Bolesław Jeleń, 'Information Note'

Havana, December 13, 1962

Secret

INFORMATION NOTE

/December 1962/

The consequences of the October Crisis are of course profound. They may have a serious impact on the further development of the Cuban Revolution and its politics. In terms of Cuba's internal life, the crisis was probably the greatest shock in its post-revolutionary history.

We will not dwell on the course of events - it is known. We have also tried to keep the Central Office informed, to the best of our ability, about the development of the situation as seen from here.

In this note, I am trying to make a certain summary - as far as it is possible today /13.XII./. It should be borne in mind that a number of elements of the situation, especially the international one, are unknown to us and could not be perceived from here.

Specific problems:

I.          The significance and purpose of installing Soviet bases.

1.         The installation of Soviet bases introduced a sudden, qualitative change in Cuba's international situation.

a/ In Cuba-US relations, a situation arose in which the use of force against Cuba was permitted even by supporters of the so-called moderate anti-Cuban course. As is known, supporters of this course were betting on the collapse of the Cuban revolution as a result of: internal structural and economic difficulties; the impossibility of fully effective aid from the countries of the socialist camp; and errors in the USSR's Cuban policy and their internal repercussions. They saw the US action in accelerating Cuba's internal difficulties by all means, including by forcing it to make a maximum defensive effort and by sabotage actions.

They permitted the use of force in the event of a threat to the Guantanamo base or the Soviet military presence in Cuba.

(p. 1)

In fact, such a military presence occurred in October this year.

b/ There was a proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuban territory - and the means of delivering them from there.

c/ Cuba's actual military involvement followed Cuban declarations not to allow foreign bases on its territory, as well as repeated Soviet declarations of non-existence of intentions to install bases in Cuba. This brought about a significant qualitative change in Cuba's position in the Western Hemisphere. It also created a further change in Cuba's position among the non-aligned countries - lesser, however, than in relation to the Western Hemisphere - after Cuba's already advanced political involvement following the Belgrade Conference.

2.         The goal of the USSR in installing missile bases in Cuba is not entirely clear. From the method of delivering equipment, installing launchers, and their dislocation (as presented by the Cubans), one can assume that the USSR did not intend to maintain a strategic missile base in Cuba for a long time.

According to Mikoyan’s explanation, it was about creating a situation enabling the application of "do ut des" [Latin for “I give so that you might give”] in order to obtain guarantees for Cuba (v. cipher 482 of November 21), has - taking into account here and the Cuban approach to the matter - obvious - gaps. A certain broader view of the Soviet goals is probably contained in the interpretation presented in a conversation with me by the USSR Ambassador Alexeyev. He supported the thesis of creating the possibility of giving compensation for guarantees for Cuba, extending it to causing in the USA - on the widest possible scale - a psychological shock, which would act favorably in favor of the developing concept of eliminating missile bases around the USSR and détente in general. From the content of the letters exchanged between Khrushchev and Kennedy during the crisis - in their parts concerning the broader implications of eliminating the crisis - it would also follow that the Soviet move fell more within the framework of the political than military strategy of the USSR.

3.         As for the Cuban side, I think we should accept its thesis that it was not it that postulated the installation of missile bases, but that it was a Soviet initiative. In its view, the installation of bases was rather of a permanent nature and was

(p. 2)

part of the Soviet military strategy. If the Cuban side had calculated the resulting risk, then given the risk of aggression in other situations as well, the installation of bases was - in Cuban reasoning - the maximum military involvement of the USSR in the defense of Cuba. This in turn corresponded to Cuba's political strategy. Obtaining the USSR’s most far-reaching political, economic, and military involvement was Cuba's constant aspiration since 1960. For its part, Cuba also acted to create conditions for accelerating this involvement, as the only current guarantee of the existence of the Cuban revolution; from the perspective of its own influence on the process and nature of the revolutionary movements in Latin America [AL], as an exit - through a revolutionary path - from isolation from its natural environment.

