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On Japan's Ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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On Japan’s Ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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1. Signature of the NPT and government statement

The government of Japan agreed with the spirit of the Treaty and signed the Treaty on February 3, 1970, from the standpoint that the proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear war and that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is necessary for world peace and is therefore consistent with the policies of the government of Japan.

At that time, in light of the importance of the Treaty, our government emphasized in its statement that regarding the criticism upon the Treaty, the government would be very interested in (a) the implementation of nuclear disarmament, (b) ensuring the security of non-nuclear states, including Japan, and (c) ensuring substantial equality in the peaceful use of nuclear energy with other parties. In particular, with regard to (c), it was pointed out that the ratification procedure of the Treaty will be carried out with due consideration so that the contents of safeguards agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under this Treaty will not be substantially disadvantageous to Japan compared to other parties (especially the Euratom countries).

2. Subsequent developments of the issues pointed out in the government statement

Compared to the time of the signature, the situation regarding the aforementioned points has shown the following progress.

(1) Implementation of nuclear disarmament

The United States and the Soviet Union began negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at the end of 1969, the year after the establishment of the NPT, and concluded the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the Hotline Modernization Agreement in 1971, the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM), and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in May 1972. Furthermore, at the U.S.-Soviet Summit held in June 1973, the Agreement on the Nuclear War Prevention was concluded. At the U.S.-Soviet Summit held in July 1974, the ABM Treaty Protocol to strengthen the regulation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests were concluded. With regard to strategic offensive weapons, an consensus was formed to conclude a new agreement as soon as possible before the expiration
of the current interim agreement. Subsequently, at the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting held in
November of the same year, an agreement was reached on guidelines for future SALT
negotiations, such as the total number of delivery systems for strategic weapons, the total number
of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
equipped with Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). Meanwhile, the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, in which Japan participates, established the Seabed Arms Control
Treaty in 1971 and is currently actively discussing the issue of a total ban on nuclear tests.

(2) Security of non-nuclear weapons state (Japan)

Since the signature of the NPT, the international situation has been favoring the security of
Japan and other non-nuclear weapons states as a whole, as tensions have eased among nuclear
powers. In particular, the establishment of friendly relations with China through the normalization of
diplomatic relations between Japan and China has contributed to strengthening Japan’s overall
security.

Needless to say, Japan’s security is continuously guaranteed by the Japan-U.S. security
arrangements. Incidentally, with regard to the security of non-nuclear weapons states, there was a
declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (June 17, 1968) that
“in accordance with the United Nations Charter, assistance will be provided to the Parties to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty who have suffered an invasion or threat by nuclear weapons,” and
a Security Council resolution (June 19, 1968), which states that such an aggression or threat with
nuclear weapons “will create a situation in which the member states of the Security Council must
act in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.” In the government
statement at the time of signature, Japan also stated that it would pay attention to the
implementation of this resolution until the ratification of the Treaty. There has not been a situation
that the resolution is required to be implemented so far.

(3) Ensuring substantial equality with other parties in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

(a) This point (3) has been particularly important for Japan, which is in a situation where it
has to continue to increase its dependence on nuclear energy.

(b) In this regard, the Model Safeguards Agreement of the NPT, which fully reflects
Japan’s position, was drawn up in 1971. And Euratom countries, which were non-nuclear weapons
states that were not ratified the NPT and have since attracted attention (West Germany, Italy,
Benelux. Denmark and Ireland, which joined the Euratom in January 1973 along with the
expansion of the EC, already ratified the Treaty), signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
April 1973 in accordance with the framework of the above Model Agreement. Meanwhile, in
November 1973, as a result of several preliminary negotiations on safeguards agreements with the
IAEA, Japan reached an agreement in principle to apply the same method and workload of
inspection as Euratom, on the premise that Japan’s system of accounting for and control (a system
for preventing the diversion of nuclear material to military purposes by understanding the current
state of the quantity of nuclear material in Japan and managing such nuclear material) should be
organized.

