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Digital Archive International History Declassified

July 28, 1978

CABLE NO. 1448, AMBASSADOR SATO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, 'TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA NEGOTIATIONS (6TH MEETING)'

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    The delegations debate the wording for the anti-hegemony clause.
    "Cable No. 1448, Ambassador Sato to the Foreign Minister, 'Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China Negotiations (6th Meeting)'," July 28, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2010-367, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Contributed by Yutaka Kanda and translated by Stephen Mercado. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/220009
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Number: (TA) R054413     5379

Primary: Asian Affairs Bureau Director-General

Sent: China, July 28, 1978,  20:40

Received: MOFA, July 28, 1978,  22:09

To: The Foreign Minister      

From: Ambassador Sato

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China Negotiations (6th Meeting)

No. 1448 Secret Top Urgent

(Limited Distribution)

Re: Outgoing Telegram No. 1434

On the 28th, the sixth meeting took place for two hours and 50 minutes, from 3:00 to 5:50 pm (including a break period of 45 minutes). A summary of its main points is as follows: (Participants on our side: Myself, Nakae, and [name blacked out]; the other side: Han Nianlong and Wang Xiaoyun (interpreter))

1. At the start, I offered five points on which we had agreed in the meetings to date: (1) This treaty is not an alliance treaty, nor is it prejudicial to the interests of third countries; (2) neither Japan nor China seeks hegemony; (3) should there be a country that attempts to seek hegemony, no matter which one, we would adopt a policy of opposition to such an attempt; (4) this treaty does not name the Soviet Union; (5) Japan is aware of China’s Soviet policy, China is aware of Japan’s Soviet policy, and neither will interfere in the policy of the other. I said: “I think that where our two sides differ, in regard to these issues of substance, is in the ‘what’ or the ‘how’ of expressing them or not expressing them.” When I asked for the other side’s view of this understanding, Vice Minister Han urged me to continue with my statement. I therefore spoke of another issue: Vice Minister Han, in reading “Soviet Union” for “any specific third country,” is thinking to say that “this treaty of opposition to hegemony is not directed against the Soviet Union.” I point out that this point is the one most different from ours and that we did not write it with that in mind.

2. In response, Vice Minister Han said: As I have repeatedly said these past several days, whether “against any third country” or “against any specific third country,” China cannot agree to it. I then explained: We are not at all thinking of making “against any third country” in this clause mean the distinct “against any specific third country” in this treaty.  Still less are we thinking of having “any specific country” signify that “opposition to hegemony is not directed against the Soviet Union.” There is an aspect of possible direction against the Soviet Union, but it is not something that indicates and targets the Soviet Union alone.

3. However, having understood that Vice Minister Han was thinking more and more of pointing to the “Soviet Union,” with the addition of the term “any specific,” I made clear that there was a difference in thinking there and said that we had to have you understand that we were not thinking of that. Vice Minister Han then said that it really was this clause that had to be settled in these negotiations and that the other clauses were comparatively easy…. [ellipsis in original text]. I therefore said: I am well aware that this clause is the point that we should settle. The difference is, I think, that the Chinese side’s position is that, as it is understood that this treaty is not directed against any third country, there is no need to put that in writing, but our side is saying: what is wrong with putting that in writing? Vice Minister Han then confirmed that that was the point of difference between the two sides.

4. Then, I further said: We are not making this treaty only from an understanding of the present international situation. Considering the future as well, it would be better to place the anti-hegemony clause clearly within the treaty, but it would be better not to limit it to the Soviet Union alone. Vice Minister Han then said: Nothing names the Soviet Union. Both Japan and China stated their intention to oppose any country that would seek hegemony. Now Japan has devised the term “any specific.” Even saying that I find it interesting, not well understanding the Japanese “tokutei no,” I see that in English it is rendered as “any specific,” which is not good because it points to something concrete. Japan is becoming more and more worried about offending the Soviet Union. I countered: We are not thinking exceedingly about the Soviet Union, then said, “In any case, we must report now to Tokyo. I think it was beneficial to have made clear the difference in our ways of thinking. I think that they will think of it in Tokyo, too. I would like the Chinese side, too, to consider it.” Vice Minister Han then, after speaking at length of the importance of these negotiations and the significance and history of this clause, underscored that, “My hope is to have the Ambassador, in reporting to his country, and Japan, in examining it, handle it dispassionately. It is a very serious, very important issue.” He also emphasized that, “It must be satisfactory to both the Japanese and Chinese sides.”

5. After that, [Asian Affairs Department] Deputy Director Wang Xiaoyun stated: At the start there was no problem when the Joint Statement was issued, but various issues began to emerge from the Japanese side. The problem is that, in the past few years, Japan’s media organizations (he did not say the Government of Japan) gave the Japanese public the impression that “any specific third country” was the “Soviet Union.” Under such circumstances, it would be inappropriate to insert the term “any specific third country.”

He said: The Chinese side does not limit opposition to the Soviet Union, nor is the Chinese draft or the Chinese side’s explanation limited to the Soviet Union.

