

December 12, 1950

Report from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong

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Summary:

Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.

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关于志愿军兵力和装备补充等问题 给毛泽东的报告

(一九五〇年十二月十二日)

主席：

关于彭〔1〕八日十八时所提各项问题，据两日商谈结果，具报如下：

一、新兵，东北十一万人均已集中。据今晚与高〔2〕通电话，他认为训练至一月中，可补前方六万五千人，我告以准备七万人。依主席今夜电示，如在汉城不远地区可以寻歼几部分敌人，则这一战役必须连续打下去；否则，不论敌固守汉城或放弃汉城，我军均将休整一时期，故一月中运新兵至前方，正合时机。分配方法，照彭来电：西线补四万五千人，东线补两万人，外加十九兵团补五千人。前方在下一战役结束后，能派干部至后方加强管训工作，当更好。

二、十九兵团一切军需装备（包括被服鞋帽，粮秣弹药，并加强轻炮）及兵站组织均保证在十二月底补充完毕。如苏联步枪、轻重机枪、转盘枪能赶到，十九兵团即可于一月中经东北时改装，然后开往前线。

三、刘邓〔3〕三个军全部到达河北地区约二月中旬，待装备补充完毕，须至二月底。此项兵力是否用在朝鲜方面，待一月后才能定夺，故苏联来的苏式步兵武器（卅六个师的），除给十九兵团外，补给这三个军还是补给前方志愿部队，拟俟下一战役结束后再定。

四、铁路修运，经吕正操〔4〕与刘居英、余光生〔5〕商定，保证在十二月二十日修通辑安〔6〕、球场、顺川、平壤线；安东〔7〕、定州、新安州、平壤线则因两座铁桥所缺桥梁材料，须俟苏联一二月来货后方能修通。平壤至汉城线及顺川至元山线均过大同江，不知桥梁情况如何，现正派员勘察中。元山沿海向南的铁路情况如何，待元山解放后方能勘察。今日从关内又派出两个桥梁团去东北转朝鲜，国内所能调动的抢修器材，均将供给前方。扫清阻塞隧道的拖拉机、起重机已商定由东北解决。依此情况，辑安至平壤可作主补给线，但运输量较新义州平壤线小，新义州至新安州桥北及宽甸经朔州至定州两线，目前只能作辅助补给线，到新安州后将由汽车向前接运，顺川以东及平壤以南亦如此。如桥梁团至朝鲜后，能设法先在清川江、大同江修成便桥则困难可减少，而汽车便可向前推进。另一困难，则为敌机沿铁道投延期性炸弹，阻我夜间抢修抢运，对此铁道兵团正研究扫弹方法。

五、空军正派人往朝鲜查明机场情况。如平壤及其他地方无喷气式飞机降落场，或有已被毁坏，则今冬能否赶修成此类机场，须待查明后始知；如无此机场，则

我国空军及苏联空军均不能前进至平壤起飞，只能在安东向平壤及其以南不远处掩护交通，过远则往返时间近一小时，无余时作战。一二月份，我能出动掩护交通的喷气式驱逐机为四个团一百二十架，届时还需有苏联驱逐机两个团配合行动方有把握，能否办到，在交涉中。至四月中，我空军可有五个团的喷气式驱逐机，一个团的拉十一式驱逐机，两个团的冲击机，四个团的轰炸机，共十二个团，三百六十架飞机，开始参加和学习作战，但决定的条件又必须朝鲜有足够的飞机场供驱逐机起落。至明年年底，我们最大限度可有廿五个团的喷气式驱逐机，三个团的拉九——十一式的驱逐机，四个团的冲击机，七个团的轰炸机，四个团的运输机，共四十三个团，一千二百九十架飞机。照这个要求，单在国内不作战，就须再修值二十亿斤米的飞机场，就须消耗十八万吨飞机汽油和煤油，其他用费都不提，就已经成为我们所能拨给空军建设作为第一位支出的和给空军的铁路运输和储油能力的最高点了。故我们今天的物质基础，明年只能达到这样空军数目，其速度也只能如此。

六、炮兵在二月中可将三七米厘（毫米）口径的高射炮营（每师一营）送往前方，原在前方的两个炮兵师可以加强，其他炮兵则须至三四月中方能使用。具体计划，正在计算中。

七、坦克部队，三月中可出动四个团，四月中出动四个团，每团重中两型坦克四十辆。

八、空司待调查机场情况后，可派指挥所至前方。特司即以现在前方炮司留一部分人在前方设指挥所。

周恩来

十二月十二日夜

根据手稿刊印。

注 释

〔1〕 彭，指彭德怀，当时任中国人民志愿军司令员兼政治委员。

〔2〕 高，指高岗，当时任中共中央东北局书记、东北人民政府主席、中国人民解放军东北军区司令员兼政治委员。

〔3〕 刘邓，指刘伯承和邓小平。刘伯承，当时任中共中央西南局第二书记、西南军政委员会主席。邓小平，当时任中共中央西南局第一书记、西南军政委员会副主席、中国人民解放军西南军区政治委员。

〔4〕 吕正操，当时任中央人民政府铁道部副部长、中国人民解放军铁道兵团副司令员。

〔5〕 刘居英，当时任中国人民解放军东北军区铁道军运司令员。余光生，当时任中国人民解放军东北军区铁道军运政治委员。

〔6〕 辑安，今集安市。

〔7〕 安东，今丹东市。

Chairman [Mao Zedong]:

Concerning all the questions raised by Peng [Dehuai] at 18:00 on [December] 8, and according to the results of two days of discussions, the following is the detailed report:

(1) New recruits, 110,000 people in the Northeast have been concentrated. Based on tonight's phone call with Gao [Gang], he thinks that [if they are] trained by mid-January, 65,000 people can be supplied to the front. I told [him] to prepare 70,000 people. In accordance with the Chairman's instructions over the phone tonight, if [we] can search and annihilate several sections of the enemy in areas not far from Seoul, then [we] should carry on fighting this campaign. Otherwise, regardless of whether the enemy tenaciously defends Seoul or gives it up, our army should rest and regroup for a period of time. So when the new recruits are moved to the front in mid-January, it is precisely the opportune moment. The method of distribution should be according to Peng's telegram: add 45,000 people to the west line, add 20,000 people to the east line, in addition, add 5,000 people to the 19th Army. It will be better if cadres can be sent to the rear areas to strengthen management and training work after the end of the next campaign.

