December 16, 1982
East German Ministry of State Security, 'US and NATO Military Planning on Mission of V Corps/US Army During Crises and in Wartime,' (excerpt)
MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY
Top Secret! Berlin, 16. Dec 1982
Only for personal use! Nr. 626/82
Return is requested! Expl. 5.
Military planning of the USA and NATO for the operation of the V. Army Corps/USA in times of tension and in war
Through reliable intelligence we received portions of the US and NATO military crisis and wartime planning for the deployment of the V Corps/USA stationed in the FRG. This intelligence concerns the secret Operations Plan 33001 (GDP – General Defense Plan) for the V Corps/USA in Europe. The plan is endorsed by the US Department of the Army and, after consultation with NATO, became part of NATO planning. This operations plan lays the groundwork for the deployment of V Corps to lead the defense within NATO’s Central Army Group (CENTAG). The plan consists of the so-called basic plan (OPLAN) and attachments. Aside from general information on intentions, goals, operational defense of CENTAG, OPLAN provides detailed instructions for V Corps and its combat and support troops, as well as general orders for cooperation and command and control within V Corps. 18 attachments and 33 appendixes explain among other things the operational structure of the corps, boundaries of the corps and division areas for defensive operations, general rules of operation and their safeguards. Finally, they cover the guidelines for use of nuclear and chemical weapons and include attachments covering the planned deployment of outside reinforcements under the command of V Corps/USA.
Operations Plan 33001 (GDP) for V Corps/USA came into force on January 1, 1981 and is classified SECRET by US forces and NATO SECRET by NATO.
OPLAN is a significant document concerning real NATO plans in the event of war. It allows us to draw extensive conclusions about the perspectives of NATO leadership regarding the character of the opening phase of a potential war, the strategy of “Flexible Response” and the principle of “Forward Defense” in the European theater of war.
The plan presents NATO with an unfavorable situation for the opening stages of a war. In this scenario, Warsaw Pact forces commence conventional offensive operations on short notice and NATO has only 48 hours warning time to occupy and prepare defensive areas. No planned outside reinforcements are available to NATO at the time.
NATO Central Army Group, including V Corps/USA, VII Corps/USA, I and II Corps/FRG and—if the requisite agreement with the French government is present—II Corps/FR, leads the defense with the following goals: to stop the Warsaw Pact attack groups close to the border and to mount a defense in cooperation with NATO Northern Army Group in order to prevent a breakout toward the Rhine.
It is worth noting that NATO expects to deploy the 12th Panzer Division/FRG in the first echelon of defense under VII Corps/USA. This confirms existing evidence and conclusions drawn from NATO troop exercises that the 12 Panzer Division/BRD will leave III Corps/FRG and come under the command of VII Corps/USA in times of crisis.
An official, periodically updated NATO “Enemy Situation Assessment” forms the basis of NATO assessment of Warsaw Pact forces. This differs from OPLAN, potentially per NATO’s instructions. Estimates of Warsaw Pact force strength described in OPLAN appendices show that NATO expects to contend with 6 to 8 first echelon divisions and 3 to 4 second echelon divisions in V Corps’ operational defensive area. NATO expects the main thrusts in the directions EISENACH, BAD HERSFELD, ALSFELD and EISENACH, HÜNFELD and SCHLITZ.
Implementation of the tasks detailed in Attachment B (Intelligence) guarantees and up-to-date enemy assessment.
V Corps leads the defense (without outside reinforcements) with the goal of stopping the attacking Warsaw Pact forces as close to the FRG/GDR border as possible and beating them with counterattacks or nuclear weapons. The main effort will be concentrated on maintaining a line of defense in the expected areas of attack; initial Warsaw Pact forces must be defeated in the area 50 km east of VOGELSBERG. Outside reinforcements will then attempt to force first echelon Warsaw Pact troops back east—and eventually out of NATO territory—through a series of counterattacks.
OPLAN divides the defense plan into three phases:
(1) Splitting of the Corps/actions of the Corps’ covering forces, (2) actions of the covering troops of the divisions and (3) and defense lead by the main forces in two units: a general reserve and covering troops in security zones.
