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June 5, 1964

Conversations between Romanian Leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Chinese Ambassador Liu Fang, Referring to Bilateral Relations and the Soviet-Chinese Ideological Conflict Snagov, 5 June 1964 (excerpts)

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

Note Regarding Conversations between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the RWP CC, President of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian P. R., and Liu Fang, Ambassador of the Chinese P. R. in Bucharest, Referring to Bilateral Relations and the Soviet-Chinese Ideological Conflict


Snagov, 5 June 1964








Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: Recently, in the international and especially the Western press, various speculations have been made regarding our country, on the theme of the development of so-called massive anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev campaigns. Where they have gotten this I do not know. Certainly, something has transpired – people are people, they raise problems, they think, and sometimes they even think aloud. Maybe they also have an espionage network collecting intelligence.


It is true that in the center of the debate in the working meetings stood the problem of relations between workers and communist parties, between socialist countries, and the fundamental principles of all categories of relations between socialist countries.


It is easy to understand that great attention was accorded the transgression of fundamental principles that must or should form the basis of relations between workers and communist parties and between socialist countries.


During the working group numerous examples of transgression of these principles were brought forth, they exposed facts of which we, the leadership, were unaware. I refer to our relations with the CPSU and the USSR and with other parties and countries.


All of this was placed in the light of great power chauvinism with all clarity – the attitude that the strongest have rights over the small and weak. Numerous examples concerning the relations of the USSR with other socialist countries were brought up. The factors which determine some socialist countries to follow Comrade Khrushchev’s conducting baton were analyzed. Very many cases of manifest illegalities, of undermining the friendship between the Romanian and Soviet peoples by damaging our interests and those of other countries were examined. Our activists, who were confronted with these deeds, brought some unbelievable things to our attention.


Ambassador Liu Fang: About what things are we talking?


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: Calls addressed to the people to rise up against the political line of our party, of questioning the justice of our party’s political line.


They did not find normal information about the situation in our country satisfying, [received] from our party, transmitted during delegation exchanges. They were speaking of equality of rights, of non-interference in internal affairs, while, on the contrary, they organized intelligence activity targeting us without our knowledge and over the head of our party leadership; seeking to discover things which they thought that we were hiding from them. This constitutes an expression of contempt towards us, and towards the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, it constitutes an expression of inequality, conforming to which the largest and strongest claim rights over the smallest and weakest.


In the course of the debate over the plenary documents their duplicitous policy clearly emerged.


We have proven with facts the unequal manner of treatment in the economic domain. They pretend that they only help others, that they are the ones that help the entire world, that they are just some good people with full pockets from which they give the poor something.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: And for that they claim they are owed gratitude!


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: Referring to us, they put the problem this way: “What, aren’t you ashamed standing up against the proposals of Comrade Khrushchev, you [are] shameless?! He only makes good proposals, in your interest, and you do not agree! And on top of that, you even get angry!”


Ambassador Liu Fang: That’s what they said to us, too, that we help you with everything; however, we paid, with the respective interest and with the arms used in the Korean War.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: They call that “internationalism” while we are the “nationalists,” we suffer from “national narrow-mindedness,” that we haven’t evolved to the level of an “excellent communist”! Why? Because we do not want to hand over our natural gas, crude oil and other raw materials to them. They can hardly wait to get their hands on these resources. They look at them like some hungry wolves. If we would let them, they would drain our resources dry – grain, corn, natural gas, crude oil, everything we have of value – in several years.


Excuse me for using the expression “hungry wolves,” which is more appropriately applied to the capitalists. But what is to be done, if no difference can be made between the capitalist wolves and these so-called comrades.


They are the “internationalists” because they desire all of our resources – for free, if they could – while we should applaud and embrace them.


We truly have become “nationalists” because we do not want to give them what they desire. Look, for example, Romania occupies the last place among the socialist countries, the members of the CMEA, in regard to the production of electric energy per capita and with all of that we furnish electric energy to Bulgaria. However, Comrade Zhivkov, who is an “excellent communist,” wants more.


Raising the issue of the complex use of the hydraulic forces of the Danube, they want to drive us from the Danube. But how, Comrade Khrushchev, can you divide up a certain territory that belongs to another country? What, you were born with these rights and others only with the right to submit? You are the aristocrat and I the servant, who must submit to you?


Just so you can see what manners they have in their relations!


They set their eye on certain territories of our country; they had big plans in the light of the theory of interstate industrial complexes.


