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Radio Free Europe Broadcasting Policy for Poland

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Summary:

Policy guidelines for Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Poland as approved by the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy.

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RFE BROADCASTING POLICY

TOWARD POLAND

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I. Objectives:

In the interest of assuring maximum possible impact and effective-
ness of the total United States broadcasting effort directed to the USSR
and to the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe, the methods and
aims of both official and unofficial American radio stations broadcasting
to the area have been thoroughly reviewed in the light of United States
policy objectives. In accordance with instructions of the Committee on
Radio Broadcasting Policy, upon whose request the review was undertaken,
papers have been prepared for individual target countries with which broad-
casting operations are concerned, outlining the role which each broadcasting
program should play in the furtherance of both general and specific American
objectives in the area and recommending such changes or modifications of
present operating practices as may seem desirable to this end.

The following directive concerns only the broadcasts of Radio Free
Europe to Poland. It establishes policies and practices to be followed
by Radio Free Europe in its broadcasts to Poland with a view to assuring
a close conformity of the activities and aims of the station with current
policy objectives of the United States in respect to Poland and to achiev-
ing maximum effectiveness in this regard by defining for RFE, as a "gray"
station, a constructive role, clearly distinct from that of the official
Voice of America.

II. Policy Considerations:

A. U.S. Policy to Poland:

The long-term U.S. objectives are the complete independence of
Poland from Soviet domination and the establishment in Poland of a
representative government resting upon the consent of the people.
The U.S. does not seek to impose any specific economic or social
system on Poland. The ultimate nature of a Polish government is to
be determined by the Poles themselves, though it is in the interests
of the U.S. that it reflect a political, economic and cultural affi-
nity with the West.

Since it is unlikely that these long-term objectives can be
achieved through internal revolutionary means, the short-term U.S.
aim is to promote an evolutionary development resulting in the weaken-
ing of Soviet controls and the progressive attainment of national
independence.

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An initial U.S. objective is to encourage, as a first step toward eventual full national independence, the establishment of a "national Communist" regime which, though it may remain in close military and political alliance with the USSR, will be able to exercise to a much greater degree than in the past independent authority and control in the direction of its own affairs, primarily confined in the first stages to its internal affairs.

"National Communism" and other tendencies or developments which may tend to weaken Soviet controls, but which in themselves retain a fundamentally authoritarian character, do not offer solutions consonant with the ultimate objectives of United States policy toward Poland. In the interest of the immediate objective to promote greater Polish independence from Moscow, tendencies and developments of this type may be judiciously exploited. But that exploitation should never be undertaken in a manner or to a degree which would be detrimental to such genuinely democratic tendencies and developments as may exist or emerge within Poland.

Immediately current objectives are to prevent the restoration in Poland of a Stalinist regime subservient to Moscow and to prevent popular demonstrations or an uprising which might lead to Soviet repression by military force.

It is contrary to U.S. policy to initiate the use of armed force in order to eliminate Soviet domination of Poland, and in the event of Soviet initiation of military action in Poland, no course available to the U.S. could be expected certainly to prevent serious damage to U.S. interests. Accordingly, U.S. policy is to encourage the Poles to seek independence from Soviet control gradually and without internal disorder, avoiding any development which the Soviets would feel they had to repress with military force. The Polish populace should not be encouraged to violence, sabotage, rioting, or guerrilla operations, since these could readily lead to the imposition of more severe controls or the intervention of Soviet armed force. Rather, U.S. efforts should be directed toward the maintenance of morale and a determined but temperate resistance to Soviet domination and toward the support of evolutionary change.

In the prevailing circumstances, Poland (as compared with other countries of the Soviet orbit) is peculiarly a test case for the application of these principles. Poland has moved in an evolutionary development in the direction of U.S. objectives. The Gomulka regime, which was born in defiance of the Kremlin leadership, has achieved a degree of independence from Soviet control notwithstanding Poland's continued membership in the Warsaw Pact. By remaining in the Warsaw Pact and the Communist camp and by restraining the Polish population thus far from a revolutionary uprising, the Gomulka regime has been able to avoid the fate of Hungary. From the standpoint of U.S. policy,

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Polish developments as a whole represent a step in the desired direction, not only as concerns Poland but also in the potential effect on other satellites and on the USSR itself. The Poles, surrounded as they are by Soviet military power, have at present little prospect of achieving full national independence. Therefore, it is consonant with U.S. policy to help in a cautious manner to maintain the Gomulka regime with a view to giving Poland the possibility of gradually increasing its present measure of independence without leading to imposition of more severe controls, internal disorder or to a situation which would provoke the USSR to armed intervention.

Within this framework, the U.S. is supporting steps calculated to reorient Polish trade toward the West, is giving sympathetic consideration to provision of credits or other trade inducements as well as economic and technical assistance in moderate amounts. Such measures have the design of sustaining the Gomulka regime, of lessening its dependence upon the USSR, of benefiting the Polish people and of building up popular confidence in Western intentions to support striving by the satellite peoples for greater independence. This involves a calculated risk in view of the precarious nature of the Polish situation and the possibility of a reversion to Stalinist controls. The intention is, therefore, to proceed with safeguards and avoid too substantial or permanent involvement with the Gomulka regime. But, although it would be unrealistic to assume that Poland can be drawn away from the USSR by economic and financial means, there appears to be an advantage in reducing the degree to which it has been economically dependent on the USSR.

Current U.S. policy looks toward the expansion and systematic development of contacts and exchanges between Poland and the West, not only in the economic but also in the scientific and cultural spheres; it encourages the intensification of informational and cultural efforts with respect to Poland within the limits of practical possibility. The disorientation caused in the Communist world by the repudiation of Stalin, and later intensified by events in Poland and Hungary, has provided a fertile field for U.S. information activities in all Communist countries and especially in Poland. It is intended to take appropriate advantage of this opportunity. The chief instrument in this regard is broadcasting. It has been concluded that the most fruitful approach of such broadcasting is the provision of straight-forward news and news commentary and the projection of the Western world. The purpose is to maintain Western ties and influence, which in the case of the Polish people have been historically strong and concerning which there is currently in Poland a unique opportunity for cultivation.

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In accordance with the policy of non-predetermination, it is not in the interest of the U.S. to espouse or appear to espouse any political group within Poland.

For the purposes of the U.S. propaganda effort, there is not at present any Polish exile organization, professing aims consistent with the objectives of U.S. policy, which appears to have a sufficient following within Poland to justify the assumption that it should be endorsed, either officially or unofficially, by the U.S. as a spokesman for Polish opposition sentiment within the country. Given the present Polish situation and overriding considerations of U.S. policy with respect to that situation, as outlined above, it would in any event be disastrous for U.S. objectives to relate a Polish political opposition-in-exile intrinsically to the U.S. propaganda effort toward Poland. This, however, does not exclude the possible judicious use by the U.S., without espousal of their views, of Polish emigre individuals or organizations which by virtue of their possession of valuable knowledge and potentiality with respect to Poland, may be demonstrably useful in the furtherance of U.S. interests. Selective reporting may be made of individuals and organizations among the Polish exiles whose talents and activities are of interest to the Polish audience and are useful in fostering exile Polish cultural and intellectual activities.

B. Policy Considerations Affecting Radio Broadcasts:

The foregoing basic policy tenets entail certain policy considerations specifically affecting the role of radio broadcasts in furthering their objectives.

1. It is essential that the officially and unofficially sponsored American radio stations broadcasting to Poland should seek to develop among all their listeners a high degree of respect as thoroughly responsible and reliable sources of news, commentary and other information. Only if there is such reliance on the trustworthiness of their character is it possible for them, and for the materials which they make available, to achieve a maximum impact on the Polish audience.

2. As a principal instrumentality of the U.S. in pursuance of its policy objectives with respect to Poland, radio broadcasting must be directed constructively, consistently and progressively toward achievement of specific aims. The roles of the two American stations broadcasting to Poland--the VOA (as an official station) and RFE (as a "gray" station)--must be clearly defined and differentiated so that there is a minimum dissipation of effectiveness resulting from duplication of effort. Radio Free Europe should play a role as distinct as practicable from that of the Voice of America. It also should take full advantage of its position as a "gray" station and of the latitude it thereby enjoys as compared with VOA, which necessarily is confined to the limits of announced U.S. policy.

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3. There should be no curtailment of the time in which the American stations broadcasting to Poland are now on the air, and American stations should be provided facilities which will enable them to put a dominant signal into the target area.

4. The concept of an overt emigre station (that is: a station speaking in the name of the national exile as a whole, of any exile organization, or of political parties reconstituted in exile) is impractical in the absence of the existence of an exile organization fully and dependably sympathetic to all U.S. objectives, and with such innate strength both among emigres and in terms of its following within Poland, as to warrant at least its unofficial endorsement as spokesman for sentiment within Poland. Under present conditions, participation in broadcasts by Polish emigre organizations or spokesmen should be confined to judicious use of specifically attributed statements by them which further the objectives for which broadcasting is conducted. This does not apply to individual exiles who serve professionally on broadcast staffs and who contribute their skills, knowledge and judgment to the presentation of programs, but who, in all instances, are without independent responsibility and are under supervision of American management for adherence to the policies and purposes of the station.

III. The Role of RFE:

The general nature and content of broadcasts to Poland will be adapted to the characteristics of Radio Free Europe as (1) a voice of the people of free Western nations dedicated to the interest of the people of East Europe, and (2) an instrument, unattributable to the U.S. Government, for the furthering of U.S. policy objectives.

A. U.S. policy will control the over-all policy position of RFE:

1. While its broadcasts must, in general, adhere to U.S. policy and avoid positions whose net result would be injurious to U.S. policy, RFE will, at the same time, maintain flexibility and objectivity. With respect to its treatment of affairs relating to the U.S., to Poland or to other countries, RFE will report objectively, giving fair coverage to significant viewpoints which are not necessarily in accord with views of the U.S. government.

2. From time to time, unannounced U.S. foreign policy will be conveyed to RFE. As an instrument for furthering unannounced policy, RFE will be governed strictly by the individual policy guidances furnished to it through appropriate channels. These guidances will relate to specific events and conditions and may, in some instances, appear to be in conflict with announced policy. In most instances, guidances on unannounced U.S. policy will relate to objectives which

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can be furthered by RFE as an unattributable radio, but which would constitute inappropriate positions to be taken by an official organ of the U.S. Government.

