German Federal Foreign Office, Wire Report, 'NPT Review and Extension Conference: Meeting of the Core Group on 20/21 March 1995'

Wire report
From: FMZ
To: 25-R Imaschewski
Date: 22.03.95
Time: 9:52
KO: 2-Office Koch
02-00 Meisel
2A-Vz Rose
242-S1 Benke
24-R Polzin
24-Vz Kinder
Subject: Geneva*621: npt examination and ext.
Priority: 3
Attachments:

Reg. Nr. for edv: 216 22.03.95, 0952
Foreign Office br
Distributor: 16 (242) cti 2 a 24x/25x
Copy: 1-5: 242
6: d 2 a
7: d 2
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9: 02
10: dg24
11: 2-z-3
12: 014
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from: Geneva
no. 621 from 22.03.1995, 0910 local time
to: bonn aa
citissime
telex (secured) to 242
entered: 22.03.95, 0952 local time
secured – only for official use
also for bmvg, brussels euro cti, London diplo, paris diplo, Moscow, Beijing, Washington, new york UN, chbk
--
attachments as telex
aa participation requested: ref 411, 201
brussels euro: please present immediately to vlr scharinger or ms. Lr i. guellil
bmvg: fue s roem3 5 (only for work level)
chancellor’s office: ref 211
az: pol 371.16 vs-nfd cdfs no. 55/95 212000 passcode
att.: keller (basement)
subj. npt examination and extension conference 1995
here: npt “core group” meeting on 20-21.03.1995 and meeting of the npt western group on 21.03.95, geneva
subject: db no. 283/ 284 from 10.02.1995

--to the briefing--

roem 1 summary

on the 20^th and 21^st of march a meeting for the preparation of the npt conference and agreement on substance and procedural questions took place of the so-called ‘core group’ of the npt (members: usa, f, rus, gb, nl, e, scn, jan, aus, i, can, b, fin and arg new and ourselves) under the can chair as well as a meeting of the western group of the npt (arg new) under the gb chair. these meetings were flanked by a working meal of the p4 (usa, gb, f, rus) and us, a lunch provided by me with aus and can, as well as a breakfast with jan.

these meetings make it fully clear that now thanks to the lobbying activities of many countries an increasing majority of member states who are for the indefinite extension of the npt appears possible. Furthermore, a consensus emerged that this effort at persuasion of undecided countries will be continued. a consensus also emerged about clear regulation, a decision when at the latest talks on the npt’s  extension should be started, and the basic principles of an agreement procedure, which still cannot be settled in the fourth prepcom. differences of opinion were nevertheless clear in questions on discussion tactics. for instance, there was no consensus whether a signature campaign should be carried out in the form of an agreement recommendation that would be binding for individual states in favor of an indefinite treaty extension. there were further differences of opinion on the matter of in which forums and what formulation of the further decision process in the direction of opting for indefinite extension should be organized and the importance that the first review part of the conference holds.

the following further meetings were agreed upon:

-3.4.95, 9:30 am at the gb representation, geneva, working group meeting of the npt western group for decision-making procedures, members of the eastern group invited as participants (however without veto rights in decisions)
-06.04.95 afternoon, meeting of the mason group (new york format) under the can chair in geneva.
-13.04.95, meeting of the npt western group under can chair in new york
-13.04.95 meeting of the npt core group under can chair in yew york

roem2 in detail

1. result of the persuasion effort up till now by individual states in the direction of indefinite extension.

alignment of the various lists on possible votes yielded the following overall picture: 85 states have definitely voiced support for an indefinite treaty extension (in the following option 1), a further 17 states are likely yes votes. thus there is a majority of treaty states for indefinite extension. this is a clear improvement of the situation compared to january 1995.

for the states that have not decided or would prefer to reject indefinite extension, regional ties play a large role. for instance, out of the 25 states of the arab league according to the usa half will vote for option 1 if they felt particularly bound by solidarity with agy, which has put forward a package deal including voting for option 1 and the entry of isr into the npt. sua furthermore holds a key role for southern africa. sua sees itself as a moderator, is for resolution that can find a large majority, such as additional fixed periods (option 3). sua has not yet made a decision. the votes of 12 other states in this region will depend on its vote. ino also holds a decisive role for the vote of nam. in recent weeks overt and intensive lobbying by various states has taken place (aside from the p4 d, aus, nl, jan, neu). we have made our commitment clear, particularly in terms of the trips by d2a and dg 24. many states were subjected to up to 10 diplomatic meetings with individual countries. a consensus emerged to concentrate lobbying activities on key states, undecided states, and states whose views were not yet known or scarcely known. overall evaluation on the basis of a can list (see following with fk attachment) will be submitted. in particular, f warned of the danger of taking these certainly positive figures at face value. it is impermissible in this effort to be negligent and fail to secure a majority in the final agreement. it has become known that opponents of indefinite extension have formed their own core group (members among others include nig, irn, ino) in order to mobilize opposition against option 1. before the npt conference (april 12-13) a meeting of the nam states will take place in new york, at which vote of nam is to be determined. many nam states do not want to determine their vote before this meeting. in general, there a danger was seen that by the review conference's overreach a decision on treaty extension could be delayed. a clear and timely determination for an agreement is seen as therefore necessary. rus made an interesting suggestion: review conference and conference reaching an agreement should partially overlap chronologically. thus the danger of a delay of the agreement could be avoided. moreover the discussion of agreement options should take place in a plenary session. such a necessarily formalized discussion would retain all agreement options intact (including those for indefinite extension). thus the opportunity would be taken away from the president to propose a compromise resolution over consultations that would be at the expense of indefinite extension.

2. rules of procedure 28.3