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September 14, 1972
Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

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Summary:

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on press release on UNCURK's report, North-South Red Cross talks, prospects for postponement, report on the UNC to the UN, military armistice commission, ROK troop withdrawal from Vietnam, US troop withdrawal from the ROK, and UNGA documentation on Korea.

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cc. Mr.Kutakov
Mr. Sivaraman

14 September 1972

Dear Ahmet,

I acknowledge receipt of your confidential letters numbered 158 and 159 dated 8 September.

Regarding the last paragraph of your 158, requesting the pouching of PV's of the general debate along with the records of the General Committee and those of the plenary, relevant to the Korean question, as they become available, I am requesting Siva to make the necessary arrangements with PSCA.

Regarding your 159, I have already cabled you that the date for the release of the report is 20 September. I imagine that we will be putting out the press release on the same day. I shall send you a cable on this question tomorrow at the latest.

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea

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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL No. 159

8 September 1972

PRESS RELEASE ON UNCURK'S REPORT

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

In reference to my coded UNKOR 107 and your 105, I am presenting herewith two copies of UNCURK's Press Release on its report submitted to the Secretary-General under cover of the letter of transmittal signed by the Chairman on 18 August 1972.

I should very much appreciate your cabled notification of the exact date and time for the embargoed release in New York to allow us to arrange for its simultaneous release in Seoul.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Özbudun
Principal Secretary

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE
UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA

Seoul, Republic of Korea
__ September 1972

NOTE: NOT TO BE RELEASED
BEFORE ____ HOURS
ON SEPTEMBER 1972.

Following is the text of the press release issued by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) on its report to the UN Secretary-General and released simultaneously in Seoul and New York.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations today, __ September 1972, transmitted to the members of the UN General Assembly for their information the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) which has been submitted to him in accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2668 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.

The first chapter of the report sets out the Commission's mandate and records its recent activities.

Chapters II and III relate to unification and to the Red Cross talks.

Significant developments relating to the question of the unification of Korea are identified within the period leading up to the 4 July 1972 Joint Communiqué, and after that date up to mid-August when the Commission concluded its report. The Commission notes that while substantial implementation of the Communiqué had yet to take place, both ROK and DPRK public statements were confidently anticipating further progress.

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The history of the preliminary north-south Red Cross talks is given in some detail, concluding with agreement on an agenda for plenary sessions on the reunion of divided families to be held alternately in Pyongyang and Seoul, beginning 30 August.

The following four chapters contain a factual account of other important developments in the Korean Peninsula having a bearing on the Commission's mandate. Because the Commission did not have access to the DPRK the content of these chapters relates largely to the ROK.

In Chapter IV, on the external relations of the ROK, the Commission recounts the ways in which the ROK has adapted to major external events within the period and identifies a disposition to seek new and wider relationships.

The review of security problems in the ROK in Chapter V includes details of infiltration and other examples of subversion and provocation and shows how the level of incidents dropped sharply towards the end of 1971 and remained virtually at zero for the remainder of the period covered by the report.

In Chapter VI the Commission notes several important political events in the ROK including the efforts of the ROK Government to preserve a state of national alertness, parliamentary developments, and the beginning of political contact with the DPRK.

In Chapter VII the Commission notes in some detail growth of the ROK economy and important measures taken by the ROK Government. It outlines the objectives of the third Five-Year Economic Development Plan.

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The Commission ends its report with Chapter VIII, "Conoluding Observations", in which it reviews the Korean question as a whole. The substantive portion of the chapter follows:

During the period covered by the report, the outstanding developments by far were the contacts between north and south Korea in Red Cross talks and negotiations which culminated in the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. Both contacts led to potentially significant agreements which, if implemented with realism and good will, could make a valuable contribution towards peaceful Korean unification.

The commencement of bilateral contacts is a welcome omen for an eventual settlement of the Korean question. However, the contacts have not changed the situation between the two parts of Korea to such an extent as to call into question the appropriateness of the traditional posture of the United Nations. This posture, personified by the political and military presence of the Organization in Korea, has steadily succeeded in one of its major purposes — the maintenance of peace and security in Korea. The UN has always looked to the time when there might be genuine detente on the Korean Peninsula. This may now be in prospect but it has not yet arrived.

