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June 15, 1995


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    Resolution for the extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty and setting goals for NPT policy.
    "German Bundestag, 12th Legislative Period, 'Printed Matter 12/5116--Resolution Recommendation and Report of the Foreign Relations Committee (3rd Committee)'," June 15, 1995, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Deutscher Bundestag 12. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 12/5116, 15.06.93. Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco.
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German Bundestag
12th legislative period

Printed matter 12/5116


Resolution recommendation and report of the Foreign Relations Committee (3rd Committee)

To accompany the submission from representatives Günter Verheugen, Katrin Fucks (Verl [constituency]), Robert Antretter, other representatives, and the SPD faction

- printed matter 12/3099 –

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

A. Problem
After the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the experiences of the Gulf War, international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have entered a new political and scientific phase.

B. Solution
The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 and the system  it created have curtained prevented a greater number of atomic powers from arising, but the Review Conference in 1995 will need to ensure an extension and improvement of this system, since there is no realistic alternative to an internationally united, guaranteed, and controlled policy of non-proliferation for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Unanimous approval in the committee

C. Alternatives

D. Costs
The Federal Republic of Germany will share disarmament assistance through financial support and provision of know-how. It must provide the necessary means—if need be, by re-allocation in the federal budget.

Recommended Resolution

The Bundestag is resolved,
to approve the following, in accordance with the submission—printed matter 12/3099:

1. International efforts toward the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which are most clearly manifested in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, have entered a new era after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the experience of the Gulf War. A review of the record shows that the NPT has actually prevented the development of a large number of new states possessing atomic weapons. Recently there have been expansions in the NPT’s participation (South Africa, France, China), in regional cooperation (South America), and in strengthening export controls (Federal Republic of Germany).

2. The treaty signatories have obliged themselves in Article IV of the NPT to effective measures toward the ending of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. With the INF Accord and the disarmament of land-based atomic short range systems whole weapons categories of American and Russian nuclear systems have been or will be eliminated. With the START Accord, if it enters into force and is implemented, the strategic potential of the USA and Russia will be reduced by two thirds.  This progress is most welcome. But nuclear disarmament must go further; the other nuclear nations must be brought into this process in order to thereby contribute to the gradual strengthening of the NPT. The nuclear weapon states are still challenged to reach a comprehensive test ban accord.

3. On the other hand, the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot be overlooked:

- The NPT system was unable to fully prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology for military purposes because of the proliferation-friendly strategy of some supplier countries, because of insufficient export controls in supplier countries, and because refined evasive tactics by recipient and supplier countries. New de facto nuclear weapons states have arisen, and numerous countries have ultimately reached the technological standard that allows them to achieve the production of nuclear weapons.

- The Gulf crisis, as well as the well-known cooperation of supply countries with states like India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Algeria, and Syria have shown that particularly in politically unstable regions, efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction have been strengthened rather than weakened. This results in great danger for world peace.

- The collapse of the Soviet Union has created the problem of the atomic weapons stored and stationed in the successor states of the Soviet Union, and the future of the military-industrial nuclear sector of the CIS. Although there have not yet been any concrete examples of proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology or successful recruitment of Soviet nuclear scientists, this danger cannot be precluded.

4. There can be no realistic alternatives to an internationally unified and controlled nuclear weapons non-proliferation policy with worldwide validity. The goal of the NPT Review Conference in 1995 must be an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. An improvement and strengthening of the NPT can be achieved by improving the regime that support it.

Missile defense is no alternative to the policy of nuclear weapons non-proliferation. In this context the German Bundestag challenges the government of North Korea to withdraw its withdrawal of the NPT and accept international inspections of its facilities. The entry of additional states into the NPT must be promoted. Regional efforts for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be supported, if they relate to the special circumstances of the region in question.

Therefore the German Bundestag challenges the Federal Government to pursue the following goals in its NPT policy:

1. Reforms to strengthen the IAEA
The Federal Government must use its influence to strengthen the oversight capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. This should include:

a) Full scale oversight over the fissile material cycle
In fissile material inspections carried out by the IAEA all civil nuclear facilities of NPT signatory states are to be included. The IAEA must be equipped accordingly in equipment and personnel.

b) Expanded inspections authority
The inspection rights of the IAEA must be strengthened. In particular, the IAEA must always be allowed to carry out inspections in suspicious cases. It must also have the right to inspect undeclared facilities if suspicion arises that such facilities could serve for the development of production of atomic weapons. In order to fulfill these additional tasks the IAEA must be provided for accordingly in terms of finances and personnel.

c) Improving effectiveness of the oversight regime
Improvements of the inspection regime should be considered and implemented.

- Controls should focus not just on the circulation of fuel, but also facilities and parts of facilities.

