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Records of Conversation between Congressman Stephen J. Solarz and Kim Il Sung and Kim Yong-nam

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Summary:

In this lengthy transcript of discussions between Stephen Solarz and Kim Il Sung, Solarz poses questions about prospects for Korea's unification, exchanges between North and South Korea, and exchanges between North Korea and the U.S. In his response, Kim emphasizes the DPRK's views regarding the necessary preconditions for unification and increased cooperation between the two Koreas. Later, Kim Yong Nam continues to elaborate to Solarz on the North Korean perspective of unification and the role of the international community in perpetrating division.

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STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

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August 4, 1980

The Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Zbig:

I'm sorry we didn't have an opportunity to get together last Sunday for some talk and tennis. Since I'm leaving for two weeks for Fire Island and we won't have a chance to see each other before the recess is over, I thought I might take the liberty of sending you the transcripts of my conversations with Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Nam in North Korea a short while ago.

If you have the time, I'd very much like to get together with you when Congress reconvenes in order to chat with you not only about my Korean trip but some other matters of mutual interest and concern as well.

In the meantime, please practice your tennis. I'm expecting you to put up a stiffer fight the next time we play.

Cordially,

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

SJS:cid

Enclosures

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A

RECORD OF MEETING WITH CONG. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

AND

PRESIDENT KIM IL SUNG

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RECORD OF MEETING WITH KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG: Welcome. There is a Korean proverb that beginning is half done. You are the first American politician to visit our country and we feel that you will break the ice.

SOLARZ: Listening to that proverb, I'm reminded of something Winston Churchill said during World War II after the battle of El Alemain: "This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it may, perhaps, be the end of the beginning." I'm looking forward to talking with you about how to improve bilateral relations between the United States and the DPRK and how to create conditions that would facilitate the eventual re-unification of Korea. I would like to ask you a series of questions. I think it is very important for the United States to get a better understanding of your policies and positions, just as it is also important for you to have a better understanding of ours.

(There followed a series of questions)

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QUESTIONS

I would like to discuss with the President ways of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and achieving progress toward the reunification of Korea. For example:

1. Would the DPRK be willing to agree with the ROK, prior to agreement on political measures leading toward unification, on humanitarian measures such as locating and identifying members of separated and missing families, exchange of letters, or the reunion of families as a means of reducing distrust and generating the confidence that might help in resolving political differences between the two Koreas? If not, why not?

2. Even though South Korea is unwilling at this time to enter into broad political agreements leading toward unification, wouldn't an early agreement between the ROK and the DPRK on humanitarian and economic measures improve the prospects that South Korea would be willing at some future time to agree to political measures leading to unification?

3. Given the extent to which millions of Koreans in both North and South would benefit from an agreement between the ROK and the DPRK on humanitarian measures such as family reunion and exchange of mail, wouldn't such agreements be worthwhile even if they didn't lead to a change of attitude on the part of the South toward unification?

4. In an effort to improve relations between our two countries, thereby facilitating a reduction of tensions and the eventual reunification of Korea, would the DPRK be willing to agree to cultural and athletic exchanges with the United States prior to

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an agreement to hold direct bilateral discussions between our two governments or, would such exchanges be possible only in the context of an agreement to hold such talks between the United States and the DPRK?

5. In the interest of achieving better understanding between our two countries, would the DPRK be willing, prior to any agreement to hold direct bilateral discussions between our two governments, to permit more frequent visits by U.S. journalists and scholars if the United States were willing to admit North Korean journalists and scholars to our country?

6. The U.S. government has taken the position that any agreement regarding U.S. forces in Korea requires the participation of the South Korean government. Would the DPRK be willing to engage in tripartite talks if these were limited strictly to military matters involving all three governments and did not touch on the question of unification, which is a matter to be worked out between the two Koreas?

7. In the interests of facilitating direct diplomatic discussions and/or trade between the United States and the DPRK, would the DPRK object to the establishment of comparable diplomatic discussions or trade relations between the PRC and/or the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea? If it does object, why?

8. What is the President's assessment of the balance of indigenous military forces on the Korean peninsula (i.e., excluding U.S. forces)?

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9. There seems to be much fear in South Korea of an invasion from the north and similar fear in North Korea of an invasion from the south. In an effort to diminish tensions and to reduce the possibilities of another war in Korea, thereby also improving the atmosphere for an agreement on political steps toward unification, would the DPRK be willing to agree to any of the following measures:

a) Demilitarization of the DMZ;

b) Joint observer teams in the DMZ, as provided in the armistice agreement;

c) Joint teams to repair markers along the military demarcation line;

d) Giving the Neutral Nations Advisory Commission more responsibility and freedom of action within the DMZ?

e) Advance notice of military exercises by each side.

10. The President has proposed on various occasions the reduction of forces in the two Koreas. Are these proposals still valid? What specific means and methods might be used by each side to verify that the other side was carrying out the agreement?

11. If the United States were to agree to withdraw its forces from South Korea, would the DPRK be willing to:

a) Sign a non-aggression agreement with South Korea;

b) Agree with South Korea on mutual and verifiable force reductions;

c) Implement together with South Korea a number of tension-reducing measures such as family visitations, exchange of letters and trade.

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12. What is the President's view concerning the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Heng Samrin regime, and the continuing Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea?

13. Are there any prospects for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem that would make possible an independent, neutral Kampuchea? Would another Geneva-type conference on Kampuchea be a useful way of resolving the problem? What role, if any, do you see for Prince Sihanouk in the search for an acceptable settlement of the Kampuchean problem?

14. What is the President's view concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the new Afghan government, and the continuing Soviet military presence in that country?

15. How does the President view the nonaligned movement since the death of President Tito, especially the efforts by Vietnam and Cuba to bring the movement under greater Soviet influence?

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SOLARZ: I hope you'll excuse me for the complicated nature of the questions but I wanted to explore in depth your views on Korean problems and on U.S.-Korean relations. Even though I don't come as an official representative of the U.S. government, but only as an individual Member of Congress in a private rather than official capacity, I'm sure that the relevant officials of our government will be looking forward with great interest to hearing your answers to my questions. And I hope to meet with President Carter and Secretary of State Muskie on my return to comprehensively brief them on today's discussions.

KIM IL SUNG: As I have already said, I wish to warmly welcome your visit as an American Congressman to our country. The U.S. government neither welcomed nor opposed your visit to our country. This was brave conduct, a wonderful thing. This is our first contact. It is the first time for me to meet an American politician. You say that our meeting is not the beginning, nor the end of the beginning. It is very important for improving relations. I don't think a single visit can solve all problems, we have been estranged for such a long time. You may have prejudices against us and we may have some against you. So we both view everything for a subjective viewpoint. Therefore, there is much disagreement. Of course, differences cannot be solved all at once, but more frequent contacts will overcome such differences. You have already started the process by your journey here. Many differences will be overcome, but if some misunderstanding remains, you can come many times. We welcome your future visits. We hope, of course, to improve relations with the

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United States and to resolve the frozen Korean question in a justifiable manner. We welcome any means to break that frozen state. What kind of attitude the U.S. government and the South Korean authorities take towards solving the Korean question is very important. The main thing is whether they want to divide the Korean peninsula permanently so as to create two Koreas and fix the division of the country, or whether they take steps toward the unification of the Korean people who are a homogeneous nation. If our country was to be divided into two Koreas forever, what is the use of talks or exchanges? We think exchanges and talks should proceed from the position of removing mistrust and misunderstandings between us, and contributing to the unification of the country. Therefore, I think it is important for the U.S. and South Korean authorities to have a correct fundamental position on the Korean question. You have raised many questions proceeding from your desire to relieve Koreans from the sufferings they are undergoing and help unification. I should like to answer your questions so far as I understand them. I should like to add, ours is a homogeneous nation with a long history and tradition. It is not a multi-national state. Ours is a single nation, and a single race, with a single written and spoken language. Therefore it has been a great misfortune for this single nation to be divided. Therefore we want to develop everything on the basis of the principle for unification. If we approve of two Koreas and do not reunify the country, that would mean committing a crime before the history of our nation. I request you to convey to the U.S. government my hope that the U.S. government in dealing with Korea should not take the position of creating two

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Koreas, but should do something helpful to the unification of the country. In my opinion, it is first necessary to reduce tension in Korea because all people in Korea do not want war. We also do not want war. We do not want a great war to take place just because of the Korean question. It is the wish not only of Koreans but also of all people. Therefore it is necessary first of all to ease tension in Korea. We are now confronting each other militarily. Ours is a small country with a big army. South Korea also has large armed forces, excluding U.S. forces. I don't know from what sources your government got the information that our military strength is greater than South Korea's and for this reason your government increased military strength in South Korea. Therefore we couldn't avoid this confrontation between the two parts of Korea. Nothing can be solved while each side levels guns at each other and confronts each other. So in solving the Korean question what is first necessary is to reduce tensions in Korea. If this problem were solved, other problems could be solved smoothly.

Whether U.S. forces withdraw or not, it is necessary to ease tensions. Just now you asked whether we could agree to tripartite talks to solve military matters. We think it possible to hold tripartite talks, but here what matters is the attitude or position one takes -- whether one takes the position for reunificiation or for two Koreas. That is why, so far, we are against tripartite talks on military matters or to solve the military armistice question. Our two sides are at a state of neither war nor peace.

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Therefore the military burden is a great burden, not only for you and the South Koreas, but it is a great burden for us. The South Koreans are aided by the Americans, but we have nobody to help us. Therefore we have a greater military burden than anyone else. We don't want the state of neither war nor peace to continue. We have no one to envy in the world but if we had no such military burden, we could have a much better life.

South Korea has a large population. It exports labor. But here we are short of labor. We have a lot of burdens, not only in finances but also in human resources. We could live a much better life without these burdens. That is why we long ago proposed to the U.S. authorities to replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. The signatories to the military agreement are the U.S. and the DPRK. Therefore we think this matter of replacing the arms agreement with a peace agreement should be solved between us. When we consider it necessary we can accept the participation of South Korean authorities as observers. What we desire most is the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. After this replacement, North and South Korea could reduce the strength of their military forces. In solving the problem of reducing forces between North and South, agreement to do so is quite enough. It's not necessary to conclude a non-aggression agreement between two states. It is true also that the neighboring countries do not want war in Korea. Also, the people of the world, the Koreans and the American people oppose war in Korea.