The plan provides for the 8th Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Division in the first echelon, the 2nd Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division in the second echelon and the so-called Task Force 5-68 (5th Armored Battalion/68th Armored Regiment minus a tank company with a mechanized infantry company), to which the 11th Armored Reconnaissance Regiment and 5 Task Forces (battalion-equivalent) should be attached for the first stage of combat operations. An artillery battalion will provide direct support for the 8 combat battalions.
The deployment of the main force in the first echelon and concentration of troops in the middle and forward defensive lines indicate NATO’s intention to follow the doctrine of “forward defense.” NATO hopes to weaken Warsaw Pact forces as much as possible in forward defensive areas and hold the attacking forces for a minimum of 24 hours in order to lay the groundwork for a successful counterattack by NATO first echelon forces near the FRG/GDR border.
The defensive area for the corps and divisions has a width of 70-80 km respectively 40 km and a depth of 120 respectively 50-70 km. This corresponds with what has been observed in NATO exercises, where the forward lines of defense featured security zones 10-15 km deep.
The second corps echelon occupies defensive positions 30 km deep and the general reserve has a staging area behind the defensive zones. Launch positions for the tactical nuclear weapons system (LANCE) are provided at 30-40 km depth.
Command lines run north south from the FRG/GDR border to the rear defensive areas at a distance of 10-15 km. The lines ease efforts to direct troops, provide a rapid overview of the combat operations and create favorable conditions for cooperation.
Nuclear weapons are seen as an element of fire support (nuclear fire support) and will be deployed by air force, artillery and engineer troops upon orders authorizing the release of nuclear weapons (R-hour). Great emphasis is attached to the use of nuclear land mines as an important escalating element.
The task of the 130th Engineer Brigade/V Corps, consisting of two command and 13 nuclear minelaying elements, under NATO command LANDJUT (distance of ca. 400 km) is presently unclear. We cannot rule out that these relocated FRG land forces are equipped with their own nuclear mines and that 130th Engineer Brigade Special Forces are meant to support Danish forces or other foreign reinforcements under NATO command LANDJUT.
It is expected that NATO forces will deploy chemical weapons in retaliation for their use by Warsaw Pact forces. Chemical weapons will be deployed as fire support by artillery and engineer troops in order to cause heavily casualties among enemy forces and reduce their mobility and combat effectiveness. Chemical weapons should also channel attacking Warsaw Pact troops into bottlenecks, which would create optimal conditions for NATO counterattack—including an attack using nuclear weapons.
A division of outside (US) reinforcements is planned in support of V Corps/USA. Four scenarios are planned for reinforcement of V Corps/USA, regardless of the character of the reinforcement division (infantry or mechanized infantry such as an armored division) and the timeframe of the division’s availability. An infantry division should be in the first echelon of reinforcements, which will be followed by a mechanized infantry or armored division in defense of V Corps.
Two infantry divisions (7th and 9th Infantry Divisions), four mechanized divisions (1st, 4th, 5th and 24th Mechanized Infantry Divisions), one armored division (2nd Armored Division) and one cavalry division (1st Cavalry Division) are potential reinforcements for V Corps/USA. Choice of reinforcement divisions depends on political decisions made by the US government and one or more of the above-named divisions may be set aside for the American rapid attack forces (RDTF).
NATO places special emphasis on problems in from civil-military cooperation. Of particular concern is the required close cooperation between US forces, FRG Federal Border Guard (FBG) and FRG military district commands upon NATO takeover of border security, defensive blocking plans and the evacuation of FRG civilians from designated areas.
NATO forces will take over military border security at NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT. We can therefore assume that the Federal Ministry of the Interior will order the retreat of FRG Federal Border Guard between the setting of NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT and 36 hours after the transition to increased border security. V Corps military police will escort FBG units to staging areas. For identification purposes, FBG troops will receive yellow ribbons for their headgear, yellow flags for the left side of vehicles and yellow panels on the their roofs.
Planned blocking measures in security zones controlled by V Corps are divided into strategic/economic and tactical measures. These measures require close cooperation between V Corps/USA and FRG authorities. The FRG government will be responsible for strategic/economic measures dedicated to the denial of strategic industrial potential and important resources to the Warsaw Pact. V Corps/USA, in cooperation with FRG military district command forces, will be responsible for tactical blocking measures.