Ambassador Liu Fang: Do you mean Moldavia?


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: No, Moldavia is another problem. The industrial complexes presuppose the removal of territory from under the jurisdiction of the respective country and incorporating it into industrial regions [rayons]. Let’s say, for example, that they would take a large piece of the territory of China and a piece of Soviet territory, they connect them and form an industrial complex region.


If one raises the issue of Tsarist Russia having taken from China a territory of 1.5 million square kilometers, and that the P. R. China requested the return of this territory, such a thing would mean “nationalism,” while the industrial complex regions mean “internationalism.”


The formula of the industrial regions pretends to be Marxist but it does not differ from the pretentions of Peter the Great to extend his borders.  


These are not merely abstract desires.


Certainly, they did not publish material regarding the industrial regions in their daily press, however, they assigned scientists to make plans for the regionalization of our country’s territory. This is an action for the dismemberment of states, for their dissolution long before they have reached the stage of the dissolution of states as foreseen by Engels. Here we are talking about the dissolution of a state through administrative measures in the name of proletarian internationalism, of the interests of world socialist system, of the interests of socialism and communism and, finally, of the dissolution of peoples as a nation.


Look, for example, how far things have evolved on this issue: a journal of Moscow University published a material drawn up by specialists regarding the creation of an industrial complex on the lower course of the Danube. Conforming to the maps annexed to the material, this region comprises a large part of the territory of Romania, a part of the territory of Bulgaria, and a little piece of the territory of the USSR. The material was drawn up for the use of Comrade Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. Exactly on the basis of this material, in 1962 Comrade Khrushchev raised for discussion the problems regarding industrial complexes, the appearance of international property, the plan etc., however, we did not know what he wanted at the time. Now, publishing this material helped to clarify to us what this was about. The foreseen region has a surface area of 150 thousand square kilometers and a population of 12 million. To it, Romania would contribute 42% of the country’s surface area, with 48% of the country’s population, 48% of its industrial production, 58.5% of its grain production and 60% of the country’s corn production.


Only two or three regions of this type and Romania would disappear in the name of proletarian internationalism.


One sees that they are well documented concerning the riches of our country, which when they are enumerated made even Hitler’s mouth water. Here is located the greatest wealth of our country and they speak as though this territory is on the moon! They discuss, in this material, in detail about existing objectives, of the great perspectives of this region, of its great importance for “the community of socialist countries, members of the CMEA,” but they say not a word about Romania, about who created this wealth with the sweat of their work, not a word about the Romanian people. The authors use in place of the term “peoples” the term “international labor forces.”


They did not reveal this plan publicly; now we will publish it in the journals Economic Life [Viaţa Economică] and The World [Lumea], together with our response which is under preparation. We are publishing this material in order to give our people the possibility of seeing what desires our brothers have.


Thus, we are facing a plan for the dismemberment of Romania, of dissolving the state and the nation. This is no longer a simple problem of interfering in domestic affairs.


It is true that the authors of the material do not say who would lead this region, but probably they foresee a Soviet, a Romanian and a Bulgarian.


Our decision to publish this material, together with our response, was taken on the basis of the following argument: why should only we, the leadership, know of this issue; the people should know, the world should know what internationalism means and what nationalism means.


See how just was the appreciation of Mao Zedong, Li Shaoqi and other Chinese leaders when they said that the Soviet comrades were manifesting tendencies of political, economic and military domination, and then, when they do not succeed in this regard, they try and swallow you piece by piece.


We are conscious of the fact that, publishing this material, which is spread in the libraries of the Soviet Union with the aim of preparing the necessary cadre for the leadership of these economic complexes, they will scream that we have published the work of some professors, about whose activity the leadership of the CPSU did not know. However this is a concrete plan, written by them and as such they cannot accuse us of provocations. We know that, just like with us, their professors are also led by the party and act according to party directives. If they say to us that this material was not published in Pravda and Izvestia, under the form of a program, we will permit ourselves to ask: why not?


We will publish this material in the abovementioned journals, with large print runs, so the world will know about it.


If they should ask why we published this material, we could respond: We don’t know, we do not occupy ourselves with the work of some university professors, who found this material interesting and published it.


