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October 3, 1990

Cable No. 1828 from Ambassador Yamada Chusei (Egypt) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (First Meeting: The Situation in the Gulf)'

This document was made possible with support from The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Secret

Telegraphic Copy                    [blacked out]

 

Number R198111        

Primary: First Middle East Division

October 3, 1990          [time blacked out]

Sent [from] Egypt

October 3, 1990          [time blacked out]

Arrived [at] Ministry

 

 

[to] Minister of Foreign Affairs          

[from] Ambassador Yamada Chusei

 

Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (First Meeting: The Situation in the Gulf)

No. 1828         Secret  Top Urgent      [blacked out]

Outgoing Telegram No. 1826 Separate Telegram 1

 

The small group session at the beginning of the meeting was suddenly, on instructions from President Hosni Mubarak, turned into a tete-a-tete meeting (only the other side’s Prime Minister Atef Sedky joined him), with the situation in the Gulf the only issue raised. Following is a summary of its main points. (Present from the other side was Prime Minister Sedky. Interpreter: Tsuruoka Koji).

1. At the outset the Prime Minister said that he highly appreciated the firm response of Egypt both in and outside the Arab world towards the settling of this issue. He also expressed his respect for President Mubarak’s outstanding leadership. President Mubarak then said the following:

(1) Showing a firm response towards this issue is natural because the issue is one of principle. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), of which Saddam Hussein was a member, always affirmed the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Its member states never thought that he would invade Kuwait.

(2) I (Mubarak) visited Saddam Hussein one week before the invasion and asked him very clearly if he intended to invade Kuwait. Saddam clearly answered that he was only going to threaten Kuwait and was not thinking of invasion. I did not think that the head of state would lie, so I was truly surprised when I learned of the invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, Saddam has said that he did not say to Mubarak that he would not invade and that there are witnesses to it. However, as I said before, I did receive a clear answer from Saddam and the statement was one that he made in a meeting between just the two of us, so there would not be any witnesses. (The Prime Minister added that it was an act against faith in people.) Saddam pretends, and he is not telling the truth, to be a descendant of Mohammed.

(3) It is my former friend King Hussein of Jordan who worked hard to persuade me (Mubarak) to join the ACC. I (Mubarak) warned that Egypt had nothing at all to gain in joining the ACC and that, because the other participating countries were Jordan as well as Iraq and Yemen, both with extraordinarily close ties to Jordan, if he did not explain it fully to Saudi Arabia, it would raise suspicions of encircling Saudi Arabia. However, because King Hussein was so insistent, I (Mubarak) in the end joined the ACC. What became clear is that that my (Mubarak) warning was right.

(4) I (Mubarak) have been deeply hurt by King Hussein. The King has been whispering to the Jordanian people that Egypt has hurt Jordan’s position, spoken ill of King Hussein’s visit to the United States, hindered Jordan’s economy for the past two years, and other baseless charges. He has tried to push responsibility for his own misgovernment onto another country.

(5) I am sorry to tell you such things, Prime Minister, but King Hussein is someone who goes around deceiving people. Nasser and Sadat were also tormented by King Hussein. Nasser went so far as to insult King Hussein in public. As the time for the Camp David Accords (CDA) was drawing near, King Hussein secretly telephoned Sadat from London and told him that Jordan wished to participate. But when he learned later that the CDA was unpopular with a great many Arabs, he returned without any notice from London to Amman, then at once criticized the CDA and joined in the denunciation of Egypt.

(6) Right after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein visited me (Mubarak) on instructions from Saddam. The two of us talked late into the night. The King urged me not to adopt an anti-Iraq position. I said that I (Mubarak) would give him 24 hours. That is to say, I (Mubarak) told him that if he were able to gain Saddam’s agreement on two points, Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government, then I (Mubarak) would be prepared to convene a limited Arab summit to save Iraq’s face. King Hussein then went directly to Baghdad. The next afternoon I received a telephone call from King Hussein, who said that Saddam had agreed to a limited summit. I (Mubarak) then asked him if he had gained agreement on the two points.  The King answered that he had not had such a detailed discussion. I (Mubarak) told him that I could not convene a summit with an unclear agenda.

(7) King Hussein from the start did not think that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait. All his actions were as planned. King Hussein received from Saddam Hussein the promise that he would get a large share when Saddam acquired Saudi oil fields.

2. The Prime Minister replied to the above in saying the following:

(1) Hearing your talk has reinforced my sense that this incident should be settled according to principle.

(2) Japan’s position is that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its annexation cannot be accepted, that Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored, and that the foreign hostages in Iraq must be released immediately. Japan is calling for the complete implementation of the Security Council resolutions for that. In addition, Japan is thinking of providing economic assistance to the front-line states, including Jordan, as a contribution that we can make. Do you have any objections to that, President Mubarak?

3. The President replied to this in saying the following:

(1) I (Mubarak) have no ill feelings whatsoever towards the Jordanian people. I support economic assistance for the Jordanian people.

(2) My criticism of Jordan was directed solely towards King Hussein.

(3) King Hussein politely welcomes guests with a gentle manner, so it is easy to be deceived. There is no truth to what the King says.

(4) (The Prime Minister brought up that there was a consensus of views between him and President Bush that it would be desirable to draw the King to our side.) I do not intend to do damage to Jordan’s position. I am only criticizing King Hussein’s inconsistent response.

(5) By the way, because Egypt can no longer increase its debt I would like to ask generous terms for Japanese aid to Egypt.

4. The President, when asked by the Prime Minister whether or not he thought that strengthening economic sanctions would have the effect of forcing Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, said the following:

(1) Saddam has stubborn notions and little understanding of international relations. No rational person would say that he would ultimately win in a war with the United States.

(2) Strengthening economic sanctions will lead to the avoiding of fighting. That is because destroying Saddam’s regime by economic sanctions is possible.

(3) Then again, Saddam committed two fatal errors. One was his giving up everything and seeking peace with Iran. The second was invading Kuwait before arriving at a complete peace with Iran. Withdrawing from Kuwait after losing everything gained in eight years of war with Iran would be tantamount to committing domestic suicide. On the other hand, Iraq will likely be bombed by the multinational force if he keeps occupying Kuwait. In either case, it will be difficult for Saddam.

5. In reply, the Prime Minister said that, in view of the worldwide support that President Bush received for his address before the United Nations General Assembly, the international community is united in its opposition to Saddam; continuing to patiently maintain international pressure is important; and, therefore, the role of the United Nations is growing in importance.

6. The President then said that, in order to increase the military pressure, Egypt plans to send in the near future another armored division to Saudi Arabia in addition to the one armored division that has already entered Saudi Arabia. (End)

The small group session at the beginning of the meeting was suddenly, on instructions from President Hosni Mubarak, turned into a tete-a-tete meeting (only the other side’s Prime Minister Atef Sedky joined him), with the situation in the Gulf the only issue raised. The document is a summary of its main points. (Present from the other side was Prime Minister Sedky. Interpreter: Tsuruoka Koji).



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Document Information

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Published online by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, File 2021-0533. Translated by Stephen Mercado.

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2024-08-22

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