。

柯：是呀，有不少家在我就任后邀我去。如西德，我已拒了；威尔也多次邀，他上台后，他好些，但越越糟，所以我同意去英，但具体日期要再，先戴米柯去，我的向后拖。我你似乎在某些上威尔政府的度不呀？

周：你有什么根据呢？

柯：比如，你英提出的合核力量的建比美的好！

周：完全是西方的挑和造。你拿出据吧！

柯：我拿的出。

周：他易大臣的候，我面批了他在中，合，北大西洋集合核力量，西上行的政策。工党份子，同保守党一，都是皇帝份子，但是有的候他比保守党坏。的一套，而作的相反。

柯：是他老毛病。我同位易部曾多次交。我同意你他的估价。
周恩来总理与过境我国的苏联总理柯西金第一次接触时谈话记录

档号: 109-03957-04                                      起止日期: 1965.2.6


本卷共: 21页
外交部绝密文件

周总理、陈毅副总理同柯西金等

第一次接触谈话记录

（未经总理、陈总审阅）

时间：一九六五年二月五日十二时

地点：从机场到钓鱼台宾馆的途中

第一部分 周总理同柯西金的谈话记录

第二部分 陈毅副总理同安德罗波夫的谈话记录

第三部分 其他同志谈话记录及有关情况

谈话内容提要

一、柯西金提出拜訪毛主席和刘主席。

二、柯西金谈到南越、老撾問題，說要帮助美国在越

南开一个出路。

三、柯西金說，他們对三月一日会议有新的情况、新

的态度。
四、安德罗波夫說，這次去越主要是為了加強兩黨兩國关系，商討越軍事技術援助的問題。並說蘇、中兩國應就一起支持越南人民的鬥爭，準備就此問題同我交換意見。

五、安德罗波夫表示：蘇方打算利用這次路過的機會同我就兩黨兩國關係問題交換意見。並說蘇代表团訪越後再訪問其它東南亞國家，訪越四天後仍經北京回國。

六、安德罗波夫表示：蘇代表团打算同我就三月一日會議交換意見，說蘇共对此已有另一个考虑，現在應該在新的環境中寻求一个好的途径，中国同志也應該改变一下自己的立场。

七、庫茲涅佐夫說，約翰遜、威爾遜都希望訪蘇，柯西金也将訪美、英，但具休時間都未定。

八、洛吉諾夫表示，在今后双方民航的談判（按：指修改民航协定及其議定書的談判）中，蘇聯民航將注意不損害中國民航的利益。
第一部分
周总理同柯西金的谈话记录
（译员：阎明复）

柯西金（以下简称柯）：我第一次到北京，你生活怎么样？

周恩来同志（以下简称周）：好，忙一点。

柯：工作多就很好，工作少，……。

周：你身体怎么样？

柯：不错，谢谢。

周：我们这里风大一点，干旱。

柯：我沿路上看到确实是干旱。

周：我们这里雪少，你们那边怎么样？

柯：伊尔库茨克雪很大。我是昨天晚上到伊尔库茨克的，时差五个半小时，我不想睡觉，夜晚就在伊尔库茨克散步，风雪很大，但是气候很舒适。

周：雪对你们很好。

柯：我们莫斯科雪也很大。整个西伯利亚都下了大雪。哈萨克斯坦也下了大雪。

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周：拿多对你们今年的庄稼好。
柯：当然是很好，但是这不起决定性作用。总有很多未知数。
周：这是农业嘛。
柯：这不是在工厂，在工厂里面一切都很清楚，在农业方面，当人们说很好，结果可能不好；当人们说不好，结果可能不错。
周：有时表面上看它长得很多，但是收下来粒子里都不饱满。
柯：我这是第一次到北京来，我们的所有同志都要我向你们问好。前天我们中央主席团开了会，勃列日涅夫、波德戈尔内和其他同志都向你们问好。
周：谢谢。勃列日涅夫同志身体好吗？
柯：不错嘛。他在工作。
周：他的身体不是比你差吗？他对我说，他有心脏病。
柯：谁的身体好，谁的身体坏，这个问题很难弄清楚。（笑）他身体不错。科兹洛夫不久前去世了。
周：是呀，我们都知道了。
柯：他病了两年了。自己不能行动，要两个人扶着才
能够站起来。他去世的那一天，就是别人把他扶到桌子旁边去吃饭，刚坐在椅子上，就跌倒死去了，一言未发。