When the Kwangju Incident broke out, the United States said that no third party should get involved there. We knew it was a

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warning against us. Therefore, we said we had no intention at all of getting involved in this uprising. In the future too, we will never get involved in such matters. This shows that the threat of North Korean invasion talked about by the South Korean authorities is nonexistent. The fear of the U.S. government that North Korea would take advantage of confusion in the South to invade the South has disappeared. The greatest worry of the U.S. government is that, if something happened in South Korea, we might take advantage of it to march south. But this incident proved that we had no such intention. There have been many such incidents in the past. For example, the April uprising in 1960 when the people rose against Sungman Rhee. This time the people rose against Park Chung Hee and Chon Doo Hwan. When the people rose last year in Pusan, Taegu and Masan, we didn't take advantage of that. Park Chung Hee was shot by a confidant and Chon took power. People are now against Chon. That is why the Kwangju uprising occurred.

SOLARZ: The fact that the North has not taken advantage of the troubles in the South is true. That is a constructive attitude on the part of the north. The statement that you have no intention of taking advantage of troubles in the future is a welcome one. But if that is so, what is the meaning of your statement in the past, that if the people of the south rose up, the north would not stand with folded arms?

KIM IL SUNG: That just means encouragement to the people because we support the democratization of South Korean society.

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Shall I continue? In concluding a peace agreement, we want talks with the United States government only on military matters. We would welcome the participation of South Korea in concluding the peace agreement as an observer. In the past, we were against tripartite talks because, as you know, the South Korean people did not support Park Cung Hee and Chon Doo Hwan. If we approved those governments by holding talks with them, what would the South Korean people say, because they are against those governments? We would be encouraging those regimes to suppress human rights. If in South Korea any democratic figure comes to power, supported by the South Koreans, and if that government does not suppress or massacre the people, then we can hold tripartite talks. Under what terms we might hold tripartite talks, we could discuss between the two sides in a fruitful manner. But what is most necessary first of all is lowering of tension between both sides.

SOLARZ: If the constitution is approved in a referendum in October, and a new government is elected, would you be willing to enter into tripartite talks with that government?

KIM IL SUNG: It depends on the nature of that future government in South Korea. We would not approve tripartite talks if that government were hated by the South Korean people. For example, if Chon, who has committed crimes and is hated by the nation, comes to power, how can we hold talks with him? If a figure supported by the people comes to power, we can hold talks with him. Anybody coming to power unopposed by the South Korean people, we can have any kind of talks with him, including tripartite talks.

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Convey one thing to your government. I think it would be better to explore other ways than to keep the present tension and status quo in Korea. That does not ncessarily mean the proposed confederation. It is necessary to take measures to reduce tensions by forming some reunification body agreed on by both North and South Korean people. What form it may take will be decided by the North and South Korean people. In this way it is ncessary to ease tension. Therefore, after the death of Park Chung Hee we appealed to the South Korean side to achieve collaboration, unity and reunification. Both the North and South should unite and collaborate in many ways: scientifically, economically and culturally. There are many ways we can cooperate with the South. By unity we mean transcending differences in system and religious beliefs.

SOLARZ: Are you saying that so long as the Chon regime remains in power, you would not be willing to have any talks with that government, given your view that he is hated by the people?

KIM IL SUNG: We are holding a dialogue with South Korea. We don't know who is the master there, Choi or Chon. I met Choi Kyu Ha in 1972.

SOLARZ: You said that North Korea would appear to be encouraging the suppression of human rights if the South Korean government participated in tripartite talks. Yet you are currently holding discussions with the South Korean government in preparation for a meeting of the two prime ministers.

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KIM IL SUNG: We have been asking who is the prime minister of South Korea. They say the acting prime minister is the prime minister. We don't know whether he has the confidence of the Korean people or not. We are continuing to hold talks to avoid breaking off the dialogue, but it is clear nothing can be achieved in the talks. The prime minister is appointed by the government, not elected by the people.

SOLARZ: You said that an agreement on family reunification and the exchange of letters would depend on a sincere desire on the part of South Korea and the United States for reunification.

KIM IL SUNG: Not that. About family reunification and exchange of letters, we made proposals in the past. If they are willing to agree, we are always ready to do such things. This is our demand. Therefore we are not against it. In the past, these things were discussed in the Red Cross talks. Why couldn't we agree? They did not proceed from the position of relieving the suffering of the people. They created many difficulties, demanding tracing cards and other things. But we are always ready to solve these problems without any preconditions.

SOLARZ: This is an important point. I want to be sure I understand it. Are you saying that if the South were willing to agree on family reunion and the exchange of mail, then you would also be willing to agree, even in the absence of a political agreement over how to resolve the differences between the two Koreas?

KIM IL SUNG: Yes. This is what the people demand. There is no mistrust among the people.

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SOLARZ: I understood that in the past the position of your government was that before family exchanges could take place, the South would have to repeal its anti-Communist laws. Are you now saying that family exchanges could take place in the absence of such action?

KIM IL SUNG: There are problems of mutual visits regarding that law. For instance, when North Koreans want to go to South Korea, they may or may not be Communists. They may have views against the South Korean authorities. South Korean authorities could arrest them on charges of violating the anti-Communist law if they said anything against the government. They could not say a word. It would be like being in prison. What's the use of exchanges under such conditions? Therefore, we wanted freedom of speech guaranteed if North Koreans went to the South. Otherwise it would be like going to prison, and not being allowed to speak.

SOLARZ: The South Korean authorities told me that people going south pursuant to an agreement on family exchanges would be given written assurances that they would not be arrested as a result of the anti-Communist law, and that they would be able to see their relatives in the south. Would that be satisfactory to you or would the anti-Communist law actually have to be repealed?

KIM IL SUNG: That is a very interesting matter. In principle we agree to family reunion and the exchange of letters. It would be a good thing. As for cultural and economic collaboration, we want it, even before the reduction of tensions. We are not against it. When Che came here, I talked about it with him. I

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proposed economic collaboration. He agreed. But when he went back to South Korea, no answer came. I had told him we have lots of underground resources. We could collaborate in exploiting them.

SOLARZ: Are you willing to agree to trade with the South without political conditions?

KIM IL SUNG: Yes.

SOLARZ: Could cultural and sports exchanges occur without repeal of the anti-Communist law?

KIM IL SUNG: They could. It is necessary to clarify what the purpose of the anti-Communist law is. Whether it is against us or against the Korean people. If it is designed to suppress Communists in South Korea, that is an internal matter for South Korea. But if it is designed to oppose us, to make us their enemy, that is another matter. Park declared anti-Communist policy for his first policy. He wanted to annhilate Communists in the North. What was the use of talking with him? Communism is an idea, an ideology. But if you say that all North Koreans are Communists, you are antagonistic to all North Koreans. What is the use of holding talks? So if they proceed from the desire to achieve national unity. then mistrust would be removed through mutual visits. It is the same case with your government. Your government does not approve of Communism but allows Communists there.

SOLARZ: You said that if the South proceeds from the desire for national unity, then mutual visits would occur.

KIM IL SUNG: Yes.

SOLARZ: What determines in your own mind whether the South is sincere concerning national unity?

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KIM IL SUNG: They first must renounce their two-Koreas policy. It is not necessary at all to fabricate two countries. We do not approve of the creation of two states. That does not meant that we are just stubborn. This is the desire of the nation. So we think that even if no reunification could be realized right now, they should not have a hostile policy against us. They should proceed from the ideology of great national unity. From the principle, that in one nation there can be two ideologies, two ideas. We think various ideologies can exist in one nation, but we both should proceed from great national unity.

SOLARZ: The South Korean authorities told me that unification was the desire of all people, North and South, but that it would be difficult to achieve because of the differences between the North and South. So they want, as I understand them, to proceed with a number of incremental steps designed to creat the kind of mutual confidence that might lead to political agreements between the North and South on the more fundamental issues.

KIM IL SUNG: This was their assertion also in the past. You must understand this point. Those differences do not exist among the people but among the upper strata of the authorities. Before publication of the North-South joint statement, the South Koreans told me that the North and the South were like different poles. Of course there are different ideologies. I told them they must overcome differences of ideology by giving precedence to the principle of great national unity. When we talk about mistrust, it is not mistrust among the whole Korean people, but

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among the upper strata of authorities. There are states with national minorities. They live well. Why couldn't we live with different ideologies? Now, with regard to the relations between our two countries, so far they have been bad. I hope we can have good relations. You propose visits between the two peoples. We are not against it, we welcome it. But about the establishment of diplomatic relations, you say that in return the Soviet Union and China should recognize South Korea. We do not approve of cross recognition because it would fix the present state of division of the two Koreas. Even though there are no diplomatic relations between our two countries, we would welcome visits of people, scholars and so on. This kind of visit would greatly contribute to mutual understanding and friendship. You asked about the military balance. I think South Korea has more armed forces. They have 700,000 regular armed forces, and 2 million homeland reserves. This shows that they have more than us. Their military equipment is better than ours because it is provided by the United States and no one helps us. They fear the threat of southward invasion. This is a useless fear, a plot to suppress the people, to keep the Americans in South Korea. We are in a state of inferiority to South Korea in all areas. Look at the size of our population. Therefore there is no reason to claim the threat of southward invasion. I can't understand on the basis of what information Carter suspended the plan to withdraw U.S. forces. This military confrontation and reinforcement only increases tension in Korea. That's why we want to end the state of neither war nor peace and conclude a peace agreement, cut armed forces,

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and ease military confrontation. You raised questions regarding the DMZ and so forth. These are interesting matters, worth wide discussion. But this can be done only while easing military confrontation. Just by keeping confrontation or by increasing the military strength of South Korea, these problems cannot be solved. We still propose to reduce armed forces in North and South and our former proposals in this regard are still valid. As for Kampuchea and Afghanistan, you can understand our views from the communiques of the joint meeting of the Political Committee of the Party and the Central Political Committee of the Government. If you have not read these, Comrade Kimg Young Ham will give you a copy. There we stated our position on the non-aligned movement. In a word, as we are against the presence of U.S. troops in our country, so we are against the presence of foreign troops and intervention in all other countries. Just as we demand the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, so we demand a peaceful political settlement to all these political questions.

