October 23, 1947
Draft of Telegram to Vyshinsky on the Korean Question
[handwritten: a reply follows to Cde. Podtserob]
to Cde. STALIN
In accordance with your instructions the draft of the telegram to Cde. Vyshinsky on the Korean question has been reworked.
Please approve [it].
[signature] V. Molotov
23 October 1947
[handwritten at the bottom
of the page: MFA cable N 21001
(3138) was sent
23 October 1947]
1. Inasmuch as the question of Korea has already been included in the agenda of the Assembly we consider it inadvisable to again propose excluding it from the agenda.
2. During the discussion of the American proposal on Korea in the political committee you ought to make a statement from the very beginning in which you should [develop] [entered by hand: be governed] by the following guidelines:
a) The Soviet government has thought and [still] thinks that the question of Korea can be solved on the basis of the 1945 Moscow Agreement.
b) However, inasmuch as the US government for some reason has not wanted to agree on this basis the Soviet government with the goal of speeding up [entered by hand: the turning] the reunification of Korea into a single [independent democratic] state, made a new, more radical proposal to the US government, the simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of American and Soviet troops at the beginning of 1948 and granting the Koreans themselves the opportunity to create [entered by hand: a national] government of an [entered by hand and then crossed out: independent democratic] a united Korea.
c) In view of the fact that the US government did not desire to accept and this Soviet proposal the Soviet delegation submitted for the discussion of the political committee their proposal about the simultaneous withdrawal from Korea of American and Soviet troops at the beginning of 1948 and granting the Koreans themselves the opportunity of creating [entered by hand: a national] government of a united Korea. At the same time, inasmuch as this Soviet proposal [entered by hand: contained a simpler and more radical solution of the Korean question] the Soviet delegation insisted that the Soviet proposal be discussed in the political committee first, that is, before the American proposal.
In any event, you should insist on the Soviet proposal, as a more radical [one], be put to a vote before the American resolution.
3. During the consideration of the question of Korea in the political committee you should suggest that representatives of the Korean people of North and South Korea be invited to the discussion of the Korean question.
At an appropriate moment you should explain that, as representatives of the Korean people, those actually chosen by the Korean people in North and South Korea should be invited, and not ordinary [people] appointed by the foreign military authorities of Korea.
4. Even in the event the political committee switches to the discussion of the American resolution it is necessary to insist [inserted by hand: on an invitation to the Koreans and] that a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea be set. If the date proposed by us, the beginning of 1948, causes objection then agreement can be given to postponing this date to the middle or the end of 1948 and not seek for the date of the withdrawal of troops be definitely set.
[Points 5 and 6 entered by hand] 5. If the question of inviting the Koreans is decided favorably it is necessary to insist that the discussion of the Korean question take place in the presence of Koreans from the very beginning, which will mean a postponement of the discussion until the appearance of the Koreans.
6. During the discussion of the draft resolution of the Americans, if in the course of the matter this discussion occurs [you] ought to seek the exclusion of the question of outside control over the creation formation of the armed forces of Korea, declaring that the question of the creation of the armed forces of Korea is the business of the national government of Korea and no external forces should interfere in this matter].
Vyshinsky is instructed that, because the Korean issue is already on the UNSC agenda, it should remain there. Vyshinsky should stake out a position that both American and Soviet troops withdraw simultaneously, allowing the Koreans to develop a unified government. Elected representatives from both Koreas should be invited to discussions. A time span for the troop withdrawals must be set. The draft includes some scrawled recommendations from Stalin.
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