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Digital Archive International History Declassified

June 12, 1962

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF COOPERATION AND FURTHER COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE MVD OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE KGB UNDER THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

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    Discussion about potential exchange of intelligence and assistance between the two intelligence agencies.
    "Record of a Conversation about the Results of Cooperation and Further Coordination of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities between the MVD of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers ," June 12, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Obtained by Pavel Zacek. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175926
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[Czech-language Ministry

of the Interior stamp]

RECORD

of a conversation about the results of cooperation and further coordination of intelligence and counterintelligence activities between the MVD of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers

Having examined the progress of the realization of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities coordinated in Prague in June 1961, both sides note that the cooperation between the MVD of the CSSR and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers has considerably strengthened and expanded. The coordination of intelligence and counterintelligence measures has facilitated a correct direction of the efforts of the organs of state security of our countries in work against the main enemy, the US and its allies.

Positive results through intelligence and counterintelligence channels were achieved in the course of performing the agreed measures by both countries and additional covert opportunities and conditions for the further improvement of work against the main enemy were created. Contacts between our organs have become closer and more goal-oriented.

In the future both sides consider it necessary to work henceforward on the solution of the tasks identified during the bilateral talks in Moscow in July 1960 and in Prague in June 1961, which have not lost relevance at the present time. In addition, considering the changes in the international situation, [the following] was found advisable:

through intelligence channels

I.

to increase agent operational work to obtain intelligence information providing first of all:

- the strategic military plans, military preparations, and mobilization measures being conducted by the US and other member countries of aggressive military political blocs, first of all NATO;

- the political and economic plans and practical activity of the US and their allies with respect to the USSR, CSSR, and the other socialist countries;

- the plans and measures being conducted by the FRG to increase their military potential, expand the Bundeswehr, produce and purchase weapons, and also the FRG’s desire to use [its] participation in blocs in its own aggressive interests;

- the subversive activities of the imperialist countries and their intelligence agencies against the countries of the socialist camp with the objective of weakening the positions of individual socialist countries and undermining the unity of the socialist camp;

- the plans and intentions of the US and its allies concerning the most important international questions, primarily with respect to disarmament, the prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and a settlement of the Berlin problem, the relaxation of international tension, etc.;

- the plans and measures of the US and their allies with respect to the countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia with the object of enslaving the peoples of these countries;

- the differences and contradictions between the imperialist countries, including inside NATO and other aggressive blocs, on various questions, most of all on questions connected with the West’s policy with respect to the socialist countries;

- the enemy’s awareness of the condition of the armed forces, and also the military and special facilities and military equipment of the USSR, the CSSR, and the other socialist countries;

- the plans and measures directed at acquiring information about the specific plans and special facilities, military equipment, and the armed forces of the USSR, the CSSR, and the other countries of the socialist camp.

The KGB and CSSR MVD will take steps for these purposes to increase agent operational work in the interests of penetrating the most important institutions and facilities of the countries of the main enemy, the US and FRG first of all, and also the governing bodies and headquarters of the aggressive blocs NATO, SEATO, and CENTO.

Considering the complexity of the agent operational situation in the countries of the main enemy and the known difficulties of the officials of our residencies recruiting directly, especially in the US, the KGB and the CSSR MVD will more broadly practice the use of recruitment agents in recruitment measures and recruitment under a false flag.

In addition, they are stepping up the recruitment of an agent network in third countries, primarily of the Americans located there, West Germans, and British and French [citizens], with the goal of using this agent network in work against the main enemy, and also inserting it firstly in the US and FRG and infiltration into facilities of interest.

The KGB and CSSR MVD will continue to exchange information about the most important institutions and facilities of the main enemy for the purpose of studying and the best use of the opportunities identified for agent penetration of these important institutions and facilities. In advisable cases our intelligence services will help one another with leads and the development of individuals working in institutions and facilities of the main enemy. In particular, available information is exchanged about the services of the French MFA (the Cosmic Bureau, the office of the cipher department, and the office of the European Department), and also descriptive information of people working in these services; the activity of West Germans in Iran, including the province of Khorasan, and other information of the institutions and facilities of the main enemy and the people working in them which deserve interest.

II.