周：是呀，有这种麻痹症的人就是怕震动。

柯：他也没有震动，就是坐在那里就死了。我今天的日程怎么样？你有什么想法？

周：我们从这里到宾馆去。时间比较长，可以谈一谈，然后你们吃中饭，下午休息，晚上我们可以在一起吃晚饭，晚饭以前可以休息。

柯：你认为有没有可能去拜访一些人？

周：你有什么想法？

柯：这怎么说呢？要我讲的话，如果适宜，可以接受的话，拜访毛泽东同志、刘少奇同志，如果这对你们不困难的话。

周：今天下午我们中央同志要跟古巴代表团格瓦拉同志谈判。我没有参加，我和这几个同志专门来接待你们。他们是前天到的，昨天已经谈了一次，今天要继续谈。

柯：当然，我刚才讲的是我个人的意见。我们虽然是邻居，但是来往不多，所以今天有这样一个机会可以谈一谈。

周：我转告吧。
柯：有什么结果，你告诉我吧。

周：我们很高兴，你们这一次去访问越南。因为越南是处在反美斗争的最前线。如果讲热战的话，那么那里是进行最激烈的战斗的地区。对美国来讲，这也是他们最头痛的地方，这是他们自己造成的。

柯：美国人对我们这次到越南去很感不安。

周：很注意。他们派了邦迪到南越去，但是又多次声明，同部长会议主席的访问无关。南越人民的武装斗争进行得很好。

柯：是很好。

周：这是个全民的战争。他们甚至于在水网地区也击败了美军和伪军。可以说，他们现在比我们抗日时期打得还好。后来居上嘛。

柯：他们运用于你们的经验。

周：运用于你们和我们的正面的经验和反面的经验。

柯：我们和你们都打了很长时间的仗，我们知道什么叫作战。

周：他们是需要支持，需要援助的。所以，你们这次去能够支援他们是好事。

柯：是呀，我认为，如果在这些问题上我们能够配合
行动的話，那是會好的，甚至於應該說是會更好的。

周：為了反美斗争的勝利，我們應該配合行動。現在美國感到非常困難，繼續打下去，他沒有信心，也沒有出路。你們不是把葛羅米柯跟美國人談話的要点告诉我们了吗？他們不是也談這個問題嗎？但是他們決不甘心退出。

柯：需要幫助他們從越南找到一個出路。不是給他們找出路，而是在越南給他們開一個出路。

周：是呀，開一個出路就是叫他們撤退，他們又不幹嘛。

柯：撤退是他們唯一的出路。

周：他們自己破壞了一九五四九年內瓦會議的協議嘛。我們都參加了內瓦會議。內瓦協議說了，越南要執行不結盟的政策。越南民主共和國是遵守這條協議的。而南越，從吳庭艳到阮庆，都破壞了這個協議。美國進行了直接的武裝干涉，違背了內瓦協議。武裝干涉是他挑起的，我們並沒有去挑。所以，我們援助越南民主共和國，援助南越人民，是天經地義的事情。如果他們撤退的話，南越人民自己去解決自己的問題。北越不會去干涉。越南人民自己會選擇自己的制度和政府。第二步，才是兩個越南的人民自己解決他們之間的問題。
柯：周恩来同志，对不起，我打断你一下，为什么这里好多人都戴口罩？

周：有风沙，要挡风，怕感冒，预防感冒。尤其是在长途的路上走来走去。有些人有经验，习惯走长路，就不戴。你看，也有的人不戴口罩。

柯：对不起，我打断了你的讲话。

周：没关系。所以，看起来，要按照一九五四年日内瓦协议，那问题是可以解决的。而美国人讲，这是个面子问题，说是要丢面子。但是，这个面子是他们自己要丢的嘛。所以，这个问题就是这样：他们陷入了既打不下去，但是又不肯走的这样一个很尴尬的局面。他们喧嚷，还要在那里打十年。就让他们在那里打十年吧。但是，这是句空话。南越伪政权一发生一个问题，白宫马上就紧张。他们还威胁说，要扩大战争，要打朝鲜式的战争。好，讲吧。

