

**June 4, 1982**

**Note for [name excised] from [name excised],  
'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and  
Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'**

**Citation:**

"Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'", June 4, 1982, Wilson Center Digital Archive, CIA Records Search Tool [CREST]. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #6.

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**Summary:**

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan's nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a "significant" Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

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NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and  
Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program

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I propose the following in response to the request (which I mentioned at this A.M.'s NIO meeting):

--Pakistan. A short (2-3 printed page) memo to holders of SNIE 31-81: "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: The Next Three Years" which would say a) that Paks have not slowed their efforts to get the bomb, and b) there is new evidence of significant PRC assistance on at least the weapons-design side. Our estimate on timing for the availability of material (late 82-early 83/84) might be adjusted somewhat.

--Argentina. A relatively short (3-5 printed page) SNIE focussing on a) intentions concerning production of nuclear explosives, b) the principal political and financial constraints, and c) incentives that might exist in the aftermath of the Falklands conflict to develop and acquire nuclear weapons.

Both papers would follow fast-track procedures. The Argentine paper could be part of a broader assessment/estimate that NIO/LA (and NIO/GPF?) will be doing. Drafters: [REDACTED] for Pak paper, and [REDACTED] for Argentine assessment (I've discussed with both). Next steps if you agree with the above:

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- Notify [REDACTED] of request and suggested follow-up (4 June).
- Discuss with C/NIC for his perspective and approval (4 June).
- Call R. Martin (INR) and inform him of approach to be taken (7 June).
- Draft concept/TOR for both papers and have C/NIC approve and send to Reps (9 June).

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cc: C/NIC  
NIO/NESA  
NIO/LA