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January 28, 1972

Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6th Territorial Department, 'Cuba-Latin America-USA Relations in the Second Half of 1971'

This document was made possible with support from Blavatnik Family Foundation

[Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6th territorial department]

Havana, January 28, 1972

By courier, Secret

Cuba-Latin America-USA relations in the second half of 1971

Prepared by: Ota Jiroušek

 

The second half of 1971 can be described as the most important period so far in the normalization of Latin American relations with Cuba. If Fidel Castro's regime experienced serious political and economic setbacks at the end of the 1960s, we can legitimately ­speak of 1971 as the year of a dynamic start to apply a more realistic and tactical policy in all spheres. In particular, the second half of last year proved the success of the foreign offensive, which Cuba wants to gradually ­get out of its isolation, mainly towards the countries of Latin America. The end of Cuba's isolation on the Latin American continent practically began with the arrival of Salvador Allende to power in Chile and continued in the past period with intensive contacts at various levels ­with a number of other Latin American states. In the same way, many Latin American countries consulted among themselves about the possibility of Cuba's return to the community of Latin American states. Cuba managed to paralyze ­the economic boycott announced against it in 1964 and, above all, increased the volume of mutual trade with Chile and Peru.

Cuba was accepted at the initiative of Peru as the 95th member of the "Group 77", which consists of developing countries of three continents and whose goal is a coordinated joint action in defending their own economic interests. Cuba was accepted with the consent of all Latin American members of the "Group of 77", which drew the ire of the US, but in Latin America it was an indicator of Cuba's steadily improving relations with the countries of the continent.

[end p. 1]

In the mentioned period, the attacks of the most reactionary Latin American states against Cuba as a country that exports the revolution to the continent and financially, materially and organizationally helps the development of the guerilla movement in Latin America have also decreased substantially. The history of the last 10 years shows that the Cuban guerrilla model as the only way to take power has practically failed. The Cuban revolutionary leadership is aware of this, so they have changed ­their tactics while maintaining the strategy of giving material and human support to the progressive revolutionary movement.

For the first time in the history of revolutionary Cuba, official delegations from Latin America took part in the July 26 celebrations in Havana. The presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile Clodomiro Almeida, his speech, and the Chilean-Cuban communique ­signed at the end of his visit, demonstrated the interest in concrete cooperation.

Relations with Mexico, the only Latin American country that did not comply with the OAS resolution in 1964 and continued to maintain relations with Cuba, also improved significantly compared to some cooling in the first half of 1971. At the beginning of August, Mexico almost unexpectedly signed a new three-year air contract with Cuba, which meant the defeat of those Mexican right-wing forces, which made the renewal of the contract conditional on the extradition of the hijackers of 3 Mexican planes to Cuba. Mexico's interest in maintaining air connections with Cuba, in addition to the permanent advantage for the USA to always have a legal connection with Havana in reserve, has primarily a political background, because for the opportunistic Mexican government, given the pro-Cuban wave in Latin America, it would be unacceptable to even partially be considered a country that has no interest in improving relations with Cuba. Additionally, in late November, Mexico and Cuba signed an agreement on direct trade between the two countries in Havana; this is the first direct trade exchange in the 13 years of Fidel Castro's rule, as mutual trade took place through Canada and payments were made through Canadian banks.

Before the military coup at the end of August 1971, Bolivia was considered to be the second country after Chile to restore ­diplomatic relations with Cuba. The regime change caught Cuba by surprise. 

[end p. 2]

For a certain period (practically until Fidel Castro's visit to Chile) the interest of some Latin American countries towards the normalization of relations with Cuba was even reduced because Bolivia was a sort of coordinator of the joint strategy of several Latin American states on this issue.

Another disappointment for Cuba was that, despite official Cuban optimistic considerations about the almost certain victory of the "broad front" in the elections in Uruguay, and this at a time when this front had only existed for four months (see Fidel Castro's speech on 26/7//1971), there was a clear defeat of this left-wing ­grouping.

Mutual Cuban-Panamanian relations gradually improved. In the last two years, the exchange of athletes has also moved to political contacts, and in particular the visit of the Panamanian government delegation in December 1971 in Havana, which discussed the case of two pirate ships detained under the Panamanian flag (transporting Cuban counter-revolutionaries to Cuba) can be considered a manifestation of Panama's interest in normalizing ­relations with Cuba. Cuba appreciates the statement by Panamanian government officials who consider Cuba's exclusion from the inter-American system to be interference in Cuba's internal affairs, and the foreign minister's statement that his government is now studying the possibility of establishing relations with Cuba.