柯：我跟腊斯克谈这个问题的时候，也是这样说的。

周：只有这样跟他们谈问题，他们才会开始考虑。

柯：这个问题对他们来说不是一个简单的问题。

周：是呀，当然，这对他们来讲，又是个内政问题，又是个同盟国的问题，还是他们在亚洲的影响的问题。
柯：他们主要考虑的是个面子问题。
周：这个问题是他们自己造成的嘛，没有人请他们去嘛。
柯：我对你对越南局势的总的评价是同意的。
周：又不是我们去挑，我们是严守自己的边界线。当然，我们边界线上是集了重兵。
柯：我们知道。
周：但是我们决不出一步。我们这样做是为了预防万一，预防他挑衅。他们派了许多U——2飞机和无人驾驶的飞机来侦察，来侦察，我们打下了几架。他们也知道我们是集了重兵。我们对他们声明说，我们是准备好的，但是我们不要扩大战争，你们走到那里，我们走到那里。朝鲜战争也没有扩大到世界范围嘛。我们是一直遵守这些原则的，我们是不走第一步的。他们走第一步，我们就跟着走。他们是要考虑的。所以，你们这次去看看是很好的。
柯：是呀，去了解了解情况。
周：对越南人民的支持不仅仅是对越南，这也是关系到老挝爱国战线党和柬埔寨王国，因为他们是利害与共的。
柯：老挝的局势也是很复杂的。

周：这也是美国一手造成的嘛。你看，一九六一年，一九六二年，我们费了很大的努力，美国人在一九六二年的日内瓦会议的协议上签字嘛。富马到你们那里去说得很好，到我们这里来也说得很好。然后他又准备到法国去，从那里到英国，他表示，要成立一个好的团结的政府。但是，从我们这里一回去，美国就指使右派搞了政变，破坏了联合政府，结果就造成了这样的局势。现在他们内部不断地吵架，自己打自己嘛。

柯：他们难道开始了武装行动吗？

周：是呀，一直在打嘛，还有死亡嘛。

柯：哪些人被打死了？

周：他们之间的一些士兵，双方都有死亡。让他们自己打嘛，不断地政变嘛。

柯：西贡也是不断地政变。

周：吴庭艳兄弟被美国人杀死以后，到现在已经是第八次政变了。

柯：他们那儿会搞第二十八次政变的。

周：是呀。

柯：他们那里会不断地政变。
周：所以，我们不要着急。

柯：不会，不会。我们并不感到不安，我最后一次看到富马的时候，是他从法国回来路过。

周：他本来是想执行中立政策。因为他有这样一个倾向，所以右派分子就搞了政变，把他完全俘虏过去了。现在他就是完全听美国和右派的话。当然，他所谓走中立，也不过就是靠拢法国一些。就连这个，美国都不许可。现在戴高乐对他也表示失望了。

柯：我跟他谈话的时候，我就问他，你为什么要接受美国的武器？他说，那你们给我武器嘛。你们给爱国战线党武器，爱国战线党打我们，那边也打，这边也打。我这个可怜的农民到底怎么办呢？到处都挨打。你要给我武器，我就不要美国武器了。

周：但是实际上那里并没有打什么大仗。

柯：是呀，是呀。

周：要讲真正打大仗，还是美国的轰炸。但是现在那里的人民也学会了打飞机。

柯：打下的也不多。

周：这也是美国人迫使他们这样做的。

柯：不管怎么说吧，老挝的局势不简单。老挝有许多
不同观点、不同倾向的集团。

周：最好让他们自己打。

柯：最好不打架。

周：不打架，大家就讲团结嘛，但是他们团结不起来嘛。三方面不是到巴黎去开会吗？爱国战线党也派人去了，也没有讲出什么结果嘛。

柯：是呀，他们这方面的代表从巴黎回来的时候都路过我们那里，跟我们见过。

周：只要富马跟右派勾结在一起，就不会有什么结果。

柯：富马指责苏发努冯说，苏发努冯不愿意跟他讲话。

周：那有这样的事呀。让他们右派内部闹嘛，让他们右派内部打嘛，让这些右派和中派自己打嘛。

柯：如果是这样的话，那就好了。但是实际上不是这样。主要是有外部力量在那里起作用。

周：外部力量就是美国。让美国陷在那里。

柯：对不起，那是什么地方？为什么用墙把它们修起来？

周：那是工人住宅。
柯：为什么都有墙？
周：这是个习惯。另外也可以挡风砂。
柯：这幢房子是什么地方？
周：这是一个工厂。
柯：什么工厂？
周：这是北京汽车配件工厂。让美国把他的泥腿陷在这里，他在世界上的发言权也就削弱了，全世界的反美斗争也会进一步开展。