2. The completion of replenishment of all military supplies needed by the 28th Army and other army organizations (including bedding, clothing, shoes and hats, army provisions and ammunition, plus improved light cannons) is guaranteed by the end of December. If the Soviet rifles, light and heavy machine guns and tommy guns can be rushed over in time, the 19th Army can change uniforms as they pass through the Northeast in mid-January, and then can depart for the front.

3. It will be mid-February until Liu [Bocheng]'s and Deng [Xiaoping]'s three armies arrive in the Hebei area. It will be late February by the time [they] finish replenishing their equipment. It will be after January when [we] make a final decision about whether this part of the armed forces will be used in North Korea. So [we] intend to wait until the end of the next campaign to decide whether the Soviet-style infantry weapons from the Soviets (for 36 divisions) should be supplied to these three armies or to the Volunteer armies at the front, besides being given to the 19th Army.

4. Concerning the repair of railways and transportation, Lü Zhengcao, Liu Juying and Yu Guangsheng came to an agreement that it could be guaranteed that, by December 20th, the Ji'an-Qiuchang-Soonchon-Pyongyang line will be repaired; due to the lack of bridge-building materials for two rail bridges, the Andong-Dingzhou-Sineuiju--Pyongyang line cannot be repaired fully until the goods come from Soviet Union in January or February. The Pyongyang to Seoul line and Suncheon to Wonsan line both cross the Taedong River. [We] do not know the condition of the bridges and are now in the process of sending out personnel for reconnaissance. Today, two bridge [repair] groups were sent out from inside the Shanhaiguan pass to the Northeast, for transfer to North Korea. All transferable domestic repair equipment will be supplied on an expedited basis to the front. It has been decided through consultation that tractors for clearing away blocked tunnels and cranes will be arranged by the Northeast. Based on this situation, the Chian to Pyongyang line can act as the main supply line, but the amount that can be transported is smaller than that of the Sineuiju--Pyongyang line. The two lines from Sineuiju- to the north of the Sineuiju- bridge and to Kuandian, through Suju to Tinju, currently can only be supplementary supply lines. After [things] arrive at Sineuiju-, [they] will be taken over and transported forward by cars. [The areas] east of Suncheon and south of Pyongyang are also like this. After the bridge groups arrive at North Korea, if they can manage to build temporary bridges at the Cheongcheon River and the Taedong River, the difficulties can be reduced and vehicles can then move forward. Another difficulty is that the enemy planes drop delayed-fuse bombs along the railways, which obstructs us from rush repairs and rush transportation at night. For this, the railway engineering corps is studying methods to remove the bombs.

5. The air force is sending people to North Korea to investigate the condition of airports. If there is no jet-aircraft landing field in Pyongyang and other places, or there are damaged ones, [we] will have to wait for the [outcome of the] investigation before we know whether this kind of airport can be rush-repaired this winter. If there is no such airport, [we] will have to wait for the [outcome of the] investigation before

we know whether this kind of airport can be rush-built this winter. If there is no such airport, neither our air force nor the Soviet air force will be able to take off from Pyongyang. [The air forces] can only be at Andong, covering the transportation to Pyongyang and nearby areas to the south. If too far [to the south], the return trip will take close to one hour, which will leave no extra time for fighting. In January and February, we can dispatch four regiments of 120 jet chasers to provide air cover for transportation. When the time comes, [we will] also need two Soviet regiments of chasers to coordinate the operations in order to feel confident of success. Whether this can be done or not, is still dependent on negotiations. By mid-April, our air force will have five regiments of jet chasers, one regiment of R11 chasers, two regiments of attack planes and four regiments of bombers, for a total of twelve regiments of 360 planes that can undertake operations. But the decisive condition is that North Korea must have enough airports for chasers to take off and land. By the end of next year, we can have a maximum of twenty-five regiments of jet chasers, three regiments of R9 and R11 chasers, four regiments of attack planes, seven regiments of bombers and four regiments of transport planes, for a total of forty-three regiments of 1290 planes. Based on this estimate, simply staying within the country without fighting, airports with a value of 2,000 million jin of rice must be built and 180,000 tons of aviation fuel and kerosene must be consumed. Not even factoring in other expenditures, this has already reached the maximum of what we can allocate for the development of the air force and for railway transportation and oil storage for the air force. Therefore, considering [our] current material base, air force numbers can only reach this level next year and the speed can only be like this.

6. In mid-February, the artillery can send 37 mm. antiaircraft gun battalions (one battalion for every division) to the front. The two artillery divisions that have been at the front can be strengthened. Other artillery units cannot be used until March or April. Detailed plans are still being worked out.

7. [Concerning] tank units, four regiments can be dispatched in mid-March, four regiments can be dispatched in mid-April and every regiment [will have] 40 heavy and medium-sized tanks.

8. After investigation of the airport situation, the headquarters of the air force can station its command post towards the front. Some of the personnel from the current frontline artillery headquarters can be left for the special forces to set up a command post at the front.

Zhou Enlai

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