Ecuadorian President Jose Maria Velasco ­Ibarra called in August 1971 Cuba's exclusion from the OAS repugnant; he declared that it is necessary to end the blockade of Cuba and that he is a supporter of the idea            of the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system, just before Fidel Castro's visit to Chile he even said that "I personally would immediately restore relations with Cuba."

In recent months, a number of Venezuelan state ­leaders have also issued favorable statements regarding the revision of Cuba's exclusion from the OAS.

The visit of the Colombian parliamentary delegation to Cuba in October is also noteworthy, although on the other hand, the Cuban

[end p. 3]

press publishes with undisguised sympathy data on the increased activity of Colombian guerrillas. In mid-December 1971 in Washington, at a meeting of the permanent council of the OAS (Organization of American States), which has 23 members, at the initiative of Peru there was an attempt at the first official revision of the diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, announced in 1964. The OAS should approve, that each member state has the opportunity to decide for itself whether or not to restore relations with the Cuban government because, in the opposite situation, there could be a danger that the authority (resolution) of the OAS may be even more undermined than before. A practical example is Chile, which restored diplomatic relations with Cuba in November 1970 without worsening Chile's relations with other OAS member countries.

The Peruvian proposal is to be officially debated in January 1972 (under the chairmanship of the Chilean delegate) and despite the opposition of the USA, some Latin American countries do not hide the fact that they are seriously considering establishing relations with Cuba (Peru, Ecuador, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, possibly Panama).

So it is not at all about Cuba returning to the OAS, which in its current form it considers the United States Department of Colonies [ministerstvo kolonií Spojených států], but about removing the obstacles that prevent some Latin American states from establishing relations with Cuba. If the majority of OAS member countries do not understand this fact, future developments in Latin America and the ever-growing group of pro-Cuban ­states purposefully directed by Chile and Peru may exacerbate the situation in the OAS to such an extent that the official policy of this organization will gradually become a dead letter.

Since the beginning of last year, various press agencies have been deliberating the visit of F. Castro to Chile. Its implementation caused many people in Cuba to fear for the life of the irreplaceable leader of the Cuban revolution, while at the same time the nation realized that it was a unique opportunity to establish personal connections outside of Cuba with Latin America, and specifically with a country that in many ways it differs from Cuba,

[end p. 4]

but on fundamental issues – socialist orientation and anti-imperialist position – it and Cuba stand on the same platform. The visit to Chile took place shortly after the celebrations of the first anniversary of the new Chilean government, and Fidel Castro spent 25 days outside Cuban territory (from November 10 to December 5, 1971). Fidel Castro's trip to Chile, at the invitation of President Allende, was Castro's third trip to Latin America after the victory of the Cuban Revolution on January 2, 1959, and the first foreign trip after more than seven years of continuous stay in Cuba. (The last time he was outside Cuba at the beginning of 1964 in the USSR). Fidel Castro visited Caracas in early 1959, where he took part in events in honor of the 1st anniversary of the overthrow of the dictator Marcos Pérez Jimenez; in April of that year, he traveled through six countries in three weeks: USA, Canada, Trinidad-Tobago, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. He had the most important meeting in Sao Paolo with the then Brazilian president Kubitschek and in Buenos Aires, where he spoke at the meeting of the "Committee of 21" (the economic group of the OAS). Since then, he has only visited the United States and the Soviet Union.

An important circumstance that preceded Castro's trip to Latin America was that of Salvador Allende in August 1971 to Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, during which the Cuban question was also discussed.

Fidel Castro's visit to Chile is undoubtedly a milestone in the political development of Cuba and the whole of Latin America, where political forces are rapidly differentiating and where today there are two states with a left-socialist orientation, even though they represent two different experiences, two different realities. Fidel Castro arrives in Chile as an internationally recognized politician and revolutionary, whose speeches are based on a reasonable, sober analysis of revolutionary Cuba and, except for the question of the Uruguayan elections, also on an objective assessment of the current situation in Latin America.