3. RFE will seek by all practicable means to broaden and improve its news coverage of world affairs and its cross-reporting of events in the Soviet orbit. In its coverage of world news RFE will strike an appropriate balance between the need to avoid the appearance of an American propaganda instrument, and the interest in U.S. affairs which follows normally from recognition by the audience that the U.S. is the keystone of the free world. In seeking this balance RFE will be guided by (a) impartial and objective selection of news based on its news value to Poles and the reporting and commenting on such news from a viewpoint consistent with its representation of the people of the free world as distinguished from its covert representation of U.S. policy, and (b) recognition that the principal role of official radios broadcasting to Poland is to reflect the American point of view and to cover "Americana"; RFE broadcasts in this area should generally be in the European context, as seen through European eyes.

4. RFE will follow the rule of avoiding to the greatest practicable extent a negative approach in its broadcasts to Poland; it will couch these in terms of positive and constructive thought. The general tone of its broadcasts to Poland will be pro-Western and will reflect the principles which distinguish the free world from that of the Communist orbit; but it will not be narrowly and contentiously anti-Communist. Criticism of Communist institutions will be characterized whenever possible by positive suggestions and by commentary which will illustrate for Poles possible means for remedying the defects or overcoming the evils of such institutions. Under present conditions in Poland RFE will not make use of "Black Book" techniques.

5. Discussion by RFE of Poland's relations with the USSR and other Communist states should be approached with the greatest caution toward the end of avoiding, as far as possible, the creation of unnecessary difficulties for the Gomulka regime in its relations with those countries.

6. It is permissible and desirable that, within the limitations indicated in this general guidance, RFE should concern itself with the internal affairs of Poland. In many cases RFE will be able to deal with internal Polish affairs by indirection. On some specific issues, however, it will probably be necessary and desirable to include some outspoken criticism of the regime. RFE will address its discussion of internal affairs to those matters which have a material bearing on Communist institution, on regime practices, legislation and controls, and on similar factors only to the extent that they serve to promote policy objectives of the U.S. with regard to Poland. It is of the utmost importance that the content and manner of such discussion be carefully calculated to aid in the gradual attainment of objectives

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without stimulating or encouraging developments which might force a regime reversion to Stalinist methods or risk Soviet intervention. RFE will be sensitive to the current sentiments of the Polish populace insofar as they can be ascertained and will avoid involvement in affairs which Poles in general would regard as peculiarly their own concern. RFE will avoid alienating Polish listeners by dwelling on aspects of internal conditions and shortcomings of which the Poles themselves are well aware. In its discussion of Polish political affairs, RFE will not present itself as a voice of specific Polish "opposition" to the regime, but it will so shape its programs as to indicate sympathy with those segments of the Polish audience whose aspirations are in accord with the policy objectives of this paper. It is not anticipated that the use of recent Polish escapees on the air, live or recorded, would be productive in present circumstances. However, such individuals may be used for such purposes provided prior approval is obtained by RFE through appropriate channels.

7. RFE will take steps toward a strengthening of its posture as a reflector of the free world to Poland. It will increase emphasis on European ideas, events and prospects for the future, both to lay foundations for future association of East European countries in the European Community, and to demonstrate the practices and achievements of free peoples by the example of European nations whose traditions, resources and physical situations are nearest to those of the audience. This will be accomplished over a period of time by:

Development of appropriate relationships with "European" organizations, whose expressed interest and practical cooperation will balance the previous identification of RFE with the U.S. alone among free world peoples.

Greater use of European materials, points of view, and speakers.

Emphasis on European integration and cooperation trends. Any discussion of European integration will exclude any direct or implied suggestion that Poland join in any Western military alliance.

Discontinuance of identification of broadcasts to Poland as the "Voice of Free Poland," and the substitution therefor of "This is the Polish Service of Radio Free Europe," or some similar designation to be agreed upon which will foster the "European" concept of RFE while at the same time maintaining the identification of the broadcasts as specifically for and in the service of Poles. The approach that RFE represents the views of Polish political opposition, or any suggestion that it is an outlet for Polish emigre political opinion is to be abandoned.

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B. RFE's aims and attitudes will take cognizance of the current delicate political situation in Poland. Whatever RFE says to Poles, by direction or by indirection, must be within the limits established by the desirability that all Poles of all shades of anti-Soviet or anti-Communist political orientation be guided by the need for restraint and sympathetic understanding of the problems confronting the regime, especially in its attitudes toward the extremes of revisionism and Stalinism, and in its relations with the USSR. Within these limits RFE's efforts in implementation of the immediate policy objective of loosening Soviet controls over Poland will include:

1. Encouragement of the disposition of the Polish people to regard themselves as belonging to Western European civilization, one important aspect of which is the satisfying of the Polish hunger for Western intellectual and cultural contacts.
2. Encouragement of political and economic thought concerning solutions of Polish problems in the light of Western, and especially Western European analogies.
3. Encouragement of elements within the regime disposed to take courses of action independent of Moscow and encouragement of resistance to regime measures which repress freedom of intellectual and cultural expression. It must be borne in mind, however, that the delicacy of the present situation and the desirability of disciplined restraint on the part of Poles could make such efforts counter-productive.
4. Encouragement of the Polish people in their inclination to regard the absence of free political action, especially in conjunction with Soviet-Russian domination, as violating the traditional Polish aspirations for independence.

C. The approach by RFE to its Polish audience will be based essentially on providing information which will help Poles to make their own judgments and determine for themselves their own courses of action. Maximum practicable use will be made of the following methods:

1. The "attractive alternatives" concept, which visualizes offering to the Polish audience, directly or by implication, ideas for practical, understandable and attainable alternatives for situations imposed upon them by Soviet control. These alternatives are practical and attainable because they are achieved within the terms of the system. The more flexible words of the Moscow leadership are used as a basis for action which in effect is at least temporarily permissible, but which goes beyond the intent by gradually reducing Soviet capability for maintaining full control of the key sources of power. An example of the application of this concept would be encouragement of support among Polish peasants for voluntary cooperatives as opposed to collectives.

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2. Indoctrination by precepts. In accord with the policy of "Europeanization," maximum effort should be made to inform the Polish people about political, economic and social conditions in Western Europe and about developments toward European unity. Leading European authorities should be used for this purpose and, whenever possible, analogies applicable to Poland should be drawn.

3. Exploitation of the "controlling apparatus" in its resistance to Soviet demands. The "controlling apparatus" is made up not only of government functionaries and Communist party members, but also of factory managers, writers and journalists, diplomats, teachers and even (because of their dynamism and influence on the rest of society) university students. The legitimate self-interest and aspirations of the "controlling apparatus" in Poland are more often than not at variance with the dictates of the USSR. Broadcasts designed to exploit these conflicts between the "controlling apparatus" and the USSR would be particularly effective in matters

a. which pertain to national integrity. Poles, as citizens of their nation, are conditioned by the traditional and emotional bonds of the concept of their nationhood. As such, they are averse to having the policies of their nation subordinated to the USSR, and they resent the corruption by Soviet influence of the cultural institutions and traditions which are at the base of their nationhood.

b. which pertain to self-expression. Particularly among the literary and artistic components of the Polish "controlling apparatus," literary freedom to create is necessary for the proper employment of their talents. To them "socialist realism," the use of art as a means to serve political ends, is mechanical and frustrating. The censor is their natural enemy. If the creative writer or artist is not permitted to express himself freely and without the restraints of any particular political doctrine, he cannot fulfill his purpose in life.

c. which arouse intellectual curiosity. The desire to know more about other people, their ideas and experiences is especially strong among professional components of the "controlling apparatus," among physicians, lawyers, scientists, engineers. They recognize the interchange of ideas as the root of vitality in their fields. This intellectual curiosity is also inherent in the student.

d. which justify decentralization of authority. The local factory manager thinks he knows how to handle his problems better than the Ministerial bureaucrat; he wants to do things in his own way. Village officials believe that they understand local problems

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better than the planners in the district headquarters; district officials resent interference from Warsaw. The desire for more local autonomy is particularly sharp in a highly-centralized Communist society. The current reverse tendencies in Poland, albeit limited, are particularly fortuitous for discreet exploitation.

4. The "small steps" concept, which is premised on the judgment that slow but consistent step-by-step progress toward an attainable goal is more effective under conditions such as those relating to Poland than an all-out attack directed at an ultimate goal which is not attainable within the foreseeable future. This concept recognizes the danger that an excessive display of zeal by the Polish people to move in the direction of liberalization might result either in catastrophe or in strengthened controls and greater reluctance on the part of the regime to grant any measure of liberalization, which also might tend to strengthen ties with the USSR. Accordingly, with reference to the Polish broadcasts of RFE, "small steps" are to be encouraged implicitly and discreetly.

IV. RFE Broadcasts to Poland will not be in violation of the following rules:

- A. Avoid excessive and contentious polemics, vituperation and vindictiveness. Sarcasm, satire and irony should also generally be shunned, except on occasion when handled with exceptional adroitness, temperance and in a vein of good humor. Polemics broadcast by RFE will be characterized by reasoned thinking and will not indulge in diatribes or blatantly propagandistic argumentation.
- B. Avoid the use of program content or tone which either is calculated to be inflammatory or whose effects may reasonably be anticipated as potentially inflammatory. Even straight news can be inflammatory if improperly handled, as for example, the impassioned delivery, or even the dispassionate reporting out of context and without relating it to political realities, of a translation of Western speech or article attacking the USSR or urging the Satellite peoples to seek liberation.
- C. Avoid any action which would amount to, or could be legitimately construed to be, direct incitement to armed uprising; or tactical advice in connection with any disturbance or uprising which might occur.
- D. Avoid taking a patronizing and condescending position or indulging in preachment.
- E. Avoid invidious comparisons between Western countries and Poland. Comparisons with Western countries will be by indirection as much as possible. When direct comparison is necessary it will carefully avoid lines which are likely to be insulting or irritating to Poles.

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- F. Avoid criticisms which would be insulting to the Poles as a people or injurious to their personal and national pride.
- G. Avoid commentary which is needlessly repetitious. Repetition is acceptable as a counter-jamming method. Use of repetition, solely as a device for emphasis, is acceptable under suitable controls to prevent its becoming counter-productive.
- H. Avoid any direct suggestions for action which, if carried out, could cause regime reprisals.
- I. Avoid rumors as a general rule, using them with great care and only in a case where some clearly useful purpose is to be served and where substantial evidence lends credibility to the rumor. In any event, rumors should be clearly identified as such--for example, before and after reference to them in broadcasts. Rumor, in this sense, includes unconfirmed reports from any source.
- J. Avoid full reliance on accepted political terminology which may have lost meaning or significance to Poles, and give preference to basic words which have an unequivocal meaning, such as "freedom," "slavery," etc.
- K. Avoid use of descriptive phrases which through prolonged use have lost significance and degenerated into mere cliches.
- V. The foregoing policy for RFE broadcasting to Poland is aimed only at promoting evolutionary change. Programming in accord with this policy should not be undertaken with the specific intention or expectation of obtaining visible effects within a short term. In the present climate, favorable developments from the standpoint of U.S. objectives may well transpire in Poland, but they should ensue as a consequence of Polish decisions and timing without patent relation to RFE broadcasts. Despite the gains achieved by the Gomulka regime, its political and economic status is unassured; the grip of the Soviet vise on Poland is strong, and the possibilities of a consequent reversal of trends or complete overthrow is an ever-present danger. Although Polish resentment of Russian hegemony and Communist institutions runs deep, there are major impediments in the way of translating this resentment into positive accomplishments short of creating a situation which might prompt Soviet intervention with disastrous results for Poland and a much more serious threat to world peace than in the case of the Hungarian revolution. However great the Polish potential for revolutionary action, developments relating to the Hungarian revolt highlight the tragic limitations on Western capabilities of providing effective assistance to a resisting satellite population. Fortunately, the Polish people generally, as well as the Gomulka regime, seem well aware of their predicament in these respects.