In a word, we will take a very strong position on this issue.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: On 23 April 1963, at “Lomonosov” [Moscow State] University, a lecture was given on these issues about which, however, we were not informed. Also, however, we received here the letter of 9 March from Comrade Khrushchev regarding the problem of the complex exploitation of the energy resources of the Danube. We thus met with this notion just at the moment when we were preparing to conclude the Accord with Yugoslavia on the construction of the Iron Gates [Hydroelectric Plant]. We rejected the proposals of Comrade Khrushchev contained in that letter and, at the same time, we explained our point of view. The respective proposals were rejected also by Yugoslavia. We did not know at the time that those proposals were based on an entire plan. Now we find that this Valev, a Bulgarian by origin, who was here in our country with a group of students from the faculty that he leads within the Academy, made a study on this occasion and then, in April 1963, drew up the work we are speaking about.


The following question arises: why [did they do so], when the CPSU already knew the point of view of the RWP – its disagreement with the organization of such forms of collaboration, clearly expressed in the RWP CC letter of response and by our position in the CMEA[?]




Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: In July 1963, Comrade Khrushchev suggested that we should not enter into a polemic. He made an appeal to us to leave open a line of retreat, while we considered as our success the fact that we forced him to back away. Because of that we decided not to attack him.


At the working groups within the party, the tendencies of interfering in our internal affairs, the mobilization of the party against any sort of interference, including against the agent networks which they had in our country, were the center of attention.


Comrade Khrushchev trusts us, but, with all of that, he wants to have his men in our country, in our party. He has numerous personnel occupied with this and in addition he tries to recruit military personnel, civilians, etc., who should work for them.


In Moscow they follow our diplomats just as they do the imperialists, and they have installed listening devices in the dwelling of our military representative to the Warsaw Pact. And all of this is done in the name of proletarian internationalism!


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: The question arises: why, knowing our disposition, did they publish, one year later, this material nevertheless?  This shows that in the conception of the Soviet leaders there persist tendencies towards political, economic and military domination.


It is presumed that this [industrial] region will be bordered by other similar regions.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: I regret that I did not have this material when the party was working on our Declaration [of 23 April 1964].


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: The material was published after the appearance of our Declaration.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: This material comes in confirmation of an entire collection of materials that expose the tendencies of political and economic domination.


We will not miss this occasion; we will work on this material as well. Publishing it along with our response, we will draw attention to those parts of our Declaration that expose the tendencies of which we are speaking.


Certainly, the publication of this material together with our response will provoke waves abroad as well. However, at present we have no other recourse except to undertake the diplomacy of placing our cards on the table.


In our response we will take a strong position, just as we did regarding the book of the economist W. Kunst of the German DR [Democratic Republic]. That economist recently wrote a book about the principles of international collaboration between socialist countries, members of the CMEA, which was sent to the editors of our journal Economic Life for review. The book contains things with which we are not in agreement and this we said in the recent review published in the number of this review from 5 June 1964.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: Up until not long ago, the Soviet comrades had five “Moscow Speaking” broadcasts per week. Recently, we reduced the “Moscow Speaking” broadcasts from five to two per week, while we increased our broadcasts for the Soviet Union from once to twice a week.[1] After that, that is, after the publication of our Declaration, the Soviet comrades lengthened their broadcasts in the Romanian language by 30 minutes, through which they seek to influence our listeners.


Within the framework of these Romanian language broadcasts, on 30 May of this year, they transmitted an offensive and denatured commentary referring to the CMEA issues raised in our Declaration.  We intend to respond to this commentary the same way.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: In this commentary it is insinuated that we are not enthusiastic supporters of economic collaboration within the CMEA and that we go to the capitalists to buy cars, installations and to obtain credit.


We have only taken commercial credit. However, the Soviet Union, as Comrade Khrushchev said, takes credit even from the devil. And why do they have the monopoly of credits from the capitalist world? Others are not permitted because they will be infected with capitalism? We do not have the right to have relations with England, France, Italy, Japan; countries with which they have relations? We sent a delegation to the USA not in order to sell socialism and buy capitalism. We make commerce – we sell, we buy. What do they have against us? Why do they criticize us? Do you want us to ask permission from you? Why? Are we children? This is the sense in which we will respond also in Romanian on our [domestic] radio stations to the abovementioned commentary. We will show our population what is our opinion in this regard. They seek to influence our population [against us]; they are nothing but adventurers.


