

January 22, 1953

Radio Policy Paper

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Summary:

A CIA memorandum formulates guidelines for RL broadcasts to be conducted by a Coordinating Center of Soviet exiles

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PAPER

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Comments attached

1. The American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, Inc. will sponsor radio broadcasts beamed to Soviet occupation personnel and to the peoples in the USSR proper, enabling the representatives of these peoples in the non-communist world to speak to their counterparts under Soviet control in terms denied official American radio activities. The Coordinating Center of Anti-Bolshevik Struggle, qualified to assume leadership of the exiled peoples of the USSR against their leaders, is now organized and in the process of broadening its representation of the emigration from the Soviet Union. The Coordinating Center in whose name broadcasts will be made, is a genuine creation of the Russian and Nationalities emigration. The functions of the American Committee are (1) to assist the Soviet refugees to create an ever more effective organization of leadership, as it has been doing, and (2) to make available to them the means, radio facilities and the like, with which they can communicate with their fellow countrymen behind the Iron Curtain.

2. Radio Liberation, sponsored by the American Committee, is an organ of the peoples from the USSR, as represented by a grouping of Soviet refugees who have associated themselves to assist in the struggle of their fellow countrymen against Soviet oppression. Its voice will be solely that of the total Russian and Nationalities emigration, so that it may achieve credibility and accomplish maximum results. United States direction and the advancement of United States aims will be attained subtly and without compromising the essentially indigenous character of the programs. There will be no duplication of or competition with the broadcasts of VOA.

3. Although the broadcasts supported by the American Committee are not to be American broadcasts, they will, in fact, be serving the interests and objectives of both the Government of the United States and the anti-Soviet emigration. These interests and objectives are similar but not identical. The general objectives of the United States Government in supporting Radio Liberation are:

- a.
- b. To deter Soviet aggression by exploiting weak spots in the Soviet armor
- c. To stimulate internal disaffection, which can be turned to United States advantage in case of war
- d. To modify the Soviet attitude toward the non-Soviet world in the direction of greater co-operation.

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The aims of the anti-Soviet Russian and Nationalities emigration, whose members are staffing Radio Liberation, and who, under American supervision, are responsible for the programming, are simpler and more specific:

- a. To overthrow the Soviet regime
- b. To establish a new regime (or regimes) which will reflect their political and ethnic concepts.

It is recognized that this divergence of aims between sponsors and emigres will inevitably produce differences of opinion regarding the content of programs and the treatment of themes. This guidance is being formulated to meet this situation and will be put into effect when accepted by the emigres themselves.

4. Radio Liberation will be a guest on German territory. In consideration of Western Germany as a sovereign host country, the radio will make every effort not to prejudice German security, or indirectly, American interests therein. It will not foster alarmist or threatening views of the inevitability and imminence of general war; it will not make direct appeals for defection, and it will not incite the peoples behind the Iron Curtain to a violent overthrow of the Soviet Government.

5. The broadcasts will be directed in the beginning primarily to the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet civilian personnel in the occupied zones of Germany, Austria, and the satellite countries. A Soviet citizen will risk his liberty and possibly his life in listening to these broadcasts, and the contents must be such as to justify his taking this risk. So that the programs may attain their definite objectives and every idea serve a definite purpose, a distillate of the best available thinking on such programming forms Attachment "A", from which direct program guidance will be extracted. Attachment "B" lists those whose careful consideration and thought form Attachment "A".

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ATTACHMENT "A"

I. PROGRAM GUIDANCE

With regard to the contents of the broadcasts, the following represents the considerations of the most knowledgeable individuals available, including recent Soviet defectors.

A. CENTRAL THEME1. Liberation

In order to give the emigre radio a positive idea, around which the diverse elements in the emigration will rally, and which will win and hold the allegiance of the target audience and which will justify the risks listeners will run, it is proposed to build this station's programs around the central theme of Liberation. Not only is Liberation the pronounced policy of the newly elected Republican administration of the United States Government vis a vis the Soviet Union, but it also constitutes the ultimate goal of both the non-Soviet world and of the disaffected peoples of the USSR wherever they reside. As a theme, Liberation permits a richness of variation - Liberation from Soviet tyranny, Liberation from police rule, Liberation from hunger and fear, Liberation from regimentation and the like. It is positive in seeking amelioration of a specific evil or group of evils, yet it does not constitute a direct challenge to the regime nor automatically inspire listeners to make useless sacrifices.