(c) Regarding the equality with nuclear-weapons countries, the United States and the
United Kingdom declared that they would be voluntarily inspected by the IAEA (Voluntary
Submission). In November 1972, the United States proposed to the IAEA that it accepts IAEA
inspections to its nuclear facilities for peaceful use, on the premise that major non-nuclear
weapons states (Japan and West Germany) undergo equivalent inspections under the NPT. The
United States is currently negotiating with the IAEA. In addition, the United Kingdom has already
entered negotiations with the IAEA.

3. Our national interest and the NPT
The necessity of examination from the viewpoint of national interest

In considering whether Japan should ratify the NPT, it is necessary not only to consider whether progress has been made on the points stated in the government statement at the time of the signature of the NPT but also to reconsider the significance of the ratification of the NPT from the viewpoint of Japan's national interest. The following are thought to be particularly important in considering this point.

(a) Stabilization of international relations is particularly important to ensure the peace and prosperity of Japan. Japan is in a position to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and make an active contribution to the stability of international relations through the promotion of peaceful diplomacy.

(b) Securing industrial energy sources is an urgent issue for Japan. In particular, nuclear power generation is becoming increasingly important as an energy source in place of oil. However, Japan, which relies on foreign countries for its supply of nuclear fuel and needs close cooperation with technologically advanced countries in the field of nuclear technology, needs to establish a system to promote international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy as smoothly as possible.

Our national interest and the NPT

(a) The NPT aims to create an international environment that reduces the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war by preventing an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states, enhances the stability of international relations, and makes it easier to promote disarmament and ensure peace. It is a treaty to suppress the military use of nuclear energy while promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(b) In this regard, the NPT is an unequal Treaty that discriminates between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. Some argue that such discrimination might be fixed. However, it should not be overlooked that the NPT recognizes the reality of the international community that some countries actually possess nuclear weapons, and that, as mentioned above, its aim is to create an international environment that will enhance the stability of international relations and make it easier to promote disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, by preventing further increases in the number of nuclear weapons states. Furthermore, this Treaty aims to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states through the total abolition of nuclear arms.

(Conversely, there would be no objection on how dangerous it is to resolve the distinction between the two countries by allowing non-nuclear weapons states to become nuclear weapons states)

(c) The NPT is intended to ensure that non-nuclear weapons states can benefit fully from the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the use of peaceful nuclear explosions, instead of imposing obligations on non-nuclear weapons states not to produce or possess nuclear explosive devices. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States stated that bestowal for technical assistance that the United States contributes to the IAEA in connection with the obligations of the NPT parties under Article IV of the NPT will be used preferentially over the parties, and the Soviet Union has made the same statement. The United States also submitted a resolution to establish an organization within the IAEA to provide peaceful nuclear explosion services under Article V of the NPT. The resolution was adopted, and it exemplifies the recent moves by the United States and the Soviet Union's tendency to emphasize the obligations that nuclear weapons states bear under the NPT. Meanwhile, with the advancement of utilization of nuclear power, the contents of international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy that Japan seeks in the future must be related to advanced technologies that could lead to the military use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is difficult to ensure smooth implementation of
international cooperation that Japan needs without clarifying our basic stance on nuclear issues through the ratification of the NPT.

(d) Although the NPT is not perfect, as stated above, it is the most important and fundamental Treaty in this area that, under the current circumstances of the international community, can meet Japan's national interests to the fullest extent.

From this perspective, Japan should participate in the NPT, promote international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and solidify its position as a peaceful country in Asia to contribute to further stabilization of international relations.

4. Our opinions on the questions regarding the NPT

Regarding the NPT, the following questions have been raised in addition to the questions mentioned in the previous section on whether the NPT will fix the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

(a) Even if Japan cannot arm itself with nuclear weapons for the time being, it should not give up its freedom to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

(b) If Japan joins the NPT, its peaceful use of nuclear energy may be hindered. Moreover, the supply of nuclear fuel may not be hindered even if Japan does not join the NPT.

The following is the response to such questions.

(1) Regarding the “freedom of nuclear armament”

(a) It is virtually impossible for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in the near future. In addition, such policies cannot be taken in view of the international environment surrounding Japan, such as relations with neighboring countries in Asia. Therefore, there is little possibility that such unrealistic “freedom of nuclear armament” can be used for diplomatic leverage, for example.