It is true that the work on the documents of our plenum centered on the issues of political and economic relations, on aspects of interference in our internal affairs. On this occasion great power chauvinism was unmasked. The international press talks of an anti-Soviet campaign in Romania, however, it was nothing of the sort. We cultivate friendship with the Soviet people, but we are not in accord on many issues with the Soviet leadership, which conducts a policy of duplicity. We have unmasked a series of unjust tendencies of the Soviet leadership and certainly the name of Comrade Khrushchev came up in the process, even though we drew attention to the fact that a personal character should not be given to these issues. However, there were so many examples brought up that it was inevitable that we were not speaking about the person of Comrade Khrushchev.


Certainly, however, people are people and they will talk, and the Western press hearing this, interpreted it as an anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev campaign in Romania. During the working group we also discussed issues of international politics, the manner in which we are placed before fait accompli. Such an example was the crisis in the Caribbean Sea. We did know about the sending of missiles to Cuba and in this regard we sent Comrade Khrushchev a very strong letter.


What happened in Cuba? It was enough for Kennedy to implement a blockade around this country and the missiles were withdrawn, and after that they bragged that they had saved Cuba. We had to tell the party what Comrade Khrushchev had done regarding this problem. When Castro was in the Soviet Union, Comrade Khrushchev paraded him about and made him a hero of the Soviet Union. They also made Kádár, Ulbricht and Nasser heroes of the Soviet Union. Maybe they will also make [Iraqi President] Aref one because he hung communists.


They wanted to give Dej something as well.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: When we were at Gagra, Comrade Khrushchev took us aside and proposed to us to accord Comrade Dej the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union.” We told him that we did not agree to it.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: We said that we understand this to be a gesture to the RWP and towards the Romanian people and not just to Dej. We did tell him, however, that we would receive only the “Lenin” order, without the title of hero of the Soviet Union, [as] the order is similar to our “Star of the P. R. Romania”.


On the occasion of Comrade Khrushchev’s 70th Birthday, we gave him the “Star of the P. R. Romania,” but we had many discussions over whether or not to offer it to him. It was not an easy problem.


The manner in which the celebration was organized made it a circus. They said that Comrade Khrushchev does not proceed as Stalin did because the CPSU Politburo did not take a decision regarding his holiday. However, everything was organized behind the scenes. He called Comrade Ulbricht and probably told him: I went to your birthday and I gave you the title of hero of the Soviet Union. What are you giving me? With Comrade Kádár he did the same. He proceeded otherwise with Comrade Gomułka, he brought him at the head of a Party and government delegation and things worked out such that he will be in Moscow on 17 April.


With us, Comrade Khrushchev sent a worker from the CPSU apparat to test the waters. This man said that the first secretaries of the friendly communist and workers parties would come to Moscow on 17 April, although there was no formal decision taken in this regard. He asked us what we would do, so as not to place ourselves in a delicate situation if the others went and we did not.


Do you hear? So that we would not be placed in an awkward situation?!


We thought about it and decided to send Comrades Gheorghe Maurer and Chivu Stoica to Moscow to accord Comrade Khrushchev the order of the “Star of the P. R. Romania.” Writing up the motive for which we accorded him the order, we thought much about the formulation of the merit that we accorded him.


Comrade Maurer was instructed not to say anything beyond the congratulations that he would give when he conferred the order.


During the banquet, the first to speak was Comrade Gomułka, who described Comrade Khrushchev as the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our times.


After Comrade Gomułka, they wanted Comrade Maurer to speak. Comrade Maurer responded that he did not ask to speak, and when his hosts insisted, Comrade Maurer said: “I do not speak while I’m eating.”


In continuation, Comrade Zhivkov spoke. They also made [Spanish revolutionary and old Cominternist] Dolores Ibarruri speak, however, she did so with some difficulty.


And they do not practice the cult of personality! And they are against Stalin’s cult of personality!


Our delegation in the USA concluded their discussions. Despite the illusions that are made about them, we sought to investigate the possibility of buying certain industrial installations from the USA. Our actions were supported by the financial and business circles, interested in developing East-West relations. During the negotiations, we did not obtain the Most Favored Nation Clause and we cannot buy because the customs taxes on our exports to the USA, being too great, do not allow us to sell Romanian goods in the USA. We consider that the results of the negotiations conform to our appreciations made before the departure of the delegation to the USA. Our delegation presented the American side with a list of equipment that interests us, in which figure nuclear-electric plants and other installations that are not found in other Western countries much less in socialist countries, as well as a synthetic rubber factory, installations for the catalytic cracking of petroleum etc. All comes to about 350 million US dollars. The discussions were fair. Our delegation was formed of old communists, people with experience, engineers.