B. DOMINANT THEMES1. Disaffection

a. One of the keys to the attainment of United States policy objectives toward the USSR is the disaffection of the Soviet peoples for their regime. This disaffection stems from the intrinsic evils of the Soviet system itself and constitutes the weakest link in the Communist Party's chain of control. Properly stimulated and exploited, it will influence the Soviet attitude in the direction of greater cooperation with the outside world, and it will deter Soviet aggression. In short, by increasing the disaffection of the Soviet people for the Soviet Government, we are increasing the prospects for a lasting peace on terms more favorable to the West. Should war break out, nonetheless, the West's advantage will be largely measured by the temper of the peoples comprising the USSR.

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b. The approaches to Disaffection, as a theme, are, of necessity, indirect. They are, however, virtually limitless in number, kind, and substance. Indeed, any theme considered appropriate for Soviet consumption can serve to further widen the breach between the rulers and the ruled.

2.

3. Economy

a. Economic themes offer a ready field for propaganda activities against the USSR. The Soviet Government has helped to create and maintain the keen interest of its subjects in economic affairs by repeatedly stressing its achievements in the material well-being of the Soviet peoples, particularly in comparison with the lot of capitalist slaves. These claims are often held suspect by the peoples of the USSR who can see in their own material condition the difference between Soviet myth and reality. These same peoples, either on the basis of personal experience or the experience of individuals close to them, are also aware of the disparities between Soviet claims and the true living conditions of the Western World.

b. In developing economic themes for Soviet consumption, it is essential to safeguard the listeners' pride in themselves and in their country. Therefore, in making material comparison between the East and the West, Radio Liberation will manifest recognition of the inherent wealth of the Soviet Union and pay tribute to the genius of its people, and blame their economic plight on the sinister purposes of the ruling circle.

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4. Ideology

Recognizing that Russians, by their nature, have always delighted in theoretical discussions, that the present generation of Soviet citizens has been raised on an ideological diet, which, because of its many contradictions, constitutes a weak point in Soviet armor, Radio Liberation will give prime emphasis to the development of suitable ideological themes. The history of the Soviet regime is a baleful record of the steady abandonment of lofty humanitarian goals and constant modifications of ideology to meet these shifts. The target audience has lived through most of these ideological zig-zags and will react to their exposure much more feelingly than a western audience. They reach to the heart of Soviet ideological control and should be exploited to the maximum. Furthermore, ideology is the basis of whatever faith the Soviet military man may have and in its inherent weaknesses offers a vulnerable point for attack.

5. War/Peace

Stirred by their own propaganda purporting aggressive capitalist encirclement of the USSR, the Soviet peoples are intensely interested in the prospects of war and peace. Unquestionably there exists in the Soviet Union a hard core of thoroughly disenchanted peoples who would welcome war as an avenue of liberation. The majority of citizens in the USSR, however, are still shaken by the last conflagration and view the possibility of future hostilities with alarm. Radio Liberation will take a positive stand on the subject of war and peace, stating simply and truthfully the reasons for the rearming of the West and the necessity for protecting the non-Soviet World's system from Bolshevik control. The radio will judiciously show that the West's potential for victory is considerably greater than that of the Soviet Union's, chiefly because the latter is unable to rally the full hearted support of its oppressed and heroic subjects for the enslavement of humanity in general. The Soviet peace offensive will be exposed in terms which the Soviet mentality can understand, and evaluate.

6. Freedom Campaign

Radio Liberation will emphasize a constant and clear delineation between the peoples of the USSR and their oppressors. Similar distinctions will be made between Soviet leadership and such groups as the Red Army, the workers, the peasants, the intelligentsia, and even the security police and the rank and file of the Communist party. These distinctions will be pointed up by the development of

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themes appropriate to a given strata of Soviet society. The radio will emphasize the scope of the freedom campaign in the West and the existing opportunity for the freedom loving peoples of the Soviet Union to join the campaign, either through defection or by certain positive measures of resistance to the regime in the USSR proper.

7. Interpretation of the West

a. In interpreting the West to the peoples of the USSR, Radio Liberation must take particular pains to preserve its integrity as an emigre operation expressing exclusively the emigration's point of view. It follows that this point of view is not always in harmony with Western thought and policy. The radio should, in the main, allude only to those differences between the emigration and the West vis a vis the Soviet Union, which were attributable to the West's past lack of knowledge of the Soviet scene, which do not reflect unfavorably on the West's attitude towards the peoples of the USSR and which are now happily resolved.

b. To avoid antagonisms inherent in implications of the West's better climate for living, interpretations of the West will stress that, but for the Soviet regime, the peoples of the USSR, with their potential wealth, their native talent, and their spirit of freedom, could live as well or better than their Western brethren.

