

**February 15, 1968**  
**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP  
SECRET, No. 76.042, Regular**

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**Summary:**

The Embassy of Romania in the DPRK discusses North Korea's position in the socialist bloc following the seizure of the USS Pueblo. The report is based on a meeting with the Bulgarian Second Secretary.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

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**Contents:**

Translation - English

On February 14, the Bulgarian Second Secretary, Surgov, told A. Lazar that the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party would hold a plenum to debate a series of ideological issues.

All Bulgarian diplomatic missions in socialist countries were asked through a note to compile a summary of the new aspects and trends in the ideological activity of the Korean Workers' Party; its general activity and specific methods for agitation and propaganda; the training programs for top cadres; the latest measures or trends to improve the activity of the party and state apparatus; and the general planning and organization of scientific research in the DPRK.

Surgov mentioned that he discussed these issues with two Soviet diplomats, which helped him realize that these diplomats had radically changed their views on Kim Il Sung. Surgov pointed out that Soviet diplomats were increasingly disgruntled with Kim Il Sung and thought that 'the independence with which he makes decisions on his own' is the product of the full development of his cult of personality.

The Bulgarian diplomat answered one of A. Lazar's questions by pointing out that the Soviets, when referring to Kim Il Sung's independence, alluded to the decision of the Korean Workers' Party not to participate in the consultative meeting in Budapest, to the USS Pueblo case, and to the fact that the North Koreans decided not to consult [the Soviets] on the ways and especially on the moment when unification ought to be achieved, etc.

Signed: N. Popa