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November 17, 1964

Echo of Recent International Events in Cuba

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November 17, 1964

 

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Echo of recent international events in Cuba

Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries

 

Cuban leaders are extremely satisfied with the results of the Cairo conference, which fully supported Cuba's demands and expectations. The wording of the Cairo Declaration regarding Cuba is a shortened version of Fidel's well-known "5 points" from the fall of 1962. Cuban satisfaction, however, also refers to the overall character of the conference, which, compared to the First Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1961, sounded more radically against imperialism. The Cairo Conference dealt less with the general questions of war and peace and more with the specific problems of the struggle against imperialism, it is emphasized in Havana. Where the Belgrade conference still devoted one of the two main resolutions to the issue of the threat of war and the call for peace, the Cairo conference sufficed with one paragraph, placed in a secondary place in the composition of the text. At the Cairo conference, the generally conciliatory tone of Nehru and the efforts to "mediate" between East and West, which were carried by Tito and Nasser, were overcome. This year the focus shifted to the most radical wing of the conference represented by Cuba, Algeria and Tanganyika Zanzibar. European problems disappeared, including the issue of two German states, and the names of European states were only mentioned in connection with accusations concerning Cyprus, Angola, Aden, etc.

In Havana, we heard a new formulation of "non-engagement ": it is not just a matter of non-engagement between the "capitalist West" and the "socialist East" (despite the fact that in this sense the conference sounded quite "engaged"), but also non-participation in the "Beijing-Moscow” dispute. In Havana, it is noted that the suggestion of introducing this problem to the Cairo conference (the Sukarno-Tito controversy, etc.) was met with the displeasure of most of the participants.

Cuba is not only satisfied with the ideological tone of the Cairo conference, but also considers its results to be a significant diplomatic success: in simple terms, at least twenty other countries have expressed their support for the Cuban position, which means that the submission of

 

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the Cuban question to any future UN General Assembly may not look good for Cuba. The positive results of the Cairo conference are all the more valuable for Cuba because they were achieved in the presence of observers from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela, i.e. countries participating in the American boycott of Cuba.

President de Gaulle's Latin American trip

Like de Gaulle's previous trip to Mexico and French territories in the Caribbean Sea (March 1964), the current arduous "marathon" through 10 countries in 25 days (September 21 to October 15) was evaluated very positively in Cuba. According to the Cuban view, which Fidel Castro explained to several Western ambassadors, it is an expansion of the French concept of the "third power" and a combative challenge to the American monopoly in Latin America, both of which Cuba watches with sympathy. The Venezuelan "impromptu" was received with undisguised enthusiasm by Couve de Murvilla, who, on being told that the Venezuelan trade unions were protesting against French trade with Cuba, replied that the French trade unions would protest if this trade were cut off, and somehow he was more interested in that.

It is quite understandable that Cuba was more interested in how and when de Gaulle's presence would trigger anti-American, or in other cases, incidents directed at pro-American governments, or other circumstances, than the effective deepening of Franco-Latin American relations. The joy of the anti-American responses of de Gaulle's trip to Cuba sometimes whipped him into recession. Thus, when Fidel Castro stated at a meeting of the sugar workers' union that de Gaulle's trip had caused a government crisis in Colombia and Argentina, he called Colombian President Leon Valencia "...a gentleman who is said to be a barbarian, imbecile and a complete moron" and he declared Argentine President [Arturo Umberto] Illia "a bad doctor of social ills who prescribes iodine tincture for social problems". Fidel Castro did not yet know about the government crisis in Venezuela, but Colombia and Argentina were enough for him to declare: "So it’s worth it for de Gaulle to visit Latin America every year".

 

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Labor victory in the British election

It was received positively in Cuba, although relations with the previous government were fully satisfactory. In Havana, the belief is expressed that relations with the new government will be just as good, and that Labor will still defend the principle of freedom of the seas and freedom of trade. It is hoped that the rejection of the US plan for a multilateral nuclear force will deepen the NATO crisis and that Britain will proceed to pursue a completely independent world policy similar to de Gaulle's France. Any new British concept for Latin America based on the support of social nationalist forces would be most welcome. In Cuban political circles, it is hoped that the impetus for this will be given by the tense situation surrounding the impending return of Perón. The connection between Perón's anti-American policy, accompanied by a pro-British economic orientation in the years 1946-1955, and the fact that there was a Labor government in Britain at that time is pointed out. The presence of a Labor government in Britain seems to be a support for all reformist and anti-dictatorship trends in Latin America. British economic influence in Chile and Peru may also play a political role.

The immediate impact of a Labor victory, according to views in Havana, may take more concrete forms in British Guiana, where it will undoubtedly affect the pre-election situation and weaken a response that has so far relied too much on intervention from London. In Havana, [Cheddi] Jagan is seen as more acceptable to Labor than [Forbes] Burnham.