SOLARZ: I would like to say before I leave, as someone who is very much committed to the improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations, and as someone who would like to facilitate a solution to the Korean problem, that it would be unrealistic to expect the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea without a significant reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Especially after the invasion of Afghanistan, so long as the United States feels there is a significant danger of war in Korea it will be unwilling to complete the withdrawal of American forces from

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the Korean peninsula. To the extent that you would like U.S. forces to be withdrawn, therefore, it would seem to be in the DPRK's own interest to agree to a number of small but significant steps to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. If agreement could be reached between North and South Korea on a number of measures leading to a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula, the prospects for the withdrawal of American forces would be significantly enhanced. Similarly, as someone who is committed to improving relations between our two countries, I do not believe the United States will be willing to enter into direct contacts with North Korea in the absence of comparable contacts between the PRC and/or the Soviet Union and South Korea. Even if it is not possible to reach agreement on such questions today, however, I believe that your willingness to accept scholarly and cultural exchanges is very constructive. Like you, I firmly believe that contacts between two peoples separated for so many years can help contribute to mutual understanding and the resolution of the differences between us.

I have two final questions. I mentioned to Mr. Kim Young Nam that there is an American soldier who left his unit in West Germany in June of 1979 whom your radio reported has defected to North Korea. His parents have been unable to communicate with him. I hope that it will be possible for me to meet him while I am here or, if that is not possible, to enable his parents, who live in the United States, to get in touch with him.

KIM IL SUNG: I will find out. I do not remember very well.

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SOLARZ: Thank you, Mr. President. When I tell my friends in Washington that I don't believe North Korea intends to go to war against South Korea, they respond by saying that North Korea is infiltrating agents into the south, digging tunnels under the DMZ, engaging in belligerent propaganda, and has engaged in a substantial buildup of its armed forces, and that all this points to a continuing danger of war in Korea and that the DPRK has not ruled out the use of force as a means of reunifying the peninsula. I would very much appreciated your response to this analysis.

KIM IL SUNG: As I told you, what you said happened as a result of confrontation between North and South. No matter how much we try to convince you, you would never believe us. If we said we had not sent spies, had not dug tunnels, you would never believe us. Even if I said here that we will not invade the south, have not sent spies, you would not believe me. If you said you would not invade us, we would not believe you. If you do not intend to invade, why are your forces still present in Korea? You achieved a reconciliation with China and you improved relations with the Soviet Union. What is the use of keeping forces in South Korea? Korea is only useful as a military base. If we continue to suspect each othere there will be no end to it. Let's first solve the problem of replacing an armistice agreement with a peace agreement. If this is solved, all other problems can be solved. In discussing the replacement of an armistice agreement with a peace agreement, we would not oppose the participation of any military authorities of South Korea rather than representatives of the South Korean

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Government. We don't know whether the South Korean Government exists in name only. We would suggest the presence of South Korean military authorities as observers just as South Koreans have observers in Panmunjom. We are not against that.

SOLARZ: When you call for the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, does that also mean the withdrawal of U.S. froces from the South?

KIM IL SUNG: After the conclusion of a peace agreement, why would the presence of forces continue to be necessary? In the peace agreement, we would pledge not to fight war. The North and South could then reduce forces. How to verify their implementation could be discussed at the talks. So in order to reduce tensions, this matter must be solved first of all. To discuss some trivial things before this would be useless.

SOLARZ: Would South Korea be expected to take part in the verification of armed forces reduction?

KIM IL SUNG: Of course.

SOLARZ: I have a personal question. As a national leader who is not only a great leader of his own country, but one who has served longer than any other leader in the world, you have met some of the other outstanding leaders -- Mao, Stalin, Tito and Ho Chi Minh. I would be interested in your evaluation of these historic figures.

KIM IL SUNG: I was on good terms with all these persons. We were intimate with each other. They were all great men who did a great service for the sake of their people and nations.

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There are some rumors about their lives, but these are their internal affairs. I do not interfere. People talk about them after they are dead. That is not a good thing. Why didn't they talk about them when they were alive? Regardless of rumors, I respect them and remain a good friend. No man is without his faults -- only Buddha.

(At this point, we adjourned to lunch.)

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At lunch, Mr. Solarz asked Kim Il Sung about his on-the-spot guidance to the people. Kim Il Sung replied that he visited each province once each year, and stayed 10-15 days in each of the 10 provinces and 3 directly-administered cities. He learned much from talking with the people. For instance, hte people say rice should be transplanted around May 30. But a government agency sent an order to the people to transplant the rice much earlier and they complained. At this place, the people tell me, they have a bumper crop this year. And they tell me they themselves decided the planting date. Asked about his references to the cold front in talking about agriculture, Kim Il Sung replied that this has been written about by Western scholars who say that it will last until the year 2000, and it affects many countries. The year before last was an exceptionally cold winter in Korea. It froze water pipes that had been placed deeply enough in the ground to remain unfrozen in normal winters. This affected industrial production.

The conversation turned to the question of democracy in South Korea. Kim Il Sung was asked his definition of democracy. He replied, democracy is a government representing the will of the people. The people should have freedom of the press, of assembly and the freedom to elect anyone they want.

SOLARZ: Can the press criticize in North Korea, and does it criticize?

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KIM IL SUNG: Yes, the press criticizes, and the Supreme People's Assembly also criticizes. If it didn't, how could you call it a People's Assembly? If the government's policies are wrong, the government should accept criticism. We are against subjectivity, bureaucratism and suppression.

SOLARZ: The people in the South, although they criticized Park Chung Hee in the past and are critical of Chon Doo Hwan at present, also want the U.S. troops to remain there. This is very interesting. When I went to the Philippines a few years ago, I discovered that the opponents of Marcos wanted the U.S. troops out because they thought our presence propped Marcos up. Similarly, when I went to Iran before the fall of the Shah, the people opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty wanted the U.S. to withdraw its military support which they thought was propping up the Shah. But in South Korea, I find that even the opponents of the Park Chung Hee and Chon Doo Hwan regimes do not want U.S. forces withdrawn, because they fear the possibility of an invasion by the North. How do you explain this?

KIM IL SUNG: The South Koreans lack an understanding of us and such thinking is there in South Korea because the separation of North and South has persisted for so long. Therefore, we always demand extensive dialogue, not only before authorities but among all strata. If through this dialogue South Koreans come to know we would not invade the South, then people in the South would not demand that U.S. troops remain there. They're not needed. The present South Korean government lacks support from the people;

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consequently, it says U.S. troops should stay to prevent Northern invasion in order to preserve its own position. Not only Americans but South Koreans suspect us. We also suspect you. We must solve all these problems through contact and dialogue. That's why we welcome you as a shock brigade to melt the ice. We have talked about many things, and you may not understand us very well. Can one meeting solve all questions? Please come again.

SOLARZ: It was not easy to come. I had to negotiate with Holbrooke the statement that the U.S. government neither supported nor opposed my trip.

KIM IL SUNG: Yes. I understand why your original plan to come in April was not convenient. The situation in South Korea was confused, and the U.S. Army was carrying out exercises in South Korea. If you go back and say that the North Koreans are not so much to be feared, many people will be impressed.

SOLARZ: I would be interested in your assessment of Stalin.

KIM IL SUNG: Of course, Stalin made errors, but his exploits were much greater than his errors. Inheriting the cause of Lenin, he developed a backward country into a developed state. He defeated Fascist Germany by rallying the Soviet people around the Party and doing well with the International United Front. That's why he won the victory. Khrushchev had no such capacity. Therefore, it was not correct for him to take issue with small things in the face of these great achievements. Maybe Stalin made some mistakes, such as purging, but one must distinguish his exploits from errors.

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SOLARZ: Stalin's collectivization and purges cost 20 million people. That was not a small mistake but a high price to pay for the modernization of the country.

KIM IL SUNG: Stalin was the first man to collectivize in the world. He made have committed leftist errors. That's why I told people I wanted to develop Korea in our way and not the Soviet way.

SOLARZ: Why has the collectivization of agriculture succeeded in North Korea while it has not succeeded in the Soviet Union?

KIM IL SUNG: We never committed subjectivism. We did everything according to the wish of the people. If there was the slightest opposition, we didn't do it.

SOLARZ: What do you think of the Chinese view that the Soviets are hegemonists?

KIM IL SUNG: You'll have to ask the Chinese.

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KIM YOUNG NAM -- CLARIFICATION SESSION

SOLARZ: Your people tell me we may have differences over what President Kim said about family reunion. If there has been a misunderstanding, I am delighted you came, because I want to clear it up. I want to be sure that I report accurately on the views of the great leader. Obviously, it would be embarrassing to both of us if I said he said things he didn't say. I would sincerely welcome any comments or clarifications. The important thing is not what your notes or our notes say, but the position of your government on this question. I have a sincere desire to reach a unified understanding on this subject.

KIM YOUNG NAM: I'm very thankful and glad that you are making this sincere effort to have a clear understanding on how much our great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, is concerned about the unification of our country. Hearing your statement, I feel more deeply friendship for you. What President Kim said is most important. We don't mean that there can be reunion of families and exchange of letters only when the South Korean authorities take correct attitudes toward reunification, not seeking division. We always demanded this, and we were always in favor of reunion of families and exchange of letters. Why was it not translated into reality? It was also proposed by us during the Red Cross talks. At that time we proposed that separated families in the North and the South freely travel to North and South and find their kin freely. At that time the South Korean side proposed to require issuance of a form or tracing card. In this connection our great leader said that we see this card issue as a

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condition for realizing reunion of families. In our view, to achieve reunion of divided families, they must travel freely in order to seek each other out. When nobody knows where the person from a divided family lives, how can we decide it by the method of cards? This is the method of creating an obstacle to uniting divided families. We want to have reunion of families and exchange of letters unconditionally.

I discussed this matter with the great leader after the meeting and saw that you had an incorrect understanding.

He was describing our position in the past, what we demanded in the past. It would be correct to understand it as follows: We would say in the past that as long as anti-Communist laws were in effect, people could not achieve their desire for the reunion of families and the exchange of letters. That means that as long as anti-Communist laws exist, we could not meet the desires of the people in this respect. So we said only after the repeal of anti-Communist laws could we realize the reunion of families and the exchange of letters.

Today, our great leader told you repeatedly and clearly and with great emphasis that we have to realize unconditionally the reunion of families and the exchange of letters even without the abolition of anti-Communist laws in order to relieve the suffering of families.