The planned evacuation of FRG citizens in V Corps’ operational areas requires close cooperation between V Corps/USA and FRG Military District Command IV. In the case that FRG civil authorities lose control of the relocation of the civilian population, FRG military district commands will be empowered to take direct military control of the relocation.
The following sections present a German translation of OPLAN. Missing passages will be indicated. Topographic inaccuracies are corrected on the basis of GDR Ministry of National Defense map 1:200,000; 1969 edition and a 1:200,000 map the Federal Republic of Germany from “Der Große ADAC Generalatlas, Mairs Geographischer Verlag, 1980 edition”.
This information may not be published or circulated in order to protect the security of its sources.
Operations Plan 33001
(GDP - General Defense Plan)
Operations Plan 33001 (GDP/General Defense Plan) V Corps/USA
OPLAN 33001 was compiled on the basis of the following documents:
a) USAREUR/VII US Army OPLAN 4102 Volumes I and II
b) USAREUR/VII US ARMY OPLAN 4360
c) USAREUR OPORD 1-75
d) CENTAG OPLAN 33001 (GDP)
e) CENTAG CONPLAN 33520
f) V Corps/USA SUPPLAN 33001 J
g) V and VII Corps/USA FSOP
h) CENTAG 1210/CENG 3/ and T/516/774
i) USAREUR Reg. 525-301
k) [sic] Maps: Western Europe 1:250,000; NM 32-1, NM 32-3, NM 32-4, NM 32-5, NM 32-6, NM 32-7, NM 32-9; 1st Edition; DMG 1970 and/or 1971
Time zone: ZULU
1. General Situation
a) Enemy Assessment: Attachment B
b) Assessment of Individual Military Forces:
CINCUSAREUR orders NATO Central Army Group (CENTAG) to assume military border security duties from SCHMIEDEKÖPFE (NB 64 92) to DREISESSELBERG (VQ 13 05) in times of crisis.
(a) Transition of Forces from Peacetime to War Readiness
USAREUR prepares the transition of Operational Command (OPCOMD) authority and Operational Control (OPCON) to NATO commanders; initiates plans to evacuate noncombatants; secures logistical, administrative and technical support for allocated troops and resources in cooperation with the countries in which they are stationed; provides support for reconnaissance, security and communications; organizes and coordinates troop movement; receives and deploys reinforcements; prepares to provide nuclear support to its allies.
USAREUR coordinates logistics, administration and technical security, such as security for allocated troops and resources, in cooperation with countries in which troops are stationed; provides technical support for communications; organizes and coordinates cooperation under wartime conditions; guarantees nuclear arms support to its allies.
(2) NATO Central Army Group (CENTAG)
Before an attack, CENTAG ends its planned deterrence maneuvers; relocates forces and resources to predefined GDP-areas; secures its assigned defensive sectors; meets Warsaw Pact aggression with the appropriate degree of force needed to maintain--or restore--the integrity of NATO territory; engages the enemy with cover troops ahead of the forward line of defense at the inner German and FRG/CSR borders; defends KAUFINGER WALD (NB 5088) and KNÜLLGEBIRGE (NB 3401); ensures coordination with NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) in order to prevent an enemy breakout in the direction of the Rhine.
(3) III Corps/FRG
III Corps/FRG coordinates military border security with V Corps/USA; defends its assigned sectors through the deployment of the 2nd Panzergrenadier Division in the north and the 5th Panzergrenadier Division in the south; holds KAUFINGER WALD (NB 5088).
(4) VII Corps/USA
VII Corps/USA coordinates military border security with V Corps/USA; defends its assigned sectors with through the deployment of the 12th Panzer Division/BRD in the north, the 3rd Infantry Division in the center and the 1st Armored Division in the south.
(5) 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF)
The 4th ATAF supports CENTAG. Commander of 4th ATAF, in consultation with the commander of CENTAG, guarantees air support for the operational land forces of NATO Central Army Group.
(6) Territorial Command South/FRG
Territorial Command South is a federal German national authority whose area of responsibility covers the entire CENTAG area. It provides support to II and III Corps/BRD, the US Army and Canadian forces assigned to Europe. The commander of Territorial Command South acts as CENTAG commander in the rear combat zone. The commander is responsible for communications security, maintenance and control; removal of wrecks; CBRN warnings.
