

**November 16, 1956**

**Proposed Interim Policy Guidance for Free Europe  
Committee, Second Draft**

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**Summary:**

Second draft of "Proposed Interim Guidance for FEC" prepared for Allen Dulles to forward [over his disclosed pseudonym] to the FEC.

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In reply refer to

Dear Walter:

I am sure you will agree that it is desirable for us to make known to you our best current thinking on how we see the effect of recent events on FEC activities.

I hope that you will find the attached memorandum on this subject helpful. If you find that there are essential points in which you differ, would you be good enough to let me know.

The relaxation of jamming, particularly in Poland, also raises questions in our minds as to the essentiality of the additional facilities for Lisbon. We should therefore like to ask you to review this project and give us your recommendations in the light of the new situation.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Ascham

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16 November 1956

Proposed Interim Guidance for FNS

Events of the past several weeks have produced changes which significantly affect FNS operations. These include:

1. A situation in Hungary resulting from the spontaneous revolution, put down in a blood bath by Soviet troops, in which the Soviet Union now virtually occupies the country; and with a Soviet commandature for all practical purposes now governing the country; a puppet government without semblance of popular support; a violently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist population passively resisting by means of a general strike; guerilla warfare in some areas; tens of thousands of dead and wounded; a people who requested western assistance at the height of their rebellion against the Soviet Union and who are now, at the least, disappointed that such assistance did not arrive and, at the worst, may become almost as anti-West as they are anti-Soviet as a result; deportations of Hungarian youth and others to Soviet Russia; and in which the attempts of the United Nations to aid the Hungarian people appear to be largely unproductive.

2. A "new" Hungarian emigration in the West, numbering some 20,000-30,000 and increasing daily.

3. A substantial loss of prestige on the part of the Soviet Union in the Free World, including neutralist areas and groups, and among many communist parties.

moment  
4. A situation in Poland in which, from all that can be judged at this time, the Polish people appear to be willing to support the Gomulka regime for the time being, at least. It is reasonable to assume that such support in the long term will be directly proportionate to the degree he is successful in

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meeting the demands of the people for greater freedom from Soviet control and <sup>individual</sup> for greater freedom and economic improvement.

5. A significant decrease in the jamming of Western broadcasts, including RFE into Poland, <sup>while</sup> it is assumed <sup>to reflect</sup> as a matter of official Polish policy. A significant decrease in jamming of Western broadcasts to Hungary, probably because of the general situation in that country, rather than <sup>the result</sup> as a matter of policy <sup>Soviet or Kadar regime policy</sup> of the Soviet Union or the Hungarian puppet government.

6. Reported unrest, particularly on the part of students and young intellectuals in the other Satellites.

7. An increased state of alert and readiness of local security units in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria as a result of nationalist pressures heightened by developments in Hungary and Poland.

For the time being, therefore, until the course of events in the Satellites may be more clearly understood, the following guidance for FNC is set forth below:

#### General:

We should be guided by an objective of breaking up or weakening what has been up to now the monolithic unity within the Soviet dominated power bloc of Eastern Europe.

We should continue to carefully encourage evolutionary changes toward democratization and self-determination, while at the same time avoiding steps which might provoke Soviet repression in other Satellites, <sup>along lines of that</sup> in Hungary. We do not want to incite violent unrest in Poland or in any other Satellite, <sup>the</sup> and particularly not in East Germany, where Soviets plan to remain at any cost.)

#### Hungary:

1. No action should be taken by FNC which is considered likely to provoke further bloodshed.

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2. NFE/Hungary should refrain from tactical advice of any kind.

NEW 3. NFE should refer as seldom as possible to the <sup>regime a</sup> Kadar Government, but make clear that responsibility for decision making in Hungary at this time is borne by the USSR.

NEW 4. NFE should confine itself generally to the balanced reporting of factual news, with a minimum of <sup>editorial comment</sup> (commentary) on local Hungarian events. Full coverage should be given to the efforts of the West to assist the Hungarian people, including action in the United Nations; efforts by the West in furnishing medical, food, clothing and other assistance; assistance to Hungarian refugees in the West; activities of recent Hungarian refugees in mobilising public opinion and other activities for carrying on the fight for the freedom of the Hungarian people from the West; Western reaction to the events in Hungary; the defections from the Communist parties in the West; all statements by international figures and organisations condemnatory of Soviet repression in Hungary (The Colombo Powers Statement, for example, call for Soviet troop withdrawal); and the like. Broadcasts to Soviet troops should be continued.

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7. Material assistance to refugees should continue through FEU in co-operation with other relief and welfare agencies.

8. A major information effort should be organized by FEU among the "new" emigration. This should include:

a. An inventory of leadership and action potential with emphasis on youth, student, worker, peasant and intellectual groups, able and willing to continue the fight for the Hungarian people from the West;

b. An audience analysis of reaction (1) to RFE broadcasts; (2)

and (3) to Hungarian exile leaders and activities in the West;

c. Other information likely to be useful in future FEG operations or in refining present activities;

d. Information of interest in the United States generally as to activities in Hungary and the other Satellites.

9. Plans should be developed to fully exploit in the Free World the reversion to Stalinism and the naked colonialism of the Soviet Union in Hungary via all FEG assets, including FERR, FEP and RFE.

10. Plans should be developed to utilize the effective people in the "new" emigration by FEG, FERR, and RFE.

11. The relationship of the effective people in the "new" emigration to the present Hungarian National Council, the representation of the "new" emigration in the ANCN, as well as their participation in other multi-national exile organizations are matters of priority importance. Steps should be taken to give priority support and emphasis to activities in which the effective elements of the "new" emigration play a part, while at the same time, disengaging from the counterproductive elements of the "older" emigration. (This should be the subject of full discussion and careful negotiation because of a number of complex problems involved.)

12. Attention should be given to the problem of disaffection, discouragement and general anti-U.S. attitude among Hungarian refugees.

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13. Particular attention should also be given to correcting the wide spread impression now being given credence in the press that the Free Europe Committee provoked the Hungarian revolution, or at least, implied that Western support for same would be forthcoming. This should be appropriately coordinated with the Crusade.

#### Poland

1. The situation in Poland in which we judge the "thaw" and "liberalization" are proceeding about as far and as fast as is possible under the circumstances calls for careful handling by FEO.

2. RFE's Polish Desk's "temporary armistice" with the Gomulka regime, while at the same time carefully and indirectly through factual news reportage encouraging liberalizing forces now in motion to produce concrete results, seems to us to be the correct policy line, at least for the time being. RFE should continue to avoid tactical advice to the Polish people.

3. Because of the reduction of jamming in Poland, and because of the need for avoidance of any kind of provocation in a tense situation containing the same ingredients which produced the Hungarian revolution, FEO should not

[redacted] until further notice.

#### Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania

1. RFE should continue as a voice of opposition in these countries, where the "thaw" has progressed the least, using present policy and programming approaches.

2. [redacted]