SOLARZ: Let me make sure I understand you. In the past your position was that to achieve the reunion of families, the anti-Communist laws had to be repealed. Today your position is that you are willing to have reunion of families and exchange of letters without conditions, even if the anti-Communist laws are not repealed.

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KIM YOUNG NAM: Yes.

SOLARZ: I have another question. When you say that people should be free to search for relatives, do you mean that people could cross the border at any time to search for relatives, or would you agree to some procedure so you wouldn't have 200,000 people all at once crossing the border to search for relatives?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Of course, to realize the reunion of families and the exchange of letters, the North and the South would have to sit down to work out methods. It would be translated in reality according to this agreement. It cannot be achieved by just saying, today we go out to search for relatives.

Anyway, as far as the anti-Communist law is concerned, it is a bad law. We want it repealed. But even if it isn't, we don't want its existence to delay the reunion of families and exchange of letters. In the past, we considered the reunion of families and exchange of letters in connection with the abolition of the anti-Communist laws, but now to remove the suffering of divided families, we are willing to agree to it, even without the abolition of anti-Communist laws. In a word, we want to achieve reunion of families and exchange of letters without condition. If you could talk directly to the great leader in the same language, you would understand. Either you misunderstood or the interpreter mistranslated.

SOLARZ: Why do you object to tracing cards as a means of reunion of families?

KIM YOUNG NAM: In the past the South Korean side, in advancing the method of tracing cards, demanded that each applicant fill out a form to be collected by the Red Cross or

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the authorities. It would go through censorship and those approved would be allowed to meet. Families divided for years don't know where the desired person lives. So the method of tracing cards is not feasible.

SOLARZ: If a person in the North wanted to see a person in the South, would he have to fill in the address or would the person in the South fill it in?

KIM YOUNG NAM: To be frank, the South Korean authorities would look at the card and would admit only those they like.

SOLARZ: One further clarification. I already made one mistake, and I wouldn't want to make another. I understand the President said that the DPRK would be willing to enter into trade with the South without any preconditions. Is that correct?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Yes.

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RECORD OF MEETING WITH CONG. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

AND

KIM YOUNG NAM

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INTERVIEW WITH KIM YOUNG NAM

SOLARZ: I appreciate the invitation to visit your country. I've been very interested in Korea for some time. I visited South Korea several times and got their viewpoint on the Korean question. But I always felt that without conversations with the leaders of the DPRK, I could not form an objective view of the Korean situation. It is very unfortunate there has been so little contact between our two countries in thirty years. Both have an important stake in the Korean peninsula. It is essential that both have a better understanding of their respective policies and interests. There is now a very tense situation in Korea. There are several hundred thousand troops in the North and in the South. Nearly 40,000 American forces are just south of the DMZ. Hardly a month passes when there are not incidents on the DMZ. While both sides presumably want peace, there is always a possibility that war could break out. I would like your assessment of the situation in Korea. What practical and concrete steps might be taken to lower tension?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I want to know exactly what you think, and I will tell you exactly what we think and want to do. We are doing our best to guarantee peace and security on the Korean peninsula and their consolidation. We're making our best efforts consistently to completely eradicate the danger of a new war. No freedom-loving, honest people like war. I understand your proposal also proceeds from this fact. What you think of is exactly what I am thinking of. It is necessary for you to understand our position in this respect, especially the policy of reunification and people's feelings

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in this respect and the reality of our country. If Korea were not divided, there would be no danger of war. Confrontation and tension would be removed. Division must be ended and reunification achieved. Therefore, our efforts to end division are not only a struggle for an independent and peaceful reunification of our country, but also to bring peace in Northeast Asia and the Pacific area. Therefore, first of all, I would like to discuss the question of reunification. I've been informed for a long time of your righteous activities in the United States, especially in regard to Korean reunification. Therefore, I'm very glad to welcome you. I have a big plan to discuss with you, matters of common interest. Irrespective of time, we can have a full exchange of views. Your stay in our country is very short. Your interest in this visit is not only in discussion, but also to see part of our reality. Therefore, we must do our best to combine the two, so we must make our discussions short, realistic, and productive. Therefore, I will present to you from my notes.

SOLARZ: I hope you don't mind if I ask a question from time to time.

KIM YOUNG NAM: I agree.

SOLARZ: I not only want to get a better understanding of your position, but of the reasons behind it. For example, I know how deeply committed the DPRK is to the unification of Korea. I fully agree that unification would enhance peace and stability in the region. But given the enormous political, economic, ideological, and social differences between the two Koreas, I am particularly interested in knowing how you think it will actually be possible to bring about unification.

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KIM YOUNG NAM: I see. I am glad to hear it. I have come to know how much interest you have in unification and how much you wish for it. Even though this is our first meeting, I have known for some time of your activities in the U.S. Congress. Prince Sihanouk has also informed me.

SOLARZ: You know more than my constituents.

KIM YOUNG NAM: Once again, I welcome you as the first American politician to come to my country. For a long time we have known of your interest in Korean unification. Otherwise, you would not have traveled such a long distance. The time difference is 13 hours. It's not easy to come here. I hope your visit will be an opportunity to remove misunderstanding between the United States and the DPRK and to start toward bringing about the peaceful unification of Korea. I'm well informed of your righteous activities and have sympathy toward you. I'm happy to meet you.

Now I would like to tell you about my government's policy toward reunification. It is necessary, first of all, to know of chu che, the guiding principle of the party and the government. The way of realizing unification and the view toward it all proceed from the chu che idea. If you know about this idea, you will understand our effort for unification. I would like to give you the main content of this idea. The chu che idea was created by the great leader, Kim Il Sung, in person. It is the state philosophy of the DPRK. Chu che is the idea that the masters of revolution and construction are the masses, and they are also the motive force. Simply, it means that one is responsible for one's own destiny and has the capacity for shaping it. Man is the master of everything and decides

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everything. The chu che idea has the following requirements: 1) to attach the greatest importance to the people and to serve them; 2) to maintain independence and creativeness in all activities; 3) to place one's own country in the first place in all activities. And on the basis of the chu che idea, solving all problems in accordance with reality and with one's own efforts free from the tendency of relying on outside forces.

This chu che idea is splendidly embodied in the policy of the party and government. It is embodied in independence in politics. Independence is the most precious life line. Man has physical life; together with this independence for all people is another aspect of his being. Proceeding from the interests of the Korean people, we decide all things independently. We do not follow another's baton. We follow our own brains and act according to our conviction. Foreign relations also follow the policy of independence, allowing no one to violate the independence of our nation or interfere in our internal affairs. You are well aware of our policies. We view international questions from the viewpoint of independence.

We follow the principle of self-support in our economy. We are developing our national economy mainly with our own techniques, sources, and cadres. We've maintained this principle from the first days. There are many examples. One is: Kim Il Sung advanced the original basic line of economic construction, giving priority to the development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing light industry. Our country has now become an industrialized socialist state, shaking off economic backwardness. In

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agriculture also, irrigation and electrification were completed long ago. Now we are at the stage of mechanization and chemicalization. We intend to modernize the economy in the near future. Before liberation, we produced only 2,160,000 tons of grain. Last year we produced 9,000,000 tons even under the severe cold front. As you see, we have developed an independent economy, including agriculture. Thanks to the firm foundation of our independent economy we are having trade on the principle of meeting each other's needs. Our people had 5,000 long years of hardship. Now for the first time they are living an independent and productive life under the wise guidance of the great leader and the chu che principle. You will see the successes achieved under Kim Il Sung's guidance. Our people came to know that independence and sovereignty could only be preserved by chu che. In the future, too, we will follow chu che.

Now I will tell you about the big patriotic effort for reunification based on this idea. As you know, people have suffered from the heart-rending division of the country for 35 years. There cannot be a greater tragedy for individuals and the nation. Unlike people in multi-national states, our people have been a homogeneous nation for 5,000 years. Therefore, we want to end national division at an early date and provide dispersed families with unification. If some other nation had been so long divided, something drastic would have happened. We, however, are striving to accomplish independent and peaceful reunification. Some people in foreign countries and

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in South Korea say that we want to unify the country by force. But the world knows that is not true. I'm not going to blame the South Korean authorities in front of you. From the beginning we wanted to stop slandering each other and seek out reunification, but the South Korean authorities wanted permanent division of the country. We want reunification, not of social systems but of the nation.

SOLARZ: Do you mind if I ask you a question. In connection with unification you spoke of separated families being reunited. The human suffering of millions of families as a result of family division must be great. Would the DPRK agree with the ROK without political preconditions on humanitarian measures such as the identification of missing families, exchange of letters and so forth, as a means of removing distrust and as a way of generating confidence that might be helpful in resolving political differences between Koreans?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We are also interested in this matter, and I will answer you later. I will continue my explanation. In the meantime, ask questions without hesitation. Some of your questions will be answered by my prepared explanation and some not. The latter I will reply to later.

The military method of reunification would bring national calamity, rather than peaceful unification. We have had the sad experience of war, and we are making great efforts to unify by peaceful means. Notwithstanding this fact, the people in some countries are mobilizing all the media to distort our position. Military people are in the van. But truth will eventually come out. Truth and social justice

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cannot be veiled by anything, history shows. Therefore, we do not attempt to counter such false propaganda, not because we have nothing to say but because it is of no use. If one really wants unification, one should not just read such materials but have sincere talks with us. Frankly, the case is the same with the United States. If the United States wants unification, it should not engage in false propaganda concerning us but have face-to-face talks without hesitation. Only through dialogue can mutual trust be deepened. Your visit is not of no importance.