[end p. 5]

To publish his views, Castro needed a middleman from another tribune - not Cuba, not a European socialist country, but a country on the continent with which Cuba has always been connected and whose current development he has something to say about. Allende did him a great service by allowing Fidel Castro to once again set foot on the continent's soil in the very country that is now the focus of Latin America and virtually the entire world. On the other hand, during his tour of Chile Castro became an enthusiastic advocate of the policies of the Government of Popular Unity and the flamboyant support he gave to the "legal revolution" of Salvador Allende popularized Chile even more in the world, as evidenced by the considerable response of world opinion.

Castro's visit to Chile was not a short protocol visit, usual for leading personalities, but a very extensive visit in terms of time and content, the specific propaganda impact of which, especially towards the working Chilean masses, is evident. In most of his speeches, Fidel Castro emphasized the role of the working class in the process of building socialism. Everything he said in this country was meant and understood as helping the workers to find solutions to the problems of the further development of the revolution. For the common citizen of Latin America, after years of systematic distortion of the personality of Fidel Castro and the revolutionary construction of Cuba, it was extremely important from a psychological point of view to get to know him up close. Here, too, a well-known fact from Cuba manifested itself - his amazing ability to influence the masses, to convince them, and gain authority among the masses. The unprecedented, enormous reception that the Chilean people prepared for him is clear proof of this, even though they also saw him as a representative of the country that was the first on the Latin American continent to decide to go its own way.

In recent years, the Latin American left has not been able to unite on a strategy for achieving socialism. Some preferred armed struggle, which — had followers in rural and urban guerillas, others focused on achieving this goal by legal means. Fidel Castro

[end p. 6]

spoke on this issue several times during his visit to Chile: He recalled the Havana Declaration, in which Cuba formulated the question of the necessity of armed revolutionary struggle where all other avenues are already closed. Violence must be used only when there is no other alternative, which happened in Cuba.

Another contradiction in the Latin American leftist movement was the opinion of whether to exactly imitate the Cuban revolutionary path or to base it primarily on one's own specifics, traditions and other factors. To that, Fidel Castro said: It would be facetious to advise other nations to do the same as we do in Cuba. The Cuban revolution is not a valid model for export.

Castro dedicated these words to the Chilean revolutionary process, which some impatient leftists describe as reformist: The extraordinary importance of the Chilean process is that for the first time in history, the possibility of a social revolution by peaceful means is opening up. A revolutionary process is taking place in Chile, but this process is not yet a revolution - it is only a path, an initial stage. In Cuba, too, we cannot yet ­speak of the victory of the revolution. Chile organizes its revolutionary process in different ways than Cuba, but that does not mean that we do not feel the presence of a true revolution here.

Regarding ideological dogmatism and political sectarianism, he stated: If we do not overcome sectarianism in Cuba, it could destroy the Cuban revolution. Sectarianism is worse than counter-revolution. Sectarianism also causes serious problems in production during the revolutionary process. And ­he warned the Chilean workers in this sense with the words: Avoid the mistake we made in Cuba when we got rid of technology. Experts need to understand the meaning of the revolution and not leave the country.

Fidel Castro in Chile did not avoid self-criticism and, in particular, he spoke words to the Chilean farmers that he did not convey even to Cuba in such a time: Cuban experience should

[end p. 7]

be an example for Chile so that it does not make the same mistakes as Cuba. And since Latin America is a subcontinent of small farmers, it is necessary to realize that land reform in revolutionary processes is the most difficult problem, but it must be solved concretely. The ambition to do a lot in a short time caused Cuba to accumulate many resources that it did not use sufficiently. Cuba bought thousands of tractors abroad, but they were not handled with care and were used for any purpose. In order not to repeat a similar negative experience in Chile, it is necessary to maintain discipline and improve the organization of work.

It is easier to be a guerrilla than to rule - an opinion that Fidel Castro elaborated and reminded of the tasks that must be solved by the new society of the socialist system: high awareness, strict discipline, education - this is a different type of heroism than the one we know from armed struggle.

On political issues in Latin America and the perspectives of the so-called political pluralism: Greater political and economic unity of the continent needs to be created. Revolutionary Cuba developed itself for a long time. It is necessary for the nations to come together to defend their own interests, and only then will they have the right to live in the world of tomorrow.

x x x x

Castro's perfect match with Allende, demonstrated by the warm reception of the whole country, was received in Havana without surprise, because it was expected.