8. Acknowledgment of Past Mistakes in Policy and Strategy

Although this theme is perhaps properly a part of Interpretations of the West, it is of sufficient importance to stand alone. In treating mistakes of the West, Radio Liberation will take the stand that the West, always sympathetic to the peoples inhabiting the present territory of the USSR, was in the past rather naive vis a vis the Soviet system. The West's intentions were good but its ignorance of the real purposes of the Soviet Government led to mistakes which were detrimental to its own well being as well as to that of the peoples in the USSR. This prior ignorance should be understandable to the Soviet peoples who themselves were originally mis-led by the Bolsheviks: Radio Liberation will make a [] explanation of the forced repatriation of former Soviet citizens following World War II in the light that the West misread the heroic struggle of the Soviet peoples against Hitler as a sign of their support for the Stalin regime, that the West was lulled by war-time Soviet relaxations of internal controls into thinking that the Soviet Government was prepared to grant its peoples real liberty (a hope equally shared by many Soviet peoples themselves) and that in its fervent desire to cooperate with its war-time allies, the West failed to recognize the fate awaiting those to be repatriated.

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9. Interpretation of the USSR

Radio Liberation will base its interpretation of the USSR on the acknowledgment of the historic and valiant struggle of her peoples, whatever their ethnic background, political orientation, or social level, for freedom and equality. This struggle is now directed against the Bolsheviks who used the hard-won freedoms of the February 1917 Revolution to seize power and reorganize the country on even more absolute totalitarian lines. Comparisons will be drawn between the Free World and the USSR emphasizing the differences in relationships between government and people. These differences will be bolstered by concrete examples close to the experience of each listener. The material on the USSR will be accurate in every detail.

10. Attacks on Personalities and System

There is much evidence to indicate that many Soviet citizens hold Stalin in great esteem, feeling that his aims are good but that injustices result from faulty implementation by minor and corrupt officials. Stalin, therefore, will be criticized subtly and by innuendo. For example, if Stalin takes credit for the accomplishments of the Soviet World, why is he not responsible for its short-comings? What was Lenin's opinion of Stalin? What is Stalin's record? The brunt of the attack will be directed against the Soviet system itself as maintained by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communist Party members, however, will be given an alternative to perishing with Sovietism.

11. Internal Tensions of the Soviet

a. There are three general types of grievances causing the internal tensions of the Soviet Union:

1. Those common to the majority of Soviet citizens, e.g. police terror.
2. Those peculiar to certain groups of Soviets and with which most other groups can sympathize, e.g. collectivization.
3. Those peculiar to certain groups of Soviets but with which a substantial share of the population is in direct disagreement, e.g. nationalism. | ?

b. Radio Liberation will accentuate the grievances mentioned in 1 and 2 above, thereby compounding the tensions between the peoples and the regime, and will, wherever possible, avoid discussion of the grievances in sub-paragraph 3 which would have the effect of drawing millions of Soviet subjects closer to the Soviet Government.

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12. Nationalism and the Political Future of the USSR

a. These are the issues on which it has been most difficult to reach agreement among the emigre groups. The question of nationalism widens the cleavage between the Great Russians and the ethnic minorities, while the problem of the political future of the USSR fractionalizes the emigration into as many parts as there are groups. The Coordinating Center, as now constituted, became a reality because the Russian and Nationalities groups were able to shelve their differences on these two highly controversial subjects and adopt the principle of self-determination, after the over-throw of the Soviet regime throughout the territory of the USSR, as a compromise measure.

b. Were Radio Liberation a puppet of American interests, it would remain mute on nationalism and the political future of the USSR. Being the mouthpiece of the emigration, however, discussions of these subjects can hardly be avoided. To assure against presenting them in explosive forms and to maintain the appearance of unanimity in the emigration, all programs, whether in Russian or in minority languages, will discuss these subjects only in the light of ethnic and political self-determination by the peoples inhabiting the territory of the Soviet Union when conditions are such as to permit them freely to express their will. Any other course is certain to alienate or antagonize a major share of the listening audience and will promptly be exploited by Soviet propaganda.

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II. GUIDANCE FOR OPERATING PERSONNEL

A. MECHANICS

1. Omission of Identification Signals

Such signals indicate to the Soviets that we are initiating broadcasting, and allow them quickly to narrow jamming on our wave length; they also may give the listener away. Signals thus lose their primary purpose of indicating to the audience the source of the program. The listener soon comes to recognize the voice of the announcer, making signals unnecessary. Although a recognizable voice also places the listener in some danger, it is still less dangerous to him than identifiable signals. It is, in addition, an important encouragement psychologically. ?

2. Omission of Recognizable Music Themes

The same restrictions apply to musical themes as to identification signals. Their use would make listening even more insecure.

3. Length of Programs and Items

The length of the initial programs will be limited to one-half hour of original script in Russian and ten minutes of original script in each nationality language represented in the KTAB. The items will be short and self-sufficient, i.e., able to convey a message to an audience with limited time to listen.