 

Change in the leading positions of the USSR

The sudden departure of NS Khrushchev from political life came as a shock to Cuba. Hundreds of questions were sent to the highest party bodies, to the ideological monthly “Kuba socialista” and the newspaper “Hoy” and to the ministries. Pravda's October 16 editorial explaining some of the circumstances of the party and state problems that probably influenced Khrushchev's resignation was not published in Cuba. The text of the editorial was distributed only to selected addresses of subscribers to the TASS newsletter, and in addition, practically the only source of information for senior and

 

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mid-level cadres in Cuba is the secret bulletin COR (Commission for Revolutionary Orientation of National Party Leadership), which reprints reports from the American agencies UPI and AP. The summation of information available to senior cadres in Cuba is by no means satisfactory. The formulations of Pravda's editorial about "collective leadership, cult, personality, unscientific politicking, swagger, nepotism" etc. have no impact at all in Cuba, on the contrary, they give the impression that the dynamic personality of Khrushchev will now be replaced by the tacit and bureaucratic production of carefully chosen formulations. After all, to talk about the cult of personality and the lack of collective leadership in Cuba is to talk about the rope in a hangman's house.

Changes in the leading positions of the USSR were therefore received with strong distrust. We heard talk in Kovan about the contradiction between the original message about "old age and illness" and the critical formulations of the editorial. Khrushchev was, for Cuban political circles and the broad masses, the author of the concept of Soviet policy towards Cuba, a statesman who, in order to protect Cuba from aggression even at the cost of the risk of nuclear war, used every opportunity at home and abroad to emphasize Cuba's rights, he was the first statesman of any socialist country who spoke out for Fidel's 5 points as the only possible solution to the situation in the Caribbean area. Last but not least, attention is drawn here to the cordial personal relationship between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, which was an ideal example of the relationship between the head of a world power and the political leader of a small nation, etc. One of the most popular slogans of all manifestations in Cuba was the slogan "Fidel-Khrushchev, we are with both" (Fidel- Jrushchov, estamos con los dos), which, by the way, was a very practical tool for expressing the opinion of the popular strata on the question of Cuba's orientation in the dispute caused by the Chinese leadership; Khrushchev's portrait was not missing from any demonstration.

Among the journalists around the "Revolución" newspaper, a comparison was heard with the technique of coups within the various "juntas" of Latin American dictatorships, and on the contrary, attention was drawn to the full disclosure of the case when, in Cuba, it was necessary to depose a leading party official (the case of Aníbal Escalante). In Cuba, it seems impossible to swallow the fact that a political leader whose policies had demonstrable popular support at home and gained such respect around the world could be removed with a single brief communique from a single secret meeting and disappear

 

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from the political scene without his name ever being mentioned, even in a less significant context. There was no mention of his resignation from the presidency of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and yet he did not appear even in connection with the visit of president Dorticos even when welcoming the cosmonauts.

(This message was sent from Havana prior to Fidel Castro's speech on the evening of October 21st at a youth rally in Santa Clara, so it was not possible to take into account a position that might change some of these records)

However, Cuba's position on the outside will undoubtedly be: this is an internal matter of the USSR, Cuba is mainly interested in the fact that there is no change in foreign policy.

President Dorticós’s visit to the USSR

It was a friendly visit, the first visit by a head of state in the USSR and also the first foreign visit by a President​​​​​​​​​​ Dorticós also in his capacity as Minister of Economy and Head of the Planning Office. On Dorticós’ arrival, a protocol-related incident occurred: the airport was decorated with large portraits of Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and in his first speech, Dorticós stated that the purpose of the trip was "an exchange of views with our friend Nikita Khrushchev". It was October 14, 3:30 p.m. Moscow time, and Mikoyan, who had welcomed Dorticós, apparently already knew about Khrushchev's resignation. Even though the whole matter was explained to Dorticóswith an apology, the Cuban side still feels embarrassed and disrespected by the arrival of the head of state.

Otherwise, Dorticós' journey, included the completion of a final communiqué and the survey of possible Soviet participation in the supply of raw materials for Cuban industry, especially metallurgy, and mainly about assistance in the modernization of the sugar industry and the substantial expansion of sugar chemistry. Especially in the last area, the Soviet side promised help in developing a perspective plan for the development of sugar chemistry and material assistance. In this sense, the unpublished results of the trip are evaluated positively in Havana.

 

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Leading Cuban circles also calmly accepted the wording of the final communique. In this sense, the Cuban leadership was not sure that the policy of the new Soviet leadership, which was given the first opportunity to comment on specific international problems, would remain unchanged towards Cuba. A certain novelty in the formulation of the hierarchy of importance of international problems was brought to my attention by a prominent Cuban party worker. In the first place of the communique, the struggle for peace is not emphasized as the most important task in the current international conditions, but a sequence of important questions was formulated anew (that is, differently from, for example, the Declarations of the Communist and Workers' Parties from 1957 and 1960): "The Republic of Cuba and the Soviet Union consider that in current conditions, there is no more important task than the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for respecting the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, for consolidating peace in the world, for eliminating the threat of thermonuclear and missile war". The highest Cuban places acknowledged this shift in importance - the fight against imperialism instead of the fight for peace - with satisfaction.