(7) II Corps/France
II Corps/France remains under French command authority. If the French government provides the appropriate agreement, II Corps/FR will come under the operational control (OPCON) of the commander of CENTAG and will be deployed according to existing plans.
(8) Border Control Authorities
In peacetime and in times of tension, the Federal Border Guard (BGS), Bavarian Border Police and FRG Customs are under non-military FRG control. They are responsible for control of the inner German border and the international borders of the FRG. BGS, Bavarian Border Police and FRG Customs forces will pull back upon takeover of border security duties by NATO forces at NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT.
(9) Military District Command IV/FRG
Military District Command IV/FRG is under national FRG command. It supports V Corps/USA in its movements and as needed after the crossing of the Rhine; provides local aid as needed; procures blocking agents for the operational area; guarantees the security of certain sensitive objectives.
(10) 10th SAM Group (HAWK)
The 10th SAM Group is relocated to the V Corps/USA’s defensive sector. 4th ATAF combat headquarters will call for its deployment.
c) Reported Allocated Forces: Attachment A
We may assume:
(1) V Corps/USA will receive warning of an upcoming attack by Warsaw Pact forces within (a minimum of) 48 hours;
(2) Not every one of V Corps/USA’s units will have enough time to occupy GDP positions and prepare their areas for wartime action;
(3) The neighboring corps will not have fully arrived at their GDP positions and will not have prepared their areas for wartime action;
(4) Reinforcements from the US, though called for, will not be on hand for the V Corps/USA’s first combat actions;
(5) The enemy will have initial air superiority;
(6) Engineers will begin their preparations of defensive areas upon trigger of NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT.
Upon orders, V Corps/USA: occupies its assigned defensive zones; focuses its defense in the areas EISENACH-BAD HERSFELD-ALSFELD and EISENACH-HÜHNFELD-SCHLITZ in order to defeat the enemy close to the GDR border; holds KNÜLLGEBIRGE (NB 3041); prepares to deploy nuclear weapons; prepares the intake, support and deployment of US reinforcements; beats back the broken enemy forces through counterattacks from NATO territory. V Corps/USA is prepared to realize the latter goal in cooperation with II Corps/FR.
a) Operation Planning
Zone defense proceeds in phases:
(a) Phase I - Development of the Corps/Actions of the Covering Troops -
Upon orders, V Corps/USA will occupy its assigned defensive zones and prepares them for defense.
The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR), under command of V Corps, occupies its assigned cover zone, secures the deployment and development of the main corps forces and defends its cover zone.
The 3rd Armored Division (3rd AD) in the north and the 8th Infantry Division (8th ID) in the south occupy their assigned defensive zones and prepare their defense.
The 2nd Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division (2/8th ID) acts as a rear corps detachment. It marches, secured by 8th ID, to command line FARGO, passes OPCON to 3 AD and occupies defensive positions in the area from LAUTERBACH (NB 2809) to OTTRAU (NB 2728). The brigade remains under the command of V Corps and cannot be redeployed without orders from V Corps’ commander. Task Force 5-68 Armor (TF 5-68) marches, secured by 8th ID, to its assigned staging area, acts as ready reserve (Initial Corps Reserve) upon passing point NA 097 618 and prepares for rear security missions.
The corps prepares to receive outside reinforcements.
(b) Phase II - Actions of Division Covering Forces -
Upon orders, the divisions assume OPCON of units in the security zones, continue defensive actions in the security zones and complete the destruction of enemy forces.
2/8th ID prepares to be a priority deployment in the defensive zone of 3rd AD.
11th ACR prepares to reestablish fighting capacity in the area of ORTENBERG (NA 4078) after extraction from the security zones. The corps prepares for the deployment of a US reinforcement division.
(c) Phase III – Main Forces Combat –
V Corps defends its assigned areas through the deployment of 3rd AD in the north and 8th ID in the south. After reestablishing fighting capacity, 11th ACR acts as corps reserve and remains part of TF 5-68 as ordered.
The corps prepares for the deployment of a US reinforcement division.