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In sum, then, expectations for RFE broadcasting to Poland must be confined largely to the following effects of RFE efforts:

- A. Assisting the Polish people to maintain their questioning or resistant state of mind with regard to Soviet policies and propaganda and with respect to Communist institutions, practices and indoctrination.
- B. Keeping the Polish people in touch with and oriented toward Western life and thought.
- C. Providing grist for Polish thinking on matters of current interest and long-term developments.
- D. Suggesting to listeners possibilities of "attractive alternatives."

It should be left to the Poles themselves to draw the conclusions, formulate the solutions, determine the timing and make the decisions on courses of action for which they must be prepared to assume the direct consequences.

VI. In the event of emergency conditions affecting Poland due to violent demonstrations, armed uprising and revolutions, or war, RFE will not assume any attitude toward such developments or participate in them in any way except for straight and restrained news reporting, until it receives direction through appropriate channels.

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RFE BROADCASTING POLICY TOWARD POLAND

As pertinent to the broadcasting policy of RFE, this appendix sets forth certain general considerations with respect to conditions in Poland, as well as certain specific considerations relating to problems and attitudes of particular target groups.

I. Considerations Regarding Conditions in Poland:

A. Sociological Considerations:

1. The population of postwar Poland is exceptionally homogeneous, representing essentially one nationality and one religion (approximately 98% ethnically Polish and 96% Roman Catholic). Poles are deeply conscious of and attached to their historical traditions in which nationalism and religion are interwoven. The attitudes resulting from both of these factors, inherited from medieval times became deeply ingrained during the century and a half before World War I when a greater part of the Polish nation was dominated by Czarist Russia, a foreign and non-Catholic power.

a. The average Pole is motivated by an intense love of country. The Polish national spirit, unquenched by generations of subjection to foreign masters and fired by struggles for independence, is marked by patriotic fervor and pride in the national cultural heritage. Exultation in and glorification of suffering for the sake of Poland have been the key notes of Polish spiritual development. Related to this is a romantic idealism which often-perhaps too easily - stirs the Pole's imagination and inclines him to act impulsively without regard for the "realities" of his situation. Long periods of alien rule have taught him many lessons in adaptability and resourcefulness for survival. Particularly, the experiences of recent years have forced upon him a measure of realism. Confronting the most devastating and systematic subjugations (Nazi and Soviet) in his national history, the Pole has learned in some degree to curb his anger and refrain from rash acts. But Poznan afforded a glimpse of how near the surface is his fiery idealism.

b. Fused with patriotism and spirited love of freedom is a high degree of individualism. Poles resent and stubbornly resist attempts to interfere with their personal lives; they do not like to be told what to do; they are extremely jealous of their right to decide respectively their own fate as individuals and that of their country. This attitude manifests itself in civic behavior through their traditional resistance,

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not only to authoritarian rule but to authority. They recoil from regulation, take steps to prevent it and even rebel against it. They tend to oppose governmental measures unless convinced in practice that these are beneficial. Traditionally, they have exhibited strong opposition to centralized power. In the past, this exaggerated individualism has sometimes produced disastrous results in a lack of responsibility for the public weal which weakened the national fibre, rendered it vulnerable, and contributed to loss of statehood. This may reflect a deficiency in social and political astuteness which is only offset by their intense nationalism. Especially do they abhor attempts by foreigners to dominate or organize their internal affairs. Historically, Poles have shown a remarkable capacity for resisting foreign domination.

c. Effects upon the population of having lived for generations in a partitioned country under several dissimilar imperial systems are still evident; and differences between socio-economic classes with regard to living conditions, interests, and problems, however modified by recent developments, cannot be disregarded. But under this surface variety there is a coreconsistency of Polish culture. Most of the Polish people show basic similarities in their moral attitudes, in their norms of behavior for themselves and for other people, in their emotional reactions and in their ways of reasoning. A primary cause of this is that, springing from roots in medieval chivalry, there has existed in the minds of the Polish people a model of personality (the "good Pole") whose moral characteristics, blended with strong nationalism, they have always managed to transmit to succeeding generations. A high sense of personal honor was one facet of this standard for emulation which has been inculcated in children from their earliest years. Courage, endurance, selfreliance, aversion to sentimentality and contempt for death were other ingredients in the composite. The impact of this national cultural pattern upon the individual has been exceptionally strong in Poland since being a "good Pole" represented the highest personal virtue in the Polish system of values.

To be sure, in the postwar years, the sense of personal honor has been considerably dulled under harsh conditions of life. Slyness, cunning, bribery, economic fraud and theft have become common in the struggle for economic survival and in attempts to evade inordinate demands of Party and Government. But ideals rooted in age-old tradition constitute a cultural residue which must be taken into account, both positively and with caution, by a judicious propaganda effect.

d. A consciousness of history has played an unusually important role in motivating Polish behavior, both individual and collective. Historical events and personalities have been

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e. Historically squeezed between two great powers the Poles have been battered by the Germans in their drive to the East and the Russians in their drive to the West; yet they have remained stubbornly unique - an unusual example of continuity for centuries. Despite this age-long battering and subjugation by rather highly developed states, few traces of alien values have survived. Oppression served principally to intensify their nationalist aspirations. Today, despite the far-reaching changes in political philosophy, leadership and governmental structure to which they have been subjected since World War II, the cultural characteristics of the people have not changed significantly. The conditions under which Poles live have altered radically, but there remains an underlying continuity in basic attitudes and social behavior. Ideas which have motivated them for centuries are still alive in the inclinations of most Poles after more than a decade of efforts to undermine the influence of religion and to implant the ideology of Communism. The integration, consistency and continuity of Polish culture reflect an extraordinary power of resistance to change.

(Reflecting these bends of character is the attitude expressed last year by a Polish university student in commenting on some intellectuals who doubt the value of a struggle for truth in the face of tanks and nuclear weapons. Despite years of conditioning under Soviet Communism, he is quoted as declaring, "It is worth while because justice must ultimately triumph, and even if this triumph is short, just as human life is short, it is worth while to live for this triumph.") Admirable though such attitudes may be, they point up the constant risks and grave responsibility of broadcasting at this time to Polish hearers.

evoked as guiding examples and seem to have stirred a responsive desire for emulation. Collective feats of bravery on behalf of Polish nationalism have provided contemporary slogans manifesting a will and spirit to fight. It is this which explains incidents when a fighting unit has died to the last man defending a single spot after the surrounding country has been submerged by the enemy. But Polish heroes are highly individualistic; the name and deed of the person is emphasized. To be a hero has signified a readiness to sacrifice life and position for the defense and honor of Poland. The corollary is that suffering and death have been regarded as accumulated capital with which to redeem Poland. Blood which has been shed in an honorable cause was not regarded as wasted; ultimately, it would be credited to Poland. And despite defeats, victory has been assured because it lived on in the national spirit and moral values. At times, this attitude has produced a messianic conception of the role of the Polish nation.

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f. Roman Catholicism has a tradition of 1000 years among the Polish people. It is highly institutionalized in Poland. Attention is focused on ritual and actions rather than upon meditation; there seems to be little inclination to mysticism on the part of the Poles. Legends of the saints occupy a primary place in Polish folklore and are preserved as favorite tales in the home. Polish Catholics tend to regard themselves as the principal and special custodians of their faith - a "chosen people." Not only is Catholicism strong in a statistical sense in Poland; in a special sense (intensified by postwar conditions) it is the people's religion; it permeates their everyday life; and it is identified with Polish nationalism - to most Poles, being a Pole is synonymous with being a Catholic. These deep religious attachments of the Polish people are reinforced by the dedicated, astute and popular Church leadership of Cardinal WYSZNSKI.

2. Although racially and linguistically Poles are closely related to the Russians, Polish culture is sharply differentiated from the Russian and, for a thousand years, has had a predominantly Western alignment. Aggressions by Russia throughout the period of modern history have contributed to the passionate Polish nationalism and have hindered the penetration of Pan-Slavism as well as Communism. Traditional Polish attitudes of religious faith, nationalism and individualism, as outlined above, combine to undergird the current popular abhorrence of Soviet domination, not only because of antipathy to its regimentation of individual behavior, its alien forms of political, economic and social conduct, and its anti-Catholic objectives, but all the more because it is Russian. Poles have been perhaps the most thoroughly recalcitrant people under Soviet suzerainty, and the extent of their present support of the Gomulka regime is due principally to the measure of independence from Soviet-Russian subjugation which it presently affords and the possibilities of further relief which it may presage.

Because of Poland's precarious situation in the vice of potentially crushing Soviet might, the Gomulka government cannot countenance public utterances in derogation of the Soviet Union or in explicit expression of desire for realignment with the West. The desirable role of broadcast programming will be to nurture the natural and eager Polish proclivities for Western affiliations without inflaming the existing bitter resentment of Soviet-Russian interference with Polish life. Anything which increases the difficulties of the Gomulka regime in its relations with the USSR should be avoided. This would include manifestations of too warm support for the regime by the broadcaster or Western circles whose effect might be counterproductive by handicapping the regime in its dealings with the Soviet Union. The aim should be to afford discreet help without provoking adverse Soviet measures. One useful expedient would be to copy the Gomulka technique of taking at face value Soviet positions favorable to the general course of developments in Poland since October 1956 and stressing these - a

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technique which tends to make Soviet retreat from these positions more difficult.

