Bolesław Jeleń, 'Memo to Department VI [Latin America]'

Secret

Havana, August 14, 1962.

Dear Leszek,

I have received the correspondence sent by the last courier. I have no comments on the assessment of Comrade Rapacki's visit presented to the Board, /there would probably be one - i.e. I have doubts about the credibility of the information about Chinese participation in the development of the Second Havana Declaration/.

Thank you for your letters. Thank you also for your efforts in dealing with personnel matters in general and the most pressing ones, which have so far been neglected by HR so much that it is impossible to live or work. I hope they will be dealt with, for now, there are no practical results, and dealing with some of these matters looks very problematic, according to the latest news from HR.

Unfortunately, I am increasingly out of work due to physical exhaustion and the inability to organize some kind of rest here. After you left - I got a little sick /general exhaustion which is starting to have repercussions with my heart again/ now for almost 2 weeks I have had a permanent low-grade fever and quite frequent cases of fever. After the couriers leave I will have to chain myself to the bed for a few days and listen to the doctors. What is worse is that my eyesight is getting worse. I hope that I will manage to go to Mexico /I received the Minister's permission/ this month to have my eyesight checked /currently I can read very little/ and maybe have a general "health checkup" if it does not have to take long. I will find out about it only when I get there.

In the conditions that I presented to you, my activity since your departure has not been as it should have been and as I would like it to be.

I am not writing a separate note about the situation here this time, I am limiting myself to touching on some issues in this letter which I hope will allow the Headquarters to orient 

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themselves in the development of the situation. I expect that you will use it.

1.         Comrade Rapacki's visit. It is understood that the visit was very closely observed by the diplomatic corps. Among Western diplomats, as I expected, there was speculation about the timing of the visit. The view is still maintained that the visit had a broader meaning than a normal visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, associated with bilateral relations between states. It was also associated with Rashidov's visit. General interpretation - both visits were aimed at improving relations with the socialist camp at a time of Castro's dissatisfaction with the scope of economic aid from the socialist states. The specific purpose of Comrade Rapacki's visit is seen as - moderating influence on Castro's policy, explaining our concept of a policy of peaceful coexistence, including cooperation between states with different systems. Taking into account our relations with other Latin American states - the visit is assessed in a way that is beneficial for our foreign policy.

On the Cuban side, after the visit, there is a note of expectation for specific steps on our part in the area of economic cooperation. It was unfortunate that during the visit, the additional protocol on trade in goods for 1962 signed in Warsaw did not take into account Cuban demands regarding the supply of ham and butter. The Cuban assessment of trade turnover with us was presented at the level of the Ministry of Health to Podobiński. In talks with me, the matter was not raised later by local leaders /Dorticós, Rodríguez, Torras/. I now expect the Cuban side to take a stance on the matter of cooperation in the area of fishing presented to Dorticós. It should not be ruled out that our offer was already covered by the protocol on cooperation in this area with the USSR signed by the Ministry of Health. However, the matter cannot be prejudged. I think that the center of gravity in this area will rest on the issue of building fishing vessels /trawlers/.

            In my conversation with Dorticos I also mentioned (so that he would be

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informed) our readiness to cooperate in the expansion of manganese ore mines and in the organization of a center for improving personnel for vocational education, noting that I intended to hold talks with Guevara and Hart on these matters. Dorticós accepted this information with satisfaction but did not take a position in a specific sense. In my conversation with Dorticós, I also raised the planned visit of Comrade Fidel. Dorticós showed particular interest in this matter. No specific preparations have yet been made on the Cuban side. I also intend to speak with Guevara on this matter.

We have before us negotiations on a trade protocol for 1963. They will probably not be easy, taking into account the further reduction in Cuba's payment capacity for 1963. The key issue will be the presented request for a technical credit of 5 million dollars.