In order to assist the efforts of our governments and the governments of the other socialist countries to ensure peace in the entire world and the further strengthening of the might and international influence of the socialist camp the KGB and the CSSR MVD will take steps to further increase work to carry out active political and agent operational measures against the main enemy and his intelligence services. Along with continuing work on previously agreed active measures opportunities will be sought and work will also be organized in the direction of:

- providing support and the popularization of the foreign policy actions of the socialist countries;

- unmasking the aggressive and adventurous policy of American imperialism and its allies by all permissible means;

- undermining and weakening the activity of the aggressive military and political blocs NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, and also the closed economic groups of the Western power such as the EEC;

- assisting the mobilization of public opinion of the capitalist countries against the aggressive policy of the imperialist circles of the US and their allies;

- promoting an increase of the anti-American sentiments in other capitalist countries, in the countries of Latin American, Africa, Asia, and the Near East first of all; unmasking the imperialist nature of KENNEDY’s new economic program for the countries of Latin America under the name Alliance for Progress;

- unmasking the militarism and revanchism in West Germany, the dominance of the fascist elements in FRG government bodies, and also the promotion of a growth of mistrust in ADENAUER’s policy in the West by publishing denunciatory articles, brochures, and leaflets in the foreign press, and instigating publications about the aggressiveness of German militarism by social, political, and military leaders, the growth of a real military threat to West European countries from German militarism, the FRG’s desire to use NATO for its aggressive purposes, etc., and by other permissible means;

- the mobilization of public opinion in the West, primarily in West Germany and West Berlin, in support of the proposals of the countries of the socialist camp about a peace treaty with Germany and about West Berlin;

- an increase of differences and conflicts between the main imperialist countries on the question of a peace treaty with Germany and about West Berlin;

- the exposure and frustration of plans to equip the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons;

- the organization of statements and an expansion of the protest movement against quartering Bundeswehr units on the territory of other countries;

- the discrediting of government leaders, political parties and organizations conducting especially hostile activity against the USSR, CSSR, and the other socialist countries;

- the exposure of special military formations and the so-called Peace Corps created by the Americans for subversive activity before world public opinion;

- the discrediting of the activity of the US Information Agency (USIA) in the direction of identifying and compromising CIA officers, using this agency for cover of the subversive work they do, and also the exposure of the USIA’s slanderous acts;

- the discrediting and undermining of the activity of ultra-reactionary fascist organizations such as the John BIRCH Society in the US, the OAS in France, and others. They organize the acquisition of materials and documents about the support of these organizations by government circles and individual monopolies of the US and France, and also about the ties of these organizations with prominent Nazis in the FRG and West German intelligence with the goal of using these materials for denunciatory acts;

- the exposure and discrediting of Guy MOLLET and BIDEAULT.

In addition, it has been found advisable:

- to study the possibilities and to exchange opinions about conducting joint operations concerning the Republic of South Africa, the Congo, and Guinea, and also to convey information to the leaders of Mali which is to our advantage;

- to study the possibilities and to exchange opinions about conducting joint operations to help the Kurdish national movement in Iraq;

- to continue an exchange of documents and materials which might be used by our services when conducting active measures, and also to discredit political figures taking an especially hostile position toward our countries.

III.

In connection with the stepping up of the subversive and provocative activity of the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the countries of the main enemy against the institutions and individual citizens of the CSSR and USSR in the capitalist countries Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence:

- will increase agent operational work to acquire and introduce agent networks into the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the countries of the main enemy, primarily the US and FRG;

- will take more active measures to identify and develop career professionals [kadrovye sotrudniki] and agent networks of the enemy directly engaging in hostile activity against our countries, missions, and individual citizens; in appropriate cases opinions will be exchanged with respect to the use of the available capabilities of one or the other side concerning the active development of career professionals of the intelligence services of the countries of the main enemy with the object of recruiting, discrediting, dangling them an agent network, and inclining [them] to switch to our side;

- will increase work to acquire and mutually exchange information about enemy preparations for provocations against the institutions and citizens of the USSR and CSSR, and also about the methods, forms, means, and objects of interest to the special services of the enemy in work against our countries. In case of necessity joint measures coordinated by them will be conducted to ensure the security of the citizens and official institutions of both countries in capitalist countries;

- will use their opportunities to collect information about the activities of the special services of the enemy against our countries from the territory of third countries, and also to recruit a prospective agent network in third countries for the subsequent extraction and introduction into the intelligence and counterintelligence bodies of the countries of the main enemy.

IV.

In connection with the growing use of various scientific discoveries and technical achievements for aggressive military purposes by the countries of the main enemy the KGB and CSSR MVD will take steps to further increase work to obtain materials and information about the main problems of science and technology (nuclear physics, electronics, missile technology, bacteriology and chemistry, and the long-range plans for scientific work) which occupy a considerable place in the aggressive plans of the enemy against the countries of the socialist camp.

