July 24, 1989
Decision of the Moldavian KGB Collegium, On the Implementation Status by KGB MSSR Section 5 'Fulfillment of the Directives of the XXVIIth CPSU Congress
on the Intensification of Ideological-Educational Work'
This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation
of the Moldavian SSR KGB Collegium, On the Implementation Status by KGB MSSR Section 5
of the USSR KGB Collegium Decisions of 26 June 1986 “With Regard to the Participation of
the State Security Services in the Fulfillment of the Directives of the XXVIIth CPSU Congress
on the Intensification of Ideological-Educational Work.”
Hearing and examining the report of Cde. P. T. Tabuika, chief of Section 5, on the issues as well as about the tasks that result from the Decision of the Bureau of the MCP CC of 23 June 1987, “On the Measures for raising political vigilance, strengthening the protection of objectives of the Soviet party organs and of other enterprises and organizations with a special regime,” the collegium notes that, guiding itself by the requirements of the above-mentioned decisions of the KGB Collegium USSR, and by the theses of the Decision of the CC of the Communist Party of the republic of 23 August 1986 for the intensification of patriotic and international education of the population [and] the fight against manifestations of nationalism, the leadership and operational personnel established and implemented practical measures oriented towards the more active participation in ideological-educational work along all lines of counterespionage activity.
The immediate efforts were oriented towards the identification of the tendencies of subversive centers and anti-Soviet organizations that act against the republic, towards a more profound study of the operational situation. Measures were undertaken directed towards the consolidation of operations, improving their quality, deepening the work for operational evidence and signals, which permitted the obtaining of supplemental intelligence about negative processes [and] the hostile activity of some persons, to eliminate the premises for the creation of some unfavorable situations, [and] to find efficient forms for influencing their formation.
The section develops more actively, in collaboration with of KGB subdivisions and municipal and county organs, counter-propagandistic and general prophylactic work, [and] some new forms of this work have been consolidated. The party organs were more operationally informed about the negative processes, about hostile and anti-social manifestations, [and] about their causes.
These measures permitted [the KGB] to bar the creation in the republic of stable groups with a hostile orientation, extremist activities among persons of Jewish and German ethnicity disposed to emigrate to be neutralized, [and] a series of illegal sect communities to be brought within the law.
At the same time, the collegium notes that the section has not yet utilized all possibilities for the intensification of ideological-educational work in the aim of actively counteracting the subversive actions of the special services and ideological centers of the adversary, [and] ending the negative activities of some persons on the territory of the republic. This work did not show enough aggressiveness, foresight, [or] orientation towards subversive centers and specific foreign anti-Soviet organizations, which frequently permitted them to implement their plans regarding the inspiration of nationalist manifestations [and] hostile pro-Zionism.
The restructuring of work with the apparatus of secret agents advances unevenly. Imperfections in assignment, weak specialization of agents of influence, the lack of sources from the ranks of the leaders and activists in informal groups does not yet ensure certain operational control and the timely procurement of intelligence that permits concentrated influence over negative processes and phenomena. Cases of delayed and low-quality documentation of the hostile actions of objects in the dossiers of operational evidence and signals (communications) are occurring, which permits them to exercise a negative influence over their medium for a prolonged period, thus contributing to the formation of some basically hostile conceptions among some politically immature persons.
In the prophylactic work of prevention, educationally, the operational personnel of the section do not always actively support itself on the force of influence of the work collective, on public opinion. The practice of studying its efficacy and of ensuring [that it is carried out] propagandistically must be improved. There are still insufficient efforts made for unmasking and publicly compromising anti-social and politically immature elements, which try to act as a parasite on transparency and democratization, starting on the road of extremism and political demagoguery.
The Collegium Has DECIDED:
The leadership and operational personnel of Section 5 must take energetic supplementary measures, ensuring the full and obligatory implementation of the conditions of KGB USSR Order no. 0365-1986. On the basis of profound analysis of the positive experience accumulated, the state of work in the ideological-political education of the working people aiming at preventing the subversive activities of the foreign adversary and of hostile elements in the interior of the republic is multilaterally and critically understood. To this end, the leadership of the section, guiding itself on the decisions of the CPSU CC Plenum of January (1987), must pay special attention to the inculcating of personnel with the knowledge of how to undertake creative work in the new conditions, [how] to evaluate from class positions the events of the historical past and the events of contemporary social life, to improve its Marxist-Leninist preparation, to form a strong professional culture, political culture and legal culture.
- To subordinate the efforts of the leadership and operational personnel of Section 5 in carrying out operational ideological-educational work and [managing] operational agents in conformity with the situation of transparency and democratization that is on the way to being affirmed. The immediate measures must be oriented towards the continual qualitative improvement of the repatriation [assignment] of secret agents and persons of trust, towards assuring reliable surveillance of the evolution of the operational situation, [and] the more profound study of the persons with dossiers of operational evidence and signals, considering this activity as a basis for the successful organization of prophylactic and preventive measures, an efficient prevention of the subversive actions of the adversary.