柯：是呀。当然，他在这个地区是陷进去了，也不知道怎么能够脱身。
周：是呀，这对世界人民的反帝斗争、反美斗争有利。
柯：是呀。
周：所以，你们这回来，我们应该配合支援越南、老挝、印度支那人民的反帝斗争。
柯：是呀。我想，如果我们能够找到共同点的话，我们可以商量若干重大措施。
周：如果这样的话，为什么你们还要开三月一号的会议呀？
柯：五月一号，噢，三月一号。如果你们愿意听我谈谈
的話，我可以好好跟你們談一談，可以跟你們談很多有意思的情況，这是一个談話的課題之一。如果你们愿意在这个问题上听我談些什么的話，如果有这种愿望的話，那么我可以談許多新的情况。

周：是啊！我记得，柯西金同志在送我走的时候说过，你们不愿意把过去的重担子背下来。那么这个三月一日的会议也是重担子之一。

柯：我想，在这个问题上，我们有新的情况，我们有新的态度。

周：但你们把这个担子继承下来了嘛！我们的态度你们都知道。我上一次都談了。我不是劝你们另起炉灶吗？从双边的和多边的会谈着手嘛！创造条件嘛！

柯：你知道吗？我想这样给你说，你们完全看錯了。在这个问题上，你们正好背上了对赫鲁晓夫的作为有利的担子。这就是我要对你们說的。我为什么这样讲呢？因为这种做法是对赫鲁晓夫有利的，而不是为了同我们在一起。

周：这倒不见得。

柯：我可以向你们解释。

周：会议是来源于赫鲁晓夫。你们要在三月一日开的
这个会，是同十二月十五日的会议有联系的，是同七月三十日的信有联系的。

柯：你说的这一切都对。

周：你们新的领导本来可以另外提出新的建议，另起炉灶。

柯：周恩来同志，我们提出了新的建议，你们不愿意听嘛！但这个问题不是能够在汽车上谈的。这个问题可以谈一谈。要知道，我是路过北京的，我们还可以谈一谈嘛！莫非我们只能利用在汽车上这个偶然的机会来谈这个问题吗？

周：那当然，我们要谈一谈嘛！

柯：我认为这是个很重大的问题，是个有关整个国际共产主义运动的问题。我很认真地对你们说：是你们向赫鲁晓夫的磨盘里注水，而不是我们。我们愿意跟你们谈，而你们不愿意跟我们谈。

周：这倒是些奇异的话。

柯：这是辩证法。

这是北京的主要街道吗？

周：这是北京饭店。这是一条从城东通到城西的大道。
柯：这是一条很漂亮的街。
周：那是封建时代修的红墙。这两个建筑是一九五九年修建的：一个是历史博物馆，一个是人民大会堂。
柯：这是什么碑？
周：是人民革命烈士纪念碑，是纪念从鸦片战争到建国以前牺牲的烈士的。这是我们的天安门。
柯：这是检阅的地方吗？是个很好的地方。
周：人民大会堂的建筑面积是十五万平方公尺。
柯：这是你们的议会大厦。
周：是人大常委办公的地方，还有大会堂，宴会厅。
柯：我很喜欢，建筑得很美。但不知道里边的照明怎么样？
周：阳光当然不够，但照明不错。
柯：这是什么地方？
周：这是中南海，是过去皇帝冬宫住的地方，算是冬宫吧。现在是我们中央，国务院办公的地方。
柯：这是部长会议吗？
周：是的。
柯：周恩来同志，你们把皇帝住的地方给占了。（笑声）
周恩来说：你们的克里姆林宫过去也是皇帝的嘛！