4.         Judging by the course of events, regardless of whether and what the further positive effects of eliminating the crisis would be, the Soviet Union probably made a mistake in calculation, and that was in the case of installing the bases (and not withdrawing them as the Cubans think). The severity and speed of the American reaction were probably not foreseen. The threat of bombing the bases and perhaps even a landing was very real on October 26, along with the opening of a further chain reaction as a consequence.

5.         In the case of accepting the bases, there was certainly an error in the Cuban calculation. I assume that the Cuban side also did not anticipate a particularly sharp and quick American reaction.

It also did not take into account the reaction in Latin America, including the national and progressive movements of a very diverse nature in this zone. However, Cuban acceptance was a logical consequence of the entire Cuban policy to date, aimed at the most far-reaching involvement in the bloc of socialist states. As for the LAC, it was associated with the Cuban reasoning that only extremely radical social movements and an active revolutionary attitude constitute, in the end, the only solid support for the Cuban revolution in this zone.

6.         The differences in approach to the goals

(p. 3)

of installing bases, as well as the errors in calculation, were later the source of the differences of opinion between Cuba and the USSR in the approach to resolving the crisis. They also influenced the process of shaping Cuban views on basic international problems.

II.        Some aspects of resolving the crisis.

1.         It is not yet possible to speak of a complete resolution of the crisis. At present, the course of the current phase of negotiations taking place at the UN between delegates of the USSR and the USA is not yet known.

The solution provided for in the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy /October 26-27/ has so far been fulfilled only by the USSR. On the US side, the blockade of Cuba has been lifted, but guarantees of non-invasion have not been formalized.

The current situation /December 13/ is rather similar to the solution presented in the US resolution submitted to the Security Council on October 22 ^/x/

10. Launchers and missiles were withdrawn, and IL-28 bombers were also withdrawn.

20. The withdrawal was inspected, (not on Cuban territory but on Soviet ships, and not by UN observers but by the USA).

30. The "quarantine" has ended.

40. Negotiations between the USA and the USSR have been initiated (but not only bilaterally, Cuba also participates in them as a party, and the coordinator of the negotiations is the UN Secretary General).

In light of the real situation that occurred after October 22 - apart from the considerations given in Part I - the solution so far is absolutely positive both in a general sense and from the point of view of Cuban interests. /A separate issue is how the Cuban leadership and society see it/.

----------------------------

/x/ Differences in comparison to the US draft resolution of October 22 are given in brackets.

(p. 4)

The steps taken so far include concessions accepted by the Soviet side in those cases where Cuba did not make concessions (inspection of Soviet ships, in a milder form, and not on Cuban territory).

The Cuban side agreed to declare its consent to the withdrawal of the launchers and then to the withdrawal of the IL-28 aircraft - as Soviet property - emphasizing that they did not belong to Cuba and making it clear in the tone of its declarations that this is an exclusive matter of the USSR, which it accepts with coldness. ^/x/

The Cuban side did not fire on American planes after October 28, despite the provocative nature of the flights, and limited itself in this matter to declaring a warning only on November 15 that these planes were exposing themselves to the risk of fire - /letter from F. Castro to U Thant of November 15, 1962/.

So, in sum, we have so far been dealing with concessions mainly from the USSR in favor of the USA, and with the fact that the USSR took over concessions that were not accepted by Cuba. As for the concessions of the Cuban side, they were made in favor of the USSR.

2.         Although no American guarantees have been given so far that Cuba will not be invaded, one cannot accept the Cuban leadership's thesis that there has been a return to the situation that existed before the introduction of missile launchers, with the exception that it has become obvious that the Soviet Union is not ready to fully engage militarily in the defense of Cuba (or - as the Cubans expand on this - any other liberation movement in the Western Hemisphere).

-----------------------------

/x/ - Fidel Castro's speech of November 1, 2012 - "the Cuban government did not pose any obstacles to the withdrawal of these weapons" and other parts of the speech;

-           letter from F. Castro to U Thant of November 15, 1962 - "the Soviet government, fulfilling the promise given to Mr. Kennedy, has withdrawn its strategic missiles, this was verified by American officials on the high seas";

-           letter from F. Castro to U Thant dated November 19, 1962 - "if the Soviet government considers it appropriate, for the good conduct of the negotiations and for the resolution of the crisis, to withdraw these planes, the revolutionary government of Cuba will not place any obstacles in the execution of this decision."

