November 26, 1984
Committee for State Security (KGB), 'Indicators to Recognize Adversarial Preparations for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
Main Department III
Berlin, 26 November 1984
Indicators to recognize adversarial preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack
(This material is to be kept safe only with Head of Department III in person)
Berlin, 27 August 1984
Main Directorate A [HV A]
Head Main Department III
Comrade Major General Männchen
Indicator catalogue of the KGB
Attached you receive a summarizing catalogue prepared by the 1st Main Directorate of the KGB about indicators to recognize adversarial preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack.
You are requested to use this document as a basis for input to the HV A catalogue of indicators coming up for review in October 1984. In particular those hostile measures and indicators are to be considered which are not covered by methods of signal intelligence.
G e y e r
Translation from Russian
Indicators to recognize adversarial preparations for a surprise nuclear missile attack
The summarizing catalogue of indicators to recognize a nuclear missile attack is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, economic.
With regard to each mentioned area, listed below are, with support of mutually coordinated indexation,
- the main tasks to uncover immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the respective area;
- the main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the respective area;
- special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the respective area.
Main tasks to uncover immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the political area
1. Uncovering measures of preparation and adoption of political decisions for a surprise nuclear missile attack.
2. Uncovering the implementation of mobilization measures to secure operations of the US leadership under conditions of a nuclear war.
3. Notice of consultations with allied partners about implementation of a nuclear attack.
4. Uncovering measures to guarantee the operation of NATO states' governments under conditions of a nuclear war.
5. Noticing the fact of the order forwarded to troops to launch missiles.
Main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the political area
1.1. Holding of extraordinary meetings by the National Security Council of the United States and of special crisis groups (White House “situation room”).
1.2. Activation of work of US government institutions involved in especially important decisions (State Department, Department of Defense, CIA, and others).
1.3. Increase in protection for leading US politicians and government institutions.
2.1. US President and people in charge at the White House relocate to protected command centers to continue the government.
2.2. Evacuation of people close to the highest political leadership of the United States from areas of increased risk on US territory and in foreign countries.
2.3. Information to the US National Archives to guarantee preservation of most important government documents.
2.4. Activation of operations by FEMA representatives in leading US government institutions.
2.5. Relocation of the most important people from leading US government agencies to places especially equipped for their work under war conditions.
3.1. Holding of extraordinary consultations by the US political leadership and the NATO states.
3.2. Activation of the mechanism of “nuclear consultations” of NATO.
3.3. Changes in political activities of US embassies in the NATO states.
4.1. Activation of work by government institutions of NATO states in charge of adoption of particularly important decisions and contacts with the United States and the other NATO allies.
4.2. Increase in protection for leading politicians and government institutions of NATO states.
4.3. Relocation of the highest political leadership and leading people from government institutions of the NATO states to protected command centers to continue government.
4.4. Relocation of the most important people from NATO Headquarters to places especially equipped for its work under war conditions.
5.1. Forwarding of the order to the troops to launch missiles.
Special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the political area
1.1.1. Formation of special operative groups of government agencies to prepare material for the President and the National Security Council on the issue of a military attack.
1.1.2. Holding of consultations between the President and leading US politicians and military, people close to him, leading Senators, former Presidents, and influential members of business circles on the issue of a military attack.
1.1.3. Arrival of former US Presidents in Washington.
1.1.4. Frequent visits to the White House by leading US politicians and military.
1.1.5. Simultaneous presence of most members from the National Security Council and special crisis groups in Washington.
1.1.6. Parking of a large number of vehicles used by official people at the parking lot of the White House (at the area adjacent to the White House).
1.1.7. Reduction of meetings by the US President and the Secretary of State with representatives of the mass media.
1.2.1. Surprise cancellations of travel, speeches, and meetings by representatives of the military-political leadership of the country.
1.2.2. Turndowns by high-ranking official people to attend receptions and earlier planned business meetings.
1.2.3. Simultaneous unexpected leaves from receptions, dinners, balls, and business meetings by official people.
1.2.4. Early unexpected returns by leading government representatives and their family members from vacation.
1.2.5. Intensification of work in government agencies involved in preparations for decisions about the nuclear missile attack. Work by according institutions (by a large number of employees) in evening hours and on Sundays and holidays. Parking by a larger number of vehicles as usual near administrative buildings.