On the basis on the economic tasks of the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic direct the efforts of the scientific and technical intelligence networks of our services at obtaining technical documentation and the latest samples concerning the most pressing questions in industry (the automation of production processes, high-grade metallurgy, the chemistry of polymers, power engineering, high-performance equipment, etc.),

Study the capabilities and exchange opinions about obtaining various samples of new technology in electronic and dosimetry equipment through a reliable agent network in European countries by bringing it to the US for a short time.

Exchange experience in organizing and using in scientific research work the intelligence departments and intelligence posts about questions of developing and recruiting foreigners coming to our countries, and also to carry out various intelligence measures abroad.

V.

It has been found advisable to keep to the established practice of contact through illegal channels of work between the KGB and CSSR MVD.

VI.

It has also been found advisable:

- to establish operational contact between our residencies in Argentina, Uruguay, Iran, and Israel on questions of exchanging information locally about changes in the operational situation and information about carrying out mobilization measures in these countries; enemy preparations of provocations with respect to our missions and officials, etc.;

- to study the possibilities and to exchange opinions about conducting joint measures to install operational [liternaya] equipment in an office space of the American Library in Baghdad used by US intelligence to meet agents.

through counterintelligence channels

Considering the positive experience of cooperation between the organs of CSSR MVD counterintelligence and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers combine these counterintelligence services in further efforts in the direction of conducting joint measures against the intelligence services of the US, Britain, the FRG, France, and their allies in aggressive blocs.

It seems advisable to continue the existing exchange of information and documentary materials of operational interest for both counterintelligence services about the questions limited to the upcoming meetings in 1960-1961.

Based on these common interests of organizing an active fight against the imperialist intelligence services it is advisable to carry out the following joint measures

against American intelligence

- in June and July of this year the CSSR MVD is to send agent Mirka, who has ties to American intelligence, to Moscow for work as a representative of the Czechoslovak airlines. It is intended to thus identify the intelligence ambitions of the enemy in the USSR and the American intelligence officers who might maintain personal contact with Mirka in Moscow.

- use the overseas agent PERL of the CSSR MVD, which will take appropriate measures to organize his arrival in Moscow in the autumn of this year, to develop officials of the US Embassy in Moscow.

- in February of this year the CSSR MVD sent agent ERNEST abroad with the goal of inserting [him] in the American intelligence espionage network. In January of this year ERNEST was personally familiarized in Prague with KGB agent YEMEL’YANOV beforehand in accordance with an agreement between the CSSR MVD and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers. ERNEST has the mission of naming YEMEL’YANOV to American intelligence as one of his close ties and giving him an appropriate recommendation, which should ensure YEMEL’YANOV is dangled for recruitment by American intelligence.

- considering that in the course of the Bryussel’ operational game led by the CSSR MVD with the use of agent LIPNITSKY the enemy began to show interest in getting information from the USSR about military questions, in December 1961 the counterintelligence directorates arranged to dangle KGB agent SHEVTSOV, a retired officer, to American intelligence through LIPNITSKY. SHEVTSOV was familiarized with LIPNITSKY in Karlovy Vary for these purposes in March of this year and the latter reported this acquaintanceship to the cover address for American intelligence. Follow-up measures on this case will be developed depending on the reaction.

- in order to insert a KGB agent into the network of the American intelligence department of NATO use the possibility of the overseas CSSR MVD agent TURISTKA who was connected with American intelligence in Vienna. Search for a way to carry out this dangle in the near future for these purposes without exposing the KGB agent to TURISTKA.

[Translator’s note: an “operational game” is dangling a double-agent to the enemy]

In particular the CSSR MVD will study the possibility of using its agent ROLAND, and the KGB its agents VASIL’YEV or BELOV.

- Considering the mutual interest in developing Donovan [Translator’s note: inserted by hand everywhere he is mentioned], the Chief of the Eastern Department of the US diplomatic mission in West Berlin, in January of this year the KGB sent the friends all the materials about him and about this organization of American intelligence. When this was done it was stipulated that both sides would take steps to dangle their agents to Donovan. The KGB sent agent SERGEYEV, who was previously acquainted with Donovan, to Berlin in April of this year. However, for unknown reasons, the latter did not show up for the meeting with SERGEYEV. At the same time the CSSR MVD managed to successfully dangle agent SVAT’ to Donovan. Further joint measures will be developed depending on the development of relations between SVAT’ and Donovan.

- Since July 1961 the CSSR MVD has been running an operational game with American intelligence through its agent BORIS (the OPERA matter), who will be dispatched in the near future to Prague to force the Americans to establish communications with him in CSSR conditions. Under a favorable development of this operational game conditions might be created to dangle a KGB agent from among USSR MVD officials through BORIS or to transfer BORIS to work in Moscow.

