October 2, 1946
Cable Nº 32951/32947/32970 from Tehran
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Copy Nº 1 – DISTRIBUTION LIST
Nº 2 – to Stalin
Nº 3 – to Stalin
Nº 4 – to Molotov
Nº 5 – to Beria
Nº 6 – to Malenkov
Nº 7 – to Mikoyan
Nº 8 – to Zhdanov
Nº 9 – to Vyshinsky
Nº 10 – to Dekanozov
Nº 11 – Silin
Nº 12 – Copy
Nº 13 – to the 10th Department
Nº 14 – to the 10th Department
Nº 15 – to file
Received at 1710
2 October 1946
Copy Nº 2
Spets NºNº 1620-1622
Today I delivered the note to Qavam which you suggested. Familiarizing himself with the note, Qavam declared that there had been no oversights from his side, that he wanted to prepare the elections in order to ensure the necessary majority in the Majlis. This work required a certain time, in addition, the fact that the Azerbaijani question has still not been resolved influenced the course of this work and, besides this, the events in the South interfered with this work.
He said that he hopes to remove these obstacles with respect to the South. He added that he intends to solve the question peacefully, for the use of weapons will lengthen the state of unrest in the South and disrupt the holding of the elections. If not for these considerations he would have taken decisive steps long ago with respect to the rebellious tribes.
With respect to the Azerbaijani question he asked me to help settle it.
I replied to Qavam that even during the last conversation I pointed out that the government is intentionally dragging out the elections to the Majlis, that sufficiently favorable conditions exist in the country for holding elections to the Majlis and ensuring the majority; however, for reasons unknown to me the government is refusing to announce the elections. I again pointed out that the resolution of the Azerbaijani question is being delayed by the Iranian government itself without sufficient reason. The differences which exist right now between the government and the Azerbaijani delegation concern particular, secondary questions, and can be completely resolved. At one time we achieved agreements on larger questions and questions of principle concerning the relations between Azerbaijan and the government in a shorter period, and right now, in my conviction, the government can easily resolve the remaining questions, which are not of a critical nature. I have personally declared to the premier that I will eagerly help in speeding up these talks; however, for some reason the Prime Minister and his deputy declined my help and my assistance in holding talks.
I again declare that I am ready to help in this matter at any time.
As concerns the events in the South I told the Prime Minister that during the last conversation the government had ability to avert these events,, however preventive measures were not taken in time. We are forming the impression that the elections are being delayed consciously, and this is what is causing concern from the Soviet government and me personally.
Qavam said that he does not agree with my last statement. If the best preparation of grounds for the elections and approval of the agreement needs to be understood as a conscious delay then he agrees with this expression. But if by this a conscious reluctance to hold elections to the Majlis and accordingly to violate the agreement which was reached to create an oil company is meant, then he does not agree with this.
I said by this expression I understand that there were and there are conditions in the country to ensure a democratic majority in the Majlis, however these conditions were not used and the elections have been and are being put off all the time for reasons not understandable for us.
I added that the authority which the government of Qavam enjoys and the support from democratic parties completely ensure the ability to elect the desired majority in the Majlis. I added that the timely observance of the agreement signed by us even further strengthens our ties with the Prime Minister, increases our trust and our support and, on the contrary, the non-observance of this agreement, on the basis of which we have achieved good relations with the Prime Minister, will arouse unavoidable large complications in our relations.
[Translator’s note: the first sentence of the next paragraph was highlighted in the left margin]. Qavam noted that the Soviet government ought not display concern, that he did not and does not intend to violate the promises he gave the Soviet government that elections to the Majlis will be held, and that the agreement will be observed in approximately the timeframes of which he spoke, that is with a delay of 20-30 days. He added that elections to the Majlis will be announced in the near future. I asked exactly when, and he replied that in about two or three days a Decree of the Shah will be announced about the start of the elections; moreover, this Decree will designate an election day (up to now a definite [day] to hold elections has not been set according to Iranian laws; the elections have been dragged out in individual provinces for two or three months – I. S.)
Qavam expressed the hope that there would be no big complications in our relations of which I spoke.
Bidding goodbye, he added that we have also openly and sincerely discussed our questions.
At the beginning of he conversation Qavam said it was with great joy that he had found out that I had decided to put off my departure from Iran.
Please indicate whether or not to insist on Qavam giving a written reply if this does not follow.
2 October 1946 SADCHIKOV
15 copies rn
Sent at 2315 2 October
Done by Volkov
Authenticated [by] [illegible name]
[handwritten: A written response from the Iranians is needed]
[separate handwritten note: [[this]] has been reported to Cde. Dekanozov, 4 October [[illegible name]]
N 10284/[illegible letters]
Soviet Ambassador to Iran Sadchikov informs the Soviet leadership that Qavam claims not to be delaying Majlis elections in order to avoid implementing the Soviet Union's oil concession in Iran. Qavam instead insists that elections will be held once there is an acceptable resolution to the Azerbaijani and Qashqai conflicts as well as other conditions necessary to ensure a majority in the Majlis.
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