(p. 5)

Focusing only on matters directly related to Cuba, the following profound achievements are evident:

a/ Cuba exists, but it might as well not have existed.

b/ Despite the US approach so far that communism in the Western Hemisphere cannot be the subject of negotiations, such negotiations have been implemented and the US has expressed its readiness to provide guarantees not to invade a country that has broken away from dependence on them, is located in their immediate vicinity, and with which it is in sharp conflict.

c/ The USA had to give up the priority - which came down to exclusivity - of the OAS in matters of the American state -/ and accepted the UN as the international forum for such a state. /In this case, they are bearing, among other things, the consequences of their own mistake in forcing the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS/.

d/ The USA had to recognize the need to negotiate with the USSR regarding the situation in the Western Hemisphere.

e/ The USA has actually recognized the invalidity of the Monroe Doctrine. /In the information for the heads of the socialist countries’ posts, which I reported in code, Mikoyan touched on this point, pointing out that the Rio de Janeiro Treaty has also been crossed out, the latter being rather highly controversial/.

Overall, there have emerged in Cuba's international situation further opportunities for progress in shaping its new international status and its de facto recognition by the United States and the EU in the form of formal, binding guarantees made or declared at the UN.

3.         Although there were possibilities of progress in shaping the new international status of Cuba in other conditions, as a consequence of the October crisis, a very specific new chance has arisen. In this case - and this is assuming all the Cuban reservations as to the value of the American guarantees and the correctness of the 5 Cuban conditions, the concretization of the guarantees - the excessive intransigence of adopting a more flexible attitude by Cuba, does not favor this progress. This has already given the USA the opportunity to harden its position and expand its demands in solving the immediate problems of the crisis. This plays against the interests of Cuba itself and creates the danger of losing this historical chance.

(p. 6)

The difficulties lie in the problems of:

a/ the concretization of the US guarantee,

b/ inspection - on Cuban territory - of the removal of strategic weapons and not the delivery of such weapons.

Both contribute to the problem - immediate, short-term and partial solutions, or long-term and complete solutions.

As is known, in talks with U Thant, Castro did not adopt the method of searching for immediate and partial solutions, not accepting their effectiveness, and maintained the position of the necessity of applying long-term and complete solutions. The result of Mikoyan's talks with the Cuban leadership was the adoption of this second path by the Soviet side, which is expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban project presented to U Thant. In comparison with the original Soviet concept, we are also dealing with a manifestation of Soviet concessions to Cuba.

As a result, however, the issue of inspection was shaped differently. The issue of long-term inspection emerged, more difficult to solve than in the case of the originally existing concept of ad hoc inspection with a limited scope, for which finding a formula was - as it seems - relatively easy with the appropriate flexibility of the Cuban side.

In the question of the method of resolving the crisis, we are dealing - in my opinion - with one of many symptoms of the narrow Cuban view of reality. I believe that this results both from the lack of experience in international politics, and from the lack of familiarity with a number of historical experiences, as well as from the delay in the formation of Cuban state thought.

I think that this also results from the very formation of the Cuban leaders' thought, created on their specific revolutionary experience. Every concession is seen by them as the opening of a complete retreat. They supposedly expressed this in discussions with Mikoyan, saying - you have a large territory and therefore the possibility of retreat, our situation is not like that - and transferring this not only to the physical concept of territory.

(p. 7)

This may also result from the well-known Cuban view of revolutionary movements in Latin America, as well as from the local understanding of the role and impact of the Cuban revolution. The local leaders understand that revolution in Latin America cannot go the way of compromises, and Cuba cannot therefore set an example of compromise and concession.

This undoubtedly contributes to failing to see or recognize that partial solutions can initiate long-term problem-solving processes.