(2) Fire: Attachment D
(a) Air Support
Direct air support must be secured for Phase I covering forces, such as 3rd AD, or for a counterattack group in Phases II and III.
Artillery will provide primary support for Phase I covering forces, such as 3rd AD, or for a counterattack group in Phases II and III.
(c) Atomic Weapons (Attachment D)
(d) CBRN (Attachment D)
(e) Air Defense (Attachment K)
(a) Engineer troops focus their efforts on the following in order of priority: denial of directions and areas to the enemy, protection of friendly forces and supplies and mobility assurance for friendly troops.
(b) Above all else, covering troops in Phase 1 and 3rd AD in Phases II and III must receive support.
(c) Plans for laying defensive obstacles closely correspond with the operations plan. The main effort will be to prevent an enemy breakthrough and to create favorable conditions for use of friendly weapons. Commander of the covering troops coordinates defensive obstacles, which will be placed before Line CONCORD by main forces in Phase I. The placement and use of defensive obstacles occurs in Phase I upon orders from the commander of the covering troops.
b.8. Infantry Division
The 8th ID will:
(1) secure the movement of 2/8th ID to Line FARGO and transfer its OPCON to 3rd AD;
(2) secure the movement of TF 5-68 to Point NA 097618;
(3) prepare to receive WILDFLECKEN combat units not under command of V Corps/USA;
(4) deploy a Vulcan battery in direct support of covering troops in the security zone when so ordered;
(5) defend its assigned zone with a main focus on the entrance to Federal Highway 40 (Bundesstraße 40), prepare for combat operations under conditions of attack by nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons and to deploy its own nuclear weapons when so ordered.
(6) receive Federal Border Guard forces from the covering troops and escort them to the 109th MP Staging Area near KLEINLÜDER (NB 384 000);
(7) support 2/11th ACR after those units cross friendly lines and convey 2/11th ACR to its main unit;
(8) ensure defensive steadfastness through cooperation with VII Corps/USA on the southern (right) corps dividing line;
(9) transfer an attack helicopter company to the commander of 3rd Support Command (3rd SUPCOM) or to the 12th Aviation Group (TF 12) when so ordered;
(10) transfer an attack helicopter company to 11th ACR when so ordered;
(11) prepare to assume OPCON of 11th ACR and deploy the unit in defense of Federal Highway 40 or in a counterattack;
(12) to provide 130th Engineer Brigade an engineer company within four hours upon request in Phase II;
(13) prepare to deploy TF 5-68 for blocking missions in the division’s sector and return those forces to the corps within eight hours when so ordered;
(14) prepare to accommodate 2/8th ID in its own defensive zone.
c.3 Armored Division
The 3rd Armored Division will:
(1) assume OPCON of 2/8th ID upon passing Line FARGO and place the unit in blocking sectors from LAUTERBACH (NB 2809) to OTTRAU (NB 2728);
(2) provide a Vulcan battery to the covering troops;
(3) defend its assigned sector with a main focus on EISENACH-HÜNFELD and KNÜLLGEBIRGE (NB 3040) and prepare for combat operations under all conditions and to deploy its own nuclear weapons when so ordered.
(4) receive Federal Border Guard forces from the covering troops and escort them to the 709th MP Staging Area near WILLOFS (NB 342 154);
(5) support 1/11th ACR after those units cross friendly lines and convey 3/11th ACR to its main unit; prepare to return 3/11th ACR to its main unit within eight hours during Phase III;
(6) ensure defensive steadfastness through cooperation with III Corps/BRD on the northern (left) corps dividing line;
(7) prepare to deploy 2/8th ID when so ordered;
(8) prepare to deploy TF 5-68 for blocking missions in the division’s sector and return those forces to the corps within eight hours when so ordered;
(9) prepare to assume OPCON of 11th ACR and deploy the unit for blocking missions or in a counterattack;
The 2/8th ID will:
(1) march, secured by 8th ID, transfer OPCON to 3rd AD upon passing Line FARGO and occupy defensive positions in from LAUTERBACH (NB 2809) to OTTRAU (NB 2728);
(2) improve defensive positions LAUTERBACH (NB 2809) – OTTRAU (NB 2728);
(3) prepare to be deployed with the following priorities:
(a) in 3rd AD’s defensive zone under OPCON of 3rd AD
(b) in 8th ID’s defensive zone.
