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October 7, 1990

Cable No. 451 from Counselor Wanibuchi Kazuo (Saudi Arabia) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'The Prime Minister’s Visit to Turkey (Meeting With President Ozal)'

This document was made possible with support from The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Secret

Telegraphic Copy                                            [blacked out]

 

Number R201604       

Primary: First Middle East Division

October 7, 1990          [time blacked out]

Sent [from] Jeddeh      

October 7, 1990          [time blacked out]

Arrived [at] Ministry

 

 

[to] Minister of Foreign Affairs          

[from] Counselor Wanibuchi

 

The Prime Minister’s Visit to Turkey (Meeting With President Ozal)

No. 451            Secret  Top Urgent [blacked out]

 

On October 5, the Prime Minister had a meeting with President Ozal from 19:30 at the Turkish president’s official residence

Following is a summary of the meeting’s main points. (Attending from our side were Owada Hisashi, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Watanabe Makoto, Director, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau; and Sengoku Takashi, Ambassador to Turkey. Attending from the other side were Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut; Deputy Undersecretary Huseyin Celem; Nabi Sensoy, Chief of Staff to the President; and Umut Arik, Ambassador to Japan. Interpreter: Consul Motoyama Akira).

1. After the opening greetings, when asked by Ozal of his impression of his visit, the Prime Minister gave the following reply:

(1) From an explosive situation at the beginning of August, the crisis has changed to a set situation. My impression was that a clear outlook was difficult to establish. I (the Prime Minister) have argued that we should seek with persistence a path of peaceful settlement and, for that, we should strictly observe the sanctions.

(2) I pressed Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan, saying that Iraq should make a decision based on the consensus of the international community, but we remained far apart in our arguments.

2. Ozal said the following:

(1) For this problem to be settled peacefully, as the entire world wishes, without using armed force, we must settle it early. If the world conveys a position of half measures, then Saddam Hussein is likely use military force. If all the world strictly observes the sanctions and Iraq does not listen even then, we should threaten to use military force, for example, after a year’s time. This is likely what President Bush means when he speaks of various ways remaining. We should reinforce United Nations resolutions and, beyond that, clearly convey the possibility of using military force. A peaceful settlement will be possible only in this way.

(2) If we do not inform Iraq of this kind of firm decision, if we put forth something like the Mitterand proposal, on the contrary, there will be war. We must not give Iraq any hope whatsoever.

(3) The invasion and annexation of Kuwait is an illegal act that disrupts the international legal order. Taking hostages is out of the question. Everyone is in agreement on this.

(4) So far we have carried out economic sanctions. We have expanded them to air transport. We need to work to turn the screws even tighter. For example, we need a United Nations resolution to make claims against Iraq for losses due to the invasion and make Iraq pay, and we need the determination to implement it. If we were to come together without any gaps among us, with the West at the center, then Saddam Hussein would either disappear or Iraq would go bankrupt. If the opposite of this were to happen, then there will be war. There will be no way to a settlement. I (Ozal) fear that if things continue as they are now for two or three months, that is what will happen.

(5) No nation should show a lenient attitude. It is a mistake for the United Nations Secretary General and President Gorbachev to be proposing talks. If this continues without a solution, it will bring great loss to the world.

3. The Prime Minister replied as follows:

(1) I understand your thinking, President Ozal, that taking united action, in expressing the possibility of military sanctions, is a way to make Iraq change its thinking. The problem, in that event, would be a possible split in international opinion or Arab reaction against it.

(2) Harsh conditions have already been arising in Iraq on account of the sanctions. Reinforcing the sanctions, even without the use of military force, could lead to the economy failing and Iraq surrendering. I think that, by reinforcing the sanctions at the United Nations, we could resolve this.

4. Ozal replied as follows:

(1) War should absolutely be avoided. The way to do that is to show firm resolve.

(2) Sanctions do not attain the desired effect. In these circumstances, with such half measures,  Saddam Hussein will not change his mind. We should force him to surrender in expressing the determination that we are prepared even to go to war.

