Cable No. 1374, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Problem of Iranian Side’s Attempt to Issue Press Statement)'

Number: R107908

Primary: Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau Director-General

Sent: Iran, August 8, 1985, 09:45

Received: MOFA, August 8, 1985, 15:50

To: The Foreign Minister      

From: Tanabe, Charge d’Affaires ad interim

Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Problem of Iranian Side’s Attempt to Issue Press Statement)

No. 1374 Secret Urgent (Priority Processing）

(Limited Distribution)

Re: Outgoing Telegram No. 1373

On the afternoon of the 7^th, an Iranian foreign affairs official came to inform us: “Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani has directed the Parliamentary Secretariat to announce to the Iranian press in regard to the morning’s meeting with Special Envoy Nakayama the fact that it took place and its content. Our side appealed strongly via the Iranian Foreign Ministry to Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani to change his mind. The result was that there was no announcement of the fact of the meeting between Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and Special Envoy Nakayama nor of its content. The circumstances of this event are as follows:

1. Around 3:30 on the afternoon of the 7^th, I was informed by Seventh Political Bureau Director Morshedzadeh, who had been present at the meeting held that morning between Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and Special Envoy Nakayama: “Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani has directed the Parliamentary Secretariat to announce to the Iranian press in regard to the morning’s meeting with Special Envoy Nakayama the fact that it took place and its content. I am here to inform you in advance of this matter so that it will not be ‘a bolt of out the blue’ for the Japanese side.”

2. Considering that this matter is an extremely important and delicate one, our side appealed strongly to the Iranian side via Political Bureau Director Morshedzadeh that we wished for them to work to persuade Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani to change his mind. As a result of our insistent appeal, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani agreed in the end not to make public this matter.

3. That evening, when I called on Bureau Director Morshedzadeh at his request, he told me the following:

(1) We understood that this visit of Special Envoy Nakayama was a secret and worked for it not to leak out, but Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani had the impression that it was not necessary to keep secret the result of today’s meeting and Special Envoy Nakayama’s visit to Iran.

This is my personal view, but I think that Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani thought that the matter of the Special Envoy’s visit to Japan contributed to relations between Japan and Iran and that this was a good opportunity for Iran to make public to the world Iran’s position on the problem of the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

(2) However, given the Japanese side’s inclination and as a result of our efforts, this matter will not be made public.

We informed the Japanese side in advance of Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani’s inclination to make public this matter out of concern that it not be a “bolt out of the blue” for the Japanese. We also did so to sound out the Japanese side’s inclination.

(3) In the past, too, this type of problem has often occurred. In many cases, the leak was from the Japanese side, which was thus unable to keep its promise not to go public.

For example, when there were visitors from your country to ours, in spite of our strong requests, there were leaks from the Japanese side, putting us in an uncomfortable position. This is my view, but I think that Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani considered various factors in deciding to announce this visit.

In addition to point (1) above, the Majlis Speaker recalled the above-mentioned string of regrettable cases, which may have been a factor in his decision “go public.”

(4) In any case, it is gratifying that the Japanese and Iranian sides kept in close contact and that we were able to coordinate on this matter.

The Iranian side has thus made efforts to satisfy the Japanese side’s inclination, so we would like to ask henceforth for the Japanese side’s consideration as well. (End)