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Digital Archive International History Declassified

January 07, 1958

CODE MESSAGE NO. 337 FROM DEPUTY MINISTER NAZKOWSKI TO SZYMANOWSKI (STOCKHOLM)

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    Deputy Minister Marian Naszkowski offers guidance for swaying public opinion in Sweden in favor of the Rapacki plan.
    "Code Message No. 337 from Deputy Minister Nazkowski to Szymanowski (Stockholm)," January 07, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1958 (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2011), Document #3, pp.6-8. Translated by Jerzy Giebułtowski. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208840
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January 7, code message from deputy minister Naszkowski to the ambassador in Stockholm:

instruction regarding the Rapacki  Plan

Warsaw January 7, 1958

TOP SECRET

CODE MESSAGE [No]  c337 Jan. 11, 1958[1], 16.50c hrs

SZYMANOWSKI – STOCKHOLM

1. Further operations on your territory in connection with the Rapacki Plan[2] should aim for:

consolidating support for our initiative among political activists and journalists,

consolidating new contacts, particularly in circles favorably disposed toward our initiative, toward the creation of a basis for future cooperation with them on the grounds of other issues,

dispelling doubts put forward  in connection with our initiative.

2.  Arguing in favor of the zone, we ought to emphasize:

a) our plan is realistic and modest; it does not lead to severance of any state from either bloc or to their liquidation,

b) it is based on the assumption that at the touch point we ought to eliminate moments that exacerbate the situation and could lead to conflict,

c) a partial solution regarding the nuclear-free zone could facilitate solution  to global disarmament program.

3. In connection with the reservations regarding our initiative, one should argue that:

a)  regarding reservations as to control:

We opt for a system of effective control.  We see hnoh difficulty in debating the feasibility of the solution to the question, provided there is consent as to the principles.

b)  regarding the claim that the established zone would alter the configuration of forces between the blocs:

According to our plan, Warsaw Pact countries would  move the area of possible location of atomic weapons further east than NATO would move its arsenal west. At the current level of technological development, we attach utmost importance to the possibility of  tension at the contact point between the two blocs.

If Norstad’s statement of December 23 to the effect that it is not necessary to locate missiles in any specific Western country is sincere, and that Strauss’s statement of  December 6 that middle-range missiles should be hwheeledh clocated  (not wheeled)c near the contact points between the two blocs – all that would confirm our claim that a nuclear-free zone would not alter the configuration of forces, but would reduce the tension in the area of potential conflict and, cprimarily, could lead to broader solutionsc.

c)  regarding the claim that the zone would create a separate status of the FRG :

As a Warsaw Pact member we undertake the same commitment as the FRG would. After all, already in the Paris Accords the FRG undertook commitments that gave it a unilaterally separate status, whereas we propose equal obligations for all countries in the zone.

d) we could underline that every interested government could try to clarify doubts in a discussion with us, something we are prepared to do, as per Rapacki’s speech at a session of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs.[3]

4.  Inspire the press so that it deal with the opponents’ arguments. In the meantime, issue press releases,1  utilizing articles from Polish  press that argued against the Rapacki Plan (among them Kowalewski’s articles in Trybuna Ludu of the 4th and 5th of this month).

5. In conversations with politicians and journalists, it is necessary to verify what kind of steps should be taken according to them in order to create an optimal climate for the execution of our plan. At the same time, we could probe for opinions concerning other operations.

fNaszkowskif

AMSZ, ZD 6/77, w. 60, vol. 853

[1] Code message produced on January 7, sent to Stockholm on January 11.

[2] The reference is to the initiative to set up a nuclear-free zone on the territory of Poland, the FRG, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, put forward by minister Adam Rapacki on October 2, 1957 at the 12th session of UN General Assembly; see  doc. no 16; see also  K. Ruchniewicz,  T. Szumowski,  eds,  Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1957 (later PDD 1957),  (Warsaw: PISM 2006), passim.

[3] The reference is to Rapacki’s speech at a session of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs of December 13, 1957.

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