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August 3, 1964

Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Peng Zhen Receive Tran Tu Binh, Vietnam’s Ambassador to China; Nesti Nase, Albania’s Ambassador to China; and Pak Se-chang, Korea’s Ambassador to China

This document was made possible with support from Henry Luce Foundation

Foreign Ministry Top Secret File


Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Peng Zhen Receive Tran Tu Binh, Vietnam’s Ambassador to China;  Nesti Nase, Albania’s Ambassador to China; and Pak Se-chang, Korea’s Ambassador to China

(Premier has yet to review and approve.)


Time: 4:30 pm, 3 August 1964

Place: Fujian Hall, Great Hall of the People

Those attending the meeting: Comrade Zhao Yimin, Comrade Zeng Yongquan

Interpreters: Liang Feng, Fan Chengzuo, Li Xiangwen

Recorder: Tao Bingwei




1. The Premier introduced to the three ambassadors to China his conversation with the Romanian ambassador in mid-July about our three ways of supporting Romania in opposing Khrushchev’s revisionism: sending a party-government delegation to participate in the twentieth anniversary of Romania’s liberation; expanding economic and trade relations between China and Romania; and our providing Romania with military aid.


2. [The Premier] introduced the situation of Stoica and Maurer leading successive delegations to the Soviet Union for talks, Romania’s disagreement with Khrushchev’s revisionist attitude on convening an international conference, the Khrushchev-Tito talks in Leningrad, the border meeting between Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito, and the situation regarding Podgorny’s visit to Romania to apply pressure.


3. Our several leftist countries and parties all have to work on Romania. Romania wants us to understand its also having invited Yugoslavia to send a party-government delegation. I intend to send Comrade Li Xiannian at the head of a party-government delegation to Romania. I hope that Albania, Korea, Vietnam also have responsible comrades lead party-government delegations there.


Zhou (to the Korean ambassador): In regard to Comrade Kim Il Sung’s visiting Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party is paying great attention to it, as are progressive overseas Chinese. There is much work to be done in the area of security work. Ambassador Yao Zhongming this morning is leaving to return to Indonesia. We are having him and Korea’s ambassador to Indonesia meet to discuss matters. We do not know the preparatory work. They keep in close contact in Jakarta.


According to what our ambassador to Burma said on his return, Premier Kim intends on his trip to Indonesia to visit Burma on his return to Korea.


The Burmese side has not yet responded, but our understanding is that the internal response is not bad. If the Burmese side decides to extend an invitation, we are ready to have Ambassador Geng Biao return a little early and help do the preparatory work. The overseas Chinese also can help us understand the situation. Burma’s situation is relatively complicated, but Ne Win still is in firm control.


(To the Vietnamese Ambassador) When will Comrade Truong Chinh go to Indonesia?


Vietnamese Ambassador: I have not yet received any information.


Zhou: We have already prepared an airplane and will fly from Kunming. Today I have asked you three comrade ambassadors to come here and discuss an issue of common interest to us. This is the issue of Romania. Last time Ambassador Nase and Comrade Peng Zhen discussed the great contradiction between Romania and Soviet revisionists and the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee’s proposal to the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee that both countries do some work on the side of Romania.


At that time Comrade Peng Zhen indicated that we can work separately, then leave it to the Albanian ambassador to Romania to talk with Romanian leaders while we talk with the Romanian ambassador to China.


Around the time of the last conversation with Ambassador Nase, Romania’s Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej invited our ambassador to Romania for a long talk. I discussed this situation in general terms not long ago with Comrade Ho Chi Minh and Comrade Kim Il Sung when I went in secret to Hanoi and Pyongyang.


Afterwards, in the middle of July, three of us—Comrade Peng Zhen, Comrade Chen Yi, and I—invited the Romanian ambassador to China here for a talk. As for discussion of the situation, Comrade Wu Xiuquan has already told Comrade Ambassador Nase, and I also told Comrade Kim Il Sung.


The substance of our talk with Romania’s ambassador to China primarily is this: We well understand and sympathize with Romania’s difficult situation, encircled by the Eastern European revisionism that Khrushchev has incited; we appreciated the statement that the Romanian Party issued, disapproving of convening on one’s own the international communist movement conference behind the back of China’s Party. If one wants to hold a conference, then everyone holds it together.