(b) Even if it is impossible to assert that there is no possibility that Japan will be armed with nuclear weapons in the long term, it is a good idea to participate in the NPT, promote international cooperation in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and improve the overall capacity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and ultimately enhance Japan's international voice, rather than to take risks not participating in the NPT on the grounds of these uncertainties, causing suspicions from other countries and being disadvantaged in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(c) In the event of an “extraordinary circumstances” in which Japan cannot ensure its security unless it is armed with nuclear weapons in the future, Japan may withdraw from the NPT to deal with the problem. (According to Article X of the NPT, if they find that extraordinary circumstances in relation to a matter covered by the NPT jeopardizes their supreme interests, they shall have the right to withdraw from the NPT after giving three months’ notice to all other parties and the Security Council of the United Nations.)

(2) Peaceful use of nuclear energy

(a) Japan's industrial power sources will have to increase its dependence on nuclear power generation in the future, and Japan needs to take every possible measure to secure the supply of nuclear fuel for this purpose. At present, Japan depends on the United States for the majority of enriched uranium, and this trend is expected to continue for the time being. Since 1971, the U.S. government has been in a position to suspend the supply of enriched uranium to foreign countries if it is incompatible with the U.S.' obligations (the United States, as a party to the NPT, is obligated not to provide the nuclear fuel, etc. to non-nuclear weapons states unless safeguards
under Article III.2 of the NPT applied to them) to foreign countries under the NPT (which is clearly stated in the uranium enrichment contract with foreign customers - confirmed in a side letter with Japanese customers). Japan needs to eliminate the causes of instability in the supply of nuclear fuel by joining the NPT.

(b) Almost all of Japan’s nuclear materials are already under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through bilateral nuclear agreements.

As was already secured by the 1971 Model Agreement, safeguards under the NPT have been promoting simplification, rationalization, and industrial secret protection compared to the existing safeguards. Furthermore, the objective of Japan’s preliminary negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the conclusion of safeguards agreements is to ensure that safeguards are taken in such a way that industrial secrets do not leak. Therefore, there is no risk of causing hindrance to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by joining NPT.

5. The necessity for early ratification of the NPT

(1) Recent developments surrounding the NPT and the need for early ratification

As described in the above 2., the situation surrounding the government statement at the time of the signature showed progress thereafter. Considering also from the viewpoint of Japan’s national interest as is described in the above 3., the ratification of the NPT is considered necessary. In addition, considering the recent international situation surrounding the NPT as is discussed in the following sections, Japan should realize the ratification of the NPT as soon as possible.

(a) Against the backdrop of the situation after India’s nuclear test, it is an urgent international task to take more proactive measures to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Under these international circumstances, Japan’s ratification of the NPT is of great significance in international politics.

(b) The US government is reportedly demanding Israel and Egypt to accept stricter safeguards than those under the NPT. The U.S. government also expressed the view that preferential treatment would be given to NPT parties over non-parties in technical cooperation in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, there is growing international opinion that concrete measures should be taken to strengthen the NPT system. Therefore, the disadvantages of staying outside the framework of the NPT may increase in the future.

(c) Preparations for the NPT review meeting, which was incorporated into the NPT’s provisions based on Japan’s insistence, have progressed, and it has almost been decided that the meeting will be held in May 1975. The purpose of this meeting is to “consider the implementation of this Treaty in order to ensure that objectives of the preamble and the provisions of this Treaty are realized.” It is expected that lively discussions will be held on specific measures such as the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy. But since it is a meeting of the NPT signatories, it is assumed that we ratify it before the opening of the meeting in order for us to participate in this meeting and fully assert our position.