1.2.6. Violation of existing protocol for meetings by high-ranking US government people. Arrival of Secretaries in their respective departments at unusual times.
1.2.7. Significant increase in anti-Soviet propaganda, unleashing of a war hysteria.
1.2.8. Statements in the press, radio, and on TV about an increase of aggressiveness in USSR policy, and the subsequent need to take countermeasures in this context.
1.3.1. Limitation of access to the White House.
1.3.2. Increased security for the White House. Deployment of police posts on the White House yards, and on the roofs of buildings adjacent to the White House. Increased police car patrol rides around the White House.
1.3.3. Providing employees of the White House with security.
1.3.4. Increased security for leading members of the State Department and the federal departments.
1.3.5. Introduction of a special secrecy routine regarding rides by the President and the Vice President, keeping their driving routes secret.
2.1.1. Surprising departure by the US President, his family, the Vice President, and the President's close advisers from Washington and their accommodation in the especially equipped nuclear shelter (Fort Ritzi) [sic, Fort Ritchie].
2.1.2. Unexpected departure by the family members of the President from their permanent residences (outside the White House).
2.4.1. Holding of extraordinary FEMA meetings.
2.4.2. Activation of operations by FEMA coordinators in government institutions.
2.4.3. Activation of operations by FEMA in the 10 regional headquarters.
2.5.1. Preparation of potential evacuation routes. Increase of police activities on roads where evacuation is supposed to occur.
3.1.1. Information of the highest military-political leadership of the NATO bloc, and the leading member countries of the bloc, about the preparation of a surprise nuclear missile attack.
3.1.2. Unexpected appearances by US government leaders in capitals of NATO states, without announcement in the press or after advance information.
3.1.3. Unplanned and unexpected visits by leading politicians from NATO states in Washington.
3.1.4. Intensive exchange of opinions between governments of the United States and the NATO countries through utilization of additional information channels.
3.2.1. Transfer of national centers on assessment of the situation to a working routine around the clock. Adding more personnel to national situation rooms and the NATO situation room (Ever, Belgium) [sic, Evere].
3.2.2. Increase of operative centers in the staffs of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Casteaux) [sic, Casteau], the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Norfolk, United States), and the NATO Allied Maritime Command (Northwood, Great Britain) by additional personnel.
3.2.3. Announcement of alert condition “Bravo” or “Charly” [sic, Charlie] for bloc headquarters by the NATO Secretary General.
3.2.4. Deployment of military representatives of national delegations at NATO headquarters, among else the French military mission, to guarantee communication between the situation room of the bloc, the national situation rooms, and the governments of the member countries.
3.2.5. Organization of a 24-hour-duty by representatives of national delegations at NATO headquarters in the meeting rooms of the Council, respectively the Defense Planning Committee of NATO.
3.2.6. Establishment of special working groups with representatives from the international military staff to support the NATO situation room.
3.2.7. Convening of a joint meeting of Council/Defense Planning Committee and NATO Military Committee.
3.2.8. Sending of urgent messages of type “Whisky” by the most important military leaderships of NATO to the Council/Defense Planning Committee of the bloc, and to the governments of the member countries, in case of a decision by most important leaderships to ask for permission of the use of nuclear weapons.
3.2.9. Replenishing personnel of the data evaluation unit on nuclear issues at the NATO situation room to analyze requests and information concerning the use of nuclear weapons.
3.2.10. Arrival of the request about use of nuclear weapons, or information about the intention to use nuclear weapons, at NATO headquarters.
3.3.1. Activation of operations of US embassies, exit of employees from US institutions under various pretexts, destroying of documents at the embassy.
3.3.2. Simultaneous arrival of US ambassadors from the capitals of NATO states for consultations in Washington.
4.1.1. Unusual activities in the residence of a head of the executive of a country. Frequent visits to the residence by leading politicians and military of the country, and by representatives of the United States and the NATO bloc.
4.1.2. Intensification of work by the most important government institutions. Work by a large number of employees on evenings and at night hours, as well as on non-workdays.
4.1.3. Early and surprising return by politicians from vacations, bans on taking leave for individual categories of government employees.