We particularly appreciate the attitude of Romania’s Party at Poland’s Party Conference, that is to say, not joining Khrushchev and Gomulka in their inciting attacks against the CPC and other leftist parties. We also indicated that we support Romania’s Party in their struggle to oppose Khrushchev and resist Khrushchev’s putting pressure on Romania.


We mentioned that the Soviet Union for many years in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) [aka COMECON] has wanted to regard each country of Eastern Europe as its dependent state and colony and attempted completely to control these countries, even openly proposing the partition of Romania’s territory. Valev proposed in a journal of Moscow University to set up some “inter-state integrated body,” calling on Romania to provide half the country (including Bucharest). This not only is great-power chauvinism, but also colonialism in its entirety. Against this Romania has gone on the counterattack, we have expressed our sympathies, and will announce them in the newspaper. We have already published the issue, and the three comrade ambassadors must see it.


We said to him that we assess that henceforth Soviet revisionists will put even greater pressure on Romania and will even mobilize such countries as Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria to attack from all sides; that we not only sympathize with Romania but must do our utmost to support it in the struggle against Khrushchev’s revisionism. We propose three ways:


 (1) On 28 August this year it will be the twentieth anniversary of Romania’s National Day. This is the day that the Romanian people with their own weapons liberated Bucharest. The Soviet army went there only after that. But at present the Soviet revisionists does not recognize this point, saying that the Romanian people could not have achieved liberation without the Soviet Union.(Regarding Korea, the Soviet Union has also given this interpretation. In fact the Korean people also relied on their own strength. At the time the Romanian ambassador said that if one does not rely on one’s own people and one’s own party, there is no use in the troops of another country coming. The Soviet army occupied Finland and Austria, political power still fell into the hands of others, and in the end they had to withdraw.)We support the twentieth anniversary of Romania’s National Day, we must send a delegation to go participate in National Day activities, and we hope that Romania will still be able to invite delegations of other fraternal countries.


 (2) We must develop economic and trade relations with Romania, supply it with all the materials it needs, and help Romania to break free of the control of Soviet revisionists.


The main substance of what we three said to the Romanian ambassador was this. In our discussion, we did not bring up relations between Romania and Yugoslavia, nor did we bring up Romania’s doing business with the United States and France. This also was due to the suggestion of Ambassador Nase, so as not to disrupt the main orientation.


Khrushchev is attempting to count Yugoslavia as a partner of his to form a complete encirclement of Romania. But Tito does not approve of it. Tito has adopted in regard to Romania another kind of attitude and has already decided with Romania on the Danube River’s Iron Gate Hydroelectric Power Station and is thinking to open a breach. Romania’s comrade leader in his thinking is somewhat close to Tito. We at present are not bringing this up. As long as Romania’s comrade leader firmly opposes and resists Khrushchev’s great-power chauvinism and national egoism, his Marxist-Leninist thought will improve.


Not long after speaking with Comrade Ambassador Nase, Albania’s ambassador to Romania told our ambassador to Romania that he had already spoken with Romania’s leader and had had a good discussion.


After we three and Romania’s ambassador to China finished our discussion, he right away wrote a report and sent it back (no cable was sent).


On 28 July, our ambassador to Romania reported back that two members of Romanian Party’s Politburo, Apostol and Bodnaras, arranged to have a talk with our ambassador. They spoke for quite a long time, and their discussion was quite sincere and amicable. They first indicated that they were pleased with everything that we three comrades had discussed with their ambassador. They said that, after seeing the report of Romania’s ambassador to China, the Politburo had a meeting and had them represent the Politburo in discussions with our ambassador (Gheorghiu-Dej, on vacation on the shore of the Black Sea, expressly had them hurry back to Bucharest from the holiday camp). They agreed to our three suggestions and will take steps for them.


