Cipher No. 6247
Havana, June 4, 1969
Comrade Jeleń
Comrade Strzałkowski in dispatch No. 65 of 2/6/69 states:
Despite Brezhnev's announcement on the 23rd of this month about the participation of Cuban observers, the hosts here delayed until the 31st of May to publish a note on this subject / C. R. Rodríguez informed us by telephone the morning of the previous day/. The staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee did not take up this subject with the diplomatic corps of the Communist states despite the persistently circulating rumours about the intention to send observers, – although they stopped using the excuse of the resolution of the January /1968/ plenum on the non-participation of the Cuban Communist Party in the conference. Circumstances accompanying my conversation with R[ordíguez] on the 1st of this month /during a reception in honour of the Vietnamese delegation/ did not allow him to elaborate on the subject I had raised, he only emphasised that "in view of the downright dramatic nature of Brezhnev's appeal to Fidel Castro via the ambassador in Moscow, justifying the importance of the conference and Cuba's participation, the Politburo, departing from its previous position, decided to send observers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba to demonstrate to the USSR that in a difficult situation it could count on Cuba.
(end p. 1)
According to R[ordíguez], the reluctance to make a decision was dictated by fears of Chinese retaliatory moves in the economic field /which, according to R[ordíguez], will inevitably occur/ - which the Cubans cannot afford at the moment. /Sino-Cuban turnover in 1968 amounted to 140 million dollars/. The day after the above-mentioned conversation, i.e. on the day R[ordíguez] left for Moscow, the Chinese embassy here passed on to us and other posts a note informing us of the recall of its previous ambassador. I do not think that this is a coincidence. It is possible that this is Beijing's first warning reaction to the change in Cuba's previous neutral attitude, which may initiate further possible Chinese moves, depending on how far Cuban involvement goes. Apart from the above-mentioned conversation between Brezhnev preceding the Cuban decision, Soldatov held a conversation with Fidel Castro and separately with some members of the Cuban Communist Party's Politburo, using arguments that were important for Cuba. According to Soldatov, the Soviets are not fully satisfied with the Cuban position, nor with the message symbolizing half-heartedness and giving the trip a bilateral character /our Claris 105/.
S[oldatov] in a conversation with Fidel Castro expressed regret over the indecision of the Cuban Communist Party to fully participate in the conference at such an important moment for the communist movement. Personally, I believe that the half-heartedness of Cuban participation, the level of delegation /without the participation of a member of the Politburo/, the modest press mention as the only public document on such an important issue, and the invitation to Havana at the same time of one of the leaders of the South Vietnamese guerrilla movement /our Claris 105/, giving the visit the highest setting and publicity - were dictated by the intention to undermine any possible sounds about a change in the Cuban line. The whole thing is being watched very closely within the diplomatic corps.
(end p. 2)