4.1.4. Cancellations of planned meetings, events, visits, and travel abroad by leading politicians of the country.
4.1.5. Turndowns by high-ranking official people to attend receptions and earlier planned business meetings.
4.1.6. Simultaneous unexpected leaves from receptions and business meetings by official people.
4.1.7. Unusual activity in the work of staffs of NATO military leaderships which are not in a context of implementing large command staff exercises of the bloc. Instructions to members of the staff to work at unusual times.
4.1.8. Organization of frequent personal meetings, unplanned in advance, between the Supreme Commander or the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Allied Joint Forces Europe with the NATO Secretary General, especially at unusual times.
4.1.9. Organization of meetings by the leadership of the NATO states with leading politicians and military, as well as with people close to them.
4.1.10. Establishment of special crisis groups consisting of government members and representatives of military and political circles.
4.1.11. Formation of special operative groups of agencies to prepare material for reporting to the political leadership of the country and members of the crisis groups.
Main tasks to uncover immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the military area
1. Uncovering measures of immediate preparation by the US forces for a surprise nuclear missile attack.
2. Uncovering measures of immediate preparation by NATO forces for a surprise nuclear missile attack.
3. Noticing the fact of the order forwarded to troops to launch missiles.
Main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the military area
1.1. Activation of command and leadership centers of United States and NATO forces.
1.2. Raising of the level of combat readiness for the strategic offensive forces of the United States (intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, self-propelled artillery), preparation and implementation of extensive exercises.
1.3. Raising the level of combat readiness for the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States in Europe.
1.4. Moving American military objects abroad to higher level of combat readiness.
1.5. Organization of extensive relocations of US forces.
2.1. Significant modifications in operation of military communication networks of the United States and NATO (putting reserve channels into operation; launch of the mode “Minimize”).
2.2. Increase of the level of combat readiness for England's nuclear forces.
2.3. Increase of the level of combat readiness for France's nuclear forces.
2.4. Putting the military objects of armies from NATO states into higher combat readiness, launch of the NATO alarm system.
3.1. Forwarding the order to the troops to launch the missiles, preparing the weapons systems for launch.
Special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the military area
1.1.1. Replenishing of war staffs and reserve command centers, increase of duty in the staff and command centers.
1.1.2. Review and clarification of alarm, mobilization, and operative planning, and of alert systems for personnel, staffs, and units.
1.1.3. Relocation of staffs of battlefield armies, and those of the army corps, divisions, and brigades to the main, forward, and reserve command centers.
1.2.1 Accelerated completion of scheduled work and technical maintenance at launching pads of intercontinental ballistic missiles; extraordinary launch of their combat readiness; removal of technical maintenance crews in intercontinental ballistic missile squadrons from launching pads and missile command centers.
1.2.2. Termination of regular technical maintenance and scheduled work at launching pads and missile command centers.
1.2.3. Termination of scheduled exercises and test missile launches at launching pads of the 1st Training Division and missile test launching sites; extensive work at those sites to prepare combat missiles for launch.
1.2.4. Conducting of work by flying and technical personnel to incorporate those planes into the alert system which are not part of alert forces.
1.2.5. Distribution of nuclear ammunition (aircraft bombs and cruise missiles) from stocks of the Air Force bases of the Strategic Air Command to fighter aircraft which are not part of alert forces; transport of this ammunition to the aircraft and its installation.
1.2.6. Introduction of flights by the strategic Air Force to flight routes of combat patrol units with nuclear weapons on board.
1.2.7. Rushed preparations and departure of nuclear missile submarines from rearward bases and into forward deployment areas (in this context: working intensity increases concerning these aspects, daily routines are changing, and security gets tightened).
1.2.8. Rushed withdrawal of nuclear submarines not ready for combat, as well as of floating bases, transporters, docks, and other swimming devices from rearward bases and their de-centralization at war anchoring locations.
1.2.9. Transfer of alert nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles from daily patrol areas to patrol areas for extraordinary situations.
1.2.10. In case of alert, assembly of the entire personnel of units, groups, and institutions of the Strategic Air Command.
1.2.11. Termination of discharges of personnel from the Strategic Air Command that had completed its fixed terms in the armed forces.