In the talks, they described the situation in which the Romanian Party’s Central Committee and Soviet revisionists in the last two months engaged ceaselessly in intense and sharp struggle. In these past two months, Soviet revisionists have said much about Romania being anti-Soviet and have put out many rumors. Because of this, the Romanian Party Central Committee in early June sent Stoica to the Soviet Union to look into it. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee brought up against Stoica a great many rumors, denouncing Romania as anti-Soviet. Stoica, acting under orders, only listened and did not speak, then returned home with what he had learned. In this period, Tito had just then concluded a tour of Northern Europe and was passing through Leningrad. Khrushchev then went and had three hours of talks with Tito. They discussed two issues. One was with regard to convening an international communist movement conference, an anti-Chinese, anti-leftist party issue. The other issue was to have Tito oppose Romania. At the time, through Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, Tito told Romania’s ambassador to the Soviet Union that he did not agree with Khrushchev’s view of Romania.


In order to clarify the overall situation of Tito’s conversation with Khrushchev, Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej asked for a meeting with Tito. Because of this, the two then met on the border for talks and spoke for three hours. This time Tito spoke in greater detail. With regard to Khrushchev wanting to convene a communist movement conference in opposition to China and leftist parties, Tito disagreed on going behind the backs of China’s Party and leftist parties to hold such a conference, saying that it was inappropriate.


For the present, what Tito told Gheorghiu-Dej is credible. Why do I say this? Because we recently received a letter from the CPSU (your Party Central Committees possibly also have received it), which wants to hold such a conference. Our letter to the CPSU Central Committee was delivered on 28 July, and the CPSU letter was sent on 30 July. They wrote this letter earlier. Once our letter was delivered to them, they right away made a telephone call and reciprocated by immediately sending their letter, dated 30 July.


In the letter of 30 July, they proposed convening in December a meeting of the 26-country drafting committee of 1960. In the letter they openly said that, as there are some countries not up to it, they would have to hold the meeting. Yugoslavia is not among these 26 parties. The letter also says that it is necessary to hold a meeting of the 81 parties of 1960. That meeting would also not have Yugoslavia’s participation. Because Yugoslavia does not agree to hold such a meeting, this time they do not want Yugoslavia. In the past there was no mention of 81 parties. Originally, they only said they needed to hold a meeting of the fraternal parties that participated in the 1957 and 1960 conferences. This time what they definitely proposed is 1960’s 81 parties.


Then there is Tito telling Gheorghiu-Dej that Khrushchev says how anti-Soviet Romania is and Tito saying that he does not believe it. On this issue, the distance between them is greater.


The Romanian side told us about their meeting.


Since this meeting, Moscow has continued to put out rumors about Romania being anti-Soviet, saying that Romania wants to recover Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and so on. The Romanian side's Party, grasping that this situation could not continue, sent Comrade Maurer at the head of a Politburo delegation, which on 6 July went to the Soviet Union for talks. Comrade Bodnaras was also a member of the delegation. On the Soviet side was Mikoyan, Podgorny, Andropov, and Kosygin. The Soviet side believed that the Romanians would talk first, but the Romanians first called on them to speak, asking the Soviet Union what was their dissatisfaction with them. As a result, the Soviet side spoke of a bunch of rumors. These talks went on a long time; almost all the issues were laid on the table (we will send you a summary of the situation). They kept talking about the Soviet-Romanian joint ventures. The Romanian side said that all the joint ventures were unfair and such. At the same time they mentioned that the Soviets had intelligence organizations in Romania that to the present still had not been eliminated. (The Soviet Union also runs joint ventures in our country and also has intelligence organizations. He asked the Vietnamese ambassador: Could it be that there are no joint ventures in your country? The Vietnamese ambassador replied: There are.) The Romanian side also brought up the Soviet Union’s always saying that it was the Soviet Union that liberated Romania, completely ignoring the Romanian people’s armed struggle for liberation.  When speaking of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Romanian side said, the Romanian people knew how these two areas were taken by the Soviet Union, but we are not going to raise the issue at present in order to avoid giving rise to nationalist sentiment. The Romanian side also said of this issue that it is not the Romanian side that has spoken of it, but Soviet leaders themselves who have mentioned it. Such talk is rumor. Khrushchev previously said that if you want withdrawal, then hold a referendum. The Romanian side said how would we hold a referendum? Earlier you moved Romanians from there. How would we have a referendum? Originally there were three million persons there, of which two million were Romanians.


In regard to this talk of referendum, it was after a Romanian Party delegation visited China and Korea, on their return to Romania, that Khrushchev spoke to them of it.


The Romanian side said that at that time they were on their way back from China and Korea. The Soviet Union suddenly proposed: If you want these two areas, then hold a referendum.