SOLARZ: You have made it clear that the DPRK has no intention of initiating a war against the South. Do you believe that the South intends to initiate a war against the DPRK?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We always hope such a thing will not happen, but the reality shows that the danger is not the much propagandized threat from the North but the threat from the South. I will explain this more later. Of course, we cannot expect everything to be resolved at this first meeting. But you are interested in unification; therefore, I hope the meeting will give you some help. To have a correct understanding of Korean unification, one must take account of, first, the Korean people's national identity. We are a homogeneous nation who have lived in the same territory through a long history. Only a few countries have lasted thousands of years as a single state like ours; therefore, our people's sense of national identity is much stronger than those of others. Peoples in multi-national states may find difficulty in understanding this. Our people are all closely interlinked

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with unbreakable bonds, not only economic and cultural but family also. The country is divided into two, but the spirit is fused into one. No force on earth can separate it. All Koreans are linked by blood as brothers and sisters. Therefore, they cannot be kept separate forever. Nothing can check this desire. Second, the history of our country's division. Some people with little knowledge of Korean reality view it as the same as the German question, but the Korean question is fundamentally different. Germany was a sovereign state, while Korea was a colony. Germany was divided as the result of an aggressive war; Korea has been divided by outside force. Germany ignited two world wars. Its neighbors fear the reunification of Germany. Germans seem also not desirous of unification. Korea has never invaded others, but was invaded by others. Even after unification, Korea will never threaten others. Its neighbors are all big countries. If Korea remains divided it will be a threat to the neighbors; therefore, they also want Korea united. Nothing can check the people's desire and aspiration for unification.

SOLARZ: How does the division of Korea pose a threat to the neighboring countries in the region?

KIM YOUNG NAM: There is a constant danger that it may generate another war. If anyone discusses Korea apart from unification, it will be an empty discussion without feasibility. People discussing Korea must give priority in all circumstances to unification. The policy of the party in government for the unification of Korea is widely known. We maintain it must be solved independently without the interference of outside

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forces by democratic and peaceful means. It is to be achieved by great national unity, transcending different systems and beliefs. We have advanced reasonable proposals on more than 150 occasions from the time of liberation. The principles of unification were defined in the 1972 joint statement between North and South. It is a consistent policy to solve the question of unification independently, peacefully, and democratically on the principle of great national unity. The idea would be to establish a unified central government by elections without foreign interference after the withdrawal of all foreign troops. We repeatedly advanced such proposals from the time of division, including the conference of April, 1948. The South Korean authorities opposed, however, and staged a separate election. Under these circumstances, we founded the DPRK on the basis of an all-Korea election. The country was divided into two and for 35 years these two parts have been traveling different roads with deep misunderstanding and mistrust. The mistrust is too deep to resolve easily. Therefore, it is difficult to hold general elections throughout Korea. There is no atmosphere for general elections in South Korea, as in the past Park Chung Hee imposed the fascist yusin system. Chun Doo Hwan's more vicious military system is trampling human rights. To build a central government through unified elections, one must remove distrust and democratize South Korea in order to provide an atmosphere for general elections in South Korea. But we cannot wait for that with folded arms. The North and South Korean people should live as one country leaving the systems North and South as they are. We should never prolong

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the country's division indefinitely because of differences in systems. Unification is urgent. Therefore, if our people are to achieve unification, we must leave the two systems as they are. This is the only way for us. We must link the severed blood vessels as one nation leaving the systems as they are. Therefore, we proposed a North-South confederation. We would form a supra-national committee of North and South to solve common problems, leaving the North and South systems intact. The committee would have equal numbers of representatives from North and South, and its mission would be to develop economic interchange, cultural interchange, and to carry out diplomatic relations in a unified way and to promote unification. For example, the North and the South could jointly develop mines, national culture, enter the United Nations under a single name, and participate in international meetings as representatives of a single Korea. I was told Congressman Solarz was interested in how to provide a unified military command. The North and South could collaborate militarily for common action. When you met our people in New York, you asked this question. When the confederation was instituted and many-sided collaboration began, other problems could immediately be resolved, such as reunion of divided families. This was proposed long ago but rejected by South Korea. To remove sufferings caused by division, we proposed general elections; but this was rejected by South Korea. We cannot wait so we proposed confederation as a transitional measure.

SOLARZ: You said that when confederation was realized, the question of family exchanges could immediately be resolved.

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But given the enormous distrust between both sides and the great political and military differences between the North and South, wouldn't the prospects of unification be improved if both sides agreed first on confidence-building measures such as trade and the reunion of families, rather than starting with great political differences between the two?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Yes, I will answer that question. Our position in this regard was clarified more than once. As a transitory step, we proposed a confederation which was also rejected. We then proposed in detail economic and other measures. These were also rejected. We proposed at least having an exchange of persons, but this was again rejected. We said let's at least have an exchange of mail, but this was again opposed. I can explain more later.

SOLARZ: I am interested in what the DPRK would do at present. I want to look to the future, not the past. Obviously, exchange of mail and reunion of families could not occur unless both sides were willing. But if the South were to agree to exchange mail and have family reunions, even trade, would the DPRK be willing to agree even without a resolution of the political and military differences between the two sides?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I will tell you later. Here I would like to mention just one point to help you understand the attitude of the South Korean authorities. It is important for you to understand for what purpose and on what occasions the South Koreans are proposing the exchange of correspondence and the reunion of families. They, up to now, bitterly opposed

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our proposals of all these measures. But now they advertise that they are interested in them as if they initiated them and try to make the world believe it. I think they proposed these things, not for reunification, but to mislead the people of other countries who are not aware of the national identity of the Korean people. In other words, they made all these proposals to perpetuate the division and create two Koreas. People not aware of reality, especially the national identity of the nation, may think proposals for exchange of correspondence and reunion of families are reasonable, but this is untrue. They proposed these things, not to remove distrust and misunderstanding, but to perpetuate national division. The reunion of families and the exchange of correspondence that we mean is entirely different from that between countries. Therefore, it is very important for what purpose one makes these proposals.

SOLARZ: This is an important point. I want to be sure I understand it. Is it your position that agreements on exchange of letters and the reunion of families, without a simultaneous solution of the differences between the North and South would solidify the division of Korea, rather than enhance the prospects for unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Not exactly. The point is that the South Korean authorities are talking about these things for the purpose of perpetuating division.

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SOLARZ: How would agreement on these proposals perpetuate division?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We don't think like that. They talk about this not for reunification but for division.

SOLARZ: Are there any circumstances under which the DPRK would agree to exchange of correspondence and reunion of families with the South?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I will explain later. I will give another example of the attitude of the South Korean authorities. It is known to the world that they are not interested in reunification. They are spoken ill of by many South Koreans and honest minded people in the world. Therefore, they felt they must show they have an interest in unification. So they talked about humanitarian steps, thinking to arouse sympathy from the world public. If they really propose these steps for unification, they must have the proper attitude. They must take a stance for unification, not for division.

SOLARZ: What is the basis for the belief that the South Koreans have advanced these proposals to perpetuate division rather than further unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We proposed free visits by families at the time of the Red Cross talks. Let us fully open the North and the South and let divided families freely travel to find their kin in the South. The South Korean authorities were against this. They proposed the use of tracing papers and to allow only suitable people to visit. For letter exchange, we proposed letters go through the post office. They said they must establish a place for censorship. That is not reasonable. Therefore, the Red Cross talks were not successful. I will tell you more later.

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SOLARZ: You base your conclusion on South Korean insincerity and on their rejection of your proposals several years ago. Do you preclude the possibility that the South Koreans have genuinely changed their mind? Might they now be willing to agree to exchange of correspondence and reunion of families, not as a substitute for unification, but as a way of improving the atmosphere for negotiations on unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Their attitude can be explained through the attitude they have taken at the negotiations on a meeting of the prime ministers of North and South. Even now they are not proposing all these matters really for the unification of the country, one can see clearly in the happenings in South Korea that began last year.

SOLARZ: Let's assume that you are right regarding the attitude of the South. Suppose that they have no intention of reaching agreement on political matters. From the purely human viewpoint, wouldn't it be worthwhile to reach agreement on exchange of mail and reunion of families, even if the South had no intention of agreeing on political issues?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I understand a little your feelings in this regard. It is quite natural to be sympathetic with long-separated families. We also regard it as a big misfortune and suffering for the nation. Therefore, we want them reunited and leading a happy life. Therefore, everything, whether correspondence or reunion must help in removing the sufferings of the nation as a whole. When confederation is instituted, one should not impose its will on the other. North and South shall conduct free activities according to their own political convictions while acting in a

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unified way through confederal machinery. In the years 918 to 1392 the Kingdom of Koryo existed in Korea. We propose to use this name, "Koryo", for the confederal state. It is connected with the fact that Korea became unified by the merger of Silla, Koryo, and a third state. The origin of the word Korea is Koryo. The formation of a North-South confederation fully conforms with the interests of the Korean people. Confederation rather than division would greatly help remove problems created by division. Enforcement of a confederation would open a very favorable phase for progress toward complete unification. It would be of great significance in removing tension in Korea and promoting peace in the world. If North-South confederation were enforced, the two sides would no longer be belligerents and the prospects of a harmonious life would open for all the people. The above is the position of the party and government of the DPRK. There is no intention to force its ideology and system on South Korea. There is only the desire for national unification by the most reasonable way acceptable to both North and South. There is no intention to force our social system on the South. Nor should the South Koreans force theirs on us. We have communist ideas, but we value unification more than communism.

SOLARZ: The confederal proposal, insofar as it would permit both sides to maintain their own economic, political, and social systems is realistic and reasonable. A Supreme National Council, as a mechanism to bring the two Koreas together, could easily agree on humanitarian matters. That would be constructive too. But, given the political and ideological differences between North and South, how could such a Supreme National Council agree

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on foreign policy and defense questions? With the Supreme National Council consisting of equal representatives from North and South, the U.N. representative of the Confederal Korea might have to abstain on all issues because the Supreme National Council could not agree.

KIM YOUNG NAM: We think that once the North and South reached agreement on a confederal plan, it could solve problems one by one in the interests of the whole nation. To remove the differences between North and South, we proposed a confederation, also measures for joint action in the international arena. We proposed before what we should do in political fields, and what we should do in military affairs in order to unite the North and South.

SOLARZ: Would armies be merged under the confederation or remain separate?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I would like to talk about post-unification Korea. Korea should continue to be independent, neutral, and non-aligned. Some people fear Korea might come under the influence of the big powers or threaten others. They think this way because they know too little about us. Our basic principle is independence. In the past, having suffered the bitter life of a stateless people, subjected to foreign occupation, therefore, we maintain an independent position now, and would also after unification. We will never become a satellite of another. We would not have given blood in the fight for independence in order to become the satellite of others. That is quite impossible. On the contrary, unification is aimed at strengthening national independence and dignity. We will defend independence and reject

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the domination of others, maintain neutrality, non-intervention in the affairs of others, and mutual respect. The unified Korea would be good for the peace of the world. It would never be bad for the United States either. Some people in the United States, however, incorrectly interpret our position and the implications of a unified Korea, either because they misunderstand us, or want to perpetuate a divided Korea. Whatever their intention, we believe it is based on a failure to know us well.

