

March 8, 1954

Memorandum from [redacted] for Chief, IO/1, 'History of the Efforts on the Part of the American Committee to Establish Large Scale Radio Activities'

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Summary:

An International Organizations Division memorandum reviews the history of AMCOMLIB efforts to organize radio broadcasts, noting that they became the primary AMCOMLIB activity only after issuance of the Jackson Committee report in September 1953.

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SUBJECT:

History of the Riferts on the part of the American Countities to Establish Large Scale Radio Activities.

- l. In the original QEACTIVE Project outline, approved by ADFO's office on 26 September 1950, it was stated that, following the organization of a United Front, a subsequent objective of the project was: "Gvert radio breadcasts by the United Front Organization designed to reach the people of the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet forces of co-cupation in Germany, Austria, and the satellite countries."
- 2, Immediately following receipt of this approval, officers of the EE Division and of the newly formed immerican Countities initiated efforts to form a United Front, the presequinite to further notion. The first meeting of four emigre groups took place at Function, Germany in January 1951, less than four months after the initial project approval. Additional meetings with the emigres resulted in agreement on a protect which, everyone concerned believed, would form the basis of the political center. Assordingly, the Countities proceeded full steam ahead to plan and implement the major elements in the program for "practical works" which, as the project outline had provided, was to follow the formation of a United Front. The Russian Research Institute was taken over. Flans were laid to establish a newspaper. And plane to devalop a large scale radio operation were given the highest priority.
- 3. The Countities hired Forrest McClumy as Radio Director in July 1951. By 15 August 1951 McClumey had prepared a complete preliminary radio plan for GKACTIVE. This plan developed requirements for a total budget of the Goundttee proceeded to acquire. A.D. Ring prepared a study for the Countities which concluded that Barcelons was the optimum site for two 160 M transmitters, given the target areas to be covered. Eugene Lyons, then President of the Countities, wrote a policy paper for the radio operation in which he stressed the importance of intesting broadcasts at the earliest possible date.

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toward the USSE itself.

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4. Under the electronstances, with the Countities preceding vigorously to develop and implement for-reaching activities in the field of practical vools, Agency officials decided that they had better obtain top level Agency and Department of State appreval for these activities, Accordingly, a meeting was arranged on 27 August 1951 in General Smith's office, attended by Mesors, Dalles, Visner, Lindsoy, and Bross of GIA and Mesors. Bohlen, Matthews, Reishardt, and Joyce of State. At this mosting, General Smith introduced the subject of CEACTIVE radio operations by questioning the effectiveness of radio propagands beamed to the USER, The commune of opinion of the State delegation was that the practical impact of redio propagands on Great Russia was problematical. Hr. Dulles stresped the desirability of concentrating propagands on Russian occupation personnel in East Germany. Accordingly, the meeting decided to parait radio breadensting on an experimental scale only; General Smith authorized limited broadcasting coverage of occupation forces in Mart Corpany and Poland, and the Soviet Union. The sum of was approved by General Smith for this purpose in October, 1951. In October the Department of State set forth its views as to the priority of endeavor it believed the Committee should undertake. A newspaper was first on the list. Last. "and well at the bettom," was listed the radio program directed

5. In accordance with the then generally accepted premise in regard to QEAGTIVE (i.e. that a United Front had to be formed before radio broadcasts could be initiated), and in view of the official attitude towards radio broadcasts as shown above, activity in the radio field on the part of the Committee them remained quiescent until the formation of a Political Center in October, 1952. Immediately following this development, the Gommittee proceeded to move rapidly towards the building of a radio organization. When it became known that the Somettee hoped to be on the air by 1 March 1953, certain Agency officials strongly recommended to DD/F that "the proposed Merch 1 opening date should definitely be postponed at least until the administrative difficulties have been straightened out and adequate saripts prepared." This recommendation was not followed, as Admiral Stevens developed a convincing argument at a meeting with ID/7 on 27 Pohruary 1953 to the affect that whatever deficiencies the operation would initially passess would most efficiently be rectified in the course of actual breadensting and operating experience. The radio went on the air on I Murch 1953 as scheduled. After a rather imperfect beginning, Radio litheration had shown sufficient improvement to warrant the following official communit from the Department of State: "Use quality of these broadcasts has steadily improved since their inception on March 1, 1953, and they should continue to be supported."

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6. Throughout this entire period, it was generally accepted that the political effort was of primary importance. It was not until the release of the Jackson Committee report in September 1953 that the Agency was officially motified that the radio effort was now to be regarded as of primary importance. It was a sudden shift in emphasis for all those who had been intimately associated with the project. Since the wary first days, when Mr. Icanes gave important to the formulation of QMAGTIVE, the political effort had not only been considered most important, but even a presequialty to other solivity. In the past mouth we have been toying to recrient the thinking of the Committee so as to recognize this basic policy change. When it is recognized and accepted, we should expect a resumption of that great drive to amplify the radio operation which characterised the early days of the Committee's activities.

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