1.2.12. Provision of means for collective protection from weapons of mass destruction, and for conducting exercises with personnel on airfields and bases.
1.3.1. Withdrawal of nuclear units in armed ground forces from their permanent areas of deployment and their transfer to areas of de-centralization, as well as preparation for manning, or the actual manning, of the firing positions to launch the attack.
1.3.2. Take-off by a part of strategic Air Force for combat patrol flights with nuclear weapons on board.
1.3.3. Removal of nuclear weapons from stocks and distribution of nuclear ammunition to the units.
1.3.4. Increase in protection and defense of nuclear ammunition stocks, as well as of units in possession of nuclear weapons.
1.3.5. Advance of all batteries from guided missiles of types “Pershing” and “Lance”, as well as of supply units for nuclear ammunition, into their areas of operation.
1.3.6. Alerting of all units with surface-to-air missiles of type “Nike Hercules” to combat readiness.
1.3.7. Appearance (numerical increase) of aircraft from strategic Air Force (reconnaissance aircraft, tanker aircraft), as well as of aircraft carriers from tactical Air Force, at Air Force bases where they had not been observed previously.
1.3.8. Inclusion of aircraft not part of alert forces into the alert system, by flying and technical personnel.
1.3.9. Mass delivery of conventional aerial bombs and guided missiles, as well as delivery of fuels and lubricants, from inventories to the airbases.
1.3.10. Start of nuclear ballistic missile submarines from their base Holy Loch in Great Britain – 2 to 3 nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles.
1.3.11. Transfer of a part of American nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles to operative command of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Forces in Europe.
1.3.12. Early arrival of second crews in forward deployment positions for potential replenishment, or substitution of crews from nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles.
1.3.13. Increase in numbers of patrolling relay station aircraft to communicate with nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles.
1.3.14. Replenishing of stocks in submarines for material and technical supply norms for wartimes (for 90 days).
1.3.15. Preparation of warships for going to sea.
1.3.16. Activation of airborne air forces.
1.3.17. Start of 24-hour-work to complete repair of warships in marine bases.
1.3.18. Towing of ships to the sea that cannot be repaired in time.
1.4.1. Increase of security for bases, staffs, units, and objects through higher numbers of guards, deployment of additional posts, sending out of patrols, and increase in readiness for units on alert; application of stricter rules for entries [to bases and objects].
1.4.2. Intensive activities of military transportation in the area of military objects.
1.4.3. Preparations for distribution of mobilization supply of ammunition and food, complete refueling of vehicles with fuels and lubricants.
1.4.4. Concentration of a higher number than usual of military supplies and military technology in train stations, ports, and bases.
1.4.5. Leave restrictions or leave bans for personnel; no permission to leave unit or garrison.
1.4.6. Distribution of individual protective chemicals to personnel, and of protective gear against weapons of mass destruction.
1.5.1. Take-off by tanker aircraft from airbases on the US continent and their landing on stopover air force bases along air routes of the tactical air force (Bermuda, Azores, and others).
1.5.2. Beginning of mass transports of forces by air from the United States to Europe in North Atlantic direction (USA, Newfoundland Islands, Great Britain, FRG) and in Central Atlantic direction (United States, Azores, Spain, FRG, Greece, Turkey), to Asia in central direction (USA, Hawai'i Islands, Marianas, Southeast Asia), and in Northern direction (USA, Alaska, Japan). Those routes are flown by strategic military transport aircraft of types C-5A and C-141.
1.5.3. Work to prepare foreign airbases for landing of aircraft from the tactical Air Force, arriving from the United States according to double-base status.
1.5.4. Arrival of special transport ships in ports to transport personnel and ammunition to designated areas.
2.1.1. Installation and activation of a reserve system to guide forces and material of the US Strategic Air Command.
2.1.2. Increase of radiation due to a check of means of communication of the main and to-be-installed reserve system to guide forces of the US Strategic Air Command.
2.1.3. Increase of traffic in communication systems “Alpha”, “Bravo”, “Green Pine”, and others.
2.1.4. Alerting personnel of the command post and communication center of the Strategic Air Command, that lives in residences of their units as well as in cities nearby, or where command centers and staff are deployed.