After the departure of our delegation to the USA a series of speculations regarding this mission began to appear and, according to our knowledge, these speculations were launched by the circles of Soviet intelligence. A short while after our delegation arrived in the US, the Soviet comrades also sent their own delegation headed by Novikov but our comrades had instructions to inform them of absolutely nothing.


In order to counteract the influence of the sending of our delegation to the USA, we used the invitation that Comrade Podgorny gave us on the occasion of his visit in Romania and we decided to send Comrade Chivu Stoica to the Soviet Union at the head of a delegation for an exchange of experience. Because in the Soviet Union many appreciations are spread about Romania, Soviet citizens cannot judge us except by our actions, and they can see that Romania sent a party delegation to study the Soviet experience in the domain of industry.


Our delegation in the Soviet Union was instructed to say to the Soviet comrades from the start that if meetings are organized as part of the anti-Chinese campaign then the delegation will take a position based on our Declaration. In the initial program made for our delegation many meetings at enterprises were included, however, after what our delegation said, they were cancelled. In exchange, the Soviet journalists that accompanied our delegation took only some words of our discussions with workers, in which they made [favorable] appreciations of the USSR and of the Soviet people, and wrote reports which give the impression that Romania fully supports the position of the CPSU. This, however, is not true.


The visit of the delegation in the USSR developed as we had initially foreseen.


Going by car to the airport, Comrade Podgorny showed Comrade Chivu Stoica the building which is being built for the CMEA, and made mention that “when you will be here you will have another attitude towards the CMEA.” Comrade Chivu Stoica responded that we have a new Embassy in Moscow.


Comrade Podgorny also said to Comrade Chivu Stoica that “between us there are no problems,” to which Comrade Chivu Stoica responded that “you know very well that there are very serious differences of opinion.”


They still hope that they will be able to bring us to our knees, however they delude themselves. We stand firm; categorically defending our positions.


Certainly, being the adventurers that they are, they are capable of anything; they can exercise pressures, make threats, etc. But we are also decided to reject any sort of pressure.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: We do not even aspire to the four possibilities of Comrade Mao Zedong, but three of them could be valid for us as well.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: They cannot take military action against us for that would make them a laughing stock in the world. With all of that, they have increased their military effectives on the border of our country. They deployed a new battalion just last week to the north of our country.


Cde. Emil Bodnaras: The Soviets have had in the past an effective strength of 2.5 soldiers per kilometer on our frontier; now they have reached 11 soldiers per kilometer at the frontier. They have strengthened guards in general and the control at frontier crossings in particular.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: We do not do this nor will we do it. We do not have people engaged in [hostile] intelligence work in any socialist country; in contrast, they have an intelligence network operating in our country. Because of that we were compelled to draw up a special material for increasing vigilance in the party and among the population.


We cannot say that they have crazy thoughts, but they are capable of very much indeed. Just as they took northern Bucovina as recompense so, too, they could take all of Romania.


They had a plan regarding the Carpathians, they wanted to juggle Transylvania, which in the armistice concluded in 1944 they said would be entirely or in greatest part Romanian. It is true that an ethnic Hungarian population of 1.5 million lives in Transylvania, of which 600,000 are in a compact group in the Mures Hungarian Autonomous Region in the center of our country.[2] This population was brought by the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the aim of dominating the territory of a Romanian population that would not submit.


It is possible that nationalist Hungarians [in Hungary] still desire Transylvania. Their pretentions would collapse if a referendum were organized; however, they do not dare raise the issue openly. The ethnic Hungarian population in Transylvania works and lives in friendship with the ethnic Romanian people. However, we do not exclude the possibility that Comrade Khrushchev would have his Hungarian comrades raise the issue of Transylvania, so that he could then appear as arbiter. If this is done then we will raise the problem of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina. On the other hand, Comrade Khrushchev already raised this issue during the visit of our delegation at Gagra.


Do you know where the ethnic Romanian population from Bessarabia was relocated? To Kazakhstan. We discovered this in a completely accidental manner. Our former ambassador in Moscow, Comrade Dalea, during a visit that he made to Kazakhstan, found himself completely surrounded by ethnic Romanians who asked him to bring them home. At present ethnic Romanian functionaries in Bessarabia are moved to the interior of the Soviet Union, and Russian functionaries are brought in their place.