- in accordance with an agreement between the CSSR MVD and the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers in January of this year KGB agent CHARLI went to Prague, where he established contact with the American Ambassador E. R. [sic, “T.” is correct] WAILES, First Secretary of the American Embassy [K. DEAN], Counsellor of the American Embassy [FLEISHER], and American Counsellor [sic] [SOMMERLATH]. In addition, he established contact with British Ambassador in Prague PARROT and Italian Ambassador AILLAUD. CHARLI also accomplished an acquaintanceship with CSSR MVD agent ANTY, who used an invitation from CHARLI in March of this year and came to Moscow to strike up contacts with members of the diplomatic corps. The KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers will send the CSSR MVD a detailed report [of] CHARLI[‘s] about his trip to Prague as soon as the agent returns to Moscow from the US,  and the CSSR MVD will study the possibility of sending agent ANTY to Moscow again to be dangled to American diplomats in Moscow.

- The KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers will undertake the necessary steps to organize trips to Prague of two or three  of its agents from foreign members of the diplomatic corps who from their capabilities could identify the nature of the communications of US Embassy officials in Prague with the Italian, French, and Greek diplomats working in the CSSR. For its part the CSSR MVD will send the available information about such contacts of the Americans in order to select the most suitable agents to be sent to Prague.

- At the present time the CSSR MVD is carrying out measures with the participation of agent VELAN, with whom American intelligence officer Fleming [Translator’s note: inserted by hand], who has shown interest in military facilities and is interested in getting leads to CSSR MVD officials with the object of their possible recruitment, has established contact. Considering that VELAN from his position is able to go abroad it has been decided to send him to Moscow with the object of establishing an operational game on the territory of the Soviet Union with his participation. In addition, the CSSR MVD will study the possibility of sending VELAN to the [World] Youth Festival in Helsinki.

- The CSSR MVD is developing a suspicion in connection with Rizl [Translator’s note: inserted by hand] of American intelligence who, on an assignment [from] American scientists, visited the USSR in 1961 and then sent the Americans a detailed report about the state of parapsychology in the USSR and gave descriptions of the Soviet scientists with whom met. It has been arranged that the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers will develop ties [with Rizl  in the USSR, inform the CSSR MVD of the materials obtained, and study the possibility of sending an agent from among its contacts to the CSSR in 1962 to take part in the development of Rizl.

- After an exchange of information about the use of a special intelligence apparatus by American military intelligence personnel when travelling around the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia it has been decided to prepare appropriate measures to remove this apparatus from the enemy. It is necessary to inform one another about the results of carrying out these operations.

- continue to use CSSR MVD agent VLADYA, who was brought into cultivation by [Klein] [Translator’s note: inserted by hand], an official of the US Embassy in Moscow who is suspected of belonging to intelligence.

- CSSR operations group agent GORAK entered into contact with officials of the American Embassy in Moscow [Maclock] and Hemingway [Translator’s note: both names inserted by hand], and was in their apartments. After GORAK’s return to the USSR continue his use in this development.

- The KGB has sent the CSSR MVD memos for agents VASIL’YEV, LAMPOV, NOYABR’, and BELOV, who might be dangled to American intelligence. The CSSR MVD will study the possibility of using them and report its opinion about this question.

- The CSSR MVD will send the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers information for agents MILAN, DOKTOR, DUKAT, FELAKH, STEGLIK, STAKH, LIDA, and ALENA who from their personal qualities, position, and knowledge of foreign languages might be used in measures to develop diplomats of the capitalist countries working in Moscow and foreign students and graduate students. The KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers will study the possibilities of using these agents for their own matters and submit suggestions to the CSSR MVD.

against British intelligence

- continue dangling KGB agent SVIRIDOV through CSSR MVD agent PAVEL who has infiltrated the British intelligence agent network. During one of PAVEL’s meetings with British resident Ditte [Translator’s note: inserted by hand] he talked about SVIRIDOV, in whom Ditte had shown interest. It is planned to invite agent PAVEL to Moscow for personal acquaintanceship with SVIRIDOV for the further development of this measure and to pass him disinformation about questions of interest to the British. It is also intended that PAVEL will tell about the upcoming official assignment of SVIRIDOV to the US in August of this year.

- CSSR MVD agent BRIKSI was on official assignment in Belgium in 1960 where he established contact with businessman Radvansky [Translator’s note: inserted by hand], who acquainted BRIKSI with a number of representatives of trade firms, including [Stifl], who according to CSSR MVD information is an agent of British intelligence. Radvansky conducted active development of BRIKSI. After some time a foreigner arrived in Prague who met with BRIKSI in Radvansky’s name and passed him a package with a large sum of money. Based on the opportunities which have been created it has been decided that the KGB will select the agent and prepare a proposal about his infiltration of British intelligence through BRIKSI. The latter’s [BRIKSI’s] arrival in the USSR on official business will be used to acquaint the KGB agent with BRIKSI.