6. I said: There has been no change in Japan’s position from the time that the Joint Communique was issued to the present. There are differences between it and China’s position, but we are not withdrawing from the Joint Communique. If both sides do not narrow the differences, a resolution will not be possible. However, I do not at all think that a settlement is not possible. Also, concerning Deputy Director Wang Xiaoyun’s statement, because it has been made clear that there is no difference in thinking between Japan and China, I would like from the Chinese side as well to consider their statements.

7. Next, I said: It would be useful for the Chinese side to indicate the issues in regard to the articles other than Article 3, as it would be useful in promoting discussion, but your side simply said, “We can well understand your feeling in saying that, but the other issues are those that we can discuss without difficulty. Of course, it is not that there are no differences of opinion. However, compared with Article 3, they are easy to settle.” Therefore, Nakae again said: “I understand that settling Article 3 is important but, as we will have to negotiate at some time the other articles, if we could have you tell us which points are an issue, it will be expedient to future talks.  You say that, ‘…. [ellipsis in original text] of course it is not that there are no differences,’ but we have still not been exchanging opinions, so we would like to have the Chinese side say where it thinks the differences could be.” The other side went on break without answering.

8. After the break, Vice Minister Han, after highly appraising the results obtained so far, said: Although the Japanese side has made the anti-hegemony clause complicated, these negotiations have a very historic significance, so I want to put time and effort into them and obtain excellent results. After that, he said: Ambassador Sato has called for a single common expression for opposition to hegemony but I would like to hear concretely the Ambassador’s opinion on what kind of expression would be good. He also said: The Ambassador said that there is the issue of “whether to write it or not” as a difference of opinion, but this is what I think. He then said the following:

“For example, can you not consider deleting Sentence 1 of Article 3,  where our two sides have a difference of opinion? If we do this, I think that we may be able to narrow the gap on both sides and possibly reach an early compromise.”

Further, as for the points at issue regarding the articles other than Article 3, he merely answered that we would understand if we carefully check and compare the drafts of the Japanese and Chinese sides.

9. In response, after rebutting as unconvincing the point that the Japanese side had made the matter complicated, I said: You had told us to consider the issue of expression, but we would like the Chinese side as well to think about it. Also, regarding the deletion issue, I simply said: “You do not find satisfactory the Japanese side’s thinking and therefore find it hard to agree to it. I will take your kind suggestion to Tokyo and we shall see what comes next.”

10. Regarding the next meeting, as there had been from our side no particular meeting proposal, it was agreed to take a break on the 29th (Saturday) and,  in any case, to meet on the 31st (Sunday) from 3:00 pm.

In addition, in view of the numerous extremely delicate points contained in today’s meeting, once again I particularly request that one handle this with the greatest care.

(End)

JAPANESE (TRANSCRIPTION) HTML

極秘

総番号 (TA) R054413  5379  主管

78年  月28日20時40分  中国発

78年07月28日22時09分  本省着  アジア局長

外務大臣殿  佐藤大使

日中平和友好条約交渉(第6回会談)

第1448号 極秘 大至急

(限定配布)

往電第1434号に関し

 28日、午後3時より5時50分まで2時間50分(45分の休けい時間を含む)にわたつて第6回会談を行つたところ、概要次のとおり。(出席者:当方;本使、ナカエ、{約6文字黒塗り}。先方;韓念リュウ、王ギョウウン、王効ケン(通訳))

1.最初に本使より、これまでの会談において合意に達した点として(1)この条約は同盟条約ではなく、また、第3国の利益を損うものでないこと、(2)日中両国はは権を求めないこと、(3)は権を求めようと試みる国があれば、それがだれであれ、そのような試みには反対の立場をとること、(4)この条約はソ連を名指すものではないこと、(5)日本は中国の対ソ政策を承知しており、中国は日本の対ソ政策を承知しているが、お互いの政策に干渉しないこと、の五点をあげて、「双方の意見の分かれているのは、上記実質問題のうち、「何を」「どのように」表現するか、あるいは、表現しないか、についてであると思う」とのべ、この認識について先方の意見を求めたが、韓副部長は、更に本使の発言継続を促したので、本使より、別の問題点として、韓副部長が「特定の第3国」を「ソ連」と読み替えて、「は権反対のこの条約はソ連に対して向けられたものではない」と言おうとしていると考えておられる点が自分と一番考えの異なる点なりと指摘して、自分らはそういうつもりで書いた訳ではない、とのべた。

2.これに対し、韓副部長は、この数日間くり返している通り、「第三国に」であつても「特定の第三国に」であつても中国は賛成できない、とのべたので、本使より、「第三国に」というのと、「特定の第三国に」というのとの相異点、更に「特定の第三国」としたからといつて、「は権反対はソ連に対して向けられたものではない」ということをこの条項で意味しようとは全く考えていない、ソ連をも対象としうる面があるけれどもソ連のみを指定して対象とするものではないゆえんを説いた。