e.11. Armored Cavalry Regiment
The 11th ACR will:
(1) absorb TF 203 (parts of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion) upon NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT;
(2) provide the 340th Military Intelligence Company to TF 302 in the security zone;
(3) deploy covering troops close to the GDR and CSR borders in front of Line CONCORD;
(4) secure the development of V Corps/USA;
(5) absorb reinforcements;
(6) defend its assigned sector and prepare for combat operations under all conditions and to deploy its own nuclear weapons when so ordered.
(7) remove the Federal Border Guard from border security duties and escort FBG to certain handover points;
(8) prepare to receive, secure and deploy an aircraft (M 56) with mine-laying capabilities;
(9) handover command of covering troops and defensive obstacles to the appropriate division upon special orders in the transition to Phase II. 11th ACR will also prepare to act as provisional command point for covering forces in divisional defensive zone;
(10) collect units in the ORTENBERG (NA 0478) region after the withdrawal of the covering troops, restore fighting ability and prepare to be deployed with the following priorities:
a) under divisional OPCON for reinforcement of the defense;
b) occupy corps defensive positions in preparation for operating out of said positions;
c) lead counterattacks;
d) take part in counterattacks under divisional OPCON;
(11) absorb TF 5-68 during Phase II or III
(12) gather the units of 11th ACR in the alternative staging area near DECKENBACH (MB 9618) when so ordered.
f. TF 5-68 Ready Reserve Corps
TF 5-68 will:
(1) march, secured by 8th ID, to point NA 097618, where TF 5-68 will act as corps ready reserve and move into the staging area near NA 065875;
(2) prepare staging area communications links FM (SECURE) and RATT to V Corps command post;
(3) prepare to be deployed with the following priorities:
(a) under OPCON 3rd SUPCON or 12th Aviation Group (TF 12) in order to secure rear areas (RAS Operations)
(b) occupation of blocking zones 1-6 in the following order:
1 – Federal Highway B-40
2 – European Route E 4 and Federal Highway B-49
3 – Federal Highway B-275
the following zones should be blocked in order to reconnoiter and in preparation to occupy rear staging areas:
4 – Federal Highway B-40
5 – European Route E-4
6 – Federal Highway B-275
(c) under the command of 11th ACR as so ordered;
(d) to act under OPCON of 3rd AD, in particular 8th ID.
g. Corps Artillery V/Corps USA
V Corps Artillery will:
(1) support the 8th ID with 41st Field Artillery Brigade;
(2) support the 3rd AD with the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade;
(3) prepare to release OPCOMD of 4/4th Field Artillery from 3rd Corps/BRD after 4/4th FA comes under V Corps/USA command;
(4) provide artillery support to covering troops in Phase I;
(5) provide munitions custodial agents to the 12th Aviation Group so that artillery units armed with nuclear shells can be transported to planned holding areas, if air transport is required.
h. 12th Aviation Group (TF 12)
TF 12 will:
(1) deploy its command post in the planned area;
(2) prepare to act as control center for the security of forces deployed in the rear corps area;
(3) prepare the intake, support and deployment of corps aviation units according to the Time Phased Force Deployment List Corps Aviation Units;
(4) support headquarters united under V Corps/USA command in the planning of the deployment of TF 12;
(5) prepare and execute the takeover of OPCON of planned units.
i. 130th Engineer Brigade (130th EB)
The 130th EB will:
(1) ensure engineer support for V Corps/USA under any circumstances;
(2) support units and detachments in placement of obstacles;
(3) to prepare and secure the units and detachments with the following priorities:
a) 8th ID when crossing the Main River,
b) logistics security troops crossing the Main,
c) covering troops and other forces;
(4) support the preparation of launch positions for the 10th Air Defense Group and other units of the 32nd Army Air Defense Command in the corps area;
(5) set up a center for damage assessment in the rear area of the corps defensive zone with the main goal of keeping corps supply roads and air bases clear;
(6) prepare the requisite forces and supplies for the deployment of nuclear land mines at the alarm level MILITARY VIGILANCE;
(7) provide TF 12 with munitions custodial agents for the receipt and transport of nuclear land mines to the planned holding areas;
(8) deploy nuclear land mines in corps area when so ordered;
(9) prepare the demolition of bridges over the Main;
(10) support 3rd AD and 8th ID with transportation of blocking materials;
(11) prepare to provide the commander of TF 5-68 with an engineer company in order to set up Blocking Section 5;
(12) ensure the supply of drinking water among other tasks outlined in Attachments E, F and O.