- The CSSR MVD is performing work with respect to Kolanova [Translator’s note: inserted by hand], who lives in London and maintained contact with British intelligence agent Gibson [Translator’s note: inserted by hand] in the past. Kolanova has relatives in the CSSR and the USSR whom she intends to visit in the near future. Conduct a careful check of the relatives of Kolanova and study the possibilities of joint development in the event of [her] arrival in the CSSR and USSR.

- [Fehl] [Translator’s note: inserted by hand] works in the British Embassy in Moscow as a bookkeeper. in 1957 he was a cipher clerk of the British Embassy in Prague. He was actively developed by the CSSR MVD through agent MEDVED’ and cultivated by Cde. MILLER, chief of a CSSR MVD section. Based on operational conditions, the CSSR MVD is sending Cde. MILLER, chief of a CSSR MVD section, and agent MEDVED’ to Moscow to take part in the development of [Fehl].

- Englishman [Bailey] [Translator’s note: inserted by hand] works in the British Embassy in Prague, and previously worked in Moscow. His development while he was in the USSR was conducted by KGB agent DZHEYZI. It was arranged to study the possibility of sending DZHEYZI to Prague together with Cde. SAMOYLOV, chief of a KGB section, who also brought [BAILEY] into cultivation.

- In 1960 KGB agent SAVEL’YEV became acquainted in Sochi with [Rides] [Translator’s note: inserted by hand], an official of the British Council living in Prague and having ties with British intelligence officer [Spensly] [Translator’s note: inserted by hand]. Organize the study of [Rides] in Prague through the capabilities of the CSSR MVD and, if the situation allows, dangle a KGB agent through her with the expectation of infiltration into British intelligence.

- Continue the use of CSSR MVD agent POFIS, who cultivated [female] British Embassy officials Smith and [Spari] [Translator’s note: the names were inserted by hand], who are of operational interest from their official positions.

concerning West German intelligence

- The CSSR MVD dangled agent ZDENEK to West German intelligence in 1960. His recruitment was done by the BND. Using the possibilities of ZDENEK try to dangle KGB agents SOKOLOV and SPRAVEDLIVYY, about whom he will speak of as his friends, to the BND.

- In 1959 West German intelligence recruited CSSR MVD agent MYSLIVETS, who was in the USSR at one time. Study his connections in the USSR in order to select from them or again recruit the agent with the goal of dangling [him] to the BND through MYSLIVETS. MYSLIVETS’ acquaintance with the selected agent is to be organized at the Brno International Fair.

- Czechoslovak emigrants in Austria Shvets and Meltser [Translator’s note: the names were inserted by hand], who are agents of the BND, have established contact with CSSR MVD agent MORAVAN. In order to identify the BND’s interest with regard to the USSR a decision has been made to organize a meeting for MORAVAN with Shvets in Austria and inform him of a proposed trip to the USSR. If successful, dangle the KGB agent to West German intelligence through MORAVAN.

- CSSR MVD agent LISTOPAD, who was Chief of the SD [[Translator’s note: expansion unknown] Department in Berlin at one time, has an agent network in the USSR in contact, and has engaged in the development of Russian emigrants in Germany. The CSSR MVD has informed us about LISTOPAD’s contacts in the USSR. The KGB will verify these contacts and send the materials acquired to the friends for their further joint use in measures against the BND.

- CSSR MVD agent BERNARD has the ability to establish contact with the heads of the TsOPEh [the Central Union of Postwar Emigrants [[from the USSR]] emigrant group in Munich. The CSSR MVD will identify BERNARD’s capabilities and submit proposals about his use in joint operations against the BND.

- as a result of carrying out an agent combination, IRZHINA, an agent of a CSSR MVD operations group, was cultivated by [Kholik], [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], a trainee [stazher] of the FRG Embassy in Moscow, who is being developed for suspicion of involvement in FRG intelligence. It is advisable to continue this development with the participation of the agent IRZHINA.

through Israeli intelligence channels

- CSSR MVD agent GUS is developing [Lavon] [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], an official of the Israeli mission in Prague suspected of ties with the intelligence organizations of Israel. KGB agent BERKUT, who has the opportunity to periodically go to the CSSR, has been sent to take part in the development of [Lavon] and other Israeli diplomats in Prague. The CSSR MVD will study the possibility of using BERKUT to develop [Lavon] and inform the KGB of [its] opinion about this question.