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The maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula since 1953 is one of the most notable political successes in the annals of the United Nations. In this period, numerous crises have been contained. In this period too, in the atmosphere of security and stability for which the United Nations can claim credit, the current bilateral contacts have commenced and developed. To remove or reduce the United Nations presence in anticipation of possible success in the bilateral contacts, would be to put at risk the security and stability of the Peninsula. Far from impeding further success in north-south contacts, the continuation of the United Nations presence is an element clearly conducive to their success. The good offices of the United Nations are available for any further efforts towards peaceful unification synchronized with the bilateral contacts. The contribution of UNCURK to the preservation of peace and security is evident, and the value of its encouragement of the maintenance of representative government in the ROK has been confirmed at successive United Nations General Assemblies.

There are two interrelated reasons why the Commission has not so far been able to bring about unification of the two parts of Korea. First, the international climate and that on the Peninsula itself have not until

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now been ready for any settlement of the Korean question; secondly, the DPRK has continued to deny any role to the United Nations in general and to UNCURK in particular. It is to be hoped that the present general atmosphere of detente, both on the international scene and on the Peninsula, may encourage the DPRK to accept the role of the United Nations and to take advantage of its impartial services and readily available presence in Korea.

The Commission, as the presence of the United Nations in the field, considers from its observations that the growing detente on the Peninsula benefited from the post-ponement of the General Assembly deliberations on the Korean items last year. The absence of serious incidents in Korea this year, the progress achieved in the Red Cross talks and the dialogue leading to the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 appear to confirm this and to suggest that the absence of distractive debate continues to be a factor facilitating greater and more fruitful contact between the two parts of Korea.

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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL: No. 158 8 September 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The following matters in my report for this week may be of interest to you:

NORTH-SOUTH RED CROSS TALKS

As you know, following the successful completion of the first round of formal Red Cross talks in Pyongyang, the second round is scheduled to commence on 13 September in Seoul. As the ROK side returned home on 2 September, it was accorded a rousing welcome. Also the send-off it received by the north Korean public was incomparably warmer than the initial "reception". Seoul is ready to reciprocate with a tremendous red-carpet treatment. I have a hunch that even President Park Chung Hee might receive the visitors.

It is expected that similar to the first round the visit will witness only one session, the rest of the stay devoted to ceremonies, functions, sight-seeing, etc. The northerners will reside at the Tower Hotel,while the formal talks are now expected to be held at Chosun Hotel.

It is of interest meanwhile that the Government Party rejected an appeal by the Opposition to have representatives of both deliver congratulatory addresses at the Red Cross Session in Seoul. The DRP, however, persuaded the NDP to refrain from this in order to keep the Red Cross talks on humanitarian issues isolated from any political influence.

According to a reliable source, the itinerary for the DPRK Red Cross delegation in Seoul include an observation of a plenary session of the National Assembly, a trip to Hyonchung-sa, the shrine of the nationally-revered Lee Soon Shin, a reception by the Speaker of the National Assembly at either Yongbinkwan (Government Guest House) or Kyunghoiru (the palace behind the Capitol Building). The source indicated that some 700 people would be invited to the reception, including foreign diplomats in Seoul. The visitors would also be taken to the Cosmos and Shinseggye Department Stores and to Walker Hill.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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Prevalent opinion in Seoul expects a most successful visit. A few people however are apprehensive that the North Korean side — fully aware of the positive impact of another successful Red Cross round on the prospects for postponement of Korean issues on the very eve of the forthcoming UNGA — might resort to a pretext for the break-down or interruption of the Red Cross talks pending Assembly deliberations on Korea. These people concede, however, that unless the "pretext" is truly persuasive and the southern side can indeed be made the culprit, any such attempt may backfire.

PROSPECTS FOR POSTPONEMENT

Japan appears to be now bent not only to vote for postponement of Korean items at the forthcoming UNGA, but also actively to campaign for it in New York as well as in Capitals around the world. I got this from a highly reliable source. However, another source remains not quite so sure lest Premier Tanaka's visit to the PRC, which practically coincides with the convening of the twenty-seventh UNGA, might bring forth "unusual" pressure on Japan, at least to refrain from lobbying.

South Korean officials are getting even more optimistic vis-à-vis postponement although they anticipate a fierce confrontation accompanied by bitter debate on the issue both at the General Committee and the plenary. Optimists are especially impressed with India's expected switch from opposing postponement to a vote of abstention; Japan's anticipated leading role; and more positive support from the United States. I understand, however, that no chances are being taken; that the Foreign Minister is leaving for UN Headquarters as early as 12 September; that reportedly letters requesting support have been addressed to Heads of State; and that sixteen friendly UN delegations will hold UN strategy meeting with the ROK in New York today.