III.       The Cuban approach to resolving the crisis and the differences of opinion between Cuba and the USSR.

1.         The overall Cuban approach to resolving the crisis can be divided into the following phases:

a/ Tough stance between October 22 and 25. At that time I Castro firmly rejected the withdrawal of strategic weapons and any idea of inspection (speech of October 23).

b/ October 26 and 27: there is concern about the real possibility of bombing, and there is a tendency to look for a compromise solution.

c/ October 26, after the Soviet decision to withdraw the bases, the Cuban position hardens.

In the first phase, the Cuban position was as follows:

-           The conviction that the USSR treats the missile bases as permanent and a quick compromise solution is out of the question;

-           That the USA would not go further than a blockade, from which, however, they would have to withdraw in some way, given the assumed tough stance of the USSR.

The Cuban reasoning was not complete, however, since the introduction of a blockade was not an expected American reaction to the installation of Soviet bases, and the Cubans therefore had no perspective on what a trial of strength might look like in the existing situation.

October 26: the leadership is convinced that the United States is ready to go further. The bombardment of the bases and landing for their liquidation using conventional weapons is expected. then there is clear concern, and

(p. 8)

with it the tendency to seek mediation, however, coming from the initiative of the Cuban side. However, the withdrawal of bases is not taken into account here in the final analysis. What is seen is rather a freezing of the situation and entering into a protracted negotiation procedure, while demonstrating that Cuba has the means of defense. At this time, along with the search for a path of mediation, the first case of shooting at US aircraft also occurs.

The position of the USSR is not known to Cuba at this time. The USSR Embassy itself has no knowledge of the situation (it learned about some of its government's moves from the radio).

At this stage, too, Cuba has no idea what the test of strength in the face of the blockade should look like.

After the Soviet decision to withdraw the bases, Cuba finds itself | facing a fait accompli, it sees that the solution to the crisis has been placed in the hands of two great powers, without the participation of Cuba itself. The shock caused by this was violent, both in the leadership and in a significant part of the society, because the events fell on especially sensitive ground. This influenced the further Cuban approach to solving the crisis and will probably leave long-lasting traces.

In this situation, Cuba maintains the position that the withdrawal of bases was unjust, it creates difficulties in the withdrawal of bombers (they maintain that it was an extension of the original American demands). In the final analysis, however, Cuba makes a concession to the USSR in this case.

As for the American guarantees, the reservations concern not only the lack of their specification. All the Cuban reservations result not only from a justified lack of trust in the US, they are based on the premises that the very concept of a guarantee against invasion starts from the assumption of the existence of the right to invade.

2.         For Cuba, the Soviet-American compromise was not only about avoiding war. It had special aspects that found their interpretation here:

-           The USSR withdrew its military support for Cuba.

-           In the name of broader interests and solutions to problems more important for the USSR, Cuba has become a bargaining chip in the USSR-US conflict, which opens up a further danger of the withdrawal of the USSR. The situation comes down to dividing the world into spheres of influence of great powers.

(p. 9)

3.         Along with the above-mentioned basic problem for Cuba, the following additional aspects of the case came into play:

a/ The USSR accepted commitments on behalf of Cuba without consulting it, including the inspection that had already been rejected previously by the Cuban government (speech by F. Castro on October 23).

b/ Lower treatment of Cuba - a socialist state, compared to Turkey - a capitalist state.

The Soviet proposal to withdraw bases from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of American bases in Turkey provided for UN inspection in both countries, on the condition of prior consent from Turkey and Cuba. Guarantees in this case were also to be made in the form of a declaration at the Security Council (Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy of October 27).

In Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy of October 28 containing the decision to withdraw the bases from Cuba, the control of the execution (although not specified that it was to be carried out on Cuban territory) is not conditioned by the prior consent of the Cuban government. Moreover, the guarantees of non-invasion are accepted by the USSR in the form of a unilateral American declaration without its submission to the Security Council.

c/ Moreover, serious suspicions of the existence of some secret agreements arose on the Cuban side as a result of the non-disclosure of Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy of October 26, containing a proposal to withdraw the bases on condition of guarantees not to invade Cuba. These proposals, to which Kennedy agreed in a letter of October 27, are seen here as presented before the proposal to withdraw the bases from Turkey and Cuba /October 27/, hence the strengthening of suspicions.

d/ For Cuba, Khrushchev's statement that the accidental use of strategic weapons installed in Cuba against the USA was excluded because they were in the hands of Soviet officers (letter to Kennedy of October 27) also had a negative connotation.