2.1.5. Restriction of work with means of communication and introduction of “Minimize” mode in national communication networks and in NATO communication networks.
2.1.6. Review of national civilian plans of the NATO states to guarantee secrecy of the means of communication operations.
2.1.7. Preparation by national agencies of NATO states to reduce some civilian services in order to transfer signal frequencies used for the purposes of NATO.
2.1.9. Starting the system of recognition and call signals by the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces.
2.1.9. Starting the system of telecommunication and covered voice communication between NATO headquarters, the capitals of member states, and the bloc's most important military leaderships.
2.1.10. National control and takeover of commercial communication networks.
2.4.1. Military units and forces in the state of increased readiness are kept in garrisons or military training areas under the pretext to conduct exercises.
2.4.2. Preparation for distribution of mobilization supplies of ammunition and iron food rations, complete refueling of vehicles with fuels and lubricants.
2.4.3. Leave restrictions or leave bans, as well as no permission to leave units, for the personnel.
2.4.4. Preparation for application of ECM [Electronic Countermeasures] and ECCM [Electronic Counter-Countermeasures].
2.4.5. Distribution of individual protective chemicals and protective gear against weapons of mass destruction to personnel.
2.4.6. Exercise of stricter control over electromagnetic radiation in bases of their troops and in objects in the hinterland.
2.4.7. Increase of security for bases, staffs, units, and objects through higher numbers of guards, deployment of additional posts, sending out patrols, and increase in readiness for units on-duty; application of stricter rules for entries.
Area of Activities of Intelligence Services
Main tasks to uncover immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the area of activities of intelligence services
1. Notice of intelligence measures immediately preceding a nuclear missile attack.
2. Notice of counterintelligence measures immediately preceding a nuclear missile attack.
Main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the area of activities of intelligence services
1.1. Activation of operations by intelligence services of the United States and NATO on territory of the socialist states, intensification of gathering intelligence information about objects against which a nuclear attack is directed.
1.2. Activation of efforts by intelligence services of the United States and NATO to pin down exact locations of the highest USSR party and state leadership.
1.3. Activation of the adversary's technological intelligence operations.
2.1. Blocking of actions of Soviet foreign intelligence on the territory of the United States and other NATO states.
2.2. Relocation of personnel from central units of intelligence services and documentation in rearward positions.
2.3. Increase in security routines at military objects of the United States on its own territory and abroad.
2.4. Increased countermeasures against Soviet technological intelligence.
2.5. Tightening of the administrative and police routines on US territory and in other NATO states.
2.6. Increased measures to guarantee security of abroad institutions of the United States in socialist states, destroying of secret documents.
2.7. Increase in security routines at military objects of the armies of the NATO states.
Special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the area of activities of intelligence services
1.1.1. Incoming instructions from foreign intelligence leadership for immediate gathering of information on the final decision about a nuclear missile attack, which is going to show in a change of work routine by the adversary's legal foreign resident agents.
1.1.2. Increase in number of cadres of US legal foreign resident agents. and the residents of the NATO states on USSR territory; their extensive quantitative equipment with most recent operative technology, allocation of additional financial funds, removal of agents.
1.1.3. Activation of efforts by Western intelligence services to gather and obtain precise information about objects against which a nuclear missile attack is supposedly directed on the territory of the USSR; about centers of government and military leadership, and the means of communication; about locations of deployment of strategic nuclear fores, and most important industry, transportation, and energy supply objects.
1.1.4. Significant changes in the structure of foreign military intelligence organs of the United States and the NATO states.
1.1.5. Activation of operations by special units from intelligence services of the United States and NATO states which are designated for acts of diversion on USSR territory.
1.1.6. Significant activation of foreign intelligence operations of the United States and the NATO states in the border regions of the USSR.
1.1.7. Establishment of new centers of espionage near the borders with socialist states, and reduction of the training period in espionage training of the US and NATO states.
1.1.8. Increase in numbers of personnel of American foreign military intelligence centers in Western Europe, especially of the operative foreign intelligence center of the US Air Force in Europe (Rammstein Airbase, FRG [sic, Ramstein]), the American group for generalization of information with the Staff of the Supreme Command of Allied Forces Central Europe (located in a bunker of the war staff of the according Supreme Command in Berfink, Netherlands [sic, Börfink, West Germany], and the center for assessment of intelligence information in conflict situations with the Staff of the US European Command (Stuttgart, FRG).