Although it was originally thought that the visit to Peru could lead to the establishment of long-awaited diplomatic relations leading to a definitive agreement, in the end the course of negotiations in Lima was accepted as satisfactory.

President of Ecuador Velasco Ibarra proved himself a statesman at the height of his time when he had the courage to accept Castro

[end p. 8]

and express his admiration for him. From this meeting, Cuba did not expect ­any concrete result, but it perfectly politically ­taught the advantageous immediate coincidence of the foreign-political interests of both countries, contradictions and US imperialism.

x x x x

The Cuban question reappeared in the forefront of North American political circles in the second half of 1971 in connection with the breakdown of US relations with the PRC and the intensifying presidential campaign. Among some American politicians, there is a fear that Nixon's new policy towards China may be interpreted by Latin American states as opening up the possibility of resuming relations with Cuba, and that the US may expect Cuba to follow China. The world press also began flirting with these considerations when they published the slogan: "After ping pong, volleyball, and after China, Cuba". It was the invitation of the American team to play in Cuba (August 1971) that provoked this opinion and could initially be a certain argument that it was the same tactic used by the PRC (inviting North American ­table tennis players before announcing Nixon's trip to China). Fidel Castro personally rejected this view, commenting on it saying: "Sports, including international competitions and matches, ­remain sports and we have no reason to mix them with diplomacy." On the other hand, it is true that they are an excellent promotion of each and therefore of its political system international sports successes and the Americans themselves admitted that Cuba is beginning to threaten the sports prestige of the USA in a number of sports (see, for example, Cuba's second place at the Pan American Games in Colombia).

Political commentators agree that the Cuban problem is closely linked to the presidential campaign, and that for Nixon to be re-elected, he must take into account the important votes of his party's conservatives, for whom

[end p. 9]

the normalization of relations with Cuba would perhaps be more alarming than the current one. Washington's China Policy. In addition, one cannot overlook the half a million Cuban emigrants in the USA, over half of whom already have American citizenship.

In early January 1972, Nixon stated on American television ­that there was no way to improve relations between the US and Cuba, and at the same time reminded that Cuba and China were two different cases. The United States will not change its policy toward Cuba as long as Cuba continues to export its revolution. The second ­well-known condition: "renunciation of military ties with the ­Soviet Union " was no longer used by Nixon in his television appearance. On another occasion, however, he indicated that the Cuban question might also be part of the talks during his visit ­to Moscow in May 1972, but only as a side issue.

In the second half of last year, the three presidential candidates of the Democratic Party commented on the Cuban issue as follows:

Eugene McCarthy encouraged urgent consideration of adjusting US-Cuba relations, arguing that nothing positive would be gained by Cuba ceasing to exist for the US.

George McGovern said he thought it would be foolish for the US to "ignore a small communist country in our own backyard" while relations with the PRC normalize.

Edward Kennedy said: "We must begin to examine the complex and difficult question of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba"; he proposed a specific plan that, for example, includes the withdrawal of Soviet military experts from Cuba and the withdrawal of Americans from the Guantanamo military base.

Of particular note is the disagreement between Congress and the State Department over how to proceed with policy toward Cuba. It appears that the State Department is taking advantage of the improved contact opportunities to unofficially probe the opinions of Cuban officials in Cuba.

[end p. 10]

We can consider Fidel Castro's words on the prospects of Cuban-American relations, which he spoke during his visits to Chile, as interesting: He expressed hope that relations between the US and Cuba would improve in the not-too-distant future. If, according to Castro, there is no repressive government in Washington, then relations could be normalized, because “we are trying to live in peace with the Americans". Currently, for political reasons, Cuba cannot allow a closer rapprochement with the USA, because it would mean a loss of trust in leftist and revolutionary movements in Latin America and in the Third World, but Cuba has been using various opportunities for a long time to establish contacts with private American companies, mainly in order to be able to buy spare parts for the American machines still in use on the island.       

In September 1971, Fidel Castro, in a speech on the 11th anniversary of the founding of the CDR (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution), announced that the end of the "air bridge" by which Cubans who have requested legal emigration are being transported from Cuba to the US on a daily basis is coming to an end. He justified this decision by exhausting the list of applicants for emigration. At the same time, he refuted the American slander that Cuba is closing all possibilities for Cuban citizens to leave for the USA, describing it as a false American campaign, creating conditions encouraging illegal departure from Cuba.