4. As a result of the elements presented in points 2 and 3, the case was additionally presented in terms of:

a/ Cuba's decline in confidence in the USSR regarding Cuba's future,

(p. 10)

            b/ the attitude of the USSR towards Cuba's sovereign rights and its impact on the domestic position of Castro and his government and on Cuba's international position, especially in Latin America.

This occurred particularly acutely against the background of the fact that Cuba sees the highest achievement of its revolution — both internally and in the eyes of Latin America — as the gaining of national sovereignty.

In this context, the bilateral decisions of the USSR-USA regarding guarantees against an invasion of Cuba by other American countries also acquired a negative connotation.

Moreover, it fell on national soil which had in its relatively recent past experienced the frustration of the war of independence, the Treaty of Paris of 1900 between the USA and Spain, and the Platt Amendment.

In the whole issue, there is therefore a moment of tactical and psychological error on the part of the USSR.

On the other hand, there are the following moments:

- Was there time for consultations and agreement on positions between the USSR and Cuba in a situation when the bombing of Cuba was seen as a matter of hours?

- What would have been the situation if, during the consultations, Castro had not agreed to the withdrawal of bases from Cuban territory?

/According to the statement of the USSR ambassador, who took part in Mikoyan's talks with the Cuban leadership, Mikoyan considered that the USSR had made a number of tactical mistakes during the crisis/.

5. In this situation, Castro's presentation of 5 conditions specifying the guarantees, immediately after the news of the Soviet decision of October 28, rebuilt Castro's internal prestige; observing some reactions in Latin America, one can also assume that it strengthened Castro's prestige in national circles of a number of countries. The support of Castro's 5 conditions by the USSR, concessions in a number of matters /part II/ from the Soviet side in favor of Cuba and finally the development of a joint Cuban-Soviet project, did not, however, fully rebuild the USSR's position in Cuba /in the leadership and among the society/. Lack of trust

(p. 11)

in the USSR even strengthened somewhat after Mikoyan's departure. The Cuban leadership believes that Cuba is still being kept on the sidelines by the USSR in the US-USSR negotiations in New York, is only partially informed, and has not been properly positioned as a party to the negotiations, including by delaying the convening of the Security Council, which in the current situation is the only forum where Cuba can actually appear as a full-fledged party.

IV. Consequences of the crisis.

1. It should be stated at the outset that the resolution of the crisis and the disappearance of the direct threat of war caused a general feeling of relief among the masses, regardless of the method of its elimination.

However, the course of the crisis caused a strong shock among political activists and the intelligentsia, and this did not spare the leadership itself.

The events took place in an atmosphere of great disorientation and confusion. Along with this, the anti-Soviet three awoke - and widely - under the impression that the USSR had abandoned Cuba. Along with them, in quite wide circles, the long-preserved distrust of the communists emerged, which the integration of the revolutionary movement did not eliminate, and which in the recent past was strengthened by the sectarian policy known as the policy of Anibal Escalante. This was facilitated by the fact that the elimination of sectarian policy and methods of work was not carried through to the end, there was even a return to them in many areas of life, and those in which the leading positions remained in the hands of the old communists (this applies especially to areas of culture, propaganda and the Trade Unions).

If Fidel's prestige was rebuilt - by putting forward the "5 points" - at the same time the view became widespread, especially among the intelligentsia, that the source of many mistakes and failures of the government's policy was the influence of the old communist cadre on Fidel. These views do not necessarily stem from fundamental anti-communist positions, they grow out of the old division of "July 26" - PSP during the period of the uprising movement and a number of old prejudices, but not hostility towards communism.

(p. 12)

The leadership bore much of the blame for stirring up the mood through a series of statements by some of its members - including Fidel in unorganized street meetings or at the permanently rallied University of Havana. However, it noticed that the stirring up of moods was taking on undesirable dimensions and content; it received this with concern and continued to work to curb them. It is certain, however, that some members of the leadership - including Fidel himself - experienced a return of distrust towards the old communists, after the well-known experience with Anibal Escalante.