SOLARZ: Does unification envision termination of the defense treaty with the PRC and the Soviet Union, as well as the United States?

KIM YOUNG NAM: After reunification, the three treaties would be of no use at all.

SOLARZ: After unification, do you envision reducing forces? Today there are over a million soldiers in Korea, by how much would they be reduced?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We have often proposed, even before unification, reducing forces on both sides. I will explain later. When we signed a treaty with the U.S.S.R., a separate statement was made saying that such treaties would be terminated with the unification of Korea. Some say Korea should stay divided because outside influence might dominate a unified Korea. This is done for the purpose of maintaining division, just like the accusation of a southward threat. We hope these wrong views will be corrected. At the sixth meeting of the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, we made public communiques of the Central Committee of the DPRK. There was wide interest throughout the world. We stated our invariable commitment to non-alignment, to prevent the non-aligned

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movement from being brought under the control of outside forces, opposition to the formation of blocks within the non-aligned movement, and so forth. If you study these documents, you will understand how fundamental is our commitment to the non-aligned movement. After unification, foreign capital in South Korea will be protected, and more capital invited. Korea will have much more to do to develop a prosperous Korea. We need more economic interchange with other countries. We will promote foreign trade helpful to the state. A reunified Korea should not be dominated by or the satellite of any country.

SOLARZ: What is the present attitude of the DPRK toward foreign investment prior to unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Now, there is no foreign investment.

SOLARZ: Are you opposed to foreign investment before unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We built our economic foundation on the basis of chu-che. We are trying to solve all problems on the basis of our own efforts and resources.

SOLARZ: You would permit foreign investment after unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: There are huge foreign investments in South Korea. These would be protected after unification, and we can even envisage more.

SOLARZ: Only in the South?

KIM YOUNG NAM: That can be decided after unification.

SOLARZ: I can imagine some neighboring countries might fear the threat from a unified Korea. Would a unified Korea be willing to agree to a non-aggression pact, especially with Japan?

KIM YOUNG NAM: There are many countries in the world. They

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cannot exist isolated. There have been many exchanges and treaties among countries in the past. The world is different now from the period of Columbus. Now, countries have means to contact each other. Agreements are a natural course. We are maintaining good relations with countries, even those far away. I see no reason why we cannot have good relations with neighbors. We will have good neighbor relations with our neighbors, including Japan. And economic and cultural exchanges, thus contributing to world peace. The Japanese authorities are saying a united Korea is not good for the security of Japan. But, they are saying so for other purposes. During our five thousand years we have been invaded by others, and surrounded by big countries we could not even dream of invading.

SOLARZ: I am aware that in the past that it was Japan which invaded Korea rather than Korea which invaded Japan. But would you agree on a non-aggression pact with Japan after unification?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We would have no reason to reject it if the Japanese requested it for a good purpose.

SOLARZ: If the day comes when a unified Korea enters into relations with Japan, let people know that I was the first to suggest a non-aggression pact so I can qualify for the Nobel Prize.

KIM YOUNG NAM: In the U.S., many desire Korea unification. They must welcome your visit to North Korea. You can be the first American Minister to our country.

SOLARZ: The DPRK has put forward a number of proposals for unification. One proposal is for a national election. When it was unacceptable, you proposed confederation. I realize

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this is a hypothetical question. But if a month from now the South said it had a change of heart and was willing to have a national election under supervision of some independent body, or that it was willing to accept a confederation, which choice would you prefer?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Our position is peaceful unification without outside interference. So when we proposed general election and it was rejected, we proposed confederation. Whether we have either must be decided by the Korean people themselves without foreign interference. If the Korean people cannot achieve unification of their country by themselves, how can they maintain their national dignity?

SOLARZ: But which do you prefer: a general election or confederation? Are both equally acceptable?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Today the atmosphere for a general election does not exist in South Korea. Democracy is gradually fading away. We can't find the slightest trace of it.

SOLARZ: Do you fear northward aggression?

KIM YOUNG NAM: There is a danger of northward aggression.

SOLARZ: Does the U.S. have any intention to attack the North?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We hope not. In Congress you supported the withdrawal of U.S. forces. You asked whether we would welcome foreign investment. I propose we eat first.

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SOLARZ: In a conversation in New York Ambassador Han pointed out that the anti-Communist laws in South Korea were an obstacle to family reunion. In a conversation with South Korean authorities they told me that they were willing to provide written assurances that persons traveling pursuant to family exchange would not be arrested. They also pointed out that if any North Korean visiting the South were arrested, that North Korea could reciprocate by arresting people from the South going North, which would bring the exchange to an end. Would you be prepared to accept such assurances?

KIM YOUNG NAM: It was the same during Park Chung Hee's time. What is happening in the South proves that honeyed words can't be trusted. They promised those in Kwangju who laid down their arms that they would not be prosecuted. But the government did not keep its word. Kim Dae Jung is being called a Communist and facing punishment. Even if they make a written statement, if the anti-Communist laws remain in effect, they can proceed against anyone, anytime. Moreover, hundreds of evil laws are preventing democracy. For unification, these laws must be abolished. Once we proposed in detail what should be done for divided families, lists were exchanged. We sent answers, but they did not reply. We supplied more than a thousand names, and they sent over 300.

SOLARZ: You indicated that the abolition of anti-Communist laws were a condition for unification and even for the exchange of families. How would the North respond if the South wanted it to abolish one of its laws in order to promote unification?

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KIM YOUNG NAM: Our laws are established by the consent of the entire people. None need to be abolished. Many in the South support our system. They use anti-Communism in the national security law too as a shield to prevent any steps toward unification. They use it like a magician's veil or cover which they must use each time.

SOLARZ: Won't it be possible to reach any agreement with the South unless they abolish the anti-Communist law and the national security law?

KIM YOUNG NAM: First of all, we demand that a necessary atmosphere for unification be created. We don't expressly demand abolition of specific laws. We point out, however, that these are obstacles. We ask the South to create a favorable atmosphere.

SOLARZ: The U.S. is encouraged by the resumption of North-South negotiations. Do you see any prospects for progress?

KIM YOUNG NAM: The South Korean situation is terrible. Yet we want the country to be unified peacefully through dialogue. We only hope for the meeting to reach a successful conclusion. We want progress, but the prospects are not bright. Brutal suppression is being staged while the talks are going on. Prime Minister Shin and the Cabinet resigned. Park Chun Hoon is an acting Prime Minister. A president and cabinet exist, but only in name. The real power is the National Security Committee under General Chun Doo Hwan.

SOLARZ: You have described the many obstacles to unification. Realistically, I suppose one must say it is extremely difficult to reach agreement on unification or even on family reunion. What about military measures to reduce tension? Both sides are

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concerned about attack. To reduce military tension and minimize the risk of war, would the DPRK be willing to agree to: a) A Demilitarization of the DMZ. Both sides have introduced weapons into the DMZ. Genuine demilitarization might reduce tensions. b) Joint Observer Teams, as provided in the armistice agreement. c) Joint North-South Teams to Repair Markers Along the Military Demarkation Line. d) Agreement to Give the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission More Responsibility and Freedom of Action within the DMZ. One of the most serious problems is the tensions that exist and the fears on both sides regarding the other. If agreement could be reached on these purely military measures, it might be easier to reach agreement on political measures.

KIM YOUNG NAM: I was prepared to answer that question. We made a five-point proposal in June, 1973 to ease tension and to reduce armed forces. I can give you details. I feel again and again Congressman Solarz' deep interest in Korean unification. To ease tension, you try to learn clearly what must be done. It is not easy for you to fully understand the first time what we mean.

SOLARZ: If I don't fully understand the first time, I can come again.

KIM YOUNG NAM: Perhaps we could continue a discussion in your country.

SOLARZ: I would welcome you to come and stay in my house, although it is not as spacious as Prince Sihanouk's palace.

KIM YOUNG NAM: There is a Korean proverb. "The narrower the house, the greater the love."

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SOLARZ: I'm puzzled at Prince Sihanouk's decision to stay here. Kim Il Sung is one of the greatest exponents of Communism in the world. The DPRK worker's state is based on the principle of equality. But Sihanouk is the embodiment of royalty and principles anithetical to Communism. How do you explain the fact that Kim Il Sung not only welcomed Sihanouk, but built him a luxurious palace?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Kim Il Sung is not only a dynamic leader but also generous and tender-hearted. He teaches us we must use our best efforts to consolidate independence and sovereignty. At the same time, we must help others and respect the independence and sovereignty of others. If independence is removed from man, he is little better than animals. System and ideology can be decided only by our own people. In relations with other countries we maintain equality, mutual respect, and independence. Of course, Sihanouk is a prince. For many years Kim Il Sung and Sihanouk had great friendship. Several times on Kim Il Sung's birthday, Sihanouk visited Pyongyang.

SOLARZ: It speaks well of the great leader of your country that he not only was allowed to live here, but was given such comfortable accommodations.

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THE MEETING CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH

KIM YOUNG NAM: I will talk further about the three principles and five points for unification. This will help you to understand. The three principles were stated by Kim Il Sung in May, 1972 when he received Yi Hu Rak. The July 4, 1972, joint statement had these three principles as their main content: independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity. No sooner had the joint statement been signed than the South Koreans upset the principles by calling for confrontation with dialogue, dialogue with co-existence, and competition with dialogue. We insisted on dialogue for unity, dialogue for collaboration, and dialogue for reunification. In June, 1973 the South Korean authorities declared their machination for national division; and their policy brought to an end the dialogue that had been arranged with so much effort. Kim Il Sung brought forth a five-point policy: 1) to remove the military confrontation and ease tension; 2) to realize many-sided collaboration; 3) to convene a great national congress with representatives from people of all strata to negotiate and solve the problem of unification; 4) to institute a North-South confederation; and 5) to enter the U.N. as a single state of Koryo. Many efforts to implement the five-point policy and the North-South confederation and other matters have already been gone into in detail. As to ways and means of easing military tension

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and confrontation, the armed forces are more than one million strong, North and South, which makes the situation strained and engenders the danger of war. To achieve peace, the military confrontation must be removed first of all. No proper dialogue can be held until confrontation is removed. How can we conduct dialogue or exchanges with guns and daggers in hand? Therefore, we proposed scores of times ways and means to prevent confrontation: 1) halt military reinforcement in the arms race; 2) withdraw foreign forces; 3) reduce armed forces and armaments, pull out military installations from the DMZ (you touched on this). We proposed that North and South cut forces first by 150,000 or 200,000 each, then, after the withdrawal of foreign forces, to 100,000 on each side.