- The demand for “significant quantities” of nuclear weapons-capable materials can be decreased.

- A requirement to inform should be introduced for the building of atomic facilities. Controls over this should take effect no later than at the completion of the facility.

- Work must be done on further technical improvements of safeguards methods, as is the case in the German Safeguard Support Program, financial support for which must be secured for the future.

d) The creation of regional control systems
The creation of regional institutions that undertake inspections under orders and guidelines from the IAEA is to be encouraged. For the EC, EURATOM, which in any case monitors facilities in the EC, can carry out the IAEA’s tasks and thus free up IAEA capacity for tasks in other regions.

e) National voluntary commitments and restraints
National self-obligation can serve to ease the work of the IAEA and strengthen the safeguard regime:

- Declaration of preparedness for special inspections,

- Consolatory assertions during the construction of facilities,

- Declarations of preparedness for general authorizations of residential inspectors,

- Confirmation by nuclear weapon states of the comprehensive inclusion of civilian fuel circulation and military nuclear activities in the inspection regime.

The nuclear facility operators should be held, insofar as possible, to refraining from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research reactors.

2. International control of waste disposal
The disposal of waste from civil and military atomic facilities should likewise be monitored by the IAEA and carried out according to internationally agreed-upon procedures. Fissile materials made available by the demobilization of atomic weapons should be disposed of under international oversight or handed over to the IAEA for controlled storage.
Internationally controlled storage can only be seen as a temporary solution. In the long term ways and options for destroying plutonium or making it unusable must be found aside from those already available. Research in this area is to be supported.

3. Support of nuclear disarmament in the CIS.
The Federal Government should encourage more intense support for the nuclear disarmament process in the CIS. Through comprehensive financial assistance and provision of know-how, the manifest preparedness of the CIS states, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, to implement nuclear disarmament must be strengthened.
The German Bundestag welcomes in this context the assistance provided particularly by the USA as well as other NATO partners. The German Bundestag challenges the Federal Government to significantly raise its appropriation for first disarmament assistance in 1993—through budget revisions if necessary.

4. Export controls
The nuclear supply countries should apply consistent standards in export controls. It is desirable for all states to adopt full scope safeguards including obligatory punitive sanctions. The nuclear suppliers are instituting an export control agency, to which all proliferation instances including all supply requests will communicated. The necessary committees for effective control will be formed.

Weapons delivery systems are to be considered in the export control system. The certification and investigation authorities in supplier countries are exchanging their knowledge about instances of proliferation.

Supplier countries and recipient countries inform the IAEA before the export or import of fissile materials.

New supplier must be included in the export control system. They must likewise apply full scope safeguards.

5. Inclusion of dual-use goods
Dual-use goods are to be included in the international control system. The IAEA should have the mandate to inspections, inspections for specific grounds, and special inspections are also to be considered in this area. Former CMEA states are to be integrated in the export control regime for dual-use goods. Assistance is to be provided to these countries in the construction of export control organs. The verification of dual-use goods in the non-nuclear area, particularly components of weapons delivery systems, must be made possible.

6. Sanctions
In the framework of the NPT system a sanctions mechanism is being developed. The United Nations Security Council has determined in its declaration of January 31, 1992 that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a threat to world peace and international security. States that attempt to obtain or produce nuclear weapons in violation of international law must have sanctions applied to them. For this reason, it is appropriate for the UN Security Council’s role to be strengthened.

The Secretary General of the IAEA must be in a position to alert the Security Council promptly about instances of proliferation. For this purpose agreements should be made about the exchange of intelligence.

Sanctions should be able to be levied:
- against companies that violate valid norms;
- against supplier countries that do not fulfill their obligations to uphold full scope safeguards or their notification obligations;
- against recipient countries that illegally obtain nuclear material

7. Transfer register and Panel of Experts
The Federal Government may encourage the establishment of a transfer register at the United Nations, which contains all transfers including the dual use area and all supply requests. The United Nations may also establish a Panel of Experts, who can be consulted in cases that are difficult to decide, and on which representatives from supplier countries and non-supplier countries collaborate.

8. General test ban
Efforts towards the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are to be strengthened. Such a treaty is a crucial prerequisite for the readiness of many countries to continue and develop the existing non-proliferation regime. The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament should be given a mandate for negotiations on a Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

9. Inclusion of new technologies
New weapons-related developments in nuclear technology must be implemented more rapidly in international control concepts. Acceleration facilities intended for the production of highly enriched uranium must be included in oversight. Technologies facilitating proliferation like laser enrichment and inertial confinement fusion should be subjected to a critical technical assessment, which also includes security and disarmament policy.

10. Encouragement of alternative energy forms
For the strengthening of the NPT system, access to modern renewable energy technologies as an alternative to nuclear should be facilitated and made easier.