j. 3rd Support Command (3rd SUPCOM)
3rd SUPCOM will:
(1) undertake support missions for V Corps/USA;
(2) develop plans for the security of the rear corps areas with the following priorities:
a) Nuclear weapons units and facilities including non-escapable depots for special weapons;
b) Non-escapable CL V depots;
c) CL III depots;
d) Airfield pipeline connections
e) Logistics depots
f) Main command centers
(3) plan and prepare for the deployment of TF 12 as command point for rear corps area security in Phases I to III, secure the deployment of 11th ACR in order to realize this task;
(4) support TF 5-68 and other units deployed in rear corps areas;
(5) be prepared to follow through with rear corps area blocking measures;
(6) prepare to absorb US forces in WILDFLECKEN and support these forces until they reach the 54th or 34th CAS-Squadron;
(7) coordinate the deployment of engineer units in rear corps area damage-removal missions with the 130th EB.
k. 22nd Signal Brigade
The 22nd Signal Brigade will ensure communications support for the corps, detachments and units as described in Attachments G and O.
l. 709th Military Police Battalion
The 709th Military Police Battalion will:
(1) accept the withdrawn FBG forces at divisional handover areas and escort them to a staging area near VILLINGEN (MA 950 950);
(2) provide 3rd SUPCOM with a military police company for use in rear corps areas upon orders from the military police commander;
(3) support the commander of Transfer District Main;
(4) ensure military police combat and logistics support for rear corps area forces.
m. 302nd Army Security Agency (ASA) – Radio Electronic Warfare
The 302nd Army Security Agency will:
(1) prepare to engage in radio electronic warfare on behalf of V Corps/USA;
(2) [page cuts off mid-sentence about 11th ACR at alarm level SIMPLE ALERT]
n. 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
The 165th Military Intelligence Battalion will gather intelligence on behalf of the chief of staff of V Corps/USA.
o. 22nd Personnel and Administration Battalion
The 22nd Personnel and Administration Battalion will:
(1) reinforce the divisions as planned with technical personnel upon orders from USAREUR or at alarm level MILITARY VIGILANCE;
(2) provide technical personnel to V Corps/USA units that do not belong to a division.
p. Coordination Methods
(1) OPLAN forms the basic planning for V Corps/USA: implementation of the plan follows as ordered.
(2) Different levels of command may directly arrange individual coordination methods;
(3) V Corps/USA will occupy its defensive zones at NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT (alarm action SOC), at military early warning alert systems stage ORANGE or upon orders from CINCUSAREUR.
(4) The commander of 11th ACR is responsible for overall planning in the security zones and acts as commander of all forces stationed in the zones during Phase I.
(5) Covering troops should reach their deployment zones within 18 hours and main forces should arrive within 30 hours. Exceptions should be reported.
(6) The units named in Attachment A will reinforce corps detachments.
(7) The deployment and relocation of forces and materials follows in keeping with Attachment C.
(8) Line CONCORD forms the rear border of the security zone. Elements of the main force will only be relocated beyond Line CONCORD during Phase I with the permission of the commander of V Corps/USA.
(9) The commanders of 8th ID and 3rd AD will coordinate transportation support for blocking materials.
(10) The commanders of 8th ID and 3rd AD will supply munitions and fuel for the attack helicopter companies operating in support of the covering troops in Phase I.
(11) The planning, laying and triggering of obstacles and blocking measures proceeds as ordered. Attachment F forms the basis of this plan.
(12) The competent sector engineer officer will coordinate requests for engineer support for the covering troops or main forces. 3rd SUPCOM will coordinate requests for engineer support in the rear corps areas.
(13) Divisions are prepared to take command of covering troops deployed in the security zones.