- Exchange opinions about people suspected of [conducting] Israeli espionage and having suspicious contacts in the CSSR and USSR to develop specific joint measures about these matters.

- Exchange memos about an agent network which can be used against Israeli intelligence and practice its routing.

through channels of French and other intelligence agencies

- The CSSR MVD is developing French citizen [Fevre], [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], who has contacts among Soviet citizens, and knows [Buizar], [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], who lives in Lvov. It is advisable to conduct the development jointly, using the capabilities of the CSSR MVD and the KGB.

- The joint development has been arranged of French citizen Lakhenko [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], who worked in the past in an institution of French intelligence and has relatives in the CSSR and the USSR. In particular, take steps to search for the son of Lakhenko on Soviet territory, who allegedly works as an agronomist on one of the state farms of Tselinnyy Kray.

- [Fleury] [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], with whom CSSR MVD agent MAREK was previously acquainted, works in the Dutch Embassy in Moscow. The CSSR MVD will send MAREK to Moscow and help in measures to cultivate [Fleury] into an KGB network. The KGB will inform the CSSR MVD about the most convenient time for the arrival of agent MAREK.

- P, a CSSR MVD cooptee, has established contact with Karasik, [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], a counsellor of the Austrian Embassy in Moscow, who according to available information will occupy a prominent post in the Austrian MFA on return home. Considering the sympathetic [loyal’nyy] attitude of Karasik toward the USSR, continue to study him, strengthening cooptee P’s relations with him.

- In 1961 Drangel [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], a Swedish military attaché in Moscow, became acquainted with CSSR MVD agent IRMA in Prague and tried to establish intimate relations with her and gave [her his] home telephone number in Moscow. The CSSR MVD will send IRMA to the USSR on a tourist visa in order to continue and strengthen her relations with Drangel.

Measures to ensure state security in Comecon and the Joint Institute [for Nuclear Research] at Dubna

- Continue careful checking of all specialists and office workers working on the Comecon staff and in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, and take appropriate steps concerning suspicious people, mutually informing the counterintelligence services about them.

- Increase the agent staff in these institutions in order to identify shortcomings in the storage of classified documents and to prevent leaks of classified information. For all signs of a leak of information or suspicious activity or contacts of people working in the Comecon staff and the Joint Institute at Dubna conduct coordinated measures to verify them with the use of all the capabilities of the CSSR MVD and KGB.

- Carry out joint counterintelligence measure excluding the possibility of a leak of classified information when holding Comecon plenary sessions, meetings, and conferences.

through channels of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and clergy

- The CSSR MVD dangled agent DOUBRAVA to Zabavsky [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], one of the heads of the Mel’nikites [Mel’nikovtsy]. Use this measure to introduce KGB agent OREL to him with the goal of paving the way for a communications channel from Ukraine to the headquarters of the Mel’nikites in the West. A trip to Ukraine will be organized for this agent DOUBRAVA after appropriate training.

- Organize a trip for KGB agent TARAS to the CSSR for development of Ukrainian nationalist Tegza [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand] who lives in the city of Presov.

- With a positive development of measures to recruit Yasovsky [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand], who lives in Munich, on CSSR territory develop a joint assignment for his use in the interests of the CSSR MVD and KGB against the Ukrainian nationalist formations on the territory of West Germany.

- Continue work to introduce Boydunik-Boydunik [sic], [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand] to Dar’ya, a sister of an active participant of the headquarters of the Mel’nikites, with the goal of then sending them to the FRG to [be] infiltrated into the headquarters of the Mel’nikites.

- The communications of Ukrainian nationalist Dobryansky (Canada) -Kovch [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand] resides [SIC: svyaz’….prozhivaet] in the CSSR. Use this fact and move CSSR MVD agent IGOR’ to Canada with a recommendation from Kovch.

- CSSR MVD agent ALENA became acquainted with Ukrainian nationalist Zagariy, director of a lyceum for children of NATO officers in France, in 1961. His relatives live in Ukraine. [Translator’s note: all underlined text was entered by hand].

- Seek the arrival of Zagariy in the CSSR or USSR via ALENA and carry out measures for his recruitment.

- Incline Ukrainian nationalists Gorbanyuk and Murashko, who live in the CSSR, to write brochures sent to expose the ties of nationalists with malicious intelligence officers and compromise the heads of the anti-Soviet nationalist centers. The brochures are to be published after joint editing.

- Continue joint measures to compromise the upcoming Ecumenical Council, which were agreed upon at the meeting of CSSR MVD and KGB representatives in December 1961. Prepare measures for joint actions during the Ecumenical Council in September of this year.

