Copy of the Report of the Embassy in Havana Ddated February 26, 1963; Subject: 'The Political Situation in Cuba'

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Copy 

of the report of the Embassy in Havana dated February 26, 1963.

Subject: The political situation in Cuba.

In the month since the departure of the last courier, i.e. since the middle of January 1963, there have been more signs that the emotions stirred up by the Caribbean crisis are subsiding, that they are beginning to think about what happened with a cooler head, they are beginning to understand them and draw the appropriate conclusions. You can see this in the press and on radio and television. They became rare and disappeared in recent times, and "extreme Cuban line" articles /I don't know what else to call it/ have been missing since the Revolution.

Among the middle functionaries working in different places, statements could be heard that were sometimes strongly veiled, sometimes quite openly, accepted the Soviet position on some problems of the Caribbean crisis, and rejected the official Cuban one.

In connection with this complex of issues, as well as with regard to the problem presented by the Chinese and Cuba's Latin American policy, there was no unity in the leadership of the ORI. Although this did not manifest itself in discussions at the ORI management meetings, it did manifest itself in the discussions between individual management members, which of course did not remain unaffected by the middle functionaries. The number of those who understood and accepted the Soviet position condemned China's behavior in other respects and began to criticize the policy related to Latin America slowly increased. Ramón Calcines spoke openly about this to me. Small signs such as a few face-to-face comments made to the Cuban ambassador in Pest, Quintin Pino, are noteworthy. Quintin Pino, who started from the right wing of the July 26th movement - not least under the influence of his stay in Hungary - considered one or another of Fidel Castro's statements to be debatable and was willing to debate them.

(p. 1)

For the Cuban top leaders and the masses of middle functionaries, the remaining and most pressing problem related to the crisis and its solution is the security of Cuba from a military point of view. I have reported on this several times. The essence of this was that, although the five points were emphasized, they talked about the desired and not received a guarantee from the USA, they always thought of the formal guarantee expected from the Soviet Union.

Alekseev told me that the time and events since the crisis slowly convinced Fidel Castro of the correctness of the Soviet position. He meets with Fidel Castro at least two or three times a week and, according to his impression, Castro understands and accepts much more than what he says in words. The facts convinced him that as a result of the resolution of the crisis, Cuba got a breather - although it is not clear how long this period, which allows for relatively calm construction, will last. He understood that all US politicians cannot be put in the same box and that with his statements and actions, Cuba must also contribute to suppressing the extreme Republican and military circles, currently strengthening Kennedy. Indeed, the meaningless angry statements strengthening Kennedy's opposition have disappeared from the leaders' speeches in the press and the radio.

Fidel Castro also understood that nobody, neither the USA nor the Soviet Union, wanted a nuclear war for Cuba. And the direct aggression launched with conventional weapons is hindered by the fact that the Soviet Union, which has a strong interest in many other parts of the world, can deal very painful and strong blows in the event of aggression against Cuba with conventional weapons. He understood that this could also be a decisive safety factor.

Fidel Castro's opinion regarding Cuba's Latin American policy has not changed / Blas Roca explained this opinion to me and I reported it last time./ This policy is a double-edged sword - Ambassador Alekseev said - we'll see what it brings.

Fidel Castro's explanation to the Soviet ambassador Alexeyev was that it would be completely inexplicable and incomprehensible to the Cubans - and also to the foreign countries - if he started talking about the complete acceptance of the Soviet position from one moment to the next. Soviet pressure, etc. would be considered a consequence. During the events, their evaluation will get to the point where the complete identity of Soviet and Cuban opinions will be logical and self-evident to everyone. The mere fact of his trip to the Soviet Union will be eloquent for the Cuban public.

Regarding the Cuban-Soviet relationship, Comrade Alekseev is of the opinion that now that the crisis and its effects have passed, it will be deeper, more grounded, and stronger than before last October. This primarily refers to Fidel Castro, however, when we think of Cuban leaders, it is primarily about him.

(p. 2)

The role of others in the exercise of power and the structure of politics is still insignificant compared to his. In addition to, or more correctly said after, maybe even more important, only RaúlCastro matters.

By the way, Raúl Castro recently made an essentially similar statement about Cuban-Soviet relations during a confidential conversation with the Czechoslovak ambassador.

Ramón Calcines - whose position I reported on last time - told me that since the beginning of February. He sees a significant change in the leadership of the ORI in the sense that the Cuban-Soviet misunderstanding is over for the majority. Cuban development. he looked at the fate of the Cuban party and socialism with great concern, now he is optimistic, trusting that things will be alright.

This was the situation when, on the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Army, Marshal Malinovsky made the well-known statements. The first public, almost meeting-like mass gathering of the new Cuban party, the Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista /PURS/, was announced for that very evening. We received an invitation in the afternoon, perhaps only then was it decided to invite the ambassadors of the socialist countries. /Everyone from Albania to Yugoslavia was invited!/ Towards the end of his speech, Fidel Castro explained the statements of Marshal Malinovsky. It was a huge ovation involving members of the party leadership and the government, leaders of social organizations and national institutions, e.g. editors-in-chief of the capital's newspapers. I think Marshal Malinovsky's statements were primarily motivated by political considerations related to the USA, but here in Cuba, understandably, they had a very big impact. They actually accelerate development.

All my information shows and Soviet Ambassador Alekseev has confirmed it that Chinese influence among the top leaders has completely and probably permanently disappeared. However, there are still a few people in the national leadership of ORI, or perhaps now PURS, and among the middle functionaries, there are quite a large number of people who are strongly influenced by what the Chinese say. It is not surprising, because they cannot remain without influence on the neophyte sect [neofita szektásra], the nationalists, the champions of the Latin American revolution and immediate armed struggle. During the last month, however, the friendly reception of the various Chinese delegations /or Albanians/ towards the Soviet delegations has completely ceased. Obviously, it will be a very long process, but it has started, which will solve this whole group of problems within the party that is being organized.

The organization of the new party is underway, and now this work has gained new momentum. However, its organization and perhaps its first congress, which will be held this year, does not mean that, if of course not in the masses, but at least in its top leaders, there

(p. 3)

will be communists, real Marxist-Leninist leaders. They started on this road, but the road will be long and probably not smooth. Reading Fidel Castro's speech, ­we must not only see that we imagined the first public gathering of members of the new communist party in a different way /about 5-6 thousand people took part/, but also that in the current state of development, there are so many new, positive and forward-looking things. I think that this speech reflects the current situation and helps further work to a great extent.

Alekseev's opinion is that the leaders and the party are still young, they have a long way to go before they really become communists. The Soviet Union, as well as him personally, managed to influence the international political arena and certain economic issues primarily through his relationship with Fidel Castro. It is gratifying that Comrade Khrushchev has a good understanding of Fidel Castro, the conditions in Cuba, and Fidel Castro also understands the Soviet Union and Comrade Khrushchev. It is unfortunate, however, that the experienced old communists, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and the others are all weak, unable to find the right voice and argue against Fidel Castro. They are not able to represent and convey the communist point of view, which is often so lacking, in economic, party political and domestic political issues in general. However, the Soviet Union or its representatives cannot argue about these issues, the Cuban communists should do so.

János Beck 

Ambassador

(p. 4)