(14) Upon orders, the divisions will assume responsibility and control of the forces and obstacles in front of Line CONCORD. Preparations will be made to allow the staff of 11th ACR to act as forward command point for the covering troops in the division area. 3rd AD’s sector has priority. In Phase II, the divisions assume command of all units deployed in the security zones.
(15) The commander of 2/8th ID coordinates the deployment of his brigade directly with the commander of 3rd AD.
(16) All V Corps/USA units must be prepared for operations under conditions of attack by nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.
(17) The divisions must support not only the division troops, but also all troops operating in the divisional sector.
(18) Plans for collective and individual CBRN defense require coordination. Units require support; support for covering troops is a priority.
(19) The divisions ensure close air defense cooperation with HAWK units deployed in the divisional sector.
(20) The commander of 3rd SUPCOM coordinates the deployment of forces in the rear corps area with the commanders of TF 12, 11th ACR, 709th Military Police Battalion and TF 5-68.
(21) Military District Command IV/FRG staff will be responsible for coordinating operations in the defensive zone.
(22) Special forces operating in the corps area will undertake covert action as needed to ensure artillery and logistics support.
(23) US forces attached to other NATO contingents expected to deploy nuclear weapons must establish contact with the 59th Ordinance Brigade. These forces will operate an exclusive US information channel over which information regarding the allocation, release and deployment of nuclear weapons will be disseminated.
(24) Upon NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT, alarm action SOC, Counter-Surprise Military Alert System condition ORANGE or orders from CINCUSAREUR, US Army Berlin/USAB, positioned in FRG theaters north of the KARLSRUHE boundary between V and VII Corps/USA, will be attached to V Corps/USA and will occupy staging areas in close to the theaters.
(25) Important Intelligence Emphases (Attachment B).
(26) Plans for actions outside corps boundaries (Attachment C).
(27) Electronic Warfare (Attachment I).
(28) Civil-military cooperation - (CIMIC Operations) (Attachment Q).
(29) Intake and relocation of outside reinforcements follows OPLAN 4360.
4. Logistics Security
Logistics security for V Corps/USA follows SUPPLAN 33001 J and GDP for 3rd SUPCOM.
5. Command and Control and Communications
a. Command and Control:
(1) Command authority of US forces will be transferred to NATO Central Army Group as follows:
a) 11th ACR covered (on Wide Screen) or upon NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT (alarm action SOC) or upon orders;
b) Covering troops in the security zone of V Corps/USA (without logistics units) upon NATO alarm level SIMPLE ALERT (alarm action SOC) or upon orders;
(2) In the event of that the commander of V Corps/USA is lost or found unfit for combat, the next-highest ranking general will assume command of the corps. Subordinate commanders must accordingly meet clear stipulations for their areas of responsibility.
(3) Command Center/Command Posts
a) V Corps/USA
(1) Command Center (Peacetime): MA 764 528 Abrams Building
(2) Command post: MA 709 773 (bunker facility) or: MA 818 576 (Headquarters- and Combat Vehicle)
(3) Command post for the rear corps area: MA 680 515 Michael Barracks
b) Emergency command centers for V and VII Corps follow FSOP.
c) Subordinate higher staff must secure the command centers and command posts in their defensive zones.
(1) The current CEOS-Communications Electronic Operating Instructions remain in force.
(2) NATO commanders will deliver NATO codes and keys to V Corps/USA in a timely manner.
(3) V Corps/USA must establish secure communications with its command center when the corps receives news of that center’s relocation.
 Originally 8 Inf Div (M); made up of 1st and 3rd Brigades/8th ID and 4th/4 ID
The Stasi's own preface to the V Corps/U.S. Army 1981 war plan (which recognizes that NATO's concept was defensive in nature in contrast to Warsaw Pact plans, which until 1987 indeed envisioned the mentioned "breakthrough towards the Rhine")
The History and Public Policy Program welcomes reuse of Digital Archive materials for research and educational purposes. Some documents may be subject to copyright, which is retained by the rights holders in accordance with US and international copyright laws. When possible, rights holders have been contacted for permission to reproduce their materials.
To enquire about this document's rights status or request permission for commercial use, please contact the History and Public Policy Program at [email protected].