- Mutually use the existing agent capabilities of the CSSR MVD and KGB in order to exert the necessary influence on the work of the World Council of Churches, the Prague Christian Peace Conference, and religious conferences in Africa and France, coordinating the assignments to the agents, determining the behavior of the agent network to achieve the planned goals.

- Determine the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox parishes of the capitalist and underdeveloped countries which first of all need the infiltration of the CSSR MVD and KGB, and then prepare a plan of coordinated measures to perform this task.

- Continue strengthening the agent positions of the CSSR MVD and KGB among the Catholic clergy, intending to ensure the fulfillment of the task to estrange the Catholics of the socialist countries from the Vatican.

- Continue the measure begun to dangle KEDROV, a KGB agent, to Latsko, [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand] a professor of the Oriental Institute in the Vatican suspected of ties with Vatican intelligence. The introduction of KEDROV will be accomplished through CSSR MVD agent MARINA.

- Continue joint measures on the DON case against a group of former Uniate clerics living in the CSSR and USSR.

- Use KGB agent SERGEYEVA in order to develop Dominican monks living in the CSSR. The CSSR MVD will create the conditions for SERGEYEVA to go to the CSSR and introduce her into Dominican circles through their agent BROKEVA.

- The CSSR MVD will send agents LUBOR and BORILKA to the USSR to develop the reactionary Catholic clergy on the territory of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian SSRs. The KGB in turn will prepare the conditions for achieving the maximum effectiveness of these visits.

through other lines of work

- Exchange information about the use of students, graduate students, and other people studying in the USSR and CSSR by enemy intelligence services and reactionary organizations. During June to October of this year organize mutual visits of foreign agents of the above category of people to Moscow and Prague to study the activity of reactionaries in associations of fellow students. Use this agent network for work against the embassies of the capitalist countries.

- Continue the exchange of information about identified enemy intelligence officers and agents among tourists, businessmen, and other foreigners visiting our countries, and organize their joint development. Also practice the mutual sending of foreign agents working in tourism and business firms with the object of stepping up coordinated measures to develop the representatives of these firms being used by hostile intelligence services.

- Considering the positive experience, continue coordinated actions when exhibitions, conferences, symposia, Olympic Games, and other mass international events are held on CSSR or USSR territory, and also in third countries to develop foreigners from capitalist countries and to protect Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens from malicious provocations.

- At the instruction of the CSSR MVD agent MARKO is writing a book directed at exposing the ties of NTS bosses with the intelligence services of the imperialist countries. The KGB will take part in examining the final text of the book and using existing opportunities to distribute it abroad.

- The CSSR MVD is developing Syrian citizen Natstsakhian [Translator’s note: the name was inserted by hand]  who is engaged in illegal operations in gold and hard currency. He is trying to establish contact with his relatives and friends living in Armenia through CSSR MVD agent MIK[AL] to make hard currency deals with them. The KGB will take steps to establish and verify these contacts in Armenia and to develop Natstsakhian in the event of his arrival in the USSR.

- Exchange information about the experience of work concerning money changers with the object to preparing coordinated measures to use contraband channels in counterintelligence terms.

- Representatives of CSSR MVD counterintelligence in Moscow are working according to a separate plan and conduct coordinated measures with the 2nd Main Directorate to develop foreigners of capitalist countries in Moscow. The experience of such cooperation has entirely justified itself. Consequently it is advisable to increase this cooperation, deepening it by the active use of all operational opportunities, adapting to the operational situation and the missions with which the counterintelligence services of the CSSR MVD and KGB are faced.



[Attached] 

ll.2

Top Secret

Copy Nº 1

[Czech-language stamp and

handwriting, probably additional

addressees]

PLAN

of work in Moscow

12 June (Tuesday)

1000-1100 - Conversation with KGB Chairman Cde. V. YE. SEMICHASTNYY, discussion of the work plan.

1130-1330 - Conversation with Cde. A. I. PEREPELITSYN on the topic of: the practice of the operation of the KGB Collegium; the preparation of the materials for discussion at a Collegium; the system of monitoring the fulfillment of orders and directives; the analysis and summation of the work experience of the state security organs.

Conversations in the 1st Main Directorate

1430-1700 – Conversation with Cde. A. M. SAKHAROVSKY on the subject: the principles of organizing and planning work in intelligence; long-range planning. Contacts with the counterintelligence directorates; methods of managing residencies and the monitoring of their work.

