

# June 2, 1966 Cable 1052 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Israel

#### Citation:

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### **Summary:**

The Department of State requested that the Embassy inform the Israelis that they were satisfied with the inspection of Dimona, but ask Israel to clarify the location of the uranium ore from Argentina.

#### **Credits:**

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## **Original Language:**

English

#### **Contents:**

Original Scan

2) To avoid possibility casting shadow of doubt on generally satisfactory results from visit, we would hope Israel could clarify question of whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and use to which it being or intended be put. Embassy should state this is precisely type of problem which augments apprehension in high levels USG and elsewhere /proliferation and underscores need for IAEA type safeguards to

NEA: NE: ANNyerges av 6/1/66

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

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2700

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reassure world of peaceful orientation Israel nuclear program. This is subject we plan take up with G@I further in near future. Embassy should recall the Secretary's statement to Eban February 9 that Israel was apparently following a policy designed to create ambiguity in the Arab world, that this also created ambiguity in Washington and Israel should expect the US to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on non-proliferation GP-3

END

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FORM 8-63 DS-322A CONTINUATION SHEET SECRET

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