3. Historically, a guiding principle of Polish private and public life has been to "look westward." Poles have regarded their country as the most eastern of the Western nations and have considered it their mission to defend and develop the values of Western culture on the borders of the East. Cultural development under Western influences is evidenced in their faith, folklore, alphabet, literature and architecture. In modern times, Poland has had close political relations with Western democracies. Strong constitutional influences from France, Great Britain and the United States have contributed to its Western affiliations. In general, the Polish people have looked to these larger Western powers for support of their national aspirations - particularly to France and England in the 19th century and during the existence of the League of Nations, and to the United States since then - counting on the interest of these nations in checking any marked preponderance of German or Russian power in Europe. Periodically the Poles have been disillusioned over the willingness or ability of these Western states to bring sufficient leverage to bear to be of any practical value to Poland. Thus, Poles have developed some reservations about the West. Many of them feel that the Western powers betrayed Poland at Yalta and the great respect which they once had for the strength of the West has been modified.

On the other hand, German aggressions and outstanding territorial issues not only have obstructed substantial German influence in Poland but have kindled Polish fears of Germany which the Soviet-Communists have not neglected to nourish. Polish preference for the non-German West was reinforced by the German and Soviet invasions of 1939, the bitter experience of extensive deportations of Poles by these occupying powers, comradeship in arms with the Western allies and American material aid in the early postwar years. Large Polish emigrations, especially to the United States and France, have strengthened the bonds with Western countries. Shipping and trade relations with the United States, particularly during the inter-war period, and emigrant remittances from America have enhanced Polish-American ties.

Relationships of family, friends and compatriots between residents of Poland and members of the Polish emigrations to the West, Polish émigré impressions of things Western, and even the concerns of Western communities of Polish descendants provide important sources of interest to Polish radio listeners of which advantage should be taken. Such programming, however, should be differentiated sharply from utilization of politically active exiles, who should be treated at most sparingly, with utmost discretion, on non-controversial topics, and only in a manner precluding all appearances that the broadcasting station is espousing any specific individual, group or cause.

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In view of general Polish attitudes toward Western countries outlined above, matters relating to France and England may well be stressed in broadcast programming. For relevant topics, Italy also can properly be emphasized. Affairs relating to Germany should be handled with lesser emphasis and special care.

4. In addition to traditionally rooted factors in Polish attitudes concerning neighboring countries (e.g. antagonisms toward Germans and Russians per se) current differences and frictions as well as areas of sympathy or agreement with other Communist countries - especially as regards "roads to Socialism" - impose special conditions on broadcasting emphasis in the treatment of matters relating to these respective countries. There is, for example, a significant bond of common interest and sympathy with the Hungarian people engendered by the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. There is a special Polish interest in China and Yugoslavia because of encouragement received from them or attractive patterns of thought and practice which they exemplify. Judicious attention to such Polish interests should be given by broadcast programming (e.g. in cross-reporting) without conveying an impression of undue approval by the broadcaster or Western circles of (for example) Chinese or Yugoslav influences. On the other hand, commentary on developments in neighboring or related countries should avoid aspects which might offend Polish susceptibilities.

5. Relative to Polish attitudes toward Germany and Russia, it must be recognized that Polish sensitivities are keen as regards the Oder-Neisse territorial question. This is a particularly complicated and delicate sphere of national interest in view of Polish awareness that Western acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line at Potsdam in 1945 was only provisional and that the United States, with its manifest interest in Germany's reunification and future, has refused to recognize the finality of this territorial settlement. Insistence upon its correctness and permanence (subject possibly to minor modifications) is not only a fundamental of official Polish policy and propaganda but one which has popular support. As with the annexation of German territories east of the Oder-Neisse, cession of areas east of the Curzon line was accomplished mainly on Soviet initiative and depends on Soviet power. Unless and until unforeseen developments occur with respect to Polish boundaries which would make desirable the reflection of a new U.S. position, it is necessary that broadcast programming avoid any involvement in the territorial issues.

6. The ethnic minorities of former times have virtually disappeared as a result of wartime exterminations, territorial alterations, exchange of populations and postwar migrations. None of the residual minorities (which altogether comprise only 2% of the present population) is of sufficient significance to justify special attention in broadcast programming.

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Of Jews, who before World War II made up about 10% of the population, only a handful remain. Traditional anti-Semitic attitudes are so strong, so deeply ingrained and so prevalent that the continuing existence of this factor must be taken into proper account. One current of popular distaste for the postwar Communist regime has been directed toward the disproportionate presence of Jews in positions of prominence and in the membership of the hated security apparatus. Apparently under stimulus from Soviet-Communist quarters certain elements of the "conservative" ("rightist"), Stalinist, Natolin faction of the Polish Communist Party attempted to utilize anti-Semitism as a weapon of intra-Party warfare against Gomulka. The problem which this posed, however, seems much less serious than it did some months ago and the near-panicky mood which it produced in Jewish circles appears to have subsided. The Gomulka government has tightened measures against "hooligan" anti-Semitic excesses and has conducted a campaign against anti-Semitism. Because of Gomulka's general victories over his intriguing opponents in the interim, the official policy in this regard has had a calming effect. But the latent problem must be clearly remembered and nothing in broadcast programming should disturb from any direction the delicacies of its status and handling within Poland.

7. The importance of the family as a social, economic and religious unit has been a dominant feature of Polish life. The strength of the family as an institution has centered in its solidarity and stability as an operating unit. Its importance for the nation derived from the fact that within its framework national tendencies were nurtured in the individual. Traditionally, family authority has been strong and has commanded respect even when resisted. The circle of kinship has been broad but closely knit and blood relationship has claimed a primary loyalty. Poles have felt that their family life is their own, that no outsider should interfere and that no such intervention can disrupt it. Drastic social changes introduced by postwar Communist regimes have made inroads on the traditional pattern of family behavior, but it may offer a useful instrumentality for appealing program approach.

8. In programming for Poland careful attention should be given to the demographic distribution of social elements as concerns their respective interests, urban and rural possibilities for radio listening, and target priorities among various elements of present-day Polish society. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that Poland is a peasant country in the process of becoming industrialized and that for the first time in Polish history, a majority of people depend for their livelihood on non-agricultural pursuits. The rural-agricultural elements unquestionably constitute the principal stronghold for conservation of traditional Polish values and offer the most stubborn resistance to communization of Poland. On the other hand, certain elements of the urban population have potential capabilities for effecting modifications in institutions

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and procedures which are not at the disposal of their rural compatriots.

B. Political Considerations:

1. General:

Poland lacks extensive experience with political forms and processes of a Western democratic type. But Poles have a dogged impulsion to manage their political affairs according to their own inclinations. Gomulka's popular support is chiefly attributable to his representation, at this juncture, of that drive for independence as well as to the absence in the popular estimation of any better alternative political leader and general policy. Although there is not a highly developed Polish tradition of political democracy, there are deeply rooted principles in Polish society which, given the opportunity, would probably favor representative political institutions and procedures. In the prevailing circumstances, broadcast treatment of democratic themes should not propagandize Polish listeners to press at this time for the advantages of Western democracy. Emphasis should be placed upon principles of freedom, justice and equality circumscribed by appropriate restraints and pragmatically worthwhile possibilities. Merely to sustain by indirection the indigenous tendencies toward independence from Moscow will suffice to serve the purpose of weakening the bonds of Soviet domination. Conservation of Polish political achievements in this regard is of much more importance than the stimulation of progress toward greater freedom, which may be accelerated too rapidly by Polish nationalist and individualist impatience. Moreover, Polish listeners should not be given the impression that they are being offered advice on courses of political action, which is a matter for internal Polish determination. In view of Polish affinity with the West, discussion of West European developments, including the non-military community associations of Western Europe, should be an effective and sympathetic means of exerting background influence on Polish political thinking.

2. Political Orientation:

The following aspects of Polish political history help to elucidate the complex of political orientation:

Until the end of the 18th century Poland was ruled by an oligarchy of great lords under a king; a landed aristocracy, linked with ecclesiastical leadership, governed the country through an increasingly feudal system. In 1795 Polish territory was dismembered by Russia, Prussia and Austria, ceased to exist as a political entity and developed until 1918 under three dissimilar imperial systems. At the outset of the 20th century, several fairly well-defined and ideologically varied political tendencies had appeared. The principal ones were associated with (1) an extremely nationalistic middle and upper class movement, concentrated in the area

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under German rule, (2) a Socialistic movement (with anti-Russian bent) active among workers and intellectuals in the Austrian-governed area, and (3) a clerically originated peasant movement, principally in Galicia, whose radicalism was confined to peasant problems and which was politically uncooperative with the workers. In the eastern territory ruled by Russia, there was also a developing phase of the Russian Social Democratic movement in its fight against reactionary Czarism. And, in this area on the eve of World War I, there appeared another peasant movement more radical than that in Galicia, anti-clerical and with many views closer to those of the Socialists.

The differing cultural, economic and political development of Poles in the three areas produced a variety of interests even within the same class of society, and for every interest there seemed to be a political grouping or organization determined to preserve its political identity rather than to merge in a broader national movement. The three principal movements mentioned above did not absorb many smaller outside groups and themselves tended to split into factions reflecting a multiplicity of shades of political opinion.

After World War I, with the help of the Western powers, Poland emerged again as a political entity, but the task of welding its people into a unified nation was complicated. They had lived for a century and a half under three different political jurisdictions and were accustomed to regional divergencies of law and custom. Especially marked were the differences in development between those who had existed for generations under a backward Russian aegis and those who had been closely associated with more progressive German or Austrian environment. But, in general, they had become disposed to regard any government as "foreign" and, for centuries, most of them had acquired no experience in responsibility for the public welfare, leaving it to the will of God. The country was plagued with radical and painful economic mutations as well as serious minority problems. Although certain material progress was made during the 20-year period of independence, the political accomplishments were limited.

Four blocs were represented in the Polish parliament at the outset of this period: right, center, left and national minorities. The rightist bloc was composed of landowners and Christian Democrats with Catholic connections, program and support from Catholic workers, artisans and craftsmen. In the vacillating center bloc, the main component was the Peasant Party. The leftist bloc comprised the Socialist Party (nationalist in outlook), the National Workers Party (leftist but nationalist and anti-Socialist), and the Peasant "Liberation" (somewhat Socialistic). The minorities bloc was composed of elements differing among themselves and, in some cases, within a single minority, but nevertheless constituting a potent factor. Interparty strife, Peasant Party inability to cooperate with Socialists and its tendency to vote with the Right produced a series of unstable rightist coalitions at a time which

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demanding a strong popular government.

Genuine parliamentary government ended in 1926 with the coup d'etat of PILSUDSKI, whose initial popular support was so widespread, especially on the left, that it even included Communists. A semi-authoritarian period in Polish political life lasted until 1935. With the rise of Hitler, nationality questions in Poland took on a different aspect and stable support of minorities was no longer assured. In 1928 a Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government had been formed; but, despite administrative pressures, intimidation of opposition parties and manipulated elections the Bloc was unable to muster sufficient support. A new constitution designed to provide an executive type of government was pushed through in the absence of popular approval. In 1935 elections were boycotted by a majority of the electorate; Pilsudski died and, in 1936, the Bloc dissolved. A less capable and more authoritarian regime was launched in 1937 - the Camp of National Unity. It was somewhat more successful than its predecessor but more in consequence of the tense international situation than because of any increase in popular support.