Bonn, May 12th, 1993

The Foreign Relations Committee
Dr. Hans Stercker

Peter Kurt Würzbach
Report Author

Katrin Fuchs (Verl [Constituency])
Report Author

Dr. Olaf Feldmann
Report Author

Report from representatives
Peter Kurt Würzbach, Katrin Fuchs (Verl), and Dr. Olaf Feldmann

In its 125th session of the 12 legislative period on November 27th, 1992, the German Bundestag discussed the report from representatives Günter Verheugen, Katrin Fuchs (Verl), Robert Antretter, Helmut Becker (Nienberge), other representatives, and the SPD faction—Printed Matter 12/3099—and delegated it to the Foreign Relations Committee as lead committee, with the Defense Committee as auxiliary.

The Foreign Relations Committee requested its sub-committee on disarmament and arms control to prepare its own advice and an expert position.

The subcommittee, which discussed the report in its session on April 28, 1993, recommended for the leading Foreign Relations Committee to accept the report on the basis of a multi-party resolution recommendation by the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. The resolution passed with votes from the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP and abstentions from the Alliance 90/Green Party and PDS/Left List groups.

The SPD faction demanded moreover in the subcommittee for disarmament and arms controls:

- That the Federal Republic of Germany unilaterally refrain from the use of sensitive nuclear technologies, particularly the reprocessing and the use of plutonium, under the framework of self-restraint and self-obligation;

- That oversight of nuclear weapon stockpiles must be ensured. These efforts should include placing existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including weapons delivery systems, under international oversight. A new agency to be established under the United Nations should take over this task. The destruction of existing nuclear weapons should be accomplished under the oversight of this agency. All states that possess nuclear weapons will be obligated to make declarations about their stockpiles;

- That the Federal Government must support a worldwide ban to the production of all fissile weapons-grade nuclear materials. The production ban and its verification are to be regulated under the framework of an international treaty;

- That export licenses for dual-use goods must ensure oversight of their final use;

- That a foundation for the encouragement of alternative renewable energy is developed under the framework of the NPT system.

The Defense Committee discussed the report- Printed Matter 12/3099 - in its 58th session on May 12, 1993 and recommended to the leading Foreign Relations Committee that it accept it with some amendments, largely of an editorial nature, in a multi-party resolution from the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP dated May 10, 1993. The recommendation was made unanimously with abstentions from the Alliance 90/Greens and PDS/Left List groups. The leading Foreign Relations Committee conclusively discussed the report - Printed Matter 12/3099 - at its 69th session on May 12, 1993, while also considering the multi-party resolution recommendation from the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP of May 10, 1993, the position paper from the Foreign Relations subcommittee for disarmament and arms control of April 28, 1993, and the Defense Committee’s vote of May 12, 1993. Upon request by the report author of CDU/CSU faction, Point 4, para. 2 of the existing multi-party text was amended to insert “In this context the German Bundestag demands the government of North Korea to withdraw its withdrawal from the NPT and allow international inspectors into its facilities.” In Point 3 of the second part of the resolution recommendation, “Support for Nuclear Disarmament in the CIS” the second sentence is given the following form: “Through comprehensive financial assistance and provision of know-how the manifest preparedness of the CIS states the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine must be strengthened.”
Points 4 and 5 were also changed in this instance, which contained the following language in the original draft of the multipartisan resolution recommendation:

“4. Export control
Nuclear supplier countries should apply consistent standards in export control. It is desirable that all states adopt obligatory full scope safeguards including punitive sanctions.
Nuclear supply countries are establishing an export control agency, which is notified with every proliferation instance including requests for supply. The agency is forming a Council for Export Control to address questionable cases, which will make a decision on such cases based on consensus.

Weapons delivery systems are to be included in the export control system. The licensing and detection agencies of supply countries are exchanging their knowledge about proliferation instances. Supply countries and recipient countries will inform the IAEA before the exportation or importation of fissile materials.

New supply countries must be included in the export control system. They must likewise apply full scope safeguards.

Inclusion of dual-use goods
Dual-use goods are to be included in the international control system. The IAEA should have a mandate for inspection. It is also expected that this will entail special inspections in suspicious cases. The former CMEA states are to be integrated into the export control regime. Assistance is to be provided to these countries in construction export control organs. The verification of dual-use goods in the non-nuclear area must be made possible.”

In Point 6 “Sanctions” the word “international” was removed from the beginning of the third paragraph.

The Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed the submitted resolution recommendation with the abstention of representative from the PDS/Left List group.

Bonn May 12, 1993

Peter Kurt Würzbach
Report Author
Katrin Fuchs (Verl)
Report Author
Dr. Olaf Feldmann
Report Author


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