Cable from Tehran Nº 31343/31353

CABLE

STRICTLY SECRET

Copy Nº 1 – DISTRIBUTION LIST

Nº 2 – to Stalin

Nº 3 – to Stalin

Nº 4 – to Molotov

Nº 5 – to Voroshilov

Nº 6 – to Dekanozov

Nº 7 – to Silin

Nº 8 – copy

Nº 9 – to the 10^th Department

Nº 10 – to file

31353

Spets. NºNº 1533 1534

URGENT

Today Qavam informed Baroyan that he had received a telegram from the south from General Zahedi about an uprising of the Qashqai. The insurgents seized Bandar Bushehr and several adjoining settlements. Battles are also going on in settlements located not far from Shiraz. General Zahedi is asking for additional troops to be sent, no less than two divisions, declaring that without reinforcements Shiraz will unavoidably fall. Qavam received a telegram from Nasser Khan Qashqai with an ultimatum demanding the Qashqai be given autonomy, the right to organize their own army, and the creation of an Enjumen with absolute authority. The telegram also raised a demand to reorganize the cabinet and create a genuinely national government.

Qavam turned to Baroyan with a question, can we urgently sell the Iranian government some quantity of bombers and tanks to put down the insurrection in the south [?]

Baroyan promised to report to me.

In this same conversation Qavam complained that the British Ambassador Le Rougetel is putting him in a difficult position by categorically denying the participation of British official representatives in the events in the south of Iran and, he said, does not provide him an opportunity to take any steps through official channels. Nevertheless, he gave instructions to London [to] Tagi-Zade to pose the Foreign Office the question of the recall of Trott from Iran.

We think that the reports of which Qavam talked need to be examined properly. There are things here which demand additional study.

1. It is not understood why Qavam arrested Bakhtiari chiefs, however he did not take any steps to isolate the Qashqai khans, although from the materials reported to us by Qavam and Firuz clearly shows that Qashqai khans (Nasser Khan Qashqai, Khosrow Khan Qashqai, and others) also took part in the plot.

2. It is unclear why, having uncovered the plot, the government still however did not take any steps to put down possible local uprisings inasmuch as the plot was fully prepared.

Having removed the leadership the government did not take any steps to eliminate the roots of the plot.

3. It is strange that during such events in the south of the country the government did not hasten to strengthen the garrisons of local regular troops. In the enormous province of Fars there is one incomplete division with a strength of about 3,000 and headed by an unreliable command (this fact was confirmed by Muzaffar Firuz). The three best battalions of the Isfahan division remain on the border with Azerbaijan up to now (this fact was reported by Motezade, the Commanding General of the Isfahan division, in a conversation with Ashurov).

4. It is not at all clear why Qavam is asking for our planes and tanks to put down the Qashqai when the Iranian army has these types of weapons and the government could have quickly sent them to Fars. (the government keeps aircraft and tanks against the Azerbaijanis).

I charged Baroyan with replying to Qavam that if the Iranian government actually needs the types of weapons named by the premier and would like to get them from the Soviet Union quickly then this question ought to be raised through the Soviet Ambassador officially.

Request your immediate instructions [about] what to reply to Qavam if he turned to me with such a request.

21 September 1946  SADCHIKOV

10 copies. vp

Sent 21 September at 1815

Done by Chalov

Authenticated [by] [illegible signature]

[handwritten:

Give if [?we get them?] back

?officially?

IL-2 dive bombers

?yellow? 2-3

tanks 30-40]

6733

N 9876