Only during World War II, inside Poland as well as in exile, did there emerge political parties genuinely reflecting the interests and aspirations of peasants, workers and middle classes who learned to cooperate. The wartime underground evolved a representative parliamentary group (mirrored in the National Council in exile).

Before the war, Communists had never exceeded 2% of the electorate. First and always they opposed the Socialists. Initially, they maintained a semi-legal existence and went underground after 1926. The Party comprised more paid functionaries than workers; except for a few isolated cases trade unions were impervious to Communist propaganda. Communist positions ran counter to strong nationalism by advocating anathemas of territorial cessions. The Party never made significant inroads on the masses; it was popularly regarded as an organization of foreign agents. Moreover, the Moscow purges of 1934-37 eliminated virtually all its first and second line of leadership. After the German attack on the USSR, a Polish Communist organization revived behind the German lines and developed a pro-Soviet underground on the basis of which Soviet plans were developed for the dominion of postwar Poland through a puppet government resting on Soviet armed might.

World War II halted the normal development of Poland as an independent nation and political community. The results of the war in human loss and suffering, effects of occupation, territorial alterations and dislocations of population were violent and extensive. A chaotic interim ensued, in which make-believe political organizations were substituted for real ones. The former political leadership was largely dead, deported or in exile and leadership potential was extraordinarily lacking. Against the Soviet-sponsored

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wave of Communist domination only the Peasant Party offered any vigorous resistance and this opposition was undermined and destroyed. There followed the imposition of a full-fledged Communist regime which was in every sense alien to Polish sensibilities and which occasioned further unprecedented disruptions in traditional patterns of Polish life through its rapidly forced policies of nationalization, collectivization and industrialization.

While there are no substantial roots of Communism in present-day Poland and while it is unquestionable that a Communist regime would be promptly displaced if Poles were today free agents, it cannot accurately be provisioned what political economic and social forms would emerge from the interplay of liberated Polish interests. It seems likely that, despite conservative tendencies on the part of the bulk of the population, the clock of the social order would not be turned completely back to past conditions and that certain influences from experience with left-of-center behavior patterns might persist. Such left-of-center propensities certainly have gained headway among intellectuals, professional groups, students, workers and even some peasants as well as among opportunistic bureaucrats and politicians who, while not convinced by Communist indoctrination, have nevertheless developed a somewhat socialistic outlook. Broadcast programming should take these considerations into account and, while not advocating specific political lines, should not, in the circumstances, do violence to political attitudes which may now be held by these elements of the Polish body politic as well as by "nativist" Communists. Exploitation of left-of-center concepts among Poles may well be assisted by reference to such political experience as that of the British Labour Party and of Swedish Socialism.

3. Communist Party and Government:

Until the Soviet armies overran Poland, the Communist Party had remained insignificant; it was only due to the presence of Soviet troops on and around Polish soil that the Party could take over the Government and perpetuate its control. The Communist rulers of postwar Poland have consisted of two basic elements: (1) "nativist" and (2) that coming from the USSR or attached to the political education staff of the Polish army under Red Army command - some old, some new and opportunistic Communists. The original postwar strength of the "nativists" is estimated at 12,000, that of the Soviet element at 8,000; both were outnumbered by the influx of new members during 1945-48.

The mentality of "nativist" Polish Communists who rose to prominence from the ranks of the wartime underground was basically hostile to international Communist traditions and to the subservience of the pro-Soviet element to the USSR; in this respect it was "nationalistic." A split of the "nativists" with the supra-nationalists became definite in 1948, and a prolonged intra-party crisis occurred because of the obstinacy of Wladyslaw Gomulka in

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defending his position on matters relating to nationalism.

Gomulka had been a prewar Polish Communist of no special rank. He had remained in Poland during the war and so was representative of the "nativist" element, although he lacked renown in Poland as well as in the international Communist movement; in this respect he was typical of all wartime and postwar Polish Communists. He emerged from the war, however, as First Secretary of the Central Committee. Clearly he was not Moscow's choice; but he had proved effective and evidently sufficiently responsive to the Kremlin's wishes to be retained for the time being. The fact that he owed neither life nor position to Moscow set him apart from most other Communist leaders in eastern Europe. He had had no Soviet training and had never served in the Cominform in any capacity, which made him even more of an unknown and uncontrollable quantity. Tendencies and ideas of his own, which were not to Moscow's liking, as leader of a native (albeit Communist) political movement, exhibited a certain amount of concern on his part to obtain a measure of popular support. Apparently, Gomulka did not have the Party machine under control and rather seemed to rely on the popularity of his ideas which included a desire to put Russo-Polish relations on a footing of friendship between two sovereign states and to eschew subservience of the Polish Communist Party to that of the USSR. His views showed disagreement with the Soviet attitudes toward Tito, the Cominform and the speed-up in collectivization. But while less oriented to the USSR, Gomulka was above all a Communist, interested in the Party of which he was head and determined to destroy any rival Socialism, although he was willing to grant Socialists a considerable role in the United Workers Party.

In consequence of the intra-Party conflicts and his inadequacy of control, Gomulka resigned in 1948, was read out of the Party in 1949, was arrested in 1951 (though never brought to trial) and, only by virtue of post-Stalin developments which rent the Party assunder and called for measures to increase its popularity, was he restored in 1956 to membership in the Party and to his position as First Secretary.

Gomulka's dramatically successful stand against the top Soviet leadership in October 1956 (including the removal of Marshal ROKOSSOVSKY and other Soviet personnel who symbolized domination by the USSR), his extraction of Soviet agreements on the status of Warsaw Pact forces in Poland and on the repatriation of Poles from the USSR, his subsequent tactical victories over intra-Party opponents, the Church-State detente which he sponsored and the somewhat liberalized political and economic measures which his regime has put into effect earned for the Party and Government under his direction a wide acceptance as the best immediately available political solution for Poland. It is a solution which, in some measure, satisfies the national chafing at Russian dictation and exactions and which provides some relief from distasteful internal regimentation, while avoiding a Hungarian type debacle. It is problematical

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whether, in the long run, the Gomulka regime can survive Soviet pressures from without and serious economic problems within and whether it can continue to satisfy sufficiently the various urges of important elements in the population for greater benefits without permitting the over-all situation to get out of hand.

The strength of the Gomulka regime lies principally in the extent of current acceptance which it has in the absence of a better alternative. Its weakness inheres chiefly in the fact that it depends to such a major extent on the personality of Gomulka and his rather solitary position within the regime. For the foreseeable future, much will depend on his ability to assert Party discipline, to overcome Party demoralization and produce Party unity.

The Party is presently fragmented into roughly the following loose groupings: (1) the Natolin or "conservative" element, which is split between pro-Soviet extremists and some who momentarily are willing to cooperate with Gomulka; (2) the centristic Old-Communists, almost as conservative as the Natolin group (from which they differ mostly by their rejection of anti-Semitism and resentment of Moscow), but of whom some incline to Gomulka; (3) true Gomulka-ists who, however, differ somewhat among themselves on the desired extent of liberalization; (4) former Socialists and Social Democrats who basically approve Gomulka policies but whose positions do not depend on allegiance to him, who work closely with the Old-Communists and cannot be trusted unequivocally; (5) the real "Leftists," pushing for more extensive and more rapid liberalization. Gomulka has not committed himself to any factional group but is following a policy of maneuver and small compromise in all directions. He is unable to govern by his own strength but, in a showdown, has so far received majority support in the Central Committee; he is able also to command active support within the Politburo. Nevertheless, the inherent conservatism of certain old-line Party members and compromised Social Democrats makes the "coalition" decidedly unstable. Gomulka's ability to control regional and local Party organizations is particularly questionable. A minority for Gomulka at the Party Congress would be disastrous for his centrist program of "National Communism."

The Polish Communist Party comprises approximately 48% workers, 36% professional and white collar personnel and 13% peasants. The so-called activists (i.e. the vital core of Party members) number only about 6000-7000.

Principal features of the current Gomulka chart for the "Polish road to Socialism" (i.e. Polish "National Communism") are: "democratization" of the Party, reform of Party organisms on lower levels, enhancement of the role of parliament, improvement in the standard of living, decollectivization of agriculture, cessation of "kulak" persecution, broadened and theoretically important (but practically limited) role of workers councils in industry and revival of some private enterprise. This program, which has been opposed by the extreme "Stalinists" in the Politburo and Central

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Committee together with many little "Stalins" in local, regional and city organizations of the Party, was made possible by the Liberals and "Leftists," who have been strong enough to obtain its avowal as a compromise but not strong enough to ensure its enforcement in all respects. It is a pragmatic program which was perhaps the minimum that would have sufficed to satisfy the populace but probably must be followed by an improvement in living standards if it is to receive continued public support, and this is precisely the area of greatest difficulty for the Gomulka regime.

By comparison with previous elections in postwar Poland and under Communist regimes in other countries of the Soviet orbit, the national election of January 1957 was a strange and exciting political contest. For the first time in a Communist-run country voters were given a modicum of choice, even though they voted as if no choice existed. Despite its unquestionable desire for a multi-party type of Government, the behavior of the electorate demonstrated a conviction that this could not be achieved without inviting Soviet intervention and that anything short of a mass vote for the preferred candidates of the National Unity Front would weaken the new regime sufficiently to enable the "Stalinists" with Soviet backing to overthrow it. The resulting Sejm, nevertheless, has shown some evidences of genuine parliamentary functioning.

The regime has declared itself in favor of a larger and more autonomous role for several important non-Marxist political groups, and a peasant youth organization has been given permission to function. Numerous victims of the Stalin era have been rehabilitated. The formerly dreaded secret police apparatus has been reorganized; its numbers and functions have been curtailed; and the use of terror has ceased to be an instrument of policy. In spite of some restrictive measures Poland has been permitted a relatively free press - more outspoken than that of Yugoslavia. Jamming of foreign broadcasts has been abolished and people are accorded free access to such programs. Other cultural and economic contacts with the West are being permitted and quietly encouraged. Church activities and religious education have been given more scope. Plans for reduction of the armed forces and the duration of compulsory military training have been set in motion.

