Skip to content

May 13, 1989

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, with Report by Zaikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov and Kryuchkov

Proletarians of the World, Unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No P158/6
To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence the Afghan situation
1. To agree wtih considerations of com. Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)
2. For the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Committee on State Security [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary measures for realization of the proposals in the memorandum.

3. For the State commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the military-industrial questions, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR together with corresponding ministries and agencies to decide urgently on the possibility of an increase of delivery of R-17 missiles and their combat divisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of] up to 10-12 units per day and to take appropriate measures for that.


To point 6 of Protocol no. 158
Top Secret

On additional measures to influence
the Afghan situation

During the almost three months since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the armed forces of the Republic manage to oppose the opposition supported by Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia. However, the enemy, who realises that its plans to overthrow the government of Najibullah may be in danger, does everything to increase its military pressure. It focuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order to set up its "transitional government" and to lay seige to Kabul.


In view of preparations for a new massive assault on Jalalabad with a large involvement of the Pakistanis, all the way to the sending of Army formations camouflaged as "Malishi," we published a Declaration of the MFA USSR and undertook other measures of a preventive nature, including ones in covert channels.


Taking into account this development, it would be advisable to carry out a number of measures to bolster the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and to exert a constraining influence on the Afghan opposition and Pakistan.


1. Of special importance in the current situation is a constant display of powerful impact on the enemy by combat fire, its further intensification, the use of the most effective types of weaponry. In this regard, we should search for additional reserves to accelerate delivery of armaments and ammunitions into Afghanistan, particularly the armament like R-17 missiles, air-defense equipment, and others.


2. The question about conducting bombing raids by Soviet aviation from the territory of the USSR requires additional study.


3. We should continue demonstrative relocations of our aircraft from Soviet air-fields near the border with Afghanistan, having in mind that these relocations should be done without any camouflage so that they could be observed by the Pakistanis and the opposition. [We should] continue further the flights of the Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly at lower altitudes, with the aim of obtaining aero-photografic data about military concentrations of the enemy.


4. With regard to the idea of Najibullah about sending foreign volunteers to Afghanistan to render assistance to the government of the Republic in the repulsing of aggression, there is nothing to object to, if the Afghan friends do this kind of work with a number of countries, particularly Muslim ones.


5. It is decided that we will continue a constant political-diplomatic campaign with the aim of influencing [public opinion] on the Afghan issue in the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar as one can use the capabilities of India, the Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the Afghan theme will continue to be a focus in Soviet-American contacts. It is advisable to accept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to play a mediator's role between us and the Afghan opposition. We have in mind to take into account the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan in developing bilateral ties with this country.

L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. Yazov V. Kryuchkov

12 May 1989
no. 390/os

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, with report by Zaikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov, and Kryuchkov regarding measures to bolster the government of Afghanistan and to protect Najibullah’s government from overthrow

Associated People & Organizations

Associated Places

Associated Topics

Document Information


TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35; trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok


The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.

To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].

Original Uploaded Date





Record ID