The Soviet side subsequently disavowed it, saying that what Khrushchev said at the time would cause another problem. The Romanian side asked what the problem was. They replied that it is only because Comrade Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders say that the Soviet Union occupied territories of other countries that Khrushchev spoke this way. The Soviet side also said that in the records are details about it. In fact, Romania had taken the records, in which there were no such details. Particularly important was that the Romanian Party delegation had made its trip in March. At that time Comrade Mao Zedong did not talk at all about the issue of borders. It was in July that Comrade Mao Zedong spoke of it to members of the Japan Socialist Party. I raised the border issue in 1956 and 1957. When Soviet revisionists saw what Comrade Mao Zedong had said, they thought to frame us by planting stolen goods on us. Later the Romanian side asked Russian staff handling the records (they were quite experienced): How did you come to have such details in the records? A staff member replied, I recorded it according to the facts. There were no such details, but others changed it.


For several days, from early July until the middle of July, the two issues over which they argued most intensely were the CMEA and the international movement conference.


As I just said, Soviet revisionists want to take half of Romania and include it in an economic cooperation zone. The Soviet Union has had this idea for some time. In March last year, Khrushchev had written to the Danube River basin countries a letter to the effect that it wanted to establish an economic cooperation zone that would include Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Tito did not approve of it then. Romania, of course, also opposed it. So, Tito then sought out Romania to build together the Iron Gate Hydroelectric Power Station. Khrushchev is quite unhappy about this and from the start has wanted to wreck it. In fact, this is to hinder Khrushchev’s policy of encircling Romania.


The Soviet side asked the Romanian side why they went public with the argument over the CMEA, the Romanian side said that it was the Soviet side that first went public with it, so only then did the Romanian side go public with it. Moreover, the Romanian side also pointed out that Khrushchev earlier in a public speech criticized Romania for having nationalist tendencies.


In short, there has been unceasing debate on this issue. Another issue is that of holding an international movement conference. The Romanian side indicated that if China’s Party and other fraternal parties do not agree, then we cannot hold the conference, that we need to reach a consensus, and that we can only hold a conference when everyone agrees to hold one. The Soviet side rebuked the Romanian side for putting the Chinese and Soviet sides in a parallel position when it issued a statement and for not listening to the Soviet Union. That statement is not good enough, from our point of view, but the Soviet Union is still dissatisfied. Kosygin went so far as to threaten: You do not support the Soviet Union, but you know the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Romania and know what acting this way means. The Romanian side replied: We understand. You want to make us suffer. 


On the last day, Khrushchev met Maurer and invited his delegation to a meal. With regard to Khrushchev inviting them to a meal, we four parties all have experience with this: the beginning is chilly, later there is quarreling, and people part on bad terms.


After this meeting, as the Soviet revisionists were anxious to hold a meeting, in the end they could not bear it. They rushed Podgorny to the shore of the Black Sea to meet Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej (Comrade Peng Zhen interjected: They were very tense.).


After talking with Podgorny, several comrades of the Romanian Party Politburo held a meeting and on the same day sent Apostol and Bodnaras to Bucharest to see our ambassador.


Podgorny spoke only of a single issue, that of wanting Romania to participate in the meeting of the drafting committee and oppose us leftist parties. The Romanian side also was firm, retorting: The drafting committee is from 1960, and you want to hold it again. We need all the parties to talk it over well. In electing a committee, how can we use the one from 1960? With regard to the international movement conference, the Romania comrades said that if some do not participate, then we should not hold it.


Podgorny surely applied pressure, and Romania resolutely rejected it.


Podgorny began by threatening: we can also hold this meeting without you. Then, feeling he had been too fierce, he said: If you do not participate, we will regret it.


With regard to this application of pressure, several comrades of Romania’s Politburo held a meeting and discussed it (Maurer was in France). At the time, they received a report concerning my conversation with the Romanian ambassador to China. Then, they discussed the entire situation with our ambassador. We have already received a letter in return recording the conversation between the Romanian side and our ambassador. I have already read this record. The attitude of the two comrades of the Romanian Politburo was sincere and amicable, and they told us the main details about the course of the two fights.