The Gomulka regime continues to have wide support within Poland despite its failures to achieve a significant improvement in the economic situation. To be sure, the first flush of revolutionary fervor has passed and, in its place, a certain degree of depression and apathy has set in. In general, however, the population looks on the accomplishments of the regime as specific and valuable gains for which Gomulka is responsible. The intra-Party fight and restraint on freedom of expression in the press, while highly important, are of less significance to the man-in-the-street and to the farmer than they are to the apparatchik or the intelligentsia. The people are not laboring under the misapprehension that Gomulka will turn away from "socialism," but they have felt that he places Polish

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interests before those of another country, and in this respect they were reassured by his stand at the last Party plenum.

In summary, then, the current political attitudes of the Polish populace toward the Government may be stated as follows:

- a. Major sources of discontent during the immediately preceding decade of Soviet-puppet rule included:
- (1) Soviet-Russian dictation.
 - (2) Depressed economic conditions in conjunction with Soviet exploitation.
 - (3) Systematic subversion of Polish national and religious values, institutions and symbols together with glorification of Soviet values, institutions and symbols.
 - (4) Deprivation of human rights especially through terroristic practices.
 - (5) Extremes of regimentation.
 - (6) Systematically fostered isolation from the West.
- b. Major sources of preference for the present Gomulka regime:
- (1) The degree to which the regime signifies freedom from Soviet colonialism in the national interests of increased Polish autonomy.
 - (2) Liberalization in some important areas of economic policy.
 - (3) The Church-State detente, affording a viable working relationship in the sphere of religion.
 - (4) Improved regard for human rights through appreciable reduction of police terror and moderately greater opportunities for freedom of expression.
 - (5) Reductions in regimentation and some encouragement of individual initiative especially in agriculture, crafts and small business enterprises.
 - (6) Enlarged opportunities for cultural and economic relations with the West.

.Broadcast programming should not attempt to exploit the Party-schisms and strife except to lend general and indirect support to a middle-of-the-road policy trend between the extremist elements of

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"right" and "left" whose benefits may accrue to the Polish people. Care, however, should be taken to avoid an impression of the station's identifying itself too closely with the Gomulka-ists or with any other political element, position, program or proposal, or of placing its stamp of approval on "National Communism." While moderate progress within this framework seems to be the advisable course for Poland at this juncture, as is evidently recognized by a majority of Poles, and while it serves to weaken Soviet dominance over this partly disengaged Satellite, a vast preponderance of the Polish population regard Communism per se as an evil and not simply because it has been forced upon them by Soviet Russia. Moreover, "National Communism" is not consonant with ultimate U.S. policy aspirations for Poland. With proper caution, advantage may be taken by Chinese and Yugoslav precepts or examples, for which there is a receptive audience in Poland, in so far as these may promise suitable as well as attractive alternatives for Polish adaptation. But here again, discretion is required to avoid giving an impression of undue approval by the station or by the West of Chinese or Yugoslav Communist ideas and practices.

C. Economic Considerations:

1. General:

With the exception of Hungary, the economic situation of Poland is the most forlorn in Europe. Poland is the largest country in the Soviet orbit in both area and population. Its climate and soil conditions are favorable to agriculture, which historically has been its predominant occupation. Industry has now supplanted agriculture as the chief source of its national income, and its industrial potential is equal, if not superior, to that of any other Satellite. Mining and manufacture, especially of heavy producer goods, has increased greatly. Industrial productivity, however, is handicapped by deficiencies in raw materials and manpower (particularly as concerns expert management personnel and skilled labor), although it is favored by extensive reserves of coal, limestone, lignite and potentials of hydro-electric power. Especially critical are the shortages in high-grade iron ore, oil and cotton for which Poland is largely dependent upon the USSR and which cause a chronic unrest in the major industries.

The same may be said with regard to grain. Before the war, Poland not only produced enough to feed its own population but exported grain in substantial quantities. Now production falls considerably short of supplying internal needs. Reserve stocks are exhausted, and Poland is currently dependent on the USSR for one and a half million tons of grain. By stopping shipments (which are from time to time held up) of iron ore, oil, cotton and grain, the Soviet Union, if it chose, could exert an unbearable squeeze on Polish economy. That the Soviet leaders have not seen fit to do so (nor, when the chips were down, to employ their superior military might) would seem to indicate that they prefer, for the time

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being, to tolerate this errant protege than to risk a Polish uprising which might set off an incalculable chain reaction. They may well believe that time will be on their side.

During the period when Soviet planners were directing the Polish economy nearly half of the state's investment went into industry and the bulk of that into heavy industry, whose principal immediate purpose was to furnish war material to the Soviet bloc. The result of that industrialization, for which the whole Polish economy was re-gearred, is an impractical accumulation of pompous, half-finished and inadequately equipped capital undertakings, including steel mills, chemical plants, aircraft and automotive works. In view of the grave economic situation which Poland faces after years of sacrifice in living standards to achieve these grandiose projects, the soundness of most of them has come into doubt and Poles are examining their relation to improvement in the meager economic welfare. Gomulka has insisted that the existing Five-Year Plan, with its continuing emphasis on heavy industry, be radically altered to sharply reduce the rate of growth in output of producer goods and to allow for increased emphasis on consumer goods. The revised plan of the regime calls for a slowdown in the rate of investment for capital goods, a 20% increase this year in investment for agriculture and a 34% increase in construction (principally housing). Poland will still be woefully short of internally produced consumer goods and dependent on imports to fill the irreducible gap. The regime's short-range program is concerned principally with food and textiles. Part of its long-range program also is to increase agricultural output.

But the farmers badly need machinery, tools and fertilizers to raise productivity. For the purchase of these and other necessities, the regime wants to apply profits from its valuable coal resources and its promising (but still prospective) chemical industry. Here again, however, adequate equipment is lacking for efficient exploitation, and this calls for capital investment at a time when Poland's trade deficit is four times higher than last year and nine times higher than the year before. Polish economists estimate that a minimum of \$500 million in foreign capital is needed urgently to put the country's economy into bare working order. (In relation to such need, the proffer of U.S. aid was comparatively small and its timing so delayed as to vitiate much of the psychological impact which it might have had.) The extent of Polish economic need provides Moscow with a special leverage for exerting influence, and the Soviet Union is strategically situated to take command of the situation if the venture in Polish independence flounders on economic rocks.

The Gomulka regime is confronting choices between overly ambitious schemes of industrial production and more modest enterprises which would make profitable use of indigenous raw materials and be more realistic in the long run. Yet cutbacks in heavy industry and any reversal of the previously stimulated transfer of rural manpower

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into urban industry will inevitably cause unemployment, dislocations of the populace and misery, particularly in those areas which are politically most sensitive.

One of the most interesting features of the regime's economic policy is the limited but concrete encouragement it is giving to individual enterprise. The number of private workshops and small retail trade establishments which have sprung up since serious "economic democratization" began in mid-1956 is perhaps not fully known even to the regime. It appears that the main demand for private work is in construction and production of building materials and, because of the tremendous need for housing construction, resistance to private initiative in this area seems to be at a minimum. Moreover, the regime is encouraging individuals to set up small tool shops, handicrafts retail trade and other service establishments (such as restaurants and hotels) so long as they do not impair socialized trade and labor cooperatives or intrude upon the Government's grain and meat purchasing. The supply of raw materials necessary to these enterprises has presented serious problems since, in many cases, they have had to obtain these prerequisites at high prices or by illegal means. But the Government is now offering to assist them through tax relief, state loans and supply of raw materials and equipment. And presumably, under announced Government policy, both collectivized and individual farmers may sell their surplus products to them on the free market. Limited as this private sector is, it should provide a useful means of absorbing some unemployed workers, personnel discharged "debureaucratization" of the Government and repatriates from the USSR; it will also further production of consumer goods. Together with this stimulation of private enterprise, plans are being worked out to enable private and socialized sectors to deal directly with each other.

In broadcasts on economic subjects, effort should be made to keep the emphasis on themes relevant to the Polish scene and toward the support of understandable and realistic goals, attainable within the context of current Polish economic conditions. Even then, care should be exercised to avoid the impression that the station is advising any particular course of action in the attempt by Poles to cope with their precarious economic situation. Regardless of the very serious deficiencies of postwar industrial installations, many Poles look upon these and other achievements with national pride. Their sensibilities in such respects should not be offended by a slighting manner of reference in broadcasts.

2. Standard of Living:

Even in prewar days the social structure and stage of economic development tended to keep the living standard of the people low; in this respect Poland ranked among the lowest in the Western world. It was a predominantly agricultural country with a large number of small holdings from which the peasant could hardly eke out a living for his family. In the cities there was an extremely uneven distribution of wealth and income. A high birth rate further depressed the living

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standard of the lower middle class and manual laborers.

The appalling devastation of the war was followed by the introduction of Communist policies to promote the development of capital goods industries at the expense of consumer goods production. This created an inflationary gap between incomes and availability of goods which further reduced the living standard, especially for the urban population (a segment whose size was artificially enlarged).

In the immediate postwar years the accelerated rate of capital formation was officially justified as requisite for extensive rehabilitation which the effects of war and occupation necessitated. Following initial reconstruction, the Polish people were compelled to forego material improvements in their living conditions in the interest of rapid industrialization. The Soviet-dominated regime dismissed the people's hardships with promises of future benefits which would accrue to them from "building socialism." Apart from introducing social security provisions designed to benefit special segments of the population, little was done to raise the general standard of living. The situation did not preclude a considerable range in levels of living. Party dignitaries, higher governmental officials and a small select group of artists and writers enjoyed incomparably better conditions of life than the rest of the population. For the wage-price structure, linked with production norms which often could not be realized for reasons beyond the workers' control, kept the real wage of the worker provocatively low. The forced system of collectivization deprived the peasant of satisfactory personal returns from his labor. Poznan demonstrated how near to a point of general explosion was the discontent engendered by such policies. By mid-1956, even the Party leadership was cognizant of the peril in their inability to stem the tide of popular dissatisfaction and initiated the move to recall Gomulka to office. He had long opposed some of the major aspects of policy which helped to aggravate the living conditions and he hitched his wagon to a promise of amelioration.

The Gomulka regime, however, inherits and must cope with this depressed standard of living; and the continuing critical economic situation in general puts a severe strain on the Government's efforts to execute policies more favorable to the living conditions of the average Pole, especially in the urban communities. As Gomulka himself has said, "Not even the greatest wizzard can pour water from an empty jug."

Famine is not currently evident in Poland but the diet is inadequate from the standpoint of nutrition and variety, by absolute standards as well as by comparison with Western countries. In fact, the food supply is so tight that serious hunger could grip the country in short order. Moreover, it has been estimated that the cost of food alone consumes about 75% of an urban worker's total expenditures, with clothing accounting for another 15%. Clothing and shoes are of inferior quality but their cost is high and, in many

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cases, beyond the reach of the average worker. Purchases of clothing and footwear are, consequently, infrequent and old clothes are made to last longer by mending. A general shabbiness in dress contrasts with the appearance of Poles before the war. In the rural areas, many people make their own clothes, sometimes from home-woven fabrics but mostly from manufactured materials which must be bought in city stores.