REPORT OF THE UNC TO THE UN

I managed to obtain an advance draft copy of this year's "Report of the United Nations Command to the United Nations" which, however, has yet to be finalized by the UNC Chief of Staff. I am enclosing two thermofax copies for your information.

MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION (MAC)

Yesterday's 332nd meeting of the MAC was significant in that (i) the DPRK side strongly demanded the full withdrawal of US forces from Korea in the spirit of the 4 July 1972 North-South Communiqué; (ii) the meeting convened by the North was the first

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held since the issuance of the said Communiqué over two months ago; (iii) it was held just between the first formal Red Cross talks in Pyongyang and the second round slated for Seoul; (iv) the DPRK side, for the first time in three years, raised Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement which recommends the holding of a high-level political conference to settle the questions of foreign troop withdrawal and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question; (v) it charged the US with attempting another aggression against the DPRK; (vi) and demanded the suspension of all US military assistance to the ROK. While the meeting was one of the shortest ever, lasting 70 minutes, it was conducted in a climate more rigid than expected. Reportedly, the number of security guards had been increased. There were no outright accusations directed at the ROK. The newly arrived Senior Member of the UNC side replied that the charges and demands raised by his counterpart were not matters that could be dealt with by the MAC.

First, some circles wonder whether the DPRK side, stressing independent Korean unification along with the aforesaid points, is willing to have the MAC continue for long.

Second, some others question whether Pyongyang is in fact proposing that a conference participated in by "governments of the countries concerned on both sides" be held to effect the "peaceful settlement of the Korean question" (phraseology of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement).

The question is whether the DPRK, which has been generally against any foreign role in the process of Korean unification, might again favour (as it did a few years ago) an international conference participated in by North and South Korea and other "interested" countries"in equal numbers" to discuss Korean unification. If this proposal is revived it would, on the one hand, contradict the DPRK's interpretation of independent unification and, on the other hand, imply possible amenability toward some form of United Nations role in the process of unification.

ROK TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM VIET-NAM

Yesterday, a ranking Foreign Ministry official strongly indicated that the ROK would withdraw its remaining 37,000 troops from Viet-Nam as of December 1972. The official added that the decision had been made after consultation with the ROV and the US, and that both Governments had been informed of the matter.

The highly negative legacy of ROK forces in Viet-Nam thus appears to be coming to an end. Many friends of Seoul had been pressing hard on the issue, indicating, inter alia, the adverse effect of continued military involvement on the United Nations.

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US TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ROK

Reports at this end today stated that the US Government had officially suggested an end to American military presence in Korea in 1975 or 1976, after the expected completion of the ROK Armed Forces modernization programme. Korean officials have opposed this vehemently.

UNGA DOCUMENTATION ON KOREA

I am very grateful to you for sending me a copy of the text of the DPRK letter to the Secretary-General (A/8752/Add.7).

The members of UNCURK and I would be highly indebted if, in addition to cabled information you kindly promised on votes, you would be so good to instruct the pouching of PV's of the general debate along with the records of the General Committee and those of the plenary, relevant to the Korean question, as they become available.

* * *

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

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REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution S/1588, the unified command considers it necessary to document a report to the United Nations Security Council of north Korea's continuing practice of violating major provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953 and Subsequent Agreements. This report covers the period between 1 September 1971 and 31 August 1972. The north Korean violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement, documented herein, include incidents of armed intrusions into the Republic of Korea across the Military Demarcation Line by land and attempts at infiltration of north Korean agents into the interior of the Republic of Korea by sea. The north Korean violations also include introduction of illegal weapons and construction of illegal fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone during the reporting period. These obviously preplanned violations by the north koreans constitute the evidence of north Korean insincerity toward he implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and unwillingness to promote a program of further de-escalation of tension in the Demilitarized Zone.