Chinese nuclear explosion

was clearly welcomed in Cuba. As is known, Cuba has not signed the Moscow nuclear test ban agreement. In the political life of Cuba and within the United Party of the Socialist Revolution [PURS], strict "neutrality" is maintained in the dispute that separates the leadership of the Communist Party of China from the majority of the international communist movement. China is Cuba's second largest trading partner, although its exports do not represent anything for Cuba that would contribute in any substantial way to solving the basic problems of the Cuban economy, Chinese products in a certain sense mean filling the gaps in the internal market with small industrial consumer goods, importing Chinese luxury goods at a very low price, it helps counter inflation by helping this sector of the market drain circulation (prices in the Cuban market are understandably high). For demonstrative reasons, China buys Cuban sugar at a fixed price of 6.11 cents (USSR at 6.0 cts), a difference of half a million pesos per year. The only public holiday of any socialist country that Fidel Castro attended

 

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in the last 15 months was the 15th anniversary of the PRC on October 1, 1964.

Due to the non-signing of the Moscow Agreement, the issue of nuclear bombs plays a completely different role in political consciousness and propaganda in Cuba than in most other socialist countries. The nuclear bomb, as the last golden argument in solving the Caribbean crisis in the fall of 1962, left a specific impact on the Cuban position on the issue of nuclear disarmament. In Cuba, the importance of nuclear disarmament in the complex strategy of the struggle for peace is not appreciated. We have even heard the opinion here these days that the Chinese bomb is an excellent solution: the USA and the USSR are mutually bound by an agreement and China has a free hand - which here means an advantage for the socialist camp as a whole. In Cuban propaganda, practically no attention is paid to the question of nuclear disarmament and the danger of further explosions, so after the explosion of the first Chinese bomb, many of the most contradictory and fantastic ideas were heard in Havana. The official position was also not expressed unambiguously. Each of the three Havana dailies carried a different version. “Revolución” called the Chinese bomb “An important achievement of the Chinese people in consolidating national defense and in favor of world peace”. “El Mundo”, whose director [Luis Gómez] Wanguemert often expresses the position of the foreign minister, evaluated the Chinese bomb as a primarily political and diplomatic event. This opinion is essentially the official position: the Chinese bomb will help the PRC finally take the place of the fifth great power both in the UN and in all matters of world politics. “Hoy” limited itself to printing an official communiqué - the pre-revolutionary Cuban communists know too well the true meaning of the bomb in the hands of left-wing adventurers; rather than wasting unnecessary words about it in their newspaper, they should allow themselves to write the truth. They make no secret of it in interviews.

On Saturday, October 17, PRC embassy staff and Chinese journalists visited all daily newspapers, major weeklies, radio and television newsrooms and explained the circumstances of the Chinese bomb. They said something like this: “A bomb in the hands of the PRC means the creation of a completely new international situation, until now a close association of political speculators was created around nuclear weapons, who used their nuclear monopoly to dictate the whole world. This situation has now

 

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been put to an end, and the PRC will destroy this monopoly with its proposal to convene a world conference at the highest level, which will raise all the countries of the world to the level of powers deciding on the fundamental issues of war and peace. Therefore, the PRC carried out its explosion in the name of the interests of all countries that did not have access to the exclusive "nuclear association". If imperialism and its nuclear partners do not accept China's proposal to internationalize nuclear arms control, the PRC reserves the right at any time to make nuclear weapons production available to countries that need it to defend against imperialist aggression. Similar visits were made by Chinese representatives on October 19 and 20 to ministries and to the secretariats of mass organizations.

 

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This document provides an in-depth analysis of Cuba's reactions to various international developments during late 1964. Cuban leaders were pleased with the radical anti-imperialist tone and diplomatic successes of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Fidel Castro welcomed French President de Gaulle's anti-American stance during his Latin America trip, linking it to tensions in pro-American governments. The British Labour Party's election victory was viewed positively, fostering hopes for policies aligned with Cuba's interests. Domestically, Nikita Khrushchev's ousting in the USSR created distrust and concerns about the continuity of Soviet support. Lastly, Cuba cautiously celebrated China's first nuclear test, seeing it as a potential shift in global power dynamics favoring socialism.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.


Document Information

Source

Národní Archiv České Republiky (National Archives of the Czech Republic), f. KSČ-Ústředny výbor 1945-1989, Praha - Antonín Novotný II část, karton 121, pp. 3-4. Contributed and translated by Radoslav Yordanov.

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