3.しかし韓副部長は、「特定の」という語を加えることにより、ますます「ソ連」ということを指していると考えているということがわかつたので、本使より、そこに考え方の違いがあることがハッキリしたが、われわれの方にその考えのないことを解つていただく他にし方がない、とのべたところ、韓副部長は、今回の交渉で解決しなければならないのは正にこの条項で、他の条項は割合簡単だが・・・と述べたので、本使より、解決すべき点はこの条項であることは百も承知だが、その相違点は、この条約が第三国に対抗するものでないことは解つているから、書かなくてもいい、というのが中国の立場だと思うが、わが方は書いたつていいじやないか、といつているわけだ、と述べたところ、韓副部長は、それが双方の相異点なり、と確認した。

4.そこで、本使より、更に、現在の国際情勢に対する認識だけから条約をつくるのではなく、将来のことも考慮に入れると、は権反対条項をハツキリ条約に入れておいた方がよいが、ソ連にだけ限らぬ方がよい、と重ねて述べたところ、韓副部長は、何もソ連を名指していない、日中双方はいずれもは権を求める国があればこれには反対する意思を表明したところ、日本が今度「特定の」という字を考え出したのは面白いと思うと述べつつも、日本語の「特定の」というのはよくわからぬので英語にして見るとSPECIFICとなり、具体的なものを指すからよくない、つまり、日本がますますソ連のことを気がねしていることになる、と述べた。これに対して、本使よりわれわれはあくまでもソ連のことを考えたためではない、と反論した上、「何れにせよ、日本側もそろそろ東京に報告しなければならないので、考え方の違いがハツキリしたことは有益だつたと思う。東京でも考えると思うが、中国側も考えてもらいたい」と述べたところ、韓副部長は、この交渉の重要性、この条項のもつ意義、経緯を長々と述べた後、「自分の希望としては、大使が本国に報告されるに当つても、また、当地で検討されるにしても、れいせいに取り扱つていただきたい、非常に厳しゆくな問題であり、大変重大なし事である」「日中双方が満足するようなものでなければならない」と強調した。

5.その後、王ギョウウン次長が発言し、そもそも共同声明発出当時問題でなかつたものが、日本側からいろいろ問題が出てきて、ここ数年間日本の報道機関が(日本政府とはいわなかつた)広はんな日本人民に「特定の第三国」は「ソ連」であるという印象を与えてしまつたのが問題で、かかる状況の下では「特定の第三国」という文字を書き入れることは不適当である。

中国側からは、反は権をソ連に限つてはいない、中国案も中国側の説明もソ連に限つているのではない、と述べた。

6.本使より、日本の立場は共同声明ができたときと、現在とで何ら変つておらず、中国の立場との間に相違はあるが、共同声明から後退してはいない、双方でその間をつめて行かぬことには解決できない、しかし全く解決できないとは思わぬ、と述べ、また王ギョウウン次長の発言に関しては、日中間に考え方の相違のないことがハツキリしたのだから中国の方でも表現を考えてもらいたい、とのべた。

7.次いで本使より、第3条以外の条項についての中国側の問題点を指摘してくれれば審議促進に役立つ所以をのべたが、先方は「貴方がそう言われる気持は十分理解できるが、他の問題は難かしくなく相談できる問題である。もち論意見の相違がないという訳ではない。しかし第3条に比べて解決し易い」とのべるにとどまつたので、重ねてナカエより「第3条の解決が重要なことはわかるが、いずれ他の条項も交渉しなければならないから、どういう点が問題か示していただければ今後の交渉に好都合である。貴方は”・・・もち論意見の相違がない訳ではない”といわれるが、まだ意見の交換もしていないのだから、中国側では、どこの点に意見の相違がありうると考えているのか示してもらいたい」とのべたが、先方は回答せず休けいに入つた。

8.休けい後、韓副部長は、今次交渉の現在まで収めた成果を高く評価した後、は権反対条項は日本側が複雑にしてしまつたとはいえ、この交渉は非常に重要で歴史的意義をもつので時間と精力を注いで立派になし遂げたいとのべた後、サトウ大使は反は権で一つの共通した表現を求めようということをいわれたが、具体的にどういう表現がいいか大使の意見をきかせてほしい、また大使は意見の相違点として「書くか書かないか」の問題があるといわれたが、そこで自分はこう考える、といつて次のようにのべた。

「例えば双方の意見の食い違いのある第3条第1項を条約案から削除することを考えられないか、ということです。こういうふうにすれば、双方のギャツプを縮め、早期妥結ができるのではないか、と思います。」

更に第3条以外の条項についての問題点については、日中双方の案をじつくり照らし合わせればわかるはずである、とのみ答えた。

9.これに対し本使より、日本側が複雑にしたという点は納得できないと反ばくした後、表現の問題を考えてくれといわれたが、中国の方でも考えてもらいたい、また削除の問題については「日本側の考え方にはそわないので、賛成し難いが、せつかくの御示さなので東京に取り次いで見よう」とのみのべておいた。

10.次回の会合については、わが方から特に開催を申し込まない限り明29日(土)は休会とし、いずれにせよ31日(月)午後3時には開催することに合意された。なお本日の会談は極めて機微な点を多々含んでいることにかんがみ、その取扱いには厳に御留意ありたく重ねて特にお願い申し上げる。

(了)

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