The extensive shortage in housing is one of the most troublesome aspects of the depressing living conditions in Poland today. Urban housing for the mass of the Polish people has always been inadequate and substandard by Western criteria. Even before the war overcrowding and inadequacy of modern facilities were widespread. Construction did not keep pace with the growth of the population and with the rate of deterioration. During the war and the long periods of occupation no major housing repairs were undertaken and even normal maintenance was put off. The military activities were so destructive to urban properties that Polish cities emerged from the war with a housing situation which was little short of catastrophic. During the early postwar years, construction activity in the field of urban housing was haphazard and limited principally to repairing damaged properties for quick occupancy by as many persons as possible. The shift of population from the country to the cities and the concentration on industrial construction to the detriment of housing placed additional strains on urban housing facilities. Consequently, the present housing situation is one of the principal sources of discontent and, therefore, an ailment which the Gomulka regime is trying to remedy.

In relation to the cost of living, even without further inflation, it should be noted that whenever a family is forced to depend exclusively on one income it is hard pressed or unable to make ends meet. Often a male householder supplements the income from his primary job by a second occupation. Postwar pressures, both intentional and incidental, have driven the housewife into the active labor force, and her income is frequently needed to bridge the gap for subsistence or a more palatable standard of living.

The average Pole needs no reminder by foreign broadcasts of his deplorable standard of living which, at best, is drab and potentially is explosive. For the Gomulka regime at present it is a tinder box. The most the broadcast programming should essay is to provide, if possible, helpful analogies from the Free World on ways in which living problems have been successfully approached. Even such analogies have limited value for Poland because of the differences in general context of economic factors.

3. Soviet Economic Exploitation:

Soviet exploitation of the Polish economy has been accomplished partly by orienting its industry to supply requirements for Soviet international machinations with a minimum regard for Polish needs. It has further been accomplished by balance of payment juggling with

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a fraudulent rate of ruble-zloty exchange under which Poles were paid ruinously low prices for their products and were charged equally ruinous prices for Russian products. The full extent of such fleecing by the Soviet Union during the past decade is unknown, but it runs into the equivalent of some billions of dollars, as for example in deals involving Polish coal.

Now Gomulka is attempting, in Polish interests, to check the Soviet exactions. He has obtained the cancellation of a 2 billion ruble debt to the USSR which his regime inherited, and is seeking other means of financial relief from Soviet quarters. But, as indicated above, the Polish economy is in a peculiarly dependent and vulnerable position for the exertion of pressures by the USSR according to Soviet will and whim.

There is no need in broadcasting to remind Polish hearers of Soviet economic exploitation, of which Poles in all walks of life are bitterly aware and which represents a major aspect of the discontent which brought in the Gomulka regime. Broadcasting exploitation of this matter is potentially incendiary; it should be mentioned, if at all, only in incidental regard and with utmost care.

4. Collectivization:

Despite the official program, beginning in the late '40's, to speed up collectivization of agriculture, stubborn peasant resistance made for slow progress in this regard. Only a relatively small proportion of cultivated land was socialized under state farms and agricultural collectives, located principally in the acquired German territory. About 10,000 collective farms had been created by October 1956 when, within the span of a few weeks, the peasants seized the opportunity to dissolve about 8000 (or 4/5) of them.

Gomulka has never approved the policy of forced collectivization for Poland, and this was a point of earlier conflict with the Party at the time of his ouster. Now, while paying lip-service to achievements of socialized agriculture and proposing to keep those collectives which have proved efficient, the Gomulka regime in effect has scuttled wholesale collectivization of agriculture in policy and practice. The Government has been encouraging collectives and state farms to "transfer" (i.e. sell) land and equipment back to the peasants, whose confidence has been increased by the abandonment of collectivization. By official admission, individual peasant holdings are likely to continue as the mainstay of Polish agriculture for a long time to come, and the present Government is more interested in an immediate, practical program for increasing food production than in advancing a Communist theory.

Polish farmers had some prewar experience with genuinely voluntary cooperatives. Gomulka himself has expressed personal attraction to cooperatives of the Scandinavian type. These factors should afford broadcast programming good openings for exploitation,

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particularly since many Polish agricultural holdings are too small and inefficient for good economic utilization.

5. Economic Orientation:

Prior to World War II, Polish trade was truly multilateral but directed principally toward western Europe, especially Germany, the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain. The United States ranked second in importance as a source of supply for Polish imports. Otherwise, the principal overseas suppliers were India and Australia. Commercial exchange with the Soviet Union was quite small (only about 1% of the whole) and, with what is now the Soviet bloc, represented no more than 7% of its total turnover. Western Europe's share in Polish exports represented over 80%; in fact, Poland financed her imports from overseas primarily by selling to western European countries.

Since the war the tables have been reversed largely by calculated orientation to the Soviet bloc and partly as a result of Western trade controls. The USSR has fostered a policy designed to increase Poland's economic service to and dependence upon the Soviet Union and, simultaneously, to minimize its economic relations with the West. In justification of this policy, Soviet propaganda has played upon the theme that Poland finds its natural markets largely within the Soviet orbit. Poles generally are aware of the traditionally factual falsity of this argument and, since late 1956, in their attempt to develop a more realistic pattern of trade in terms of Poland's needs, they have been attempting to develop other markets which are not at the same time impractically competitive with the U.S., the U.K. and Germany.

While the Gomulka regime is maintaining contacts with the Soviet bloc and cooperation with such agencies as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Polish structure of foreign economic relations is becoming less rigid. Poles are looking to the West for more efficient machinery, for supplies of agricultural products and for raw materials.

Broadcast programming should quietly sustain this disposition of the Poles to think in terms of genuinely multilateral commerce, while remembering that such trade may be limited for the time being, as much by Western caution and controls as by Polish obligations under CEMA.

D. Special Targets:

In the recent past, no pressure group (in the accepted sense of the word) could be said to exist in Poland. The Catholic Church in its aims vis-a-vis the Government has been similar to a pressure group which represented the overwhelming majority of the nation. Today a vast network of barely organized pressure groups exists. Perhaps the most important of these consists of workers in the giant factories; others are the youthful

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intellectuals, the students and the amorphous body of peasants. These and certain other segments of the population (e.g. women, Party functionaries and Government bureaucrats) constitute especially apt targets for broadcast programming. In all cases, however, and in some instances especially, great care must be exercised by radio programs not to excite the respective grievances and discontents of these target groups or to inflame the impetuosity of Polish temperament. Broadcast programming should not expect or attempt to obtain concrete results of liberalization in Poland. It should content itself (1) with providing implicit support of self-disciplined "gradualism" in current Polish affairs, (2) with helping to keep open natural channels to Western life and thought, (3) with supplying grist for Polish thinking on matters of present interest and long-term developments, and (4) with suggesting (but not recommending) possibilities of "attractive alternatives." It should leave to Poles within the country the responsibility of drawing their own conclusions, of formulating solutions and of deciding on courses of action for which, in their perilous situation, they will have to assume the direct consequences, possibly unmitigated by effective outside assistance. The prime need is for straightforward news, judicious news commentary and the projection of political and cultural information on the Western world.

In this context, the following special targets are suggested:

1. Industrial Workers:

The Communist administrations of Poland have claimed to govern in the name of the workers; the Party is called the United Workers Party. In some respects, the Communist governments of Poland have favored this group in material ways. Little unemployment has existed in this segment of the population and, indeed, as a concomitant of wartime losses in manpower, followed by industrial, administrative and military expansion, the country has faced a labor shortage, especially in the category of skilled workers. This shortage prompted the previous Communist governments to draw part of the rural population into industry, to induce economic dependents (especially women) into gainful employment and to force members of the former middle class into labor employment status. The workers have been relatively privileged beneficiaries of the social security system and recipients of fringe benefits and privileges.

Nonetheless, control of manpower has been in the hands of the Government; the state was the employer, arbiter of labor mobility and the principal determiner of working conditions. Genuine trade union organization, with which Poland had some prewar experience, was perverted from serving in a protective capacity to form a cardinal part of the Government's machinery for manpower control. In implementing the heretofore avowed "socialist" principle of the "identity of interests" between workers and the state, the trade unions have participated in the administration of labor control laws and were used to promote the economic plans of the regime.

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Thus, they become an instrument of the Party and the state in the regimentation of labor, by fixing norms and wages and awarding social benefits.

The significant difference for Poland has been the existence of Workers' Councils in industrial plants (and lately in agriculture). These councils corresponding to the Yugoslav organizations were to have a real voice in management. While in some respects more effective than their Yugoslav counterparts, their role has proved more theoretical than real; they have served more as debating societies than as partners in directing the enterprises within which they function.

Yet it was a workers uprising at Poznan which gave the pre-Gomulka regime such a rude shock, even though the initial impetus to the atmosphere of ferment was given previously by the intellectuals. Worker dissatisfaction at Poznan was more serious for the regime than disaffection among the intelligentsia and called for more realistic measures.

While there is worker discontent over the strenuous demands imposed by the Communist regimes, labor dissatisfaction in Poland has been directed less against working conditions than toward the inability of the workers to reap a greater measure of return in personal gain from their labor. Ideals and promises have offered poor substitutes. The inability of the Gomulka regime to perform miracles in rebuilding the economy on a more economic basis has hit hardest on the working class where, instead of widespread pay boosts, the Government has found it necessary to renege on a projected large-scale grant of labor bonuses and premiums. Increases which were granted have been nullified to some extent by the short supply of food products and consumer goods. From the over-all standpoint of the regime, its refusal to consider a general wage increase is sound fiscal policy. But worker discontent is inevitable. Some local labor unrest continues, checked only by Gomulka's personal prestige; and the regime must proceed cautiously, making small concessions to avoid losing the confidence of workers. Gomulka's position on restricting the role of Workers' Councils (which means that they will not be encouraged to assume wider authority) is likely to further dampen labor enthusiasm, and his reiteration of this position may provoke the workers. Thus the problem of labor unrest in Poland remains a serious and dangerous one; the worker sector is potentially the most explosive area.

The following lines in broadcast programming might be appropriate to this group:

- a. Discussion of workers' conditions, labor union activities, government labor policies, etc. in western European countries with an eye to analogies of conditions in Poland. The caution, however, must be observed of shaping programs in terms of realizable and moderate possibilities for Polish workers within the

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context of their present situation and of neither stimulating them to press hastily for greater gains nor aggravating them by bald contrast of how good labor conditions are in the West as compared with those in Poland.

b. Quiet reminder of the economic gains which might accrue to Poland from trade with the Free World.