(d) The EC countries (West Germany, Italy, and Benelux), which are non-nuclear weapons states, do not ratified the NPT and drew attention together with Japan, have signed the NPT Safeguards Agreement in April 1974. Parliament’s approval procedures for ratification are completed (West Germany, the Netherlands) or soon to be completed (Luxembourg, Belgium), except for Italy, which is expected to be delayed due to domestic procedural problems.
Under these circumstances, after four and a half years since the signing of the Treaty the prospects for substantial equality in the field of peaceful use, which Japan has been most emphasizing, have emerged. If Japan continues to hesitate to ratify the Treaty, it is regarded to be more likely that adverse effects, such as the deterioration of Japan’s image, destabilization of international relations due to the weakening of the NPT system, and disadvantages to Japan in terms of peaceful use of nuclear energy, will occur.

(2) The disadvantage of the delay of the ratification

Regard these points, there is a view that it would be more advantageous for Japan not to ratify the NPT for the time being, maintain its position of criticizing nuclear weapons states from outside the framework of the NPT, and to press them to promote disarmament by utilizing this position as leverage. However, (i) as described in 4.(1), it is almost impossible for Japan to postpone its ratification of the NPT and maintain its titular “freedom of nuclear armament” as a diplomatic bargaining chip. Moreover, increasing distrust for Japan because of its refusal to ratify the NPT could undermine Japan’s demand for nuclear disarmament. Rather, it is advisable for Japan to participate in the NPT, promote international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and enhance its overall capacity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It will enhance Japan’s international voice in promoting disarmament. And (ii) As described in 5.(1), considering the increasing possibility of specific disadvantages arising from the delay in ratification of the NPT under the recent international trend, policy of postponing ratification should not be taken.

6. Ratification procedure of the NPT

(1) The policy of the government

In preparation for the ratification of the NPT, along with previous policy, the government is making necessary preparations to advance preliminary negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the conclusion of safeguards agreements in order to ensure substantial equality with other NPT parties in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. With the completion of these preparations, the government intends to resume preliminary negotiations for the conclusion of safeguards agreements and seek Diet approval as soon as possible based on the results of the negotiations with the consent of relevant parties.

(2) Relationship between negotiations to conclude safeguards agreements and ratification of the NPT

(A) In its statement issued at the time of the signature of the NPT, Japan made clear that the contents of the safeguards agreements concluded by Japan should not be treated in a substantially disadvantageous manner in comparison to those concluded by other parties. The government of Japan also intends to undertake ratification procedures for the NPT with due consideration of this point. Therefore, prior to ratifying the NPT, the government is in a position to conduct negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to confirm that the contents of the safeguards agreements concluded by Japan are not substantially disadvantageous compared to those of other countries.

(b) On the other hand, according to Article III, Paragraph 4 of the NPT, a country depositing their instruments of ratification or accession within 180 days from the date of entry into force (March 5, 1970) of the NPT shall commence negotiations on safeguards agreements not later than the date of deposit. And it is said that “the agreement shall enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations.” Therefore, the fact that negotiations on safeguards agreements under this Article are to be commenced will lead to the obligation to bring into force the agreement after a certain period of time.
(c) Taking into account the above, the government of Japan, with the approval of the IAEA, held preliminary negotiations after 1972, which were not subject to the provisions of Article III.4 of the NPT. In November 1973, a consensus was formed in principle that IAEA would grant Japan the same treatment as Euratom if Japan established the technical conditions for domestic inspections same as Euratom. Therefore, Japan needs to proceed with negotiations with the IAEA to draw up the safeguards agreement that incorporate the contents of this consensus. Japan has made it clear that this is the continuation of preliminary negotiations and not the negotiations prescribed in Article III.4 of the NPT. The IAEA has given a clear understanding of this point.

(d) Therefore, the purpose of Japan's future preliminary negotiations is to confirm whether the request in the government statement will be fulfilled in the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Even if this is confirmed, the ratification of the NPT will not be decided immediately. The ratification of the NPT will only be possible when a comprehensive political decision is made based not only on the results of the preliminary negotiations but also on issues that need to be taken into account in order to ensure Japan's national interests, including disarmament and the security of non-nuclear weapons states, which were the two points mentioned in the government statement at the time of the signature of the NPT.
わが国の核兵器不拡散条約（NPT）批准について

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昭和50年1月
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1. NPTの署名と政府声明