SOLARZ: Must agreement in principle on foreign forces be reached before beginning the 150,000 reduction?

KIM YOUNG NAM: At the beginning we placed no conditions. The South Koreans did not respond so we proposed new ones. Whether foreign forces are withdrawn or not withdrawn, we would be willing to reduce forces to 100,000 on each side.

SOLARZ: How would the reduction be verified?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Both sides would agree on verification measures. The fourth and fifth points in the five-point proposal to end military confrontation were: 4) stopping introduction of armaments from other countries; and 5) a non-aggression agreement. After the publication of the North-South statement, the South Korean authorities turned it upside down. In October

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after the publication of the North-South statement, the South Korean authorities turned it upside down. In October, 1972 they proclaimed a state of emergency. We still continued efforts to realize the North-South dialogue. On November 2, 1972, the second meeting of the co-chairmen of the NSCC took place. Three representatives, including Choi Kyu Ha and Yi Hu Rak, came to Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung met them. He proposed exchanges in political, economic, cultural, and military fields. The South Korean side agreed to pool efforts for unification of the North and South. The NSCC meetings continued until mid-June, 1973. We made a five-point proposal to reduce military confronation: 1) halt arms buildup; 2) withdraw foreign forces; 3) reduce armed forces and armaments; 4) stop introduction of weapons from the outside; 5) sign a peace agreement.

SOLARZ: Did withdrawal of foreign forces include abolition of the security treaty?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We demanded only the withdrawal of foreign troops. Then we could sit down and discuss abolition of treaties with foreign countries. We also proposed the reduction of military production and expenditures, but the South Korean authorities refused to agree.

SOLARZ: How could each side be sure the other side was complying with a reduction of forces?

KIMG YOUNG NAM: We proposed to form five subcommittees of the North-South Coordinating Committee. As a result, agreement was reached on this and published. We proposed, and it was agreed,

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that equal numbers from North and South of persons in comparable positions should form subcommittees. Had this been realized, it would have been a big step forward, but due to the insincere attitude on the other side, it failed. At this time Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped in broad daylight from Tokyo.

SOLARZ: Verification is very important. There are two possible ways. One is inspection by neutral nations, and the other is by joint teams from the North and South. Would either or both be acceptable to the DPRK?

KIM YOUNG HAM: That is also connected with the attitude of the South Korean side, whether they really want reunification or division. We give priority to reunification, consider everything from this viewpoint and take every measure to this end. If the South Korean authorities really want reunification, not relying on outside forces and are willing to discuss in detail such measures as a measure for reunification, we can take steps for reducing military tension by detailed negotiations. One cannot say there must be a third country involved for all these steps. If the South Korean authorities really want reunification, we ourselves can reach agreement and solve all problems. As for the NNSC, their activity is often hindered by unwarranted actions by the South Korean side. The Commission is now confined to Panmunjom. Formerly it was located in various cities, North and South. It had to withdraw because of unwarranted acts by South Korea. They hampered the activities of the Commission and killed a Polish member.

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SOLARZ: Assuming you are right, and they are not interested in unification at this time, preferring the division of Korea instead, the fact is that for thirty-five years Korea has been divided, and there has been virtually no contact between North and South. If Korea is to be unified, their minds will have to be changed. Wouldn't there be a better chance to persuade the South of the advantages of unification if there were an agreement on family reunion, letter exchange and trade, than if there were no agreement?

KIM YOUNG NAM: You may think so. But, in light of the situation and their attitude, such steps are impossible. We proposed all these points in negotiations for prime minister meetings, but in the context of unification. As you know, the South Korean authorities say they will develop nuclear weapons. This is a dangerous situation. Family reunion and letter exchange are of no use under conditions of military confrontation. All these matters must be considered in the context of unification. Cooperation and interchange between North and South would help the development of the country and the promotion of unification. It is necessary for the North and South to remove misunderstanding and mistrust. We proposed economic and cultural exchange. Family reunion and so forth could be settled in this connection. We proposed more than twenty years ago that if general elections and a confederation were unacceptable, many-sided exchanges should be conducted. On many occasions we have proposed cultural exchange, trade, family reunion, letter exchange. The South Korean authorities accepted no such proposals. Nevertheless, we continued our efforts. Especially at the beginning of the North-South dialogue, we made efforts. I told you about Kim Il Sung's meeting with

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North-South representatives in 1972. He proposed many-sided cooperation and interchange, joint use of resources, joint irrigation, fishing, research on national language, joint production of motion pictures, exchange of films, single art troops and single sports teams. The South Koreans welcomed all of these proposals. They agreed to work on them, but only in words and under the pressure of public opinion. They rejected all on the grounds of the stage of priority. They came out with a North-South economic cooperation plan all of a sudden after having rejected all of the above formerly. This was intended only as a smokescreen to deceive opinion. They ruthlessly repressed democratic forces in the South. Today they are going from bad to worse. It is clear to anyone that the North-South economic cooperation plan was aimed at permanent division. Even today, if they renounced their splittist activites and stopped anti-Communist activities, we would be willing to have economic interchange. We support an extensive scale dialogue among individuals and organizations of the North and the South. We proposed a great national congress. Unification is not a matter between countries that can be entrusted to a few people in authority. We've had experience with the South Korean authorities; they are uninterested in unification. Now we want to broaden the dialogue so persons interested in unification can participate. Some fear that people might fall into the trap of Communization, but we have no intention of imposing our system on the South. Negotiations at Panmunjom have continued for nine meetings, without significant progress. They are using delaying tactics. They first proposed meetings at Geneva. We could hold talks in Pyongyang until conditions for talks existed in the South, but Seoul disagreed. Finally, after

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two months, we both agreed on Panmunjom. There is still no agreement on an agenda. They want to avoid any wide scope dialogue for unification, dragging talks on in order to fabricate two Koreas. We want dialogue on unification, and among many individuals and organizations. If the South Korean authorities maintain their attitude for division, dialogue can never succeed. We have made efforts to solve the problem of family reunions on forty occasions, including exchange of correspondence, but the South Koreans rejected it each time. In 1957, we gave the addresses of 357 persons that South Korea asked about. Our side asked about 1,432 persons, but the South Koreans have sent no report. Nevertheless, we continue to make efforts. As a result of our perseverance, the Red Cross talks opened. We proposed defining the scope of families and personal visits as the main method to find families, and removing legislative and social conditions hampering efforts to find families according to their free will. The South Korean side rejected the proposal, demanding the tracing card method, which caused a suspension of the full-dress talks. Later, at working level meetings, the South Korean side was insincere.

SOLARZ: It is obvious your government is concerned about family reunion. I have a request concerning a matter of family reunion which I would like to present to you on humanitarian grounds. (SJS then presented the information contained in the memorandum about Private First Class Chung Myeu Sup).

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KIM YOUNG NAM: This is news to me. Throughout the world, the South Korea authorities are carrying out tricks to confuse the world public. Let me continue. Then I will answer your questions. I will check if he is here or not. In March, 1978, when the twenty-sixth working level meeting was being conducted, the United States and South Korean authorities carried out the joint exercise "Team Spirit 1978". The talks were broken off again and failed to reopen. It is important to take a fundamental position. If the South Korean authorities want to bring about reunion, they must lift martial law, the anti-Communist law, and other laws, otherwise no progress can be made. Our people want reunification at an early date. In my view, division is largely a result of the Korean policy of the United States. You may feel displeased, but unlike other Americans, you are interested in the problems of our country. If the United States had not supported the South Korean authorities, seeking division, and had not kept troops in Korea, our country would long ago have been unified. In 1972, at the time of the dialogue, the United States tried to fabricate two Koreas, proposing simultaneous United Nations membership, and cross-recognition. Contrary to his initial commitment, President Carter froze the troop withdrawal plan and instigated the rule of a new military ruler. To justify the suspension of withdrawal, the U.S. administration claims a big military increase in the North. This is too clumsy a drama. You say we have increased military strength thirty percent, and have an army of seven hundred thousand. As you know, the North has a population of seventeen million; 8.6 million -- more than

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half -- are in school at various levels. Also construction is being carried out on a vast scale. There are many women and old people in our country. It is impossible to increase our military strength that much. Three hundred and fifty thousand to four hundred thousand is our actual strength, and it is a tremendous burden.

SOLARZ: Including reserves and para-military forces?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We have no such thing. Our total armed forces are three hundred and fifty thousand to four hundred thousand. We cut our military expenditures every year. These accounted for more than thirty percent of our budget in 1968, at the time of the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. This year, 14.5 percent of our national budget goes for defense. We are not increasing our armed forces and making war preparations. South Korea's population is thirty-five million. Their armed force is seven hundred million -- twice our size. In addition, they have a homeland reserve of three million, a student defense force of 1.73 million. There is nothing comparable in the North. To justify the increase, South Korean authorities say that North Korea has this many or that many para-military forces. Actually, there are no such forces at all.

SOLARZ: Can you give estimates of the numbers of tanks and artillery available to the North and South?

KIM YOUNG NAM: I'm not a military expert; I don't know. The South has a civilian defense corps of 4.5 million, and U.S. forces of 42,822 equipped with nuclear weapons. Any man with common sense can judge which side has the more. South Korea gets military weapons free or cheaply from the United States.

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The United STates refuses to withdraw troops because of a threat from the North. This is no more than a pretext. The government time and again has said it has no intention of invading the South. When Park was shot, and popular uprisings occurred, some said that the North might take advantage of this. Far from invading the South, we repeatedly held dialogue with them. We demanded that the South Korean authorities halt the bloody suppression and hold a constructive dialogue. Instead of the threat of invasion from the North, the threat is invasion from the South. Many military exercises have been held in the South, threatening the North. The Carter Administration is giving a huge amount of military aid to South Korea under the name of compensatory aid. In FY 1979, $975 million worth of military equipment was given to South Korea. In FY 1981, military aid amounted to $251,490,000. That is over $1 billion in two years' time.