13 June (Wednesday)

0930-1130 – Conversation about agent penetration of NATO facilities and work against the EEC.

organized by Cde. M. G. KOTOV

1130-1330 – The practice of work of managing illegals. The possibilities of using illegals in work in African countries.

organized by Cde. V. G. PAVLOV

1430-1730 – Conversation about the experience of using impersonal contact with an agent network.

organized by Cde. F. K. MORTIN

14 June (Thursday)

0930-1030 – Conversation with Cde. S. N. ZAKHAROV on the question of organizing the protection of Party and government leaders.

1030-1230 – An exchange of experience about work with a valuable agent network. The use of agent recruiters.

organized by Cde. V. G. PAVLOV

1430-1730 – The practice of work to ensure the security and protection of embassies and other foreign institutions from the penetration of a hostile agent network.

organized by Cde. V. G. PAVLOV

15 June (Friday)

1000-1200 – The practice of carrying out active measures. Work to misinform the enemy.

organized by Cde. I. I. AGAYANTS

1430-1700 – Discussion of the performance of the measures through intelligence channels coordinated in June and December 1961.

organized by Cde. A. M. SAKHAROVSKY

16 and 17 June (Saturday and Sunday)

Trip to Leningrad.

Exchange of experience of the work of regional [periferiynye] bodies.

18 June (Monday)

0900-1100 – Conversation in the 3rd Directorate about the practice and experience of work of military counterintelligence; the cooperation of territorial bodies with military counterintelligence organs in work to protect military facilities against the penetration of hostile intelligence officials; the organization of work in areas where military units are quartered. The practice of work in special military subunits; methods of checking draftees.

organized by Cde. A. M. GUS’KOV

1100-1230 – Conversation about counterintelligence measures in the area of Ukrainian nationalists and exiles.

organized by Cde. F. D. BOBKOV

1230-1330 - Discussion of joint measures

1430-1700 through intelligence channels

organized by Cde. A. M. SAKHAROVSKY

19 June (Tuesday)

1000-1200 – Conversation – Analysis and summation of materials about the activity of hostile intelligence and counterintelligence services and the use of these materials in operational work.

organized by Cde. V. G. PAVLOV

1200-1400 – Conversation about the practice and experience of work to train professional intelligence officials [Chekistskie kadry]; the organization of educational establishments; the improvement of the professional skills of cadre; the upbringing of officials.

organized by Cde. A. I. PEREPELITSYN

[handwritten: II. [[one word,

possibly in Czech]

Conversations in the 2nd Main Directorate

13 June (Wednesday)

0930-1300 – Conversation – An exchange of experience of counterintelligence work to combat American intelligence and a discussion of joint measures regarding this.

organized by Cde. S. M. FEDOSEYEV

1430-1700 – Conversation – An exchange of the experience of work to combat British intelligence and a discussion of joint measures.

organized by Cde. G. V. BONDAREV

14 June (Thursday)

0930-1300 – Conversation – The exchange of experience of counterintelligence work to combat West German intelligence and a discussion of measures regarding this.

organized by Cde. V. V. KRUTOUSOV

1100-1300 – Conversation – An exchange of the experience of work to combat Israeli intelligence.

organized by Cde. A. P. DAVIDYAN

1430-1530 – Conversation – An exchange of the experience of counterintelligence work against congresses, conferences, and among correspondents.

organized by Cde. YE. N. ALESHIN

1530-1700 – Conversation – concerning the organization of counterintelligence work in defense enterprises, especially important facilities, and transport.

organized by Cde. PANKRATOV.

15 June (Friday)

0930-1330 – Conversation with Cde. O. M. GRIBANOV – concerning 1430-1700  the organization of the work of the 2nd Main Directorate.

Communications with regional bodies and monitoring of their work. The subversive activity of the intelligence services of the countries of the main enemy against the USSR. The legal channels of penetrating the Soviet Union of an agent network of foreign intelligence services, particularly French intelligence. The organization of information work. The state security organs’ ties with the masses. Preventive work. Prevention of a leak of secrets. The organization of counterintelligence work in Comecon and the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. Fighting smugglers and currency speculators. The organization of work to search for the authors of anonymous letters, malicious leaflets, and graffiti. Counterintelligence work among Soviet citizens assigned to work in underdeveloped countries.

18 June (Monday)

1230-1330 – The exchange of experience of work about visiting foreigners.

1430-1700 - The exchange of experience of work about students and graduate students from underdeveloped capitalist countries. Discussion of joint measures with the operations group of the CSSR MVD in Moscow.

19 June (Tuesday)

1000 on – Conversation with Cde. O. M. GRIBANOV – Discussion of the results of the meetings in the 2nd Main Directorate.

1600-1700 – Concluding conversation with the KGB leadership.

[date left blank] June 1962

Nº 11/2087 12 June 1962

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