2.         Cuban-Soviet relations. The new Soviet ambassador is due to arrive in Havana tomorrow. Kudryavtsev's dismissal and the new ambassador are still being commented on in Western diplomatic circles as an expression of the discord in Cuban-Soviet relations. The Yugoslav ambassador interprets the matter as an expression of the Soviet leadership's dissatisfaction with Kudryavtsev's activities because: K[udryavtsev] was not aware of the existence of the conflict with Escalante until the matter was revealed; he did not exert a sufficient moderating influence on Castro's policy; he did not establish a sufficiently close position in relations with Castro personally. This assessment is perhaps partly justified. If so, then there is undoubtedly a lot of blame on the Cuban side.

I have no idea of the nature and objectives of Raúl Castro's last visit to the USSR. Although the visit was arranged at the level of the Ministry of Defense, taking into account Raúl's position in the government and the leadership of the ORI [Integrated Revolutionary Organizations] (Deputy Prime Minister, Second Secretary of the ORI), it should be assumed that it concerned many aspects of Soviet-Cuban relations. From the talks with Kudryavtsev, there was also great interest on the part of the party in bringing about a fuller

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and more thorough discussion at the highest level of Cuban needs in the economic sphere and in exchanging views on ideological matters. I believe that, given Fidel's impossibility to go, Raúl was the most qualified person for this.

The fact remains that in recent months there has been a significant increase in Soviet aid in the economic sphere and a great deal of emphasis on technical aid, with a very far-reaching consideration of Cuba's difficult situation in terms of supplies and technical personnel. This is combined with a very strong emphasis on Soviet aid from the Cuban side.

Serious aid—among other things—is the sending of 5 trawlers (750 tons) with crews for fishing and reconnaissance of the fishing base. The trawlers are also used for training Cuban crews. They are to work for 6 months under the Soviet flag as part of the aid, and then they will be purchased by the Cuban side.

3.         Internal situation. There is no significant improvement in the situation in the area of supplies for the population. There are transitory symptoms of seasonal improvement in the supply of some items.

In agricultural production, the sowing of new sugar cane areas is assessed as successful, with about 50 percent of the forecasts being fulfilled, (about half of which is the result of small- and medium-sized private agricultural sector). The sowing of other crops is proceeding quite successfully - cotton, beans, rice. There is an increase in vegetable production. However, the purchasing and distribution apparatus is functioning badly, as it is insufficiently organized and unable to take advantage of the seasonal improvement in agricultural production.

In agricultural policy, the following line was confirmed several times: support by the government for the economic efficiency of farms of all types; respect for property sanctioned by the agrarian reform and unconditional observance of the revolutionary rule of law; rejection of leftist phraseology; solving problems not by administrative coercion, but by using

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the economic laws operating in the transition period to socialism. This line, however, emphasizes, in particular, the guarantee for the small and medium-sized farms /up to 5 cab. - 67 ha/ considered a potential supporter of the revolution. As for large ownership /from 67 to 400 ha/ the leadership understands - although does not declare it - the guarantee of maintaining it as temporary, considering it as a necessity to join the Second Agrarian Reform in the future. This type of ownership, currently covering about 11,000 farms with an area of almost 50% of individual land ownership, with high commercial production, undoubtedly constitutes a serious problem, among others, in the scope of applying material incentives for the development or even maintaining its current level of production.

There are no results yet on the work on the revision of the national economic plan. The year will end without a plan. It is not known how far the work on the planning section has progressed, it is only known that the new version of the plan assumes a more modest increase in national income, and is to aim at a faster increase in the production of means of consumption. The Central Planning Junta has already effectively passed under the leadership of Guevara, it is to take over the functions of the central body of economic management - which in fact was the ORI economic commission until now.

There is a lot of confusion in the area of domestic trade. I have the impression that a very narrow view of reality and a lot of leftism dominate here and that the importance of securing the circulation of goods through channels supplementing the insufficient state purchase is not noticed in this area. The issue has not only economic aspects, it is generally about the course towards the petty bourgeoisie. The line of struggle against speculators dominates in this area. Administrative measures dominate here, which do not eliminate speculation, but limit supplementary channels of distribution. This also affects the countryside, where it is quite common to not collect perishable products (fruit, vegetables) that are generally missing on the market.