Ambassador Liu Fang: In order to clarify some issues, I would like to know what Comrade Khrushchev said to Comrade Chivu Stoica; did he not refer to the so-called anti-Soviet campaign in Romania?


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: He did not refer to it. He left the impression that he was another man. He tried to speak about the insinuations of our delegation in the USA, however he was very courteous. We can, however, give you the note of the conversation between Comrade Chivu Stoica and Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Chivu Stoica told him that bringing capitalist cars would not bring capitalism, and Comrade Khrushchev affirmed that “very well, we will also receive from you those things that they will not give to us.”


Ambassador Liu Fang: In connection with the activity of the CMEA, is there a high level meeting planned in the near future?


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: Apart from the working meetings of different commissions, there are no other planned meetings.


Ambassador Liu Fang: Thus it is not a question of problems of principle where pressure would be exercised.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: At the last meeting of the Executive Committee there was a clash between the secretary of the committee and our deputy permanent representative; they wanted to take under their control all foreign trade. They tried to exercise pressure; they were extremely rude. Our deputy representative responded with dignity, and as a result, the secretary of the committee tried to blame it all on the cognac. We have rejected all attempts. On the other hand, we are alone in opposition within the CMEA. We are one side, but the other side is formed of all the other countries. It is not easy. We have the impression that they will ask us if we want to collaborate with the CMEA any longer. We will answer in the affirmative, but not as they would like. Their only alternative is to throw us out of the CMEA.


Ambassador Liu Fang: What measures could Khrushchev take against Romania?


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: They could hit us along economic lines, but we are prepared for that. We have taken a series of measures to diversify our economic relations.




Ambassador Liu Fang: We have resolved many problems in which we had depended on the Soviets, among which was also the problem of military spare parts.


Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: They do not take us to their heart; they consider us as an unsure and capricious ally because we express our opinion, and we do not swallow all of theirs. In the Political Consultative Committee we do not accept whatever [Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal] Grechko desires. There are many things unclear and unjust in the relations between us, but step by step, we will clarify and replace them. We must proceed in such a manner so as not to give them cause to scream.


What happened with Albania? They threw it out of the Warsaw Pact and when others try to express their opinion they scream.


Last year, at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee the acceptance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact was written into the order of the day. We were against it, evaluating this as a provocation addressed towards China. We combated all arguments for it and in the end we left aside the legal arguments and asked how we would respond if China asked us, and they would have every right to ask us, why Mongolia was joining the Warsaw Pact? Would not the entrance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact be interpreted as a rock thrown through the window of the Chinese comrades? We explained that on this issue we could respond however we liked to the capitalists; but how do we respond to China? I requested that they cut this issue from the agenda because we considered it inappropriate. We told all of this to Comrade Gromyko, adding that we would have liked to have said it to Comrade Khrushchev. We also wanted to tell Comrade Khrushchev that he should ask the Chinese comrades what they thought about it. We expressed our opinion that if the issue was not stricken from the agenda, at least discussion of it should be postponed. Comrade Gromyko asked us until when it should be postponed. I responded to him that I could not say, and even that maybe it was unnecessary altogether, that in any case it is not clear to us why there is a need for Mongolia to join the Warsaw Pact. The next day, Comrade Khrushchev said that this problem would be stricken from the agenda.


Please bear in mind that these issues are only for your information. When the time comes, when internationalism, nationalism, greater power chauvinism, etc. will be discussed, we will not be afraid to speak openly about these issues.




[1] The Romanians were apparently jamming the other Soviet broadcasts beginning in 1964. They had ended their jamming of Western broadcasts, especially Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe but also the BBC and Deutsche Welle, in July 1963.

[2] According to Romanian census figures there were about 1.5 million ethnic Hungarians in all of Romania at this time, with just slightly less than one million in Transylvania and some 600,000 concentrated in the area mentioned by Gheorghiu-Dej. The ethnic Romanian population in Transylvania was between 6 and 7 million.

In excerpts from their conversation, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Romanian Workers Party and Liu Fang, Chinese Ambassador to Romania, discuss the increasing tension between both their countries and the Soviet Union. Gheorghiu-Dej also explains his objections to the attempted admission of Mongolia to the Warsaw Pact. Romanian military leader Emil Bodnăraş is also present.

Document Information


ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Secţia Relaţii Externe – China, dosar 5/1964, f. 28-53; Document 219 in Budura, Relaţiile Româno-Chineze (2005), pp. 463-483. Translated by Larry L. Watts.


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