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November 12, 1975

Cryptogram No 1982/IV from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Conversation with Ambassador Drezdenko on Romania

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation





Cryptogram No 1982/IV

from Bucharest, on Nov  12th, 1975




Com. Wojtasik in his telegram No 304, dated 122h this month informs:


From a conversation with Ambassador of the USSR, Drezdenko on [Ștefan] Andrei's visit in Moscow:


1/ Talks with Andrei were conducted by Katuszew. Andrei was also received by Ponomarev, Andrei relentlessly insisted on doubling trade in the years 1976-1980. This refers mainly to the increase in Soviet supplies of raw materials and unique technologies. Arguments used by Andrei are a specific form of pressure; he appealed to:

- example of other socialist countries - CMEA, which will double the trade volume with the SRR

-  thesis about the "balance" of  turnovers between the socialist and capitalist countries, suggesting that "Romania may be forced to violate this" balance "

He stressed the fact that they will not abandon plans of dynamic development, adopted during the 11th Congress.


Soviets agreed to expand cooperation, but there are certain difficulties as for doubling the turnover in trading, which include:
- Unwillingness of the Romanians to widen cooperation and specialization,
- Convergence of commodity assortment list in a mutual exchange,
- In general: an objective impossibility to fulfill  partner proposed requirements with regards to raw materials and technology.


However, Romanians concerns are carefully analyzed and taken into account as far as possible. Of course, a number of issues still need discussion and clarification. Soviets emphasize cooperation and specialization, they put forward concrete proposals in this regard. It is believed that by the end of this year, protocol to coordinate plans should be signed


2/ Katuszew tactfully remarked at Andrei that "in the international arena both countries not always walk hand in hand, quite often there are divergent actions – which brings satisfaction to the enemies." He pointed to specific, well-known examples - without requiring answers or responses from his interlocutor.  He noted that "we are strategically unanimous and compatible, but tactically it looks different – contra." In this context, the PRC policy issue: "a new situation that now goes not only for the Soviet-Chinese relations. China supports reactionary, bellicose forces  in the world, associated with  extremist circles of NATO, Germany, which are against the interests of all socialist countries and anti-imperialist forces. Therefore, the so-called "Romanian neutralism” is not completely understood.


Andrei invoked the resolution of  the RCP 9th Congress  in his response and the principle of "no interference in the internal affairs" and said that he would "inform N. Ceaușescu."


3/ Andrei gave Katuszew documents on the United Nations and disarmament. He expressed the view that "he does not think that they will enter the UNGA agenda, but will be the fabric of their delegates' speeches at the Assembly - representing the view of Romania."


Soviets judge such behavior as unsound and contrary to the reality, because after a very preliminary reading of these documents, Katuszew stated that:
- above all, they must be evaluated by specialists
- disarmament matters are presented with objectivity, marked by the lack of class approach. When it comes to the UN - a clear revision of the Charter.


He asked if the documents are to be the subject of consultation. Answer: No, they are presented in the mode of information. In conclusion, Katuszew stated that these documents will not receive the support of the USSR, that they do not contribute to the improvement of Romania's relations with the brotherly socialist countries, the intention of which is repeatedly expressed by Romania.

The interlocutor notes that despite all these negative remarks, Romanians pursued the course of action of these documents.


4/  Soviets evaluate Katuszew's earlier conversation with Ceausescu and those with Andrei, reported here, as generally appropriate and useful

They think that  dialogue should be conducted patiently - of course, on the basis of the principles. This is not without the influence and importance, although results are not immediately visible. Romania expressed satisfaction with the talks and expressed interest in continuation.  


5/ Romanians are seeking a meeting with Brezhnev –  they have intensified these efforts in recent times. Currently, Brezhnev's official visit to the SSR is out of question. However, a working meeting on the hunt, for example, in ​​the border area in the Carpathian Mountains is possible.

If such a meeting is to take place - probably no earlier than the spring of 1976.


6/ As for the summit meeting in Moscow: Romania still does not change their position on the concept of co-operation with the EEC and political - economic co-ordination - talks in progress. When it comes to party conferences - nothing remarkable.



Report on a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Drezdenko on Romanian politician [Ștefan] Andrei's visit to Moscow. Romania wanted increased trade with the Soviet Union.

Document Information


Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, D-I-R-0-24120-2-75, 1. Obtained and Translated by Adam Burakowski.


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