As one can see from this talk, the Romanian Party is advancing in opposition to Khrushchev’s great-power chauvinism and national egoism and in opposition to Khrushchev’s pressure. Because of this, the proposal of the Albanian comrades is realistic.


In order to make our three fraternal parties and fraternal countries understand the whole situation, we are ready to extract the main contents of the talks we had three times with the Romanian comrades and the Romanian comrades had with us, and send them to you three comrade ambassadors to see. In addition, we would also send it separately to leading comrades of the three fraternal parties via our ambassadors. Comrades of the Romanian Party’s Central Committee also know that our four parties are not going to participate in that meeting. We all agree. No matter whether it is a plenary session or a drafting committee, none of us will participate. I have already told this to the Romanian ambassador.


Looking back at present, Romania has greatly raised the three issues we asked.


With regard to the first issue, they sent a cable saying that they understand that the Premier had better not go, because if the Premier went, the Soviet revisionists would be greatly shocked and imperialism would also sow dissension. Therefore, they hope that we send a party-government delegation led by a vice premier (a Politburo member), including trade personnel, general officers, and scientists.


We immediately sent a cable in response, agreeing to send such a first-class party-government delegation. We have not yet decided on the specific persons to send. At present some comrades in the Central Committee comrades envision Comrade Li Xiannian going, but the Central Committee still has not approved it. We will first tell the comrades. He handles finance, not military affairs. If Comrade Chen Yi were to go, he is a marshal, and the Soviet revisionists would feel even more nervous.


The Romanian side wants us to respond is this: If we agreed, they would invite all the socialist countries. There are some countries, if the parties of revisionist leaders do not go, they cannot blame Romania, because Romania will have invited them. If the leftists all go, then that would be a great support for Romania. If they have a choice, that would be no good, because they would not be able to learn from Poland and are in a different situation than that of Poland. We can learn from Poland, which has set a precedent. There are some to invite and some not to invite. The Romanian side also hopes that we understand that they want to invite a party-government delegation from Yugoslavia. It would be better not to hold an international conference. If it were for, say, National Day, one could invite them to come offer their congratulations. If we were to hold a meeting on National Day, would not Yugoslavia’s representative participate as well? (Albania’s Ambassador interjected: I went to Mongolia to participate in their National Day, and a delegation from Yugoslavia was also there. Zhou: At present it is hard to say how strong Mongolia is in comparison to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev is even worse than Tito, and his bad effect is even greater. Albania’s Ambassador: Khrushchev is the bandit chief.


The Romanian comrades also want us to try to persuade the Albanian comrades to go participate in their National Day, and they hope that we explain it to the Korean and Vietnamese comrades. They know that the Korean and Vietnamese comrades would easily go, because China would go, and our three countries are Asian countries. As Albania has the issue of Yugoslavia, I particularly hope that we can explain it to the Albanian comrades. They particularly proposed that, in future seating arrangements, Albania and Yugoslavia not be seated together and that China and the Soviet Union not be seated together. As we see it, we can all go, because this would support them in opposing Khrushchev’s revisionism. Of course, at present we still cannot see Romania’s leading group as leftist like us. But their general trend is to the left, not to the right. Through practical struggle, they will see things more clearly. This is the most important thing I wanted to discuss today.


I believe that once our cable is sent, they very quickly will issue invitations.


The reason is that the date is drawing near. The delegations that they will invite this time will not be many. Other than party-government delegations of fraternal countries, it is still not clear to us whether they will or will not invite other fraternal parties of capitalist countries. As for democratic countries, it would be better that they not invite them, because it would not occur to others that we would be willing to go.


If the leftist fraternal countries were to go, then the revisionist countries would be in a difficult position: to go or not to go. Moreover, they also could not think to do as they did in Warsaw, using Poland’s National Day to hold a small conference.


This time is not the Bucharest of four years ago. The situation’s appearance has changed enormously.


This is a major issue. Please report it to your party and government.


Not long after that will be the fifteenth anniversary of our National Day. We must choose to invite leftist countries, leftist parties, leftist organizations, and leftist elements to participate in our National Day. When I was in Pyongyang, Premier Kim said to me: Afterwards we had better handle it. Poland started it. We will hold a party conference in the future, and we can choose whom to invite.


This matter conforms to our way of doing things. He first takes a step, and we then take a step. He takes a step, and we follow with a step. He strikes first, and we then strike.