われわれの政府は、核兵器の拡散は核戦争の危険を増大させるものであり、核兵器の拡散を防止することが世界平和維持のため必要であること、及び核兵器の禁止を求める世界の声を尊重し、これに協力する意図を表明した。このことにより、昭和54年2月3日条約に署名した。

その際、政府は、この条約の重要性にかんがみ、政府声明に述べて、この条約の批准に当たっては、(1)核兵器の実施状況、(2)わが国を含む非核兵器国の安全保障及び(3)原子力の平和利用における他の締約国との実質的平等性の確保に強力な関心を払う旨強調した。

(1) 特に前述の(1)については、わが国がこの条約に基づき国際原子力機関(A.I.A.E.)との間に結ばる保障措置協定の内容が他の締約国(特にアメリカ諸国)に比較してわが国に実質的・不利益な条項をとらないよう十分考慮した上で条約の批准手続きをとる旨指摘した。

政府声明で指摘した議点のその後の推移

(2) 核兵器の実施状況

(2)1. NPは作成した翌年の昭和44年4月より米ソ両国は、核兵器制限条約(SALT)を開始し、昭和46年核戦争防止合意条約及び核攻撃防止合意条約、昭和47年5月核攻撃防止

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（2）非核兵器国（わが国）の安全保障

わが国のNPT署名以後の国際情勢は、核大国会をめぐる緊張
緩和の著進により全体としてわが国をはじめとする非核兵器国
の安全性を高める方向に推進している。とくに日中国交正常化
による中国との友好関係の開始はわが国全般の安全保障を強
化し貢献している。

また、わが国の安全保障が自国安全保障体制によりひきつづき保
障されているとは言うまでもない。非核兵器国間の安全保障
については、「核兵器による脅威又は脅迫を受ける核兵器
不拡散条約締約国に対して国連憲章に基づいて互いに援助を与え
る」旨の米・英・ソ三国による宣言（昭和43年6月17日）
及びこのように核脅威又は核脅迫を「安全保障政策が国連憲
章に基づく国際法に基づいて互いに行動しなければならない事務を

ひきつづくものであることを認める」旨の安全保障理事会決議（
昭和44年6月19日）があり、わが国も署名の際の国家声明
の中で、核拡散防止条約を採択、国連44年7月の米・
英首脳会談では、A MB 制限条約の規制を更に強化するための
暫定措置を講じている。現在、核兵器不拡散条約締約国が講じる、非核兵器
兵器については、現在暫定措置が有効期間満了の前のできるだけ早い
時期に正式措置を講じる旨の合意ができた。ついて同月11月
の米・英首脳会談では、核兵器不拡散条約の最終規制、個別踏
歩数制限（MIRV）を装備したミサイル（1MBM）
及ぶ重水素弾原子爆弾ミサイル（SLBM）の規制措置等後日の
SALT交渉のガイドラインにつき合意が得られた。また、わ
が国も参加しているシナゴ左脳委員会においては、昭和46
年9月の米核兵器不拡散条約と国際原子力核不拡散条約につい
ての審議が進められている。
3. わが国の国益とＮＰＴ

(1) 国益の見地からの検討の必要性

わが国がNPTを批准すべきかどうかを考えるに当たっては、署名国の政府声明に述べられている諸点について実態があっただどうかを検討するだけでなく、わが国の国益の見地からNPT批准の有無を考慮して意見を巡らすべきである。この点を考えるに当たって特に重要となるのは次の諸点であると思われる。

(2) わが国の平和と繁栄を確保するためには、国際関係の安定が特に重要であり、わが国としては、日本安全保障体制を維持するにともない、平和外交の推進によって国際関係の安定のために積極的貢献を行うべき立場にあること。

(3) わが国にとって重工業エネルギー産の確保は緊急の課題であり、特に石炭を用いるエネルギー源として原子力発電の重要性が高まっているが、核燃料の供給を海外から依存し、原子力技術の分野でも技術先進諸国との緊密な協力が必要である。わが国としては、原子力平和利用のための国際協力を行うだけのであとも塚を得る体制を整える必要があること。