2. In the management itself — I mean the 6-person secretariat in which only Blas Roca, absent from the former PSP since the beginning of October, remained (in his place Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was co-opted for talks with Mikoyan) — confusion was also far-reaching. Unanimity was introduced by Fidel, whose position is decisive, by the way. It seems that the arrangement of views in the management is as follows:

-           the extremely radical tendency represented by Guevara;

-           the realistic tendency represented by Dorticós and Raúl Castro /whose first reaction to the Soviet decision of October 28 was positive/;

-           centrist - between these two tendencies - the position of Fidel Castro; this line was adopted in practice by the entire secretariat.

/As for the member of Aragones' secretariat, he did not have his own view of the situation. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was in a particularly delicate situation, as the only leading figure of the former PSP in this team; he supported Fidel's line and his school of thought from the beginning/.

There is no clarity in all this about the situation of the member of the secretariat Blas Roca. The beginning of the crisis found him in the GDR, his further departure was planned for Bulgaria for the Party Congress and to the USSR on November 7. After the resumption of air connections with Prague during the crisis he was ready to return, however, he received ( already at the airport) an order to go to the congress of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Italian, and then Czechoslovakian parties. He returns to Cuba in a few days. The suspension and further delay of his

(p. 13)

return to Cuba are explained by the fact that at a solidarity rally with Cuba in Copenhagen (where he went from the GDR) - after October 28 - he supported the USSR's position without reservation. There are various speculations about the future position of Blas Roca, one thing is certain, that his participation in the talks with Mikoyan was seen by the leadership as undesirable.

3. The course of the crisis had to influence the formation of a more precise Cuban view of the fundamental issues of the world situation.

On other occasions we have shed light on how the understanding of the issues of war and peace; peaceful coexistence and the fight against imperialism; relations between socialist states and the relations of socialist states to national liberation movements were shaped in Cuban conditions. As for the Cuban view of the prospects of Latin America, they were shed light on our part in the assessment of the Second Havana Declaration.

The Cuban approach to these issues was, however, relatively fluid, and certainly not fully formed. The specifics of the Cuban revolution and the US-Cuba conflict - on the one hand, and on the other hand the real state of forces in the socialist camp and their possibilities of real support for Cuba - created a situation of avoiding involvement in discussions in the international communist movement. The growth of the USSR's position in Cuba since the summer of this year has also had an effect on weakening Chinese influence. However, this did not mean acceptance of the entire school of thought of the majority of the communist movement on the situation in the world. There was a far-reaching affinity of views with the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fact that for Cuba the tangible basic problem is the fight against imperialism. As we reported at the time, Fidel expressed this in his speech in May this year, on the occasion of presenting him with the Lenin Peace Prize in the form - everyone fights for peace in their own way and depending on their situation, some with the explosion of a 50-megaton bomb, others in a clash with imperialism. In general, there was a line of balance between the Chinese and Soviet positions, in intimate thinking Hala's own, similar to the Chinese one, shaped by Cuban specifics, dominated.

The October crisis weakened the USSR's position, however,

(p. 14)

and created a situation in which - in Cuban reasoning - Cuba could count on full USSR guarantees. In the same understanding, this was extended to the attitude of the USSR and other economically developed socialist countries towards all national liberation movements. ^/x/

It is known how the Chinese campaign highlighted the resolution of the crisis and how the action of solidarity with Cuba looked in China itself. The Chinese criticism of the resolution of the crisis is basically consistent with the Cuban view and uses some of its specific aspects discussed above. This is what the Cubans see. However, they also captured the real involvement of both the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as the People's Republic of China. The moment of the PRC's propaganda involvement - after October 28 - in contrast to the degree of this involvement between October 22 and October 28, was interpreted in such a way that the PRC's propaganda involvement carries not so much a pro-Cuban edge as an anti-Soviet one. The Chinese position is also seen as a policy of a great power with its own goals and aspirations, which do not have to be consistent with Cuba's direct interests; such was the message of the development of the Sino-Indian conflict during the First Caribbean Crisis.