柯：那时沙皇住在彼得堡，克里姆林宫不是皇宫。但周恩来同志却把皇帝住的地方给占了。（笑声）

周：最后的一个是蒋介石，那时他还在南京呢。

柯：我自己是列宁格勒人，我看见过沙皇阅兵，我用石头扔过旧警察。我生长在工人区——维堡区。

周：前边是民族宫。

柯：是什么时候建筑的？是新建的，还是旧有的。

周：是新的，也是一九五九年建筑的。

柯：是按照旧的风格建筑的吧？

周：是按照民族风格。那是民族饭店。

柯：是十一层吧？我们决定在莫斯科建筑十层、十一层的楼房。赫鲁晓夫那时乱搞一通。他下命令只能盖五层的。我们对他讲，这样做不对。他说：你们什么都不懂，只能盖五层的。我对他讲，你说我们什么也不懂，实际是你什么也不懂。现在我们把这个命令取消了。

周：那是电视大楼。

柯：中国哪些城市有电视台？

周：上海、天津、沈阳、广州等近十个城市

柯：电视机多不多？
周：不多。
柯：大概有多少？
周：一下子我不能回答你。
柯：电视是很有意思的一个问题。象美国、意大利、法国这些国家，都陷到黑白电视里边去啦！大家都买了黑白电视机。要想改成五彩的，至少需要十年。我们可以越过黑白的，直接搞五彩的。这样，几年后就可以跑到他们前面去。他们现在吹牛，将来就落后了。
周：这也是后来居上。
柯：我们想在电视机普及这个问题上办一件有意思的事情。我同法国、西德的专家讨论过这个问题。美国已开始搞五彩的了，大约有一百万台，而黑白的电视机则为五千万台。要想起来不是一个简单的问题。我们的黑白的将近两千万台。如果我们一下子改用五彩的，就可以超过他们。最主要的是不让美国的五彩电视侵入西欧。他们是一个体系，我们是另一个体系。如果我们把自己的体系的电视机推广到欧洲，他们就进不去。法国人现在正研究这个问题。我们正在同法国人合作。这样美国人进不去。
周：同法国人合作，抵制美国，这是个好的决定。
柯：我们在这个问题上同戴高乐谈判过。在这个问题
上，你们也可以在亚洲这样做。

周：我们还没有这么大的力量。

柯：我们一块搞嘛！你们老是反对我们，说我们是赫鲁晓夫分子。我们没有给你们戴过帽子。我们赶走了赫鲁晓夫，你们倒把我们叫做赫鲁晓夫分子。让赫鲁晓夫分子见鬼去吧！

周：你们把赫鲁晓夫赶走，我们并不反对呀！

柯：可是你们还是把我们称为赫鲁晓夫分子呀！周恩来同志，你们这是个弱点。你们会看到，历史将证明，你们是不对的。
到宾馆后的谈话记录

（事后追记）

周：我们这次去越南，你们是否赞同？

柯：我不是一开始就说了，你去越南访问，对越南人民给以支持和援助，我们很高兴。

周：是的。我们这次去主要是听听越南同志的意见，谈谈我们的意见，主要是内部谈话，去做工作，少搞群众场面。

周：公开的支持还是必要的，可在宴会讲话中表示。

柯：他们安排了群众大会，我在讲话中一定要表示公开支持。对美国人印象深的是我们内部谈些什么。我因工作很忙，所以在越南只停留四天。

周：那就是十号回国。

柯：是的。

周：这是你就任后第一次出国访问。

柯：是呀。有不少国家在我就任后邀请我去访问。如西德，我已拒绝了；威尔逊也多次邀请，他上台后，我们还以为他们会好些，但越来越糟，所以我们同意去英国
访问，但具体日期要另谈，先让葛罗米柯去访问，我访问的时间向后拖。

我发现你们似乎在某些问题上对威尔逊政府的态度不错呀？

周：你这样讲有什么根据呢？

柯：比如说，你们认为英国提出的联合核力量的建议比美国的好！

周：这完全是西方的挑衅和造谣。你拿出证据来吧！

柯：我拿得出来。

周：当他们的贸易大臣来的时候，我当面批评了他们在两个中国问题、联合国问题、北大西洋集团联合核力量问题、马来西亚问题上执行的政策。工党份子，同保守党一样，都是帝国主义份子，但是有的时候他们比保守党还好。讲的一套，而作的则相反。

柯：这是他们的老毛病。我同这位贸易部长曾多次交谈。我同意你对他们的估价。