(4) わが国の国益とNPTは、核兵器国への拡散を防止することによって核戦争を防ぎ、平和の確保をより容易にするような国際環境をつくりだすことを目的としており、原子力の軍事利用をより制限する一方で、原子力の平和利用はこれを推進しようとする条約である。この点において、NPTは核兵器国と非核兵器国を差別するという強調をなじめつつある。しかし、ここで非核化を求める国にはNPTは、非核兵器国が持っている国であるという国際社会の現実を一概に否定する上での、上述のように核兵器国が核兵器増加を防止することによって国際関係の安定に寄与することを重視する上での国際環境をつくり出すものであり、核軍備の抑制による核兵器国と非核兵器国との新たな解消という観点の下では、NPTは、非核兵器国に核兵器をもたらすのではないのである。
核兵器国がNPT上負っているかかる義務を重視しようとする傾向がみられる。一方原力利用の合理化に、核兵器国が求める核兵器平和利用分野での国際協力の一層の必要性を問い直す機会が今、特に重要である。

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5. NPT早期批准の必要性

(1) NPTをめぐる最近の情勢と早期批准の必要性

上記のとおり、欧州の核政策の動向がめぐる情勢がその後進展をもとにして、上記のようにわが国の戦略の見地からみても、NPT批准が必要であると考えられることに加え、最近のNPTをめぐる次のような国際情勢を考慮すれば、わが国としては、できるだけ早期にNPT批准を実現すべきものと考えられる。

(2) インテルの核実験以後の情勢を背景として、核の拡散を防止するための積極的な防拡措置を講じることが国際的な重要性を有し、国際情勢の中でわが国のNPT批准は国際政治上大いに意義を持つに至っている。

(3) 米国政府がイラン、イラクに対してNPT批准の保障措置および核不拡散の信条を要求している模様であり、たなあため原子力平和利用に核不拡散協定およびNPT批准国の非核軍国より優遇との考えを示しており、NPT体制強化のための具体的措置をとる必要があるとの考え方が国際的に合意している。従ってNPTの批准を早期に図ることの重要性は今後增大する可能性がある。

(4) わが国政府の強い主張によりNPTの批准により早期に囲まれたは、NPT批准国会議は昭和5年5月に開催されることがほぼ決定となった。この会議の目的は、「核不拡散条約の適用を検討する」ことにより核拡散の防止、原子力平和利用の推進などの具体的策を実現するための会議である。
であるので、わが国は、この会議に参加し、わが国の立場を
充分に主張し得るためには、会議開催前に推進することが前
提となる。

（c）わが国とかもその動向が注目されているNPT未批准の
非核兵器国たる3国（韓国、イラン、ベリルルクス5国）は、
すでに昭和49年4月NPT変相推進国の署名しており、
国連核兵器問題諸国会議の経過の難問の提携から推進されて
いなるぞいう、国際的影響が生じる可能性が高まっていると判断され
る。

6. NPT批准の段取り

（1）政府の方針

政府は、従来の方針どおり、NPT批准の推進を図り、ます原
子力平和利用の分野における他のNPT批准国との実質的な平
等性を確保するため、国際原子力機関との間の推進措置協定結
締の文書交渉を進め、必要を再検討している。政府と
しては、これらの文書が進む方針、推進措置協定締結のための
文書交渉の再開について、この交渉の結果をふまえ、かつ
関係国へと示すもので、できるだけ速やかに国会の承認
を求めるべきである。

（2）推進措置協定交渉とNPT批准との関係

（a）わが国は、NPT批准の際の政府声明において、わが国が
批准する推進措置協定の内容は、他の批准国が締結する推進
措置協定の内容に比して、わが国がより具体的な不利益取扱
いとなすべきであるとし、政府としてはこの点を十分
考慮したうえでNPT批准推進措置をすると考えていることを明
らかにしている。従って政府としては、NPT批准措置をと
（）従って、わが国は、NPT条約の承認を求める立場をとり、交換の結果、NPT条約の承認を求める立場をとることを決定した。従って、わが国は、NPT条約の承認を求める立場をとり、NPT条約の承認を求める立場をとることを決定した。