4. Music

Music is generally useless for the short propaganda programs envisaged. The music which the Soviets broadcast is equally as good or better than any which we could produce at this station. Unless it serves a direct propaganda purpose its use will be limited to background for certain dramatic features or for transition.

5. Proportion of News and Features

News is of first consideration in programming. The peoples of the Soviet Union are vitally interested in hearing the truth and in learning of events about which they hear nothing but which affects them personally. Straight news, news analysis, and news commentary will occupy some 70 percent of total broadcast time, leaving the remainder to features. By presenting certain news items which the Soviet listener can easily verify, his confidence is gained, and it lends credence to other news items.

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6. Arrangements: Interspersing

Programs will be rebroadcast continuously during the day. News broadcasts will contain 10-20 per cent straight news items with the remainder commentary and analysis. News broadcasts will be interspersed with feature programs, but repeated more often than features. Best schedule of broadcast seems to be 6:00 - 7:00 a.m., 2:45 - 6:00 p.m., 9:00 - 11:30 p.m., local time.

7. Type of News: "Hot News": Refutation of Soviet News

News will be concerned with major world events which can be shown to have a real and definite interest to our target audience. Regional news items will be stressed if they tangibly can be shown to affect the present or future of our target audience. "Hot News" is good on occasions, but not so important as to an audience which has continual and almost immediate access to news events as they occur. Soviet news will be refuted at the very earliest moment if blatantly untrue. The truth is of utmost importance in straight news items, which must be positive, not refutery and not dependent upon Soviet news items. They must be timely, however, in following Soviet emphasis in newscasting even though the initiative remains with our station.

8. Information Denied Soviets

Such information will be supplied to our station, but will not be broadcast braggingly in terms of the democratic world, or in scattered sequence with no seeming purpose in mind,

9. Type and Composition of Features

Features will be dynamic and positive in their approach, and refutery only in rare instances. The voice of the announcers, as well, will be strong, authoritative, knowing. The features will employ material with which the audience is at least partially familiar; Soviet history, reversals in Soviet policy and the Communist line; references to forced labor camps, purges; state controls over peasants and workers, and over science and the arts; are important composites. The questions to be left in the soldier's mind are: "Why am I here? Why are my living conditions and those of the people at home so poor? Where is our personal liberty?" Program material must make him think and lead him to seek additional information. Timeliness is a most important consideration.

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B. DO's and DON'Ts**1. Be Clear**

Enunciate carefully, speak slowly, use simple words and sentences. In presenting ideas, be sure they are comprehensible to the intended audience. Explain facts.

2. Be Repetitive

Concentrate on a few basic important themes and exploit their every facet.

3. Be Interesting

Vary illustrations, arguments, style. Use humor, irony and the like, but stay within basic themes. Use human interest stories, first person narratives, eye witness accounts. Use drama in all its forms. Personalize your commentators.

4. Be Timely

Catch listeners' interest in an event at the time when that interest is at its peak. Know the day to day out-pourings of Soviet domestic propaganda.

5. Be Truthful

Truth is one of the great strengths of anti-Soviet propaganda. Know in accurate detail what you are talking about, particularly where the audience is in a position to verify your propaganda. Temper truth with discretion.

6. Select Your Facts

Play the news that supports your case. Select supporting facts from history. Select carefully the arguments or frames of reference in which your case appears strongest. Avoid facts and arguments that might offend your audience.

7. Know Your Listeners Group By Group

You can then tie-up propaganda with listeners' personal interests and lives and appeal to their strongest motivations.

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8. Give Impression of Absolute Conviction

Every facet of broadcasting, from the voice of the speaker to the words he speaks, should impart an air of self-confidence and strength. Present an idea as if its truth is self-evident and universally accepted.

9. Give Impression of Absolute Objectivity

In this connection the radio will have to acknowledge those accomplishments of the Soviet Union which are irrefutable. These acknowledgments, however, should be qualified by pointing out the facts behind Soviet accomplishments. Objectivity does not imply neutrality.

10. Eliminate Any Impression of Antagonism

Identify the speaker with the audience. Avoid impressions that the speaker is "different", critical, boastful, condescending, and the like. Within limits cater to audience prejudice.

11. Build Self-esteem of the Audience

Show appreciation for national culture, native talents, peoples' accomplishments. Avoid appearance of flattery.

12. Attack Opponents Case Directly and Persistently where it is weakest.

13. Make Promises, Claims, or Offers Only If They Can Be Fully Substantiated

14. Do Not Speak in the Name of Any ONE Emigre Group or Personality

15. Do Not Discuss Vlassov and the Vlassov Movement

16. Do Not Use Threats