2. Intellectuals:

This group includes authors, journalists, teachers and university professors, scholars and scientists, other professional people engaged in intellectual pursuits and middle-ranking members of the bureaucracy. It was the intellectuals in Poland, particularly the journalists, who first made articulate the climate of thought which was reflected in the Poznan demonstration and which led to the October revolution. They were important in mobilizing public opinion behind Gomulka and then avoiding the sort of action which would have pushed the movement too far in its early stages, as happened in Hungary.

Yet many of these intellectuals who initially supported Gomulka have become less sympathetic and less patient with his subsequent behavior. They have been frustrated by regimentation and are agitating for changes. Gomulka actually had little choice but to invoke disciplinary measures in early 1957 against a group of writers whose views went too far beyond the limits of his own rather flexible dialectic. His crackdown does not represent a basic departure from his policies as enunciated at the October Plenum. It reflects his realization that the extreme positions taken by a number of Polish intellectuals and writers in the liberal press constituted a real threat to some of his political goals, such as, unification of the Party, and placed too dangerous a strain on Soviet-Polish relations. During the early days of the revolution, Gomulka did not control the press, but he had the support of most journalists. From his standpoint, however, the later irresponsibility of some newspapers was undermining his leadership and policies. Consequently, he re-established a modicum of Party control over the principal Polish publications. The recalcitrant intellectuals have now realized that Gomulka is going to remain affiliated with the Soviet bloc of nations and professedly attached to the principles of Marxist-Leninism, while asserting independence of action in following his own pragmatic plan for the development of "Polish socialism." A degree of restiveness continues in Polish intellectual circles; but several ranking literati recognize the danger which they and their colleagues have caused to the Gomulka venture.

Withal, the Polish press retains a greater freedom than that of any other country in the Communist world, and outside the press there is astonishing freedom of expression. Available evidence suggests that the ranks of the intellectuals include a considerable element which remains basically anti-Communist in inclinations. There are some who are essentially opportunists. And there are others who

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represent varying complexions of sincere Socialist opinion. There is presently among the Polish intelligentsia a large amount of intellectual uncertainty and confusion. There is also in general a tremendous curiosity about trends of thought and achievements of arts, letters and science in the outside world.

The following lines of approach in broadcast programming might be particularly effective with this group:

- a. Discussion of developments in various fields of intellectual endeavor in the West (including proceedings of international professional meetings), which by implication will serve to cultivate in the Polish audience historic associations with Western patterns of thought and which will encourage thinking along Western lines. In this connection, a useful device might be the broadcasting of mailing addresses in western Europe to which interested listeners might write for additional information, particularly for scientific and technical material.
- b. Cultural programs in the same context.
- c. Discussion of political developments in western Europe, particularly as they relate to developments in the direction of west European unity (soft-pedaling the military aspects).
- d. Discussions of an academic nature regarding comparative politics and economics. These might well be round-table discussions.
- e. Discussion of Marxist doctrine and Communist theory, including newly emerging concepts. Talks by western European leaders who have had a broad experience with Communism (e.g. former Communists in western Europe) might offer possibilities for effective presentation.
- f. Cross-reporting on intellectual activities in other countries of the Communist world, like Yugoslavia and China.

3. Youth:

Ferment among the students, before and after the October revolution, has been more pronounced than in any other group; and they have been the most vocal in denouncing the subsequent developments as a retreat from October. As one observer has put it, "The 120,000 university students are 120,000 potential revolutionaries." They cannot settle down after the exciting events of 1956 and resent the advice that they should now concentrate on their studies. Perhaps, if they were allowed freedom of association, their energies would be directed to more stable pursuits, their political interests would be placed in better perspective and the academic institutions would cease to constitute such potentially explosive centers in the present precarious circumstances.

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Up to now the educational objectives of Polish Communism during the postwar years have been to indoctrinate a new generation in the Communist way of life according to the Soviet pattern, to create a pool of trained workers and technicians and to channel young people into specific branches of the economy according to the needs of state planning. Consonant with the postwar pace of industrialization, the major emphasis has been placed on technical education, and the quality of higher education has been impaired.

Polish youth became resentful and restive under the restraints imposed upon their choice of jobs, on their freedom of organization and on their use of leisure time. They have been affected by the influences of lawlessness, arbitrary violence and deceit engendered by the war and occupations, by the Communist system under which they were raised and by the deplorable economic conditions under which they have lived. These factors have aggravated the customary instability of youth. Evidences are to be found in some measure of breakdown in respect for parental or other authority, widespread lowering of traditional moral standards, juvenile delinquency and "hooliganism." Moreover, the new wine of Poznan and the October revolution went to the heads of Polish youth, which is still intoxicated.

Polish students welcomed the prospects of revision and de-emphasis of Marxist-Leninist instruction and a shift of educational orientation away from absolute reliance on Soviet experience. It is apparent that Soviet-Communist indoctrination was less effective than was once feared and did not succeed in destroying independence of thought among young people who had been educated under it.

From this it may be concluded that Polish youth in general and university students in particular are receptive targets for the "attractive alternatives" approach which must, however, be employed toward them with great reserve. The following lines might be taken:

- a. Those previously cited as applicable to intellectuals.
- b. Cross-reporting of moderately liberalized youth activities in countries, including other countries of the Communist world.
- c. Jazz music, which has an exceptionally strong appeal for the youth of Poland and which affords a natural bond with the West.

The following factors should be taken into account by way of caution:

- a. Since Polish youth is especially apt to be volatile, programs directed toward students and young people in general must avoid any element of incitement to disorderly behavior.
- b. As with the intellectuals, while Polish young people may

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not be "sold" on the Moscow brand of Communism, they will probably tend, in consequence of their environmental background and education, toward left-of-center and socialistic patterns of thought and, hence, be relatively more responsive to developments and thought of a socialistic character in the outside world.

4. Communist Hierarchy and Government Officials:

The October revolution placed a stamp of approval upon those in the Party apparatus and government who are disposed toward the adoption of a practicable measure of "attractive alternatives" to conditions of absolute domination by Moscow. For many the new situation is attractive in satisfaction of national pride and opportunity for some degree of Polish autonomy. For some the change is welcome because of the actual and prospective area of independent action available to responsible members of the Party or Government which was precluded by the completely puppet nature of the preceding regime; such persons may see for themselves a new future as a result of the potentialities offered by the Gomulka "road to Socialism."

To be sure, there are those in the Party and Government whose vested interests are now challenged by the policies being implemented or projected with respect to "democratization," "decentralization" and "de-bureaucratization." Their prestige or personal economic status is damaged or threatened. Many have been ousted from positions in Party organizations or Government bureaus and nurse grievances against Gomulka. In concert with Soviet intrigues and some eventual inability by Gomulka sufficiently to satisfy popular expectations, this disaffected element may prove to be an Achilles heel.

Nevertheless, this group as a whole, in present circumstances, affords an exceptionally ready target.

The following lines of broadcast programming, designed to encourage flexible thinking, might be useful with this group:

- a. Discussion by Western political and economic leaders, particularly of practical problems with which they are familiar, where helpful analogies may be drawn to Polish conditions.
- b. Discussion by highly qualified Western political leaders or theorists of Marxist doctrinal problems, especially in the light of new concepts emanating from countries like China and Yugoslavia.
- c. Programs designed to indicate calmly and without chauvinism sympathy for Polish national sentiments and desire for independence.
- d. Programs designed to indicate how a country like Poland

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eventually might fit into a united Europe.

As a negative factor, it must be borne in mind that many members of the current officialdom in Poland have had no experience with political affairs outside of the Communist world.

5. Peasants:

About 45% of the Polish population derives its livelihood from occupations connected with agriculture (as compared with over 60% before the war). In the immediate postwar period peasants enjoyed a relatively privileged position. However, subsequent collectivization of agriculture, heavy taxes and compulsory deliveries undermined the peasant's economic and social position.

With the advent of the Gomulka regime 80% of the collective farms were permitted to dissolve. Charters of the remaining collectives are being altered in the direction of greater freedom and larger individual allotments for private farming. The restoration of collective land to the peasants, the abandonment (in some categories) or reduction of compulsory deliveries, increased state payments for farm produce and the promise of reduction in land taxes and of free marketing opportunities afford the Polish peasant the greatest degree of autonomy since 1948. Moreover, Gomulka has condemned the previous policy discriminating against the richer peasants (kulaks).

These extremely liberal economic policies are dictated primarily by desire to improve agricultural production and obtain more food. But, naturally, they assure the regime of widespread peasant support.

Broadcast programs directed at this large segment of the Polish population must be simple and direct. Emphasis should be on attracting the peasant audience by programs of interest to farmers, with easily understood commentary and discussion of problems within the peasants' range of experience. Probably the key factor in any approach to the Polish peasant is his traditional and strong desire for individual as well as national freedom from external interference in his affairs.

The following lines of broadcast programming might be particularly suitable for this group:

- a. Reaffirmation of the farmer's basic right fully to enjoy the fruits of his land and labor.
- b. Explanation of economic gains for peasants in countries of western Europe with agricultural situations which present some analogies to those of Poland.
- c. Discussion of the development and operations of free cooperative movements in western Europe, citing Scandinavian examples.

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Negative factors to be considered are the lack of sophistication and well-developed political consciousness among peasants. Polish peasants have had in their history very slight opportunity to experience free and democratic government.

6. Women:

In connection with the strong emphasis of the preceding Communist regime in Poland upon industrial expansion, the build-up of the administrative bureaucracy and the related drain on agricultural manpower, many women have been induced or pressured into employment status. This has brought a materially increased number of Polish women into direct contact with the operations of political and economic life.

Many women are likely to be among the most ardent in their rejection of Soviet-Communism. Their motives may range from those who have resented the compulsory education of their children by anti-religious Communist methods for Communist goals to those who have resented the loss of family land to collectives. Except for possibilities of personal financial insecurity and dislocation attendant upon measures being taken by the Gomulka regime, many such women will be gratified by the relaxations and "attractive alternatives" which the new order affords or gives hope of affording.

A number of broadcast programs directed to other Polish targets will appeal to women in the radio audience. Additionally, however, programs aimed directly at the feminine audience might be effective in the interest of general broadcast objectives.

The following type of programming should be useful with Polish women:

- a. Discussion of the role of women in the political, economic and social life of western Europe.
- b. Discussion of household improvements, clothing and similar topics of interest to women (so long as these do not dwell unduly on luxuries beyond the grasp of Polish women).
- c. Discussion of child bearing, child raising and education in western Europe.
- d. Possibly, religious programs.