5. In reply, the Prime Minister said the following:

(1) I understand your thinking, President Ozal. I think that the agreement at the US-Soviet summit to take additional measures as necessary is the same thing.

(2) With the United Nations at the center, we have gone so far as carrying out an aerial blockade, but we need to reinforce this line and influence Saddam Hussein. A split in international opinion would be a problem for that. International unity is needed.

6. Ozal said the following:

(1) It is no good to let Saddam Hussein think that he can draw this out, as the Mitterand proposal does. The effects of sanctions are not enough. The important thing is what we are going to do about it.

(2) We should not get caught up in short-term solutions. We should also think of long-term ones. That is to say, we need to think about what happens after this crisis is resolved. Iraq speaks of resolving this among the Arabs themselves, but the Arabs are split, so this is nothing more than a dream. With the solution that Iraq is seeking, the Arab monarchies would cease to exist, the Arabs would lose their stability, and the result would be the emergence of extremists like those in Libya. It is after this crisis is resolved that difficult situations will emerge.

7. The Prime Minister replied as follows:

We must not allow the present situation to become a fait accompli. We need to reinforce the mechanisms of the United Nations and establish the line of argument that those who do not comply with United Nations resolutions will certainly fail.

8. Ozal said the following:

(1) Turkey borders Iraq and has problems with other countries as well. Turkey is the only stable country in the Middle East. Turkey’s stabilization is needed for the stabilization of the region. The condition for that, however, is the aid of friendly countries, namely the United States, Europe, and Japan.

(2) Everyone says that economic sanctions are important, but Turkey is the key to their complete implementation. Turkey has the pipeline that goes out from Iraq. Also, it would be possible for Iraq to survive in relying on Turkey alone. Iraq said that it would supply oil to Turkey for free for two years, but Turkey declined the offer indirectly, saying that it would strictly observe the sanctions.

(3) As trade with Iraq is unlikely to go well from this point forward, we have proposed to many countries that they promote trade with Turkey, but only the United States has responded concretely to us. Turkey is considered an advanced industrial country and is not considered in need of support. I would like to ask of Japan as well, and not just once, continued soft loans and commodity credits.

9. Following that, the Prime Minister said the following:

(1) I highly evaluate the firm position that Turkey has taken under difficult conditions. I also have high hopes for Turkey’s role in the Middle East. The present situation is for Japan, too, a burden, with a decrease in oil supplies and a rise in oil prices. Nevertheless, we have decided to give two billion dollars in aid to support as much as we can neighboring countries. President Bush, too, mentioned Turkey and Egypt. I spoke in detail about this with Prime Minister Akbulut. We will carry out this year emergency commodity credits. We are also considering projects. We would like to cooperate as much as we can, including 500 million dollars within the trade insurance framework and an investment protection agreement.

(2) Last, there has been talk of Iraq possessing nuclear weapons. I would like to ask your thoughts on the future security of the Gulf.

10. At the end, Ozal replied as follows and ended the meeting.

(1) Various things have been said regarding Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, but there is no conclusive evidence of the country’s having possessed them or that it is in the process of doing so. Iraq does have chemical weapons. For the security of the region after this crisis, we will first need to eliminate Iraq’s chemical weapons and nuclear capabilities. Saddam is a little stupid. If he had them, he would want to use them. In that sense, this crisis is an opportunity.

(2) Also, there remains the conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

(3) As examples of concrete security proposals, it may be possible to consider an agreement on NATO’s use of military force outside the region or bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations.

(4) (After that, spreading out a world map, he said that he was thinking of a region of economic cooperation that would encompass the Turkish ethnic areas around the Black Sea and that he had spoken to Gorbachev about it. If realized, he said, the area would become a major market of more than 400 million people, and he was speaking of this in hoping for Japan’s cooperation.)

Passed to diplomatic missions in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations.  (End)

 

Summary of Japanese Prime Minsiter Kaifu's meeting with Turkish President Ozal. Kaifu describes his conversation with Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan and Ozal calls for a firm response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.



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Published online by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, File 2021-0533. Translated by Stephen Mercado.

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