At the moment it is difficult to determine whether or to what extent Cuba will become openly involved in the ideological dispute in the international communist movement. It may happen. However, it may come into play that if before the crisis the Cuban leadership did not want to transfer the dispute to Cuban territory and hindered it, then in the new situation it may not be happy for the Cuban issue to be used as one of the main topics of the dispute./?/

It must be stated, however, that the propaganda campaign

----------------------

/x/ A comprehensive account of Cuban views on these matters is contained in the note of the conversation between editor Unger and CR Rodríguez, which we are sending at the same time. It is characteristic that CR Rodríguez, who is certainly the most outstanding representative of the old Cuban communist cadre, was one of the supporters of the fullest application of Soviet models in Cuba. Before the integration of the revolutionary movement, he was a supporter of a flexible and moderate course of Cuba's foreign policy.

(p. 15)

Chinese activity and the ideological influence of the People's Republic of China are carried out, by the PRC Embassy's own means, with great intensity, while the level of Soviet influence is very low.

4. ORI did not really act as a party in mass action during the crisis, and it had not yet been constituted as a party. /see previous information on the creation of the party/. The crisis and mobilization halted the slow organizational formation of the party that had been underway until then. Confusion did not spare the organization and cadres of ORI during the crisis. Here, too, there was a phenomenon that many of them saw Soviet models as the only ones to be applied in Cuba and they completely and abruptly switched to extremely anti-Soviet positions. This included some of those from the old PSP cadre, but also young activists from the former July 26 movement, as well as post-revolutionary activists. This had a wide reach in the Communist Youth League, especially at the University of Hawaii. /For the politically swayed and very superficially ideologically shaped academic youth, the main target of the attacks was the rector of the University of Havana, Marinello - in fact, not for political reasons, but simply because he represents the view that a university must be, first and foremost, a place of studies/.

However, there are trends among the old PSP staff to hold a serious ideological discussion in ORI. I doubt it will happen. At the moment, against the background of the already signaled phenomenon of distrust towards the older generation of communists, there are predictions of quite wide-ranging regroupings in the staff.

In speculations on this topic, the names of activists who are actually very burdened with sectarian methods of work and an intolerant approach to younger staff are mentioned. However, it seems that the process of transferring managerial and responsible positions in the apparatus to people more closely associated with the leadership of the former July 26 movement is expected to move forward, as was the case after the Escalante case was revealed.

The whole situation in ORT raises the question of whether the conditions for the merger, carried out last year, have actually matured. In the whole process of creating a new party, a number of elements support the view that the dominant result of integration so far

(p. 16)

has been the liquidation of PSP, and not the creation of a new party.

It is difficult to fully address this issue.

The integration balance sheet so far actually looks like this.

-           Before it, the PSP acted as an independent organization and by force with a shaped ideology. It used tactics - basically - of moderating influence on Castro's policy.

-           Integration was preceded by a process of ideological interaction between the PSP and "July 26". If the left of "July 26" adopted in principle the Marxist ideology and the Leninist concept of the party, then on the other hand the PSP adopted the idea of Fidel regarding the issues of the Cuban revolution and its further development and his views on the perspectives and revolutionary path of Latin America.

-           After the integration, on balance, the ideological influence of the former PSP on Fidel himself and the former staff of "26th July" disappeared. The management of ORI at all levels passed (especially after the Escalante case) into the hands of people personally closely linked to Fidel (among them many from the former PSP). The further course of this process is currently outlined. It is also a fact that the former PSP has on the negative side its contribution to the development of sectarian methods of action (which, however, also grew to a large extent from the foundations of the former "26th July") and its narrow and very limited knowledge of the deep experiences of the socialist world, which in this form was transferred to the staff originating from "26th July".

The current state of ORI and the problem of creating a party undoubtedly has its roots in the fact that Fidel himself intimately holds the view that the entire international communist movement is ossified, and that he sees a lot of opportunism in it (without actually knowing the specific conditions in which it operates).