1.1.9. Activation of information exchange between the center for assessment of intelligence information in conflict situations with the Staff of the US European Command and foreign intelligence organs of the NATO states about bilateral communication links between the center and various capitals of the bloc's member countries. Organization of an intensive information exchange between civilian and military foreign intelligence organs of the bloc's countries and national delegations at NATO headquarters, between the headquarters itself and these organs, as well as directly between the intelligence services of the NATO states.
1.1.10. Chance in procedure of distributing foreign intelligence information within NATO. (Usually, foreign intelligence organs of the bloc's member countries send their information to the NATO situation room, which then distributes it to the Secretariat, the international military staff, the most important military leadership organs, and the delegations of member countries at headquarters and their governments. In an unusual situation, national foreign intelligence organs have permission to send urgent information straight to recipients).
1.1.11. More frequent than usual (once within 24 hours) distribution by the NATO situation room of intelligence overviews that are unrelated to the bloc's large command staff exercises.
1.3.1. Additional starts of artificial space satellites, space apparatuses, and space transportation ships of the Shuttle type (from Cape Canaveral and the testing site of the Vandernberg base [sic, Vandenberg]).
1.3.2. Surveillance aircraft and unmanned intelligence devices are moved to a status guaranteeing their immediate operation.
1.3.3. Application of mobile means of technological intelligence on the ground.
1.3.4. Moving ground units for space technological intelligence towards working in increased shifts.
1.3.5. Arrival of the war contingent of specialists at the ground units of NASA.
1.3.6. Arrival of specialists from higher-ranking organizations at the main units and means of technological intelligence.
1.3.7. Increased delivery of additional material and devices to the units and means of technological intelligence.
1.3.8. Additional equipment of civilian and warships with devices for technological intelligence.
1.3.9. In objects of technological intelligence: installation of stations and allocation of equipment for decontamination, and for protection of personnel and technology against chemical and bacteriological agents.
2.1.1. Grave deterioration of the operative situation for foreign intelligence organs of the USSR and the other socialist states, application of signal intelligence as well as of operative technology. Implementation of operative measures to gather data about the USSR's status of information concerning plans of the United States for the execution of a nuclear missile attack.
2.1.2. Activation of actions by the US propaganda apparatus to create inside the country, and in allied states, a situation of chauvinism and of undermining the international reputation of the USSR.
2.1.3. Surprising changes in work routines of the adversary's foreign intelligences services and their units, with simultaneous tightening of the security regime.
Analogous changes in working routines of legislative and government organs in charge of controlling operations of foreign intelligence.
2.1.4. Increase in observation operations against employees of Soviet institutions. Moving of observation service to different news frequencies.
2.1.5. Intensification of monitoring of Soviet citizens.
2.1.6. Extensive application of operative technology against Soviet institutions and citizens.
2.1.7. Introduction of additional travel restrictions in the country for USSR representatives.
2.1.8. Reduction of the number of Soviet institutions and expulsion of individual employees.
2.1.9. Massive numbers of declines of diplomatic visa for representatives of the USSR and other member countries of the Warsaw treaty.
2.1.10. Creating a tense situation near Soviet institutions, threat of physical violence against Soviet representatives, organization of demonstrations and manifestations as well as other provocations, among else approaches for recruitment and similar things.
2.1.11. Organization of repressive measures by counterintelligence and police against progressive organizations and individual people, among else against those who maintain contacts with the Soviet embassy.
2.3.1. Strong activation of operations of military counterintelligence, transfer of employees of these organs to a 24-hour work mode, introduction of a tight security regime in military objects.
2.3.2. Declines of permissions for foreign diplomats and journalists to travel to areas where military objects are located.
2.3.3. Introduction of a tight security regime in individual areas of the country, especially where most important mobilization measures are implemented. Setting up of street checkpoints.
2.4.1. Change of secret codes and ciphers of government and military institutions, in NATO staff, and in the armed forces; introduction of additional measures to protect communication lines from eavesdropping.