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NORTH KOREA'S VIOLATIONS OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT DURING 1971-1972

1. The 4,000 meter-wide Demilitarized Zone, which stretches for approximately 151 miles across the Korean peninsula, was established as a buffer zone by the Armistice Agreement "to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities" in Korea. The Military Demarcation Line, which divides the Demilitarized Zone equally between the North and the South, is clearly marked.

a. The Armistice Agreement prohibits either side from executing any hostile act "within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone", and prohibits introduction of automatic and crew-served weapons into the Demilitarized Zone and construction of fortified positions as well. Despite this, north Korea has dispatched its armed intruders across the Military Demarcation Line into the Republic of Korea on missions of espionage and subversion in violation of pertinent paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement, introduced illegal weapons, and constructed illegal fortifications and fences in the Demilitarized Zone.

b. The United Nations Command has repeatedly proposed meetings of the Joint Observer Teams to inspect and investigate alleged violations charged by either side. However, north Korea habitually either rejects

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or ignores proposals for joint investigations. The north Korean failure to permit investigations by the Joint Observer Teams demonstrates their insincerity towards the Armistice Agreement.

c. The casualties resulting from these incidents due to north Korean armed intrusions during the reporting period were: 12 north Koreans, 6 United Nations Command personnel, 4 Republic of Korea National Police and civilians killed; and 19 United Nations Command personnel and 2 Republic of Korea National Police and civilians wounded. (See Appendix A)

2. The following is a summary of more serious incidents during the period between 1 September 1971 and 31 August 1972:

a. Infiltration by land:

(1) On 17 September 1971, a number of north Korean armed infiltrators were sighted by local residents near the village of Chwa-dong on Kimpo Peninsula. The intruders were encountered by the United Nations Command defense forces and three of them were killed in an ensuing firefight. Six United Nations Command military personnel and three civilians, including one child, were also killed in the encounter. In addition, 20 more Republic of Korea personnel were wounded. Equipment recovered included four north Korean AK-47 Automatic rifles, and two north Korean pistols.

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(2) On 25 October 1971, two north Korean armed intruders were sighted by the United Nations Command defense forces in the vicinity of a spot 1450 meters east northeast of Military Demarcation Line Marker Number 0010. During the encounter, both of the intruders were killed. Equipment recovered included two north Korean AK-47 rifles.

b. Infiltrations by sea:

(1) On 13 September 1971, two north Korean armed agents were discovered by United Nations Command defense forces south of Kampo along the southeast coast of Korea. Both of the agents were killed. Two United Nations Command defense personnel were wounded. Equipment discovered included a north Korean AK-47 automatic rifle and many items of espionage equipment.

(2) On 29 October 1971, a north Korean agent boat was intercepted near Sohosa Island west of Kwangju. Four north Korean infiltrators aboard the agent boat fled to the island and all were killed in the subsequent encounter. Equipment captured included one light machine gun, three north Korean AK-47 automatic rifles, two RPG recoilless anti-tank launchers and the agent boat.

c. Other significant violations:

(1) Since August 1971, north Korea has been constructing a barrier type fence, along with fortified positions, within its portion of

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the western sector of the Demilitarized Zone in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The total length of fence completed is about 80 kilometers. The fence is well south of the northern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone.

(a) At the 327th Military Armistice Commission Meeting, on 26 January 1972, the United Nations Command charged the north Koreans with the construction of 16 kilometers of fence.

b. Construction of an additional 15 kilometers of fence was charged during the 328th Military Armistice Commission Meeting on 2 March 1972.

(c) At the 329th Military Armistice Commission Meeting on 23 March 1972, the United Nations Command protested approximately 22 kilometers of illegal barrier fence being constructed by the north Koreans.

(d) At the 330th Military Armistice Commission Meeting on 18 May 1972, the United Nations Command charged the north Koreans with the illegal construction of approximately 26.5 kilometers of fence.

(2) During the reporting period, the United Nations Command charged the north Koreans with some 954 cases of introducing illegal weapons into the Demilitarized Zone, to include 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns and 82 mm recoilless rifles, and constructing or improving illegal fortifications in over 1200 cases.

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APPENDIX A

Level of Incidents in the Demilitarized Zone
And the Republic of Korea

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972*
Significant incidents south of the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone	37	445	542	87	66	37	0
Significant incidents, interior of the Republic of Korea	13	121	219	24	47	10	0
Exchanges of fire, Demilitarized Zone	19	122	236	55	42	31	0
Exchanges of fire, interior of the Republic of Korea	11	96	120	22	26	6	0
North Koreans killed in the Republic of Korea	43	228	321	55	46	34	0
North Koreans captured in the Republic of Korea	19	57	13	6	3	2	0
United Nations Command military killed in the Republic of Korea	35	131	162	15	9	22	0
United Nations Command military wounded in the Republic of Korea	29	294	294	44	22	47	0
Republic of Korea National Police and other civilians killed in the Republic of Korea	4	22	135	19	7	8	0
Republic of Korea National Police and other civilians wounded in the Republic of Korea	5	53	16	17	17	6	0

*As of 30 August 1972