In December, President Nixon accused the Cuban government of violating international maritime laws when Cuban armed forces attacked a Panamanian-flagged merchant ship captained by an American citizen on the high seas. It was actually the second ship that Cuba captured and accused of piracy against Cuba (landing counter-revolutionaries on the island). The United States responded by declaring a partial state of alert. Castro then attacked Nixon for his policy of intimidation and for his aiding and abetting attacks by Cuban counter-revolutionaries against Cuba. He guaranteed the right of free navigation of only those ships that do not disturb the peace in the

[end p. 11]

the Caribbean area. Castro solved the whole matter very intelligently by agreeing on the fate of the crew directly with the Panamanian government, without US intervention.

The Cuban counter-revolution has reached a stage of lethargy. In the past years, more than 20 émigré organizations planned the overthrow of Fidel Castro's regime. Today, there are at most 6 organizations active in the US; many others are revolutionary in name only, and most have practically given up and focused their attention on other matters.​​​​​​ Some organizations have completely disintegrated.​​​ The Cuban exile is demoralized by various conflicts and there is animosity and rivalry between the individual leaders. The spread of Cuban emigration is currently the largest in all the years of its existence. Perhaps the only active organizer of armed Cuban emigration is Jose Elias de la Torriente, who has been trying to coordinate the Cuban counter-revolutionaries in the USA for two years and whose main plan, known as the "Torriente Plan", prepares for an open war against Cuba. Despite some partial successes of a rather psychological-propagandistic nature (rapid raids, especially against the province of Oriente) and despite the bombastic bragging that preparations for secret operations continue successfully in Cuba, his plan is effectively doomed.

Conclusions:

Developments in the second half of 1971 reaffirmed the fact ­that Cuba had endured long years of blockade, shortages, and hardship; the revolutionary enthusiasm and determination of the people to continue on the path they had started did not decrease, on the contrary, the efforts to eliminate the mistakes of the past period strengthened the socialist awareness of the masses even more.

The blockade by the OAS countries was definitively disrupted by the successful development of Cuba's cooperation with the progressive regimes of Peru and Chile, Fidel Castro's trip to Latin America and the growing interest of Latin American countries to restore

[end p. 12]

relations with Cuba. Castro's visit to Chile, Peru, and Ecuador can be considered as an important event as the PRC's admission to the United Nations.

On the initiative of mainly Chile and Peru, a strong diplomatic ­offensive continues with the aim of opening up possibilities for the normalization of commercial and political relations between Cuba and Latin American countries. The number of states in Latin America that identify with the words of the Chilean delegate to the UN is growing: "The exclusion of Cuba from the community ­of Latin American countries distorts the true face of Latin America and only helps the reactionary forces." Fidel Castro ­characterized the past development as follows: Cuba's foreign policy has not changed, however Latin America is changing.

There are also certain changes in the relationship between Cuba and the USA, although not as significant as in the relationship with Latin America. Based on the opinions of some American politicians, Cuba ­could become - for the first time since Castro came to power - an important topic of the North American presidential election campaign. Fidel Castro remains the main danger to American monopolies, as the example of Cuba in Latin America and the efforts to create a grouping of progressive Latin American states with an anti-imperialist focus gradually weaken the influence of the US in this area. Castro himself is not interested in allowing himself to be maneuvered into police contacts with the USA, because ­he would thereby lose his prestige as the leader of the revolutionary movement in Latin America.

 

Ambassador [signature]

 

[end p. 13]

The document discusses Cuba's evolving foreign relations in the second half of 1971, emphasizing its efforts to normalize ties with Latin American countries and reduce its isolation. Key achievements include strengthened relations with Chile and Peru, entry into the "Group of 77," and growing interest among Latin American states in reestablishing connections with Cuba, despite U.S. opposition. Fidel Castro's high-profile visit to Chile and growing support for Cuba within the region are contrasted with the stagnation of US-Cuban relations, where Cuba remains a contentious issue in American politics.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.



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Source

NAČR, KSČ-ÚV 1945-1989, Praha - Gustáv Husák, k. 379. Contributed and translated by Radoslav Yordanov.

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