2.5.1. Increase of security for government institutions and restriction of access to administrative buildings.
2.5.2. Tightening of security and guarding of buildings of intelligence services and their offices, as well as of adjacent areas.
2.5.3. Increase in security for government officials and high-ranking people.
2.5.4. Increase of border and customs control at state borders, airports, and in sea ports.
2.5.5. Tightening of security to guard airports, river and sea ports, train stations and hubs, main roads, and bridges.
2.5.6. Introduction of censorship of the press and other mass media. Increase in mail censorship and imposing of restrictions for phone and telex connections to foreign countries.
2.5.7. Cancellation of radio amateur licenses for the territory of the United States.
2.6.1. Increased coordination of diplomatic activities between representations of the United States and NATO states within the USSR.
2.6.2. Transmission of instructions from the capitals of the United States and the other NATO countries to their representations in Moscow and in other cities of the USSR.
2.6.3. Unexpected and unmotivated departures from the USSR by heads of diplomatic and other representations of the United States and other NATO states.
2.6.4. Surprising mass destruction of documents in representations of the United States and other NATO states in the USSR.
2.6.5. Surprising leave from exercises of the USSR and its allies within the Warsaw Treaty by observers from the United States and other NATO countries.
Area of Civil Defense
1. Notice of measures to increase mobilization readiness in organs of civil defense in the context of an immediate preparation for a nuclear missile attack.
2. Notice of measures to prepare shelters to accommodate the population, to replenish food and water reserves in the context of an immediate preparation for a nuclear missile attack.
3. Notice of measures to secure medical care of the population under conditions of a nuclear counterattack.
4. Notice of preparations to evacuate specialists (from the overall population);
5. Notice of measures to bring important material valuables and national cultural treasures to safety from a nuclear attack.
Main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the area of activities of civil defense
1.1. Activation of operations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its regional staffs.
1.2. Activation of operations of government institutions of Western European states in charge of organizing the civil defense systems of those countries.
1.3. Preparation and implementation of extensive exercises of the civil defense systems of the United States and NATO.
2.1. Testing of communication and information means of the civil defense systems of the Western states.
2.2. Installation of shelter and camouflaged accommodations of the civil defense system.
2.3. Replenishment of food and water reserves.
3.1. Expansion of the network of medical institutions.
3.2. Activation of blood donations.
3.3. Replenishment and distribution of inventories of special medications.
4.1. Mobilization preparation of personnel from a limited circle of most important companies, institutions, local and mail services.
4.2. Preparation of roads for mass evacuations of population from large cities, and establishment of decentralized areas for the population.
4.3. Bringing to safety especially important material valuables, national culture monuments, and pieces of art.
Special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the area of activities of civil defense
1.1.1. Significant changes in operations of FEMA.
FEMA Headquarters: 1725 I Street, Washington D.C. 20472
The FEMA has regional staff in 10 regions on United States territory, in particular in:
- 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349, New York, NY 10007.
- 211 Main Street, Room 220, San Francisco, CA 94105.
1.1.2. Transfer of FEMA and its regional staff to work under war mode.
2.1.1. Transfer of means of information and communication to permanent working routines. Introduction of 24-hour-duty in signal center.
2.2.1. Removal of unnecessary items from shelters and radiation protection rooms.
2.2.2. Removal of nuclear radiation observation posts.
2.2.3. Checking of filter ventilation systems and electricity supply for hermetic tightness and functioning.
3.1.1. Creating additional hospital space in existing military clinics.
3.1.2. Establishment of mobile military clinics and hospitals.
3.1.3. Additional delegations to courses for training medical personnel.
3.1.4. Establishment of additional medical installations at potential evacuation routes.
3.1.5. Maximum release of sick people from hospitals and increase in capacities of military clinics.
3.2.1. Conducting a mass campaign to donate blood, with an expansion of the number of pure blood donors, plasma donors, and paid donors.
3.2.2. Activation of measures to propagate blood donations on radio, television, in the press, and the like.
3.2.3. Collecting donations not just in large cities, but especially in suburbs and rural areas, and in places with probable locations of military hospitals and evacuated population.
3.2.4. Decentralization of blood banks and stocking up of installations, equipment, standard serum, blood preparations, and blood substitutes in relatively safe areas, activation of operations of private blood banks.