SOLARZ: Have any military exercises been held in the North?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We are too busy to hold military exercises. We all go to the fields and construction sites. There is no real question where the real threat is. Chun Doo Hwan is trying to satisfy his dirty lust for power. He conducted an unprecedented bloody suppression in Kwangju. The United States expressed regret, but forces under the U.S. command were sent to take part in the suppression. The United States also sent the Coral Sea hurriedly to the vicinity of Korea. It is high time for the United States to change its policy toward our country. Voices for change in U.S. policy toward Korea are ringing out louder in the U.S. The Americans for Democratic

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Action adopted a resolution demanding a change in U.S. policy toward Korea. First, that the United States should withdraw its forces so the Koreans could solve unification by themselves. This would benefit the United States itself and not impair U.S. honor.

SOLARZ: How would withdrawal of U.S. forces pave the way for unification of Korea? Is it because you believe the United States is putting pressure on the South not to agree to unification, or is it because you think U.S. forces prop up the government in Seoul, Korea, which is stifling the desire of the people for unification, and if the government changed unification would be easier?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Korea's division is an artificial one created by outside forces, that is, by the U.S. occupation of South Korea. I won't dwell on the past, but look to the future. Reality shows that the South Korean authorities' anti-democratic military rule was supported by the United States in this or that way. For example, under the name of aid the South Korean authorities are supported and are getting large-scale military aid which was necessary to execute their anti-democratic military coup. Contrary to what the South Korean authorities say, they are seeking division. In reality, the United States, taking into consideration public opinion in Korea, is instigating the South Korean authorities to that purpose. For example, we proposed not only to ease tension and military confrontation, but also an end to incidents-ground, air and sea. Last year, we proposed from March 1st to stop all military provocations, including military exercises, but American-South Korean armies

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staged Team Spirit 1979. The South Korean authorities can ruthlessly trample on democracy, and enforce military rule under American backing and instigation. The presence of U.S. troops not only hinders a just solution of the Korean problem, but is a source of constant tension. I know you favored the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1979. As you said then, "when you visited South Korea in 1975, you met Park Chung Hee." You said if war should break out, U.S. forces would not come to defend Korea. We think people like you might help the U.S. government change its mind. The U.S. will not benefit from the military occupation of South Korea. The Military Information Center is asking whether the entry of U.S. forces into war on the Asian continent serves U.S. interests. They said that the U.S. division in Korea is unnecessary and should be pulled out. The U.S. should stop supporting dictators who trample on human rights. The instigation of Chun makes the people of the world feel misgivings regarding U.S. policy. We are aware that you are active in supporting human rights in South Korea. Unless the South Korean society becomes democratic, the South Korean people can neither get rid of the present situation nor achieve unification.

SOLARZ: What do you mean by democracy?

KIM YOUNG NAM: All political parties and politicians can have free activities. Stop suppression of people who demand democracy and unification and repeal the anti-Communist laws.

SOLARZ: Does repeal of anti-Communist laws mean permission for the Communist party to operate in South Korea?

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so-called Tri-Partite Talks. It would not talk to us without South Korea participating. This is devoid of feasibility. The Carter proposal was to discuss overall questions regarding economic, cultural matters and eventual reunification. This shows that the proposal for three-way talks is confused. It mixes up the problems between us and South Korea with others between us and the United States. Overall problems between North and South are internal affairs to be solved by Koreans themselves. The United States should not intervene. What are the problems that the U.S. should solve with us? Pulling out of U.S. forces and replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. The South Korean authorities were not signatories to the armistice agreement; therefore, they are not qualified to intervene. The problems are different, but the three-way talks proposed mix all together. The unreasonableness is that it seeks division while ostensibly seeking unification. Similarly, the United States talks about simultaneous U.N. entry and cross-recognition. What is to be done regarding the question of dialogue with the United States. It is necessary to sit down together. You, Mr. Solarz, consider it necessary to come in contact with us. Since the United States refuses to take part in a dialogue without South Koreans, we could consider bringing them into the dialogue as observers only when problems relating to them crop up. For this purpose, the United States and North Korea should meet first to discuss the form and method of dialogue. The U.S. authorities continue to refuse this proposal. Only by talking and exchanging views can problems be solved. If the United

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States wants peace in Korea, and a correct solution to the problem of peaceful unification, there is no reason why it should not engage in dialogue with us. We would not stick only to our demands as regards talks with the United States; we are prepared to consider any fair proposal. If the United States finds difficulty in one form, we can use another. The United States could have secret contacts first. This is the stance of the party and government, and I hope that you will do something to cause the U.S. government and Congress to agree to a dialogue.

SOLARZ: What do you think about cultural and sports exchanges between the United States and the DPRK?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Not bad, I think.

SOLARZ: Why did North Korean basketball and boxing teams decline invitations to come to the United States last year?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Not in every case must one go to a tournament outside the country. I think if they didn't go it must be for technical, not for other reasons.

SOLARZ: If the United States invited North Korea to send cultural groups or athletic teams to the United States, would North Korea be prepared to extend similar invitations?

KIM YOUNG NAM: It is not impossible. It would be done according to agreement in each case. Even in that case it must not be aimed at perpetuating division, but at promoting unification.

SOLARZ: Would the DPRK be willing to engage in cultural and sports exchange with the U.S. before a dialogue existed?

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KIM YOUNG NAM: It would be better if it could be started after the dialogue, but we are not sticking to our demand. We want to translate it into reality. We want to translate things into reality one by one in sincere discussion.

SOLARZ: People of our two countries know little about each other. Would the DPRK permit more frequent visits by journalists and scholars if the United States were to admit DPRK journalists and scholars?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We took the lead in this respect.

SOLARZ: Your government wanted to limit the number of journalists who could come with me. Many journalists were not given visas. Many scholars also wanted to come.

KIM YOUNG NAM: We have told Americans that we always welcome them. However, the American Administration makes ungentlemanly remarks about us. We do not exclude the possibility of this. Probably the delay was due to technical reasons. It is not necessary for us to limit the numbers. We couldn't find out whether they wanted to come in connection with your visit or use it as a pretext. We gave visas to all recommended by Congressman Solarz.

SOLARZ: If the United States had trade or diplomatic relations with the DPRK, would the DPRK object to similar relations between China, the Soviet Union, and South Korea?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We are opposed because that would perpetuate division and promote two Koreas. In 1973 Park proposed simultaneous U.N. membership as a policy. He was encouraged to do so by other countries.

SOLARZ: What is the aim of the proposal?

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KIM YOUNG NAM: International legalization of the two-Korea policy. When frustrated, they proposed cross-recognition and balance of forces which aimed at guaranteeing the division of Korea by arms.

SOLARZ: Since a number of countries already have diplomatic relations with both Koreas, how would cross-recognition by the United States and North Korea and China and the U.S.S.R. with South Korea perpetuate division?

KIM YOUNG NAM: None of those countries is the United States. Since the DPRK was founded, the United States and several capitalist powers tried to prevent our country from having relations with other countries. Thus, at the beginning we couldn't have relations with many. Later, when many countries could take an independent position, they started to consider the Korean question in an independent way. They also came to know about our government's policy and position -- that we are seeking a peaceful method, rather than a military solution to reunification. The South Korean authorities, by seeking division, relying on foreign forces, tried to justify policies opposed to the liberation struggles of many countries. Those countries who came to learn our policies established relations with us with a desire to see Korea unified. Some African countries have taken the bold step of severing relations with South Korea. Therefore, there are tremendous differences between recognition of us by non-aligned countries and cross-recognition which is being loudly trumpeted by the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

SOLARZ: How would cross-recognition interfere with unification?

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KIM YOUNG NAM: They know well. The need to justify two different countries by making division de-facto.

SOLARZ: I'd like to better understand your opposition to U.N. membership. Both Koreas have observer missions at the U.N.; both belong to U.N. organizations like WHO. In the 1950's the Soviet Union proposed North Korea for U.N. membership.

KIM YOUNG NAM: According to the U.N. charter, membership is limited to national states. Therefore, we cannot enter in a divided state. Those who want separate admission are not only against unification, but also seek to challenge the U.N. charter.

SOLARZ: Supposing a resolution admitting both Koreas, stating it was a temporary measure without prejudice to later admission of a unified Korea, were passed by the United Nations?

KIM YOUNG NAM: It would be a self-contradiction. The resolution would be against the charter itself. It would be a legalization of division.

SOLARZ: If South Korea agreed to confederation, do you believe it would eventually lead to the reunification of Korea with a system similar to that in the North today, or would both the North and South continue indefinitely to have separate systems?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We will see after confederation occurs. The system adopted is to be decided by the general will of the people of the country.

SOLARZ: I'm not clear about your response to my questions with respect to the possibility of demilitarization of the

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DMZ, the use of joint observer teams as provided by the armistice agreement, and joint North-South teams to repair markers.

KIM YOUNG NAM: It is unnecessary to agree separately about such steps. It must be discussed within the framework of all other actions to promote unification, remove military confrontation, and to ease tension.

SOLARZ: You expressed concern regarding a possible attack on the North. I can assure that the last thing the United States wants is war in Korea. Wouldn't peace in Korea be enhanced if U.S. forces remained to ensure that South Korean forces wouldn't attack the North?

KIM YOUNG NAM: Our view is contrary. We know people in the U.S. and elsewhere have used this argument. This is merely a pretext to justify U.S. forces staying.

SOLARZ: Are you worried at all if U.S. forces withdraw?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We have no worries at all. We know some foreign papers write about this. They say our country will be influenced by this or that big power. This is to justify keeping U.S. forces in Korea. We would be most happy if Congressman Solarz could understand that what some people say has no basis in fact.

SOLARZ: If the United States were willing to withdraw forces from the South, would the DPRK agree to: 1) a non-aggression agreement with South Korea; 2) a mutual verified reduction of armed forces; 3) confidence-building measures such as trade, family reunions, and so forth?

KIM YOUNG NAM: We've already proposed to sign a peace agreement with South Korea. Through negotiations we could

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fully solve all problems. How to do so in practice requires a sincere discussion with South Korea. Compare your proposals with treating a patient. To cure the patient you must find the cause of the illness and remove it. Without treating the root and applying some medicines, you cannot cure the illness.