With regard to the issues of economic and trade development and military aid, they said that they would send people later for talks, and they thanked us for our kindness, saying that they understood the difficulties.


In this matter first we must give credit to the proposal of the Albanian Labor Party. It is you who pushed us forward.


Please, Comrade Ambassador Nase, convey our thanks to Comrade Hoxha, Comrade Shehu, and other Albanian leading comrades. (Albania's Ambassador: This is our common struggle.)


With regard to the issue of Romania, I spoke in general terms about it in Hanoi, and much more in Pyongyang. Today I have spoken more comprehensively. (Comrade Peng Zhen: When the Premier was in Hanoi, he still had not grasped much about the situation, so there was not detailed discussion.)


Today what I want to discuss is this.


When Premier Kim passes through our country on his visit to Indonesia, I can still talk with him again.


When Comrade Le Duan returns from Korea (Comrade Le Duan did not publicly go to Korea), in the same way we can talk in detail.


Now, it is you (speaking to the Albanian ambassador) who is so far away, so there is a geographic difficulty. I hope that you have a responsible comrade to lead a delegation to Romania. This way, Comrade Li Xiannian can talk with him.


(Comrade Peng Zhen interjects: Another Bucharest conference!)


Comrade Ambassadors, do you have any views?


Albanian Ambassador: I thank Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Peng Zhen for their valuable presentations to us. The positions of our two parties are completely identical. I personally think that Comrade Zhou Enlai’s assessment is correct. Regarding the talks between our comrade ambassador in Romania and Gheorghiu-Dej, I have already said to comrades of the International Liaison Department that we still have not received word of it. Once we do, we will immediately tell the International Liaison Department. I think the message could come on the seventh this month. In regard to the situation about which Comrade Zhou Enlai spoke today, although the materials will be sent to us later, I will immediately give a report to the Party Central Committee.


I will put particular emphasis on reporting the issue of sending a party-government delegation to participate in Romania’s National Day. Again, I express my gratitude.


(Zhou: You pushed us forward. As Comrade Ambassador Nase says, this is our common struggle.) 


Korean Ambassador: I will report immediately to the Central Committee what Comrade Zhou Enlai has said. I thank Comrade Zhou Enlai for talking with us at such length when so fully occupied.


(Zhou: A common struggle. As I see it, the Romanian comrades are even busier than us, and even more nervous. Albania, too, is busier than us, and at present it is has become a bit better. Albanian Ambassador: There is no need to worry.)


Vietnamese Ambassador: What Comrade Zhou Enlai has said today is what he has discussed somewhat in the past with Chairman Ho.


But with the greatest urgency I will immediately report to Hanoi and ask for the sending of a delegation to participate in Romania’s National Day. The Romanian Party and people are under siege, as our situation is also one being under siege. (Zhou: You are in another kind of situation.) Perhaps Comrade Zhou Enlai already knows about this situation: the Soviet Union does not give us any of this year’s order for military equipment. At present they speak by daily broadcasts of the greatness of the Soviet Union’s contribution. To a certain extent, they want to attack us.


(Zhou: They want money, want you to repay debts. You then stand up to them. In the event things are no good, we will help you. They are total gangsters. Albanian ambassador: They are bandits!)


CC: Politburo Standing Committee, Secretariat each comrade, [Dong] Biwu, Chen Yi, He Long, [Nie] Rongzhen, [Chen] Boda, Confidential Affairs Office,


Office of Foreign Affairs (1), Central Propaganda Department (1), International Liaison Department (5), Investigation Department (1), Military Intelligence Department (1), Ministry of National Defense (3)


Ministry of Foreign Trade (1), Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (1) [Foreign] Ministry leaders, General Office (3), Soviet and East European Affairs Department (2), 2nd Asian Affairs Department, Embassies, 4 file copies, 57 copies printed in total


(Soviet and East European Affairs file copy)


Received on 5 August 1964                        Submitted for printing on 5 August 1964


General Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs                        Printed and distributed on 6 August 1964





The meeting was among leaders from China, Vietnam, North Korea and Albania in 1964. They discussed Soviet-Romanian relations and plans to support Romania.

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PRC FMA 109-03909-08, 47-64. Translated by Stephen Mercado.


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