Recent moves in the domestic trade sector include the ban on street trading, as economically unnecessary

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and a form of speculation. /Another move is to recognize as a speculative form of trade the private transport of agricultural products in quantities exceeding 11.5 kg /25 lb./. The ban on street trading has, in addition to its economic aspects, a social aspect, because it hits the mass of hawkers and merchants estimated at around 150,000, i.e. the sector of the poor petty bourgeoisie. The announcement of employment in production and the provision of benefits for those for whom street trading was the only source of income will not solve the problem, and the base of dissatisfied people has been significantly expanded.

There is a clear difference in the approach to the problem of the petty bourgeoisie compared to the recent past, when it was pointed out that there were long-term conditions for its economic and political coexistence with the revolution. The main propaganda emphasis now goes against the bourgeois mentality and against submitting to its influence. It should be noted that it is indicated in this that a passive attitude or passive opposition should not be identified with counter-revolutionary activity.

It is difficult to say whether there is a fully developed policy towards this layer of the population. The situation in this section is, however, difficult and quite swollen.

Progress in building the party is slow. It follows the line we have already presented in previous information. The admission of basic ORI organizations to the organization takes place through a strict all-around selection, under the control of meetings of the workplace staff. Fidel is still very critical in his speeches of the initial stage of creating the party - after the creation of ORI, he shows that at this stage the party was shaping a petty-bourgeois mentality among its members. He clearly expresses his fears of the party being flooded by petty-bourgeois elements and declarative revolutionaries, he wants to avoid an administrative party, even if he would like to see a cadre party consisting of activists. Perhaps he prefers the long process of shaping the party to the risk of repeating the mistakes

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made so far. It is difficult to express a final opinion on this subject at the moment.

4.         This year's celebrations of July 26th differed organizationally from those of previous years in that they were not limited to the central concentration of people. In addition to the central concentration in Santiago, there were local and workplace assemblies at which ORI activists from both the former July 26 Movement and the PSP [LPS] chambers spoke alongside the participants in the attack on Moncada.

Unlike previous years, the celebrations were preceded by a broad campaign of ideological and political preparation. This was the first celebration of July 26 after the creation of ORI. The preparatory campaign was mainly aimed at demonstrating the revolutionary traditions of the July 26 Movement and the existence of socialist tendencies in it from the beginning, its orientation from the beginning towards mass struggle.

The emphasis on the revolutionary traditions of the July 26 Movement was calculated, among other things, to bring elements associated with the July 26 Movement closer to the current ORI.

The central assembly was mainly concerned with mobilizing the peasant masses, among other things, to clarify agricultural policy, emphasize guarantees for owners of small farms and the policy of a worker-peasant alliance.

The emphasis in Fidel's speech that the only threat to Cuba at present could be direct aggression from the US was calculated - I believe - mainly to stimulate an atmosphere of calm in order to focus on economic tasks, to gain the conviction that Cuba's international situation was stable; the existence of the danger of direct aggression was linked to the general aggressive plans of the US; the speech stressed several times that Cuba was exposed to the same danger of aggression as all progressive humanity and all socialist countries.

5.         Nuncio Centoz was recalled last month. The MFA considers this a positive move on the part of the Vatican. The head of the nunciature remains a councilor - Monsignor Zacchi, assessed - in contrast to Centoz - 

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as a supporter of correct relations between the Vatican and Cuba. On the Cuban side, a gesture was made to the Vatican in the form of a reception given by Roa for the departing nuncio. All heads of diplomatic missions were invited. As for the missions of the socialist countries, the MFA made it clear several times that it wanted them to participate in the reception, which should be understood as a farewell to the dean of the socialist states’ representations. I was present at the reception, as were all heads of the socialist states’ missions - with the exception of the ambassadors of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, Korea, and Vietnam.

B. Jeleń

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