October 17, 1966
US Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Harlan Cleveland, 'Notes on Washington Trip'
SECRET
NOTES ON WASHINGTON TRIP
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Non-Proliferation

Supplementing the instruction on handling the non-proliferation issue in the October 19 meeting of NAC, the Secretary gave me the following guidance, some of it for my own information:

1. Gromyko agrees that we are not discussing a situation in wartime; in the event of war, all bets are off and treaties presumably would not restrain action that nations at war felt themselves obliged to take.

2. Gromyko also agrees that we are not trying to make the treaty cover the political decision to go to war. In this connection Gromyko clearly dropped any Soviet objection to institutionalizing consultation of the "McNamara Committee" type in NATO.

3. When the Secretary asked Gromyko what arrangements the Soviets have with their allies, he said he did not think that the US and the Soviets needed to discuss between themselves what arrangements they have with their own allies. But a little later in the conversation, Gromyko reverted to his effort to specify what the arrangement should be among the Western allies.

4. The Soviets should not really be concerned about the number of fingers on or near the trigger as long as the US finger is crucial to an affirmative decision to use nuclear weapons. But both the Soviets and the allies can share an interest in increasing the number of safeguards on the use of weapons, and collective arrangements for decisions about their use should raise added safeguards against their use.

5. Gromyko drew a diagram making a distinction between three kinds of proliferation and suggesting they should all be ruled out: transfer of nuclear weapons from a nuclear-weapons state to (a) a non-nuclear-weapons state directly; (b) a non-nuclear-weapons state through an alliance; and (c) an alliance as such.

Gromyko's point is that an alliance is something different from and more than its members. Thus, NATO consists of sixteen entities -- the fifteen member-countries and a sixteenth entity which is all
Non-Proliferation (cont'd)

of them together. He would like the language of a non-proliferation treaty to rule out proliferation to that sixteenth entity also. The Secretary argues -- and argued with Gromyko -- that the Alliance does not exist apart from its members, and that he cannot imagine a way of transferring nuclear weapons to an alliance that would not transfer them to the nations which are members of that alliance.

(I said that it would be technically possible to transfer weapons to SACEUR, or even to the North Atlantic Council, under some agreed release procedure. The important thing would be whether we relinquished control of the warheads. The Secretary’s point is that it is not a transfer unless we relinquish control.)

6. The Secretary said his judgment is that joint ownership of nuclear warheads is out. He said that he had come close to describing the MLF as dead, in answering a question from Senator Jackson in the Stennis Committee. His statement in this regard had been brought to the Soviets’ attention. Joint ownership arrangements for US-produced warheads would require a change in legislation; in the Secretary’s judgment we could not get such a change in the Atomic Energy legislation if it could be credibly charged that such an arrangement would stand in the way of a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviets.

7. The central principles which we want to enshrine in a non-proliferation treaty are:

a. No transfer directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapons state.

b. No relinquishment of control by the US over US warheads.

8. The Soviets should have no real difficulty in finding a common interest with us in signing a treaty which enshrines these two self-denying provisions. If they want to go beyond that, and discuss the refinements of what we are not transferring nuclear weapons to, it will mean that they still don’t want a non-proliferation treaty enough to be willing to abandon the use of NPT negotiations as an instrument of their European policy.
Non-Proliferation (cont'd)

9. The Secretary's net impression is that the Russians are increasingly concerned about proliferation of nuclear weapons -- that, indeed, they are for the first time concerned about possible proliferation in countries other than the Federal Republic of Germany.

I may give the Council a firm assurance that any/language for a non-proliferation treaty will first be discussed with the Council, before it is agreed with the Soviets.

This does not, of course, mean that we will not discuss language with the Soviets that has not previously been cleared with our allies. We talk with them (particularly through the Foster-Roshchin channel) all the time.

NOTE: New language for Article I may shortly be suggested to the Soviets. It has been given informally to George Brown by the Secretary. It is not the Secretary's present intention to give it to anybody else, including the Germans, unless it develops that it is interesting for the Soviets. There is no point, he feels, in stirring up an argument about specific language when there is, in his judgment, so small a chance that the Soviets will buy it.