July 20, 1964
Cable from Xie Kexi, 'Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s Attitude toward the Sino-Indian Boundary Issue and Her Inclinations'
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Mrs. [Sirimavo] Bandaranaike’s Attitude toward the Sino-Indian
Boundary Issue and Her Inclinations
[To] Premier [Zhou Enlai]:
According to your instructions this morning, I report my views to you about Mrs. Bandaranaike’s attitude towards the Sino-Indian boundary issue and her inclinations:
(1) With respect to the Sino-Indian boundary issue, since China’s victory in the military counterattack, and having taken a series of proactive political measures, the situation is very favorable to China. We have completely taken the political initiative. Militarily, India suffered a great defeat. The true face of Nehru—big power expansionism, hypocrisy, deception, a reactionary colluding and seeking refuge with the United States—has been exposed. Politically, he is now isolated and having a difficult time. Now India is unwilling to admit [this], and wants to play this card to collude with the United States and the Soviet Union, seeking aid and bargaining for more help. While it is too weak to fight and cannot carry out any big tricks, [India] will continue to make small disturbances.
(2) Mrs. Bandaranaike is obviously taking sides with India, judging from her recommendations at the Colombo Conference and her so-called clarification of her recommendations during her visit to India. While her attitude has weakened since the Premier [Zhou Enlai] and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly reasoned and appropriately struggled with her, she feels that, [because] China and India did not sit down to talk at the table, she did not play her cards well and did not land any capital. Furthermore, her ruling term as prime minister is set to expire and, regardless of whether [she] can stay in power following the next general election, she is missing capital. It seems that she still has illusions about India no matter whether Nehru is in office or [Lal Bahadur] Shastri comes into power. She thinks China is easy to deal with, so she is always coming up with ideas about seven civil administration points in the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border, asking China to make concessions. Although the Premier offered a clear explanation during the talk at the meeting in Sikkim in late February, judging from her movements thereafter, she has too strong of subjective self-interest motivation and she still has illusions. In addition, India takes advantage of these characteristics to shift pressure onto China.
(3) It is predicted that Mrs. Bandaranaike’s proposal at the meeting will fail, but she may reveal her intentions in a subtle way, observe our reactions and views, and, under the deception and instigation of the Soviet revisionists and the Indians, propose it again.
I fully support the spirit of the Premier’s instructions from this morning. We should continue to attack India in Asia and Africa. I agree with the Premier that, at the appropriate time, we should put forth that we should talk with India about the unlawful region south of the McMahon Line. With regard to Mrs. Bandaranaike’s intentions, it seems that only explaining and checking [her views] are not enough. Politically, we should take the offensive against India. In terms of actions, we may consider indicating our intentions to the six countries in advance or at the same time, leaving Mrs. Bandaranaike to consider the issue.
There must be something wrong and improper with the above opinions. I request that the Premier please read this and point out my errors.
Evening of 20 July 1964
Report on the attitude of Ceylon's Prime Minister Bandaranaike towards the Sino-Indian conflict: While China had the upper hand both politically and militarily, Mrs. Bandaranaike was taking sides with India. The report predicted that Mrs. Bandaranaike's proposal would fail and proposed that China should politically take the offensive against India.
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