3.2.5.Expanding the pool of autonomous mobile stations with blood supplies.
3.2.6. Additional recruitment and training of personnel to work in mobile stations with blood supplies and in blood donation centers.
4.1.1. Conducting prophylactic vaccinations (especially in factories and institutions with priority relevance in the period of rebuilding).
4.1.2. Distribution of individual protective gear to units in factories and institutions.
4.1.3. Implementation of evacuation plans for families of military employees and civilian personnel from staffs and troops of the United States and NATO.
4.2.1. Removal of means of transportation designated for evacuation purposes from potential areas of destruction.
4.2.2. Preparation and partial implementation of plans to evacuate the civilian population (especially from the endangered areas).
5.1.1. Closing of the largest museums and exhibition sites (maybe under the pretext of repair work, testing of civil defense systems, and the like).
Main tasks to uncover immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the economic area
1. Notice of mobilization measures to guarantee security for the leadership and for assets of large corporations and banks under conditions of a nuclear war.
2. Notice of mobilization measures to guarantee operations of the most important industrial objects under conditions of a nuclear war.
3. Notice of measures to mobilize means of transportation and their complete allocation to operate under conditions of a nuclear war.
Main measures/indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the economic area
1.1 Relocation of personnel from central administrations, and from the most important employees of large factories, banks, companies, and academic centers to protected shelters and accommodations.
1.2. Restrictions of operations, and transfer of assets of the largest banks of the United States and other NATO countries to neutral states.
1.3. Implementation of additional measures for physical protection of the most important industrial sites.
2.2. Replenishing and decentralization of raw material and fuel supplies (on a national level, in individual factories and warehouses).
2.3. Selection of additional workers for most important armament factories by job placement centers.
3.1. Activation of operations in US government institutions in charge of mobilization of transportation in emergency situations.
3.2. Mobilization of civilian aviation.
3.3. Decentralization of ships of civilian navigation.
3.4. Mobilization of train and vehicle transportation.
Special indicators of immediate preparations for a nuclear missile attack in the economic area
1.1.1. Evacuation of headquarters of leading US banks and corporations in areas designated for use under war conditions. In particular relocation of headquarters of the telecommunication branch of AT&T (American Telephone & Telegraph Corporation) from Badminister [sic, Bedminster] (State of New Jersey) to the underground shelter in Netkong [sic, Netcong] (State of New Jersey).
1.2.1. Transfer of financial and currency assets of the largest banks of the US and other NATO states to foreign banks (especially to Swiss banks).
1.2.2. Significant changes in policies of banks and insurance companies from the US and other NATO states, in particular the FRG, with regard to crediting and insurance of trade agreements with the socialist states.
2.1.1. Evacuation of equipment and products of certain factories, especially from the border areas.
2.2.1. Increase of raw material and fuel supplies to a maximum, not caused by current production but depending on capacities of warehouses and company sites.
2.2.2. Mass slaughter of livestock and storage of meat for a long period.
3.1.1. Intensive preparations to transfer transportation services of United States and NATO states to a state of war.
3.2.1. Handover of aircraft from civilian airlines to the Allied Air Forces, in particular to the Danish airline SAS.
3.3.1. Confidential information to shipping agencies and ship owners about the rise of international tensions, and recommendation to reduce maritime traffic of NATO states and their allies in respective regions.
3.3.2. Takeover of ships from merchant and passenger fleets for deployment for military purposes.
3.3.3. Changes in customs and immigration procedures of required arrival formalities for Soviet passenger and trade ships in ports of those countries.
3.3.4. Unexpected departure by civilian ships from the US and NATO states from ports and territorial waters of Warsaw Treaty member countries.
3.4.1. Mobilization of means of transportation to evacuate civilian factories and the population from large cities.
3.4.2. Intensive relocation of military and civilian vehicle transportation means from the depths of NATO countries in areas close to border districts and troop concentration of the Warsaw Treaty armed forces.
A catalog of indicators of NATO preparation for nuclear war that were monitored by Warsaw Pact intelligence services under Project RYaN. The activity is divided into the following areas: political and military, activities of intelligence services, civil defense, and economic.
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