- To launch the study of those who develop subversive activities against the republic of the presenters from the Romanian Section of Radio “Free Europe,” the “Dragan” Institute, the Union of Jewish Women of Canada, the “Slav Mission,” NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] section in London, as well as the propagandistic and religious centers of Objective 24, with the aim, using the modified entry and exit regime of the USSR, together with Sections 1, 2, 4 [and] 6, to make a supplementary evaluation on the possibility of using the existing agent networks to be sent abroad and to identify the emissaries of the above-mentioned centers on the territory of the republic.
- Conducting itself according to the directives of the USSR KGB regarding the practical implementation of the decision of the CPSU CC Plenum of June (1987), the leadership and operational personnel of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, [and] 6 of the municipal and county sections must seek with perseverance reserves and possibilities for increasing the efficiency of the work of guarding Soviet citizens from the hostile actions of the adversary, the prevention of recidivism on the part of persons who have served penal sentences for state crimes and against whom the KGB organs have applied prophylactic measures, to isolate them in timely fashion from politically immature persons in order to avoid contact with them. To not permit the reorientation of the activities of informal associations that appear towards positions that are harmful from a political perspective. To consider as an important task the timely and accurate informing of the party organs about the processes that are produced and upon which their instigators can imprint a hostile tendency.
To base ideological-educational work more on the work collective, to assure the consolidation of business relations with the administration, community organizations, commissions and groups of enterprises and institutions. Informing them about the situation created, on the basis of certain, verified materials, in order to draw them into more active participation in the actions for preventing state crimes, the premises for exceptional cases, the leaking of state secrets, as well as for the localization of negative process and conflict situations, the public unmasking of their instigators in order for the efforts of nationalist [and] pro-Zionist elements, of sect authorities, of political demagogues who try to use democracy and transparency for inciting dissatisfaction, [and] the attainment of their own ends should meet with an active public counteraction.
To broach more seriously the issue of workers trained in the development of prophylactic actions, entrusting them to experienced, well-prepared collaborators. To increase the organizing role of Section 5 in the implementation of ideological-educational work carried out in the municipal and county organs of the republic KGB.
- The operational subunits of the [KGB] and of the municipal and county organs must launch general prophylactic and counterpropaganda work that exposes the subversive activity of the adversary in the current stage. To diversify their forms and methods, to enrich them with a new content, to increase the responsibility and role of the leadership personnel in its organization and qualitative implementation. To clarify, within the month, the plans of this activity and the graphics of taking some concrete measures, with the help of the graphics and persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art, through the intermediary of the means of mass information, to unmask and to decisively compromise the instigators and participants in hostile and noxious manifestations from the political point of view, to provide propagandistic coverage for the operational and prophylactic actions undertaken. To carry out the actions undertaken in such a way as to be understood by working people and be supported by them.
To draw special attention to the intensification of general prophylactic and counterpropaganda work in preparation by the anniversary of the 70th Great Socialist Revolution of October and the 70th anniversary of the CEU-KGB.
- All subunits of the central apparatus of the MSSR KGB and of the municipal and county organs must adopt for immediate implementation the Decision of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC of 23 June 1987 “About the Measures regarding political vigilance, the intensification of the safeguarding of the objectives of the Soviet party organs, of other enterprises and organizations with a special regime,” coordinating its requirements with the problems that are resolved along every line [of KGB work], and every sector.
Section 5, the municipal and county organs must launch the search for the authors and executors of anonymous documents, especially those containing threats against the Soviet party Activ, the identification of psychological ill persons who hatch impossible and extremist plans, to assure permanent and reliable operational control over their behavior. Sections 3, 5, the municipal and county apparatus will be analyzing the situation in places where armaments, and explosive and toxic substances are kept, and the ranks of personnel who have contact with them. To realize supplementary measures in order to assure the discovery of the intentions of hostile elements, of gaining control of them. Jointly with the MSSR MAI [Ministry of Internal Affairs], to activate the work for discovering lost and withdrawn armament, to expose abuses in the regulations for its preservation in organizations and institutions, to eliminate them without delay through the intermediary of official personalities. To give the perpetrators an appropriate political evaluation, to give publicity to it, [and] to take measures of public influence against those guilty.
To task Cde. D. H. Munteanu, the deputy President of the MSSR KGB for Inspection, with the control of the execution of the decisions of the collegium. The leaders of the KGB subunits and of the municipal and county organs should examine the decisions of the collegium collectively, tracing together with the party organizations the ways of a more active participation in ideological-educational work, the raising of political vigilance. To report on the implementation of the decisions of the collegiums to the chief of Section 5 when the annual report is made for 1987. In 1988, to study the situation of this work in Group I of Section 5, in Group I of Section 6, in the municipal and county organs of Bălţi and Cahul with following hearings with the leadership of the [KGB] Committee.
President of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, General-Lieutenant, G. M. Volkov (signature)
Report by the Moldavian KGB on the decisions it had implemented of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year. Includes work to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda. Romania is referred to by the code name "Objective 24." General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of “persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art,” in order to neutralize “the subversive activity of the adversary” by identifying and isolating the “emissaries of the adversary” and imposing “permanent and reliable operational control” over them.
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