Hence his view that the communist parties in Latin America are not capable of raising the revolutionary movement, as he understands it according to the ideology presented in the Second Havana Declaration and his bet on the emergence of new revolutionary forces in this zone, along the same path as it was in Cuba. In this case, however, he also builds his views without knowing the specific conditions and situation of all Latin American countries.

(p. 17)

Similarly, one can sense Fidel's view of the entire national liberation movement. This is why he pays special attention to Ben Bella, with whom he feels a great affinity, and even to Nasser and Kassem, despite the difference in the social nature of the Cuban revolution and the changes made in Egypt and Iraq.

5. The moment is not yet ripe to see what further consequences the October crisis will have on Cuban policy. The general conclusion is that Cuba has entered a deep crisis of its foreign policy.

There are no elements that allow us to sense what conclusions the government intends to draw from the latest experience and its current assessment of the situation in the world. The disorientation continues. The local leadership assumes that the support of the USSR - as it sees it today - is not sufficient to guarantee Cuba's security. However, it also assumes that political, economic and military support for maintaining Cuba's own defense potential will continue, and it seems that the assurances given by Mikoyan went in this sense.

It seems that at the moment the government doctrine can be summed up as follows:

-           The US cannot invade because of the political damage it would cause;

-           The USSR cannot reduce the scope of its current involvement for the same reasons.

However, the ability to use the economic aid of the Socialist Contingent, the needs of which are constantly growing and which are becoming a serious burden for the socialist countries, is becoming a serious problem           (assumed negative balance of trade turnover for 1962 with the Socialist Contingent - 300 million, of which in turnover with the USSR - 200 million. In the middle of this year, a negative balance of 200 million was assumed for all Socialist Contingents - of which with the USSR - 150 million.)

Taking into account the economic demands presented to the SC during the trade negotiations for 1963, it does not seem that they can be met, and the Cuban side will give it a political interpretation.

As far as we can judge, Cuba does not currently have any developed concept for expanding and strengthening its support

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in the world.

This could not happen without costs, and Castro cannot make any significant concessions. At present, the furthest he can go is to switch to a policy of non-alignment, this should not be ruled out and it would certainly not harm Cuban interests. So far, too far-reaching involvement has caused harm, which has increased Cuba's isolation, especially in Latin America.

The alternative is a further hardening of foreign policy, but by no means can this lead to strengthening Cuba's position.

However, we are dealing with a case when actions and progress are not based on objective knowledge of the situation in the world and/or the immediate environment and when Castro alone decides.

The basic condition for Cuba's survival is to emerge from its isolation in Latin America.

This is what management sees.

Another issue is the path leading out of isolation. After the October crisis, it is felt that the leadership does not see the possibility of using the Latin America-USA contradiction so as to act on the formation of a new international status of Cuba based on the real balance of power in the world. The conclusion drawn so far from the October crisis is that even the previous attitude of Brazil and Mexico does not give any support to Cuba, the country of AZ that brought the greatest help to Cuba in the last crisis was, in the Cuban assessment, Venezuela (according to Roa) through the armed actions that took place there. Such an assessment of the situation and relying exclusively on the proximity of serious revolutionary movements in Latin America obviously narrows the prospects for getting out of isolation.

So, at the moment we are dealing with a situation where elements of the internal crisis (note of May 19, 1962) which has not been overcome have been joined by elements of the foreign policy crisis. In the case of the internal crisis, despite its duration, the government and the OBI management have not managed to work out a full program of action. At the moment, there are no elements of the foreign policy program either. It is not possible to think that this could happen immediately.

Perhaps the whole situation will force you to look for a program. However, this will probably not happen quickly, especially considering

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taking into account the institutional backwardness of the country four years after the victory of the revolution, the state of the ORI, and the general disorientation and ideological dilemma in the leadership.

The matter ultimately comes down to understanding the necessity and the ability and possibility of defining the fundamental task of the revolution at the stage it entered more than a year ago; it cannot be limited only to the issue of the country's defense but must include the appropriate organization of an effective national economy